

Pontian Godfrey Okoth

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**DURING AND AFTER
THE COLD WAR**

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Pontian Godfrey Okoth



University of Nairobi Press

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Dedicated
to
my wife, Rhovina
and my children – Jimmy,
Regina,
Cecilia and Assumpta.

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Preface

Diplomatic history, also called international history, is the study of the history of relations between or among nation states. It is an attempt to provide a balanced appreciation of the complex forces that shape foreign policies and foreign relations. Diplomatic history encompasses more than one country's history. There can, as such, be no diplomatic history where there are no foreign affairs—more than one country needs to be involved.

This book falls within the speciality of diplomatic history. It focuses on the periods marked by the Cold War and the post-Cold War. The Cold War period witnessed competition from political, economic, ideological, diplomatic, military and even social dimensions. This competition was between the United States of America, the leader of world capitalism, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the leader of world socialism. In these superpower rivalries, the Third World was not spared. Thus, India and Africa were adversely affected in many ways during the Cold War period. The situation for India and Africa did not change for the better in the post-Cold War period which has witnessed the domination of the world by the US and its allies, the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized countries. This domination has been characterized by the process of Americanization of the world, otherwise termed globalization, in virtually all spheres of life.

The problem investigated in this book can be defined in the following manner: during the period under study, many African leaders, most of them dictators, used the United States for their own selfish purposes of clinging to power against the wishes of the masses in their countries. This caused problems in the democratisation process in those countries thereby negating the very principles of democracy which the US cherishes. This made the US to formulate and implement a contradictory foreign policy toward Africa during the stipulated period.

During the same period, on the other hand, India tended to side with the Soviet Union thereby making the operations of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in which many African states were members, precarious. Nevertheless, India's behaviour was determined by, among other factors, the geopolitical significance of the region which witnessed intense rivalry between the two superpowers during the Cold War period. This superpower competition partly influenced India's foreign policy and relations.

The scope of the study, in terms of time frame, covers the period from 1945 to 2001, that is, the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period. However, in the first six chapters,

we seek to establish the deeper historical background of the foreign policies and foreign relations of the US, India and Africa by tracing them, in some cases, to many centuries back in order to effectively bring out the more significant historical threads in the story. With the end of World War II, the international political order changed in favour of the victorious powers, namely, the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, 1945 was a turning point in world history as it ushered in the Cold War which ended in 1992, the year which was itself a benchmark in world history. The Cold War period and the post-Cold War period, not only affected Europe, but also the entire world.

The book, therefore, demonstrates the interaction among the US as a superpower, India as a middle power or “power in the middle” and Africa as a small power, the conceptual definitional details of which are offered in the chapters themselves. This is done by analysing their foreign policies and foreign relations from the beginning of the Cold War in 1945 to the post-Cold War era which came into being following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe.

It is established that US relations with India and Africa were, during the Cold War period, based on inequality and exploitation, thereby favouring the former. This contrasted sharply with Indo-African relations which were based on the principles of “peaceful coexistence” on South-South cooperation in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the imperative of North-South dialogue to redress the problems of underdevelopment and unequal exchange facing India, Africa and other marginalized areas of the Third World. But the post-Cold War period aggravated the situation for India, Africa and other Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the realms of economy, politics, diplomacy, security and even social life. Via globalization, exploitation and marginalization of these areas by the US and its allies, the G-8 countries, have heightened. It is argued in the book that globalization, nevertheless, poses new challenges not only for India and Africa, but also for the US. The last two chapters of the book address some of the implications, options, advantages and disadvantages of the post-Cold War world order for Africa, India and the US.

The objectives of this book are five-fold. First, to confirm that both the United States and the Soviet Union used African states, India and other Third World countries, for their own geopolitical considerations. Second, to establish that the foreign policy and foreign relations of the US were meant to subject Africa and India to the dictates of US imperialism. Third, to contribute towards a body of knowledge pertaining to diplomatic history with the purpose of making the findings readily available for wider readership. Fourth, to assess the impact of the Cold War and the post-Cold War order on Africa, India and the entire world. Fifth, to prove that the Non-Aligned Movement is still relevant despite the demise of the Cold War, for it can still be used by Third World countries such as India and those of Africa for the purposes of North-South dialogue and for South-South cooperation, especially in the economic realm.

The theoretical parameters lie in the structural imbalance between the industrialized North, headed by the US, and the largely impoverished South, the imbalance which created a dependency syndrome in the South. The possible solution, therefore, lies in an effort by India and Africa to reorientate their foreign policies and foreign relations such that they are equal partners in the comity of nations that the US dominated during the

Cold War and after. This is the major thrust of the argument that guides this book in which we empirically demonstrate that both India and Africa can positively influence the reshaping of US policies to their advantage.

The book comprises nine chapters grouped in three parts entitled: foreign policies; bilateral relations; relations in the post-Cold War world order, respectively. Chapter one looks at the nature of foreign policy from a general point of view while Chapter two analyses US foreign policy. Chapter three analyses Indian foreign policy; Chapter four discusses African policy and diplomacy; Chapter five focuses on US-Indian relations while Chapter six discusses US-African relations. Chapter seven is on Indo-African relations while Chapter eight discusses the end of the Cold War and its implications and options to Africa. Chapter nine tackles the subject of the end of the Cold War from the global and Indian perspectives. A unit in the middle of the book carries portraits of selected personalities who shaped and moved events in the three countries during and after the Cold War.

As it happens when doing research on contemporary history, one major problem in writing this book was that certain vital documents and crucial pieces of information were unavailable. They remain either fully or partially classified by Governments in Africa, the US and India. Intensive interviews with various key official actors were not possible principally due to the political sensitivity of the issues in the US, India and Africa. For Africa, it was not possible to visit each country, as it would require vast financial resources. Additionally, we have treated Africa in totality as opposed to the approaches of some writers which amount to the balkanization of the continent. There is only one Africa. I, therefore, did not believe in characterizing Africa as “Arab Africa,” “Africa South of the Sahara”, “Africa North of the Limpopo”, or “Tropical Africa”, as Euro-centric writers do.

Since the completion and the actual submission of this work to the publisher and its publication, there have been enormous challenges to the post-Cold War world order. These were occasioned by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C, the 2003 US led war against Iraq, the depressed global economy and other challenges, all of which have had negative impact on the US, India and Africa regarding their international relations generally and their relations with each other in particular. These developments could not be captured adequately in the book as the study was conducted between 1990 and 2001. The developments, however, constitute areas of further research.

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While in the US, I consulted the rich sources at the National Archives, Washington D.C., the Library of Congress, the Department of State Library, and the presidential libraries scattered all over the US. I am grateful to the staff of these libraries for the tremendous assistance rendered to me in locating the relevant sources.

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Professor Pontian Godfrey Okoth

Nature of Foreign Policy

As a concept, foreign policy has been variedly defined by experts. This therefore means that there is not a consensus on the definition of foreign policy.

To H. Gibson, foreign policy is a well-rounded comprehensive plan based on knowledge and experience for conducting the business for government with the rest of the world.¹

G. Modelski defines foreign policy as the process whereby the state adjusts its actions to the actions of other states in order to “minimize adverse actions and maximize the favourable actions of foreign states.”² In this regard, according to C.M.B. Utete, foreign policy is taken not as actions based on some grand design, but rather as continuous process of pragmatic adjustments to the actions of others in the external environment.³ Modelski’s definition is, therefore, a functional one which clarifies neither the general nor the specific character of region policy as a mode of state action in international relations. This concept is, therefore, both general and abstract.

The sociological definition of foreign policy is provided by I.D. Levin. According to him, foreign policy is a combination of aims and interests pursued and defended by the given state and its ruling class in its relation with other states, and the methods and means used by it for the achievement and defence of these purposes and interests.⁴ This means that the class that wields state power shapes foreign policy. It does this according to its class interests which it may rationalize as national interests. These interests can be shared between the state and others, including state managers. As Utete puts it, depending on the given political circumstances, defence of state sovereignty, national independence and the territorial integrity of a country, inter alia, all correspond to the interests of the nation as a whole.⁵ And as K.J. Holsti has argued, routine foreign policy decisions do not, in most cases, deal with matters directly related to such ‘core’ interests or values; rather, the tendency is to centre them on so-called “middle range objectives”, such as inter-state economic, commercial and political relations, including efforts to influence the behaviour of other states in desired directions.⁶ It is in such matters that class interests tend to have a decisive influence on policy-making, hence the ideological rationalization in foreign policy-making.

In a similar way, A. Gromyko argues that foreign policy is the course taken by the state in conducting its relations with others.⁷ It marks a rationalization or justification of the state’s attitude or behaviour towards other states and it comprises a set of objectives and the means by which they are achieved. In other words, the state has certain interests that

it carefully and strongly guards and furthers while having relations with other states.⁸ It is to this school of thought pertaining to the definition of foreign policy that this writer subscribes to.

The foregoing excursion suggests that foreign policy is an extension or complement of domestic policy. Indeed, F.S. Northedge has observed that foreign policy is the use of political influence to induce other states to exercise their law-making power in a manner desired by the state concerned. It is an interaction between forces originating outside the state's borders and those working within them.⁹ However, the distinction between the two is not a matter of substance; it derives from the fact that the state's foreign policy takes account of the relevant attitudes, actions, and reactions of other actors, whereas its domestic policy is not, in general, burdened with such considerations.¹⁰

The term "the foreign policy of a nation", was used, according to the research staff of the Brookings Institution, a moderate think tank, to refer to the complex and dynamic political course that a nation follows in relation to other nations. They argued that the foreign policy of a nation is more than the sum total of its foreign policies (through its course of action for achieving objectives), for it also includes its commitments, the current forms of its interests and objectives, and the principles of right conduct that it professes.¹¹ To J. Frankel, foreign policy "consists of decisions and actions which involve, to some appreciable extent, relations between one state and others."¹²

However, theory, definitions, and descriptions of foreign policy are not discussed here, because they are beyond the scope of this book. They have only been cited in order to help the reader arrive at an understanding of the nature of foreign policy. Whereas some authors like Gibson emphasize the ideas (the plan of action), prior to action and others like Modelski emphasize the action, i.e., policy as executed,¹³ the essential idea of all the authors is that foreign policy is concerned with the behaviour of a state towards other states.

Elaboration of the central idea is quite lengthy. It suffices to state that normally, every state enters into political, economic and cultural relations with other states. Thus, treaties of friendship, peace and cooperation can be signed between or among states. But signing treaties does not mean that relations between states are or will always be friendly. Obviously, relations between states have been hostile, as is demonstrated later in this book. During the Cold War, there was no declared war, but the relations between states were sometimes unfriendly, although not technically hostile. This was the case with US-India relations, and US relations with those African countries that were Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-anti-imperialist.

The focus in foreign policy is on the foreign minister, who directs that policy, to change the behaviour of the foreign state(s) in the manner desired by his or her own country. In this regard, the essence of foreign policy is the use of the state's resources, that is, economic, diplomatic, propagandist – to induce such behaviour on other states and promote national interest.

But what is "national interest"? It is not easy to define it. Indeed, some critics even declare that it is a vague and meaningless formula, or a pseudo-theory.¹⁴ However, it is inevitable that in a system of international politics, with the nation-state as the unit, the

ordinary person should judge the success of the foreign policy in terms of the benefit accruing to the masses. It is also important that statesmen and women accept the achievement of national interest as their aim in foreign policy. Indeed, Jawaharlal Nehru was right to state that whether a country is imperialistic, socialist, or communist, its foreign minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country.¹⁵

We can, therefore, accept as a working definition, the time-honoured definition of national interest as “the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts.”¹⁶

The concept of national interest may be clear, but what it is, in concrete terms, may not. It suffices to note that the content is both general and particular. Every state aims at preserving its political independence and territorial integrity by safeguarding its international boundaries. The means may vary from balance of power and alliances, to non-alignment and peaceful co-existence, but the national interest in the preservation of territorial integrity is clear.¹⁷

The need for the preservation of independence of policy, whether internal or external, is the implied message in the above statement. The preservation of territorial integrity is, therefore, essential. Another idea that emerges from the statement is that not only is independence of policy imperative, but also the preservation of a people’s culture. This is why President J.F. Kennedy of the US expressed the view that the basic goal of the US was to seek a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it did not threaten the freedom of others.¹⁸

One important element in national interest of different nations and even of the same nations at different times is the stage of social and economic development attained. For instance, the interest of an affluent society such as the US, is to preserve it and rid it of such influences as are found by the nation to hamper its healthy and harmonious working. The interest of a socialist country like the then Soviet Union was to conserve the gains of the revolution and to increase the supply of consumer goods and to provide the conditions in which it could effectively compete with capitalism. The interest of Third World countries such as India and African countries is economic development, i.e., improving the living standards by increased production and equitable distribution. This is in addition to preserving their political sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The question that arises is: are the interests of one nation necessarily opposed to the interests of other states? No. The answer is no because in pursuing their national interest, states are bound to take into account universal ideals, and principles of international law and morality, such as peace, justice, the sanctity of treaties, non-interference in other nations’ affairs, freedom and a decent standard of living. The mutuality of their interests has to be borne in mind even when they pursue their national interests: all nations have an interest in peace, in strengthening the forces of peace such as a strong United Nations (UN) and the Rule of Law. The pursuit of national interest, therefore, has, to be consistent with the interests of other nations.

Another important issue to be clarified is the view increasingly held by both statesmen and political thinkers that there is hardly any distinction between foreign and domestic policy, because there is hardly any distinction between foreign affairs and domestic

affairs. As such, Senator J.W. Fulbright wrote in 1959: "If ever the line between domestic and foreign affairs could be drawn, it is now wholly erased."¹⁹ According to Hans J. Morgenthau, the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic policies tends to breakdown.²⁰

But these were his views in 1960 and if indeed, the distinction between domestic politics and foreign policies tends to breakdown, then it is pointless to talk of foreign policy. Perhaps it would be more useful to speak of 'public' policy.

It is an exaggeration to argue that the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs "is now wholly erased." There is no doubt, there is increasing interdependence between domestic and foreign affairs and, therefore, between domestic and foreign policy. For instance, the economic development of India and Africa is a matter of domestic concern and is tied up with seeking foreign capital and foreign technical know-how. Similarly, the security of India and African countries is tied up with the purchase of ammunition from abroad and seeking friends who could, if need be, assist in a crisis. Thus, foreign affairs impinge on domestic affairs as is demonstrated in this book. More so, the UN has not hesitated to interpret the phrase 'domestic jurisdiction' found in Article 2.7 of the Charter in such a manner that many apparently domestic matters such as the treatment of racial minorities, economic development, the maintenance of full employment, the abolition of forced labour and freedom of association have been held to be of international concern.²¹

However, analytically, a distinction between foreign and domestic policy can be drawn. The question is whether a modification of the behaviour of a foreign government arises. Our response is that the internationalization of domestic affairs – and, therefore, the blurring of the distinction between domestic policy and foreign policy – depends on the extent to which the needs, security and welfare of the people of a given state are satisfied from the human and non-human resources available within the state.

To avoid confusion, we concur with the Brookings Institution's definition of 'foreign policy' to cover both 'foreign policy' and 'foreign relations.' We, therefore, in this book, use two terms, 'foreign policy' and 'foreign relations,' to cover the entire range of the relations of a given state with other states.

In a nutshell, foreign policy is the sum total of the principles, the interests and objectives which a given state formulates in conducting its relations with other states. The principles are the codes of right conduct, which are considered desirable in themselves such as adherence to treaties and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Interests are what a state considers, in general terms, essential of its survival and development. They include: territorial integrity; improvement of living standards; and maintenance of democratic way of life. Objectives are the more or less precisely delimited interests, formulated in the circumstances in which the relations with another state are conducted. Foreign relations are the actions that a state resorts to in pursuance of the foreign policy formulated, such as, declaration of war, conclusion of peace, the signing of a treaty, giving or accepting aid, recognition of a state, establishment of diplomatic relations, and implementing negotiations.

What we have established is the dual nature of the sources of foreign policy. These are, the international environment and the domestic environment.

In the international environment, the complexity of foreign policy arises from the interaction of the desire of states within the international community to achieve their own national interests and their consequent attitudes to international issues, all connected directly or indirectly with issues of peace and war. The aim of a sound foreign policy is not the establishment of friendly and cooperative relations between nations. This would imply simplifying the complex task that arises from the very nature of international politics.

The difficulty of conducting foreign policy arises from the fact that the state has no sure means of controlling the behaviour of other sovereign states. It can persuade, promise or deny economic and military aid. It can threaten another state with the use of force. However, the state cannot act the way it desires. A powerful state like the US can influence other states – India and African states, for instance – by withholding military aid. But it may not be successful. However, the act of giving economic aid has enabled the US to influence the policy of other states. The government must often choose between a few rational options.

The third source of difficulty is that the world is continuously changing. As such, new events and personalities create fresh foreign policy problems for all concerned. For instance, the impact of the October Revolution of 1917, the rise of Communist China in 1949, the rise of Charles de Gaulle to power in France in the 1950s, the emergence of new states in Asia and Africa since 1946 and recently, the demise of the Cold War, all created problems which could not have been foreseen by the Foreign Ministers of the time. Despite this difficulty, there is both continuity and change in the foreign policies of all states. This is because every nation has its own history and traditions.

In the domestic environment, there are four major elements which influence foreign policy. These are geography, history and tradition, the social structure and the political organization.

The geography of a country is important in shaping its foreign policy. This is confirmed by the development of the science of geopolitics which has been variedly defined. For instance, one scholar defines it as the relationship between the geography and politics of a given state in reference to other states.²² Geographical factors, such as the size and location of the country, its natural resources and the number of its population, contribute to the power of a nation. These in turn shape its foreign policy. However, their importance cannot be exaggerated because their effectiveness depends on a combination of several factors which include: the quality of governmental leadership and technological strength.

The equation of national power harbours a multiplicity of variables. It is, therefore, the relationship among these variables that largely determines whether nations are weak or strong.

For example, Britain was a great power until 1945. Today it is not. Part of the explanation lies in its relative deficiency in size and population and in food supplies. On the other hand, the US and the Soviet Union became superpowers partly because of their

size and population. The US is virtually self-sufficient in the raw materials necessary for modern industrial production; so was the Soviet Union. Although the US is also not deficient in food, such a deficiency has been a permanent source of weakness for Britain which has to rely on its naval resources to ensure that its population does not starve.

Oil is also an important natural resource. The Soviet Union was self-sufficient in oil. On the other hand, Britain lacks oil supplies. Oil is definitely vital for industry and war. Although West Asian countries are not super or great powers, they have a large deposit of oil and this gives them some influence in the region in terms of international relations. But oil alone is inadequate, unless it is coupled with other factors like, able government, technological organization, and military strength.

Location is an important geopolitical factor. Britain and Japan, small islands off the coasts of Europe and Asia, became great nations because of their ability to use the oceans as highways of commerce. The absence of natural frontiers can decide whether or not national security can be preserved. Throughout its history, Poland has established this fact. The fact that the US is separated from the old world was a considerable factor in its early development as it was secure and free to develop a virgin country. The fact that Britain is separated from Europe by twenty miles of water gave it an advantage denied to such countries as France and Germany. They, therefore, had to spend much of their resources in fighting each other because of border problems.

Resources have of course reduced the significance of this factor. During the Cold War era, the possession by a potential enemy such as the Soviet Union of intercontinental ballistic missiles mollified the protection afforded to the US by its location. During the blitz in World War II, Britain discovered that its insular position no longer gave it security. In the same vein, Pakistan's location, adjacent to the Soviet Union and China, moulded its position in international politics and gave it an influence out of proportion to its size and population. The position of Nepal as an independent buffer state between India and China has also posed problems for India, explicable to a great extent, in terms of Nepal's location.

Our earlier remark that there is continuity and change in foreign policy confirms that the history of a nation has an influence on its foreign policy from time to time. The elements of continuity and change represent the legacy of history. Way back in 1949, Frank K. Roberts, a member of the British Foreign Service, commented that over the years, certain historical factors had become constant in the British approach to international affairs. Six such factors were listed by him in this order: the commonwealth connection; friendship with the US; friendship with the Low Countries and with France as the nearest neighbours to Britain; close ties with Turkey and the Arab countries and Persia; friendship with South East Asia; and finally the relations with Russia, despite many frictions and differences.²³

The conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing is that history had taught the British, the virtues of constancy and moderation in their approach to international relations.

The influence of history is also evident in the foreign policy formulated by Third World countries such as India and African countries. India itself, having been under colonial

rule, and having non-violently struggled for freedom, supported the liberation movement of dependent countries everywhere – especially Algeria, Morocco, Vietnam, Indonesia, etc.

Tradition is another factor in the making of foreign policy. Traditional values are those principles embodied in beliefs and practices which have been transmitted through successive generations and have been regarded as worthy of esteem and adoption. Because foreign policy is a form of social action undertaken by people, a foreign minister is part of the social milieu in which he or she operates. Thus, a foreign minister cannot disregard the basic values held in his or her society. For instance, a free way of life, embodied in democratic norms and institutions, is part of the American way of life.²⁴ For this reason, former Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles declared "...The broad goal of our [American] foreign policy is to enable the people of the United States to enjoy, in peace, the blessings of liberty."²⁵ Indeed, communism was to Dulles, an anathema. Thus, his policy of containment can only be understood in the context of the goal of foreign policy enunciated by him.

The structure of society is yet another factor in foreign policy formulation. Indeed, national morale is an important element in the state's power. It is, therefore, vital in the successful conduct of foreign policy. It suffices to observe that a homogenous society provides stronger national unity and morale than a heterogeneous one. Vices like sharp divisions in society, i.e., division between the rich and the poor, religious divisions, regional imbalance, etc. make it difficult for a government to cultivate immediate and nation-wide cooperation from society. Such cooperation is essential for a successful foreign policy, especially in a war situation. For instance, Britain's firm and united stand during World War II under Winston Churchill's leadership, or the resistance of the Soviet Union to Hitler at Stalingrad between 1942 and 1943, under Stalin's leadership, were instances of how aggressors were thwarted by unity at home. Although the leadership of Churchill and Stalin can be credited, the basic honour goes to the people of the two countries who were prepared to endure extreme hardship so as to preserve their freedom.²⁶

The internal political structure of a country also has an important impact on that country's approach to international affairs. This is evident from a comparison of the decision-making processes in an absolute monarchy or a dictatorship on the one hand, and a parliamentary democracy on the other. In the former, since the decision-making power rests with an individual, aided by a clique, decisions can be relatively quickly made, and according to the will of the person and the clique in power. In the latter, freedom is allowed to the citizens to express their opinions on public policy, domestic or foreign. Besides, there are established institutions such as an elected parliament, political parties and free press for the free expression of opinion.²⁷

Often times, two terms "foreign policy" and "diplomacy" are either misunderstood or even misused in the science of international relations. There is also the tendency to employ both terms as synonyms. For instance, when we say: "the American diplomacy proved an utter disillusionment in China, or that British diplomacy of 'divide and rule' proved most disastrous for India", it is not the success or failure of diplomacy but of foreign policy of a given state; this is the most significant factor.

Unlike other foreign policy means, diplomacy is the official international activity of the state and its agencies. The function of diplomacy is to peacefully defend the national rights and interests of the state abroad and through negotiation, to ensure peaceful settlements of international and global problems and disputes. Whereas foreign policy is the “legislative” aspect of the problem of inter-state relations, diplomacy is its executive aspect. In this regard, foreign policy is the “general course pursued by a state in international affairs.” Diplomacy is, therefore, an “integral organic part of foreign policy... a totality of the practical measures, forms, means and methods used to implement foreign policy.”²⁸

In a democratic state, whereas the matters of foreign policy are decided by the cabinet, with the approval of the legislators, they are executed by the civil servants, who make up the “diplomatic service”, or individually called “diplomats.” Theoretically, the diplomat is supposed to be non-partisan in states with multi-party democracy. As observed by H. Nicolson, the duty of the diplomat is to place his or her experience at the disposal of the Government in power, to tender advice, and if need be, to raise objections.²⁹ Writing on ambassadors, K.M. Panikar observed that ambassadors are in a country to translate and give effect to the policies of the home government with the policies, attitudes of mind and the general conditions of the countries to which they are accredited.³⁰ Similarly, “diplomacy, used in relation to international policies, is the art of forwarding one’s interests in relation to other countries.”³¹ Thus, the role of diplomacy is especially crucial for Third World countries. Virtually devoid of other tools of wielding influence in the global arena, most post-colonial states use the instruments of diplomacy to obtain their foreign policy objectives. This is for the simple reason that these states are weak in many respects: militarily, economically and even politically, and are, therefore, vulnerable to the dictates of the big powers. The majority of these weak states are found in Africa.

What, essentially, was the Cold War? It was the struggle between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union for world hegemony. This struggle took the form of intense economic, political, military and ideological rivalry between the two superpowers just short of military conflict. The Cold War was neither a cosmic inevitability nor an historical accident but a consequence of a political process rooted in the international system itself.

The Cold War was an outcome of the cataclysm of World War II. The conflict between the US and the Soviet Union would not have been possible, at least on the scale it eventually assumed, at any earlier period of history. The course it took was largely shaped by the new environment of international relations that followed the destruction of the Axis powers, namely, Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and imperial Japan.

The US and the Soviet Union emerged from the war as the only two superpowers with adequate capability to conduct a global policy. Both Americans and Russians quickly assumed that since their policies were the only issues anyone was doing anything about, they were the only important issues in the world.

The redistribution of power brought about by the war had two important aspects. First, both the US and the Soviet Union improved their power positions relatively and absolutely. Each emerged from the war with its potential girth of 1939 substantially translated into reality. Second, the post-war world witnessed not only the active

participation of the US and the Soviet Union in the thick of world affairs but their collective monopoly of decisions as well. The old world powers, namely, Britain, France, Germany and Japan sank into insignificant actors.

A crucial aspect of the “new” world order that emerged from the ashes of the war was the rapid dissolution of the structure of empire developed by the older world powers. First in the Middle East, next in Asia and finally in Africa, old style imperialism and colonialism disappeared and several young, assertive states emerged: hence, the role of such states as India and several African states in the post World War II era.³²

However, the late 1980s saw profound changes in international politics. The intense rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union resulted in the collapse of the latter in 1992, thereby terminating the Cold War. This had serious implications for the entire world in general and for the Third World areas such as India and Africa in particular.

The foregoing difficulty notwithstanding, I have tried to fill in gaps throughout the book, by consulting numerous American, Indian and African periodicals. I, therefore, trust that the research was worthy undertaking. I also trust that the research findings will benefit other researchers who might be interested in doing further research on the subject, university academics, students both at the undergraduate and graduate levels interested in diplomatic history, policy-makers who handle the international relations of countries in Africa, the Indian subcontinent, the US, and other parts of the world.

Notes

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US Foreign Policy

In his farewell address, President George Washington laid down for his successors and his fellow Americans, a set of maxims for the conduct of US foreign policy. He assured his fellow citizens that successful adherence to these principles would lead to a time “when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.”¹ Thomas Jefferson, four years later, as he became the third president of the US, a new nation that had not yet secured a firm place in global affairs, stated that the US had made a unique form of government that was “the strongest government on earth.”² Thus, from the beginning, there was an ebullient faith that the young US government and its people would, by nature of their constitution and geography, become the pre-eminent power in world affairs. This extravagant destiny was largely realized. However, how it was realized involves tracing the historical roots of US foreign policy based on ideology and American self-image.

Ideology and the American Self-Image

In a study of the role of ideology in US foreign policy, Edward Weisband traces the philosophical origins of US actions and responses to other nations.³ These origins can be found on the writings of John Locke, and the two most important principles the US has taken from Locke are the morality of private property and the right of self-defence. These beliefs are at the core of the norms, which have guided US foreign policy since the early years of nationhood up to the present.

The strategic point in studying the history of US ideology is a consideration of the Monroe Doctrine. The doctrine asserted that the US was unlike any other state in the world and, therefore, it was responsible for the expansion of “freedom” throughout the world. The Monroe doctrine, proclaimed in 1823, stressed – officially and explicitly the ideological difference between the so-called New World and the Old World. It specifically declared that the American political system was “essentially different” from that of Europe whose nations were constantly engaged in warfare. The implication was that the “democratic government equals peace, and aristocratic government – which was identified with despotism, means war.”⁴ However, the case of Venezuela boundary crisis proved the foregoing statement contradictory because the US turned what was otherwise an apparent minor issue into a major controversy threatening war with Britain. The American “desire” was to prevent British exploitation of Venezuela and future violations

of the Monroe Doctrine. In other words, the Americans used the Monroe Doctrine to ensure their monopoly of the economic exploitation of Venezuela.⁵

However, the US backed away from a war with Britain over Venezuela. This is because the US faced difficulties with Russia in the Balkans and the Far East with Germany over the Transvaal. Moreover, Britain had accepted a negotiated settlement with the US. Additionally, a financial panic over a possible war turned much of the American business community against a conflict. Most important, however, Britain's alleged exploitation of Venezuela appeared to be an insufficient moral question over which to go to war.⁶ For Americans to go to war, they wanted to believe that they were rescuing some helpless victim of underserved exploitation. Victims of a terrible depression at home for which they had no cure, Americans identified with and found considerable appeal in "rescuing" other victims abroad.⁷ However, if Venezuela and Britain could not supply the right formula, Cuba and Spain did.⁸

McKinley contributed to the US ideology when he described the war against Spain (1898), as a defensive operation. This was despite the fact that Spain saw little gain and much loss from war with the US.⁹ This was the beginning of a major ideological tenet. This is to say, the US always views itself as the wronged party, never the offender. Because of this, the claim is that Americans fight only if they have as a nation, been violated in some way or if it becomes necessary to stand up for what is "right".¹⁰ The proponents, on the other hand, fight to secure economic and/or political gain. Historically, therefore, American motives have always been pure: the opponents' actions stem from the aspect of human nature.

Woodrow Wilson was another significant contributor to the American ideology. He believed that the US had a moral mission to "democratize" the world. He thus expanded the Monroe Doctrine, which was aimed primarily at Latin America, to a global crusade to "Make the world safe for democracy".¹¹ When we add to this, Theodore Roosevelt's conception of the US as a world policeman, it is not difficult to observe how the present-day American self-image has evolved. To exercise US imperialism, Teddy Roosevelt had created Panama in order to build the canal for the growing American Navy at the turn of the century. The 1903 treaty between the two countries had granted the US "in perpetuity, the use, occupation, and control" of a ten-mile-wide zone to build, run and protect the canal, although the sovereignty of this territory was to remain vested in Panama. The result was a virtual colonial situation. The US role in that tiny country became dominant. The Canal Zone sliced Panama into two and was run by the US Army. Panamanians in the zone were subject to American law administered by American courts. All business enterprises were operated by the US: Panamanians were denied the opportunity to compete. Moreover, the US government held large tracts of land and water needed by Panama's rapidly growing population. In other words, the US acted as if it were sovereign in the zone when in fact it only possessed certain treaty rights over a piece of Panamanian territory.¹²

Whether it was Spain, Cuba, the Philippines, etc. diplomatic historians have offered different explanations for the causes of American action in Latin America.

One school of historians contends that imperialists and novelists like Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Albert Beveridge, John Hay, Albert Shaw, Walter Hines Page, Henry and Brooks Adams, Admiral Mahan – presented the US with a *fait accompli*.¹³ By sending US fleet into Manila Bay and troops to invade the islands, by capturing Manila and occupying the city, bay and harbour, and by extending US military rule to the entire archipelago before the Senate could debate the wisdom of taking the islands, the expansionists made it difficult for the country to resist annexation.¹⁴ Another school of historians has emphasized the economic forces and businessmen.

Despite the fact that conservative business leaders had initially opposed war with Spain as disruptive to national economic stability, they shifted ground after the prospect of seizing the Philippines arose. However, foreseeing that the economic and political stability of the US eventually depended on finding overseas markets for surplus goods, businessmen now viewed the Philippines as essential to the Asian trade of the US. Since mass opinion in the country accepted the need for foreign markets, it was now ready to favour the acquisition of some empire.¹⁵

Yet another school of historians has cited Manifest Destiny and Social Darwinism as reason for US actions. The Manifest Destiny tradition, which was premised on “preordained” American acquisition of additional territories in the first half of the nineteenth century, made more sense to Americans in the circumstances of 1898-1899 than customary anti-imperialism. However, in some different form, Manifest Destiny became the rationale for the imperial outburst of the late 1890s.¹⁶

Another historian regards Social Darwinism as an important factor. Claiming that international affairs were a struggle for survival among nations and that a country must expand or die, the US went to war with Spain. The US also regarded colonial acquisition as its “duty” and “destiny”. When the opportunity to acquire the Philippines came, the US concluded that its own national survival required it to bring the islands under its control.¹⁷

Other schools of historians have emphasized “psychic” and foreign influences in justifying US expansion following the war. According to the first school, the acquisition of colonies represented the dynamics of domestic tensions or an outlet of spent-up emotions generated by internal instability; that “the widespread anxieties and discontents of the era clearly had important bearings on questions of war and empire and must be seen as major instrumentalities of history.”¹⁸ The second school has it that the impact of British and European examples on Americans combined with: Manifest Destiny; Social Darwinism; Economic pressures and psychological turmoil to make a policy of imperial expansion, were temporarily more appealing.¹⁹

These influences, in varying degrees, played a role in launching the US on its imperial course. Traditional Manifest Destiny and foreign thought and actions influenced American imperial elite; so did economic considerations, Social Darwinism, personal frustrations and “psychic” tensions and a conviction that a turn toward colonial empire might end the economic and social tensions, thereby setting the US into a more purposeful and settling course for a greater role in global affairs. This role boded well for the US internal social cohesion.²⁰ Thus, the acquisition of colonies, Manifest Destiny and

the imperative to imitate and outdo other nations or die – explain US imperialism at the turn of the nineteenth century.

Manifest Destiny served to justify the wholesale slaughter of indigenous Americans and Mexicans by a government founded on the belief that “all men are created equal.” While this genocide went ahead full force, the US became equally contradictory in its foreign policy, particularly toward Latin America.²¹

The Monroe Doctrine attained a more modern version with Harry S. Truman in the Cold War years. Americans were now educated to believe that they were engaged in a “Jihad” against communism around the globe, but especially in Latin America. In 1947, President Truman declared, “The whole world should adopt the American system.”²² Woven in with this ideology was the notion that the US was an agent of God destined to lead the so-called “free world”. Indeed John Quincy Adams had long before described the US as “a nation destined by God and nature to be the most populous and powerful people ever combined under one social compact.”²³ This belief in the inherent morality and divine approval of whatever policy the US pursues abroad, along with the ideological tenet that the American System is the best, combine often to produce a highly self-righteous attitude in the American people. At the root of this, is a simplistic worldview, as we shall see later. Suffice to state here that this world view sees life in Mainchean good-evil terms. Since Americans must be “good” (for the above-mentioned reasons), the Soviet Union was “evil” and the Soviet system was viewed to be “equally perverse.”²⁴ Thus, one arrives at the major ideological components upon which virtually all post-World War II US foreign policy is based, namely; militant-anti-communism; and opposition to social and economic change not directed by the US, including but not limited, to socialist change.

Three norms that comprise the American ideological tradition have been identified by Weisband. They are: self-determination; self-identification; (US and other) and self-preservation (war or violence as defensive mechanism). These norms are derived from John Locke and continually provide justifications for foreign policy decisions.

At the root of much of the American ideology has been the doctrine of self-determination. It was one of the most central concepts in the formulation of the Declaration of Independence. However, as one authoritative source points out, the application of the doctrine developed into something quite different from what the founding fathers intended. Initially, it was believed that the US had a mission of “redemption.” But this mission was to be implemented by the US being a model, not a master to the world: “It was by our example that we might hope to regenerate mankind, not by our invention.”²⁵ Although the US was founded on the ideal of self-determination, the great disparity between theory and practice soon became evident, both at home (in treatment of “native” Americans and in the keeping of slaves) and abroad, as successive American presidents crusaded around the globe “in search of monsters to destroy.”²⁶

Closely linked to the notion of freedom in the US has been the ideal of self-determination: which is one of the ways Americans exercise their freedom. In fact, in the American psyche, self-determination is not only a right, but a duty.²⁷ One author has described the narcissism which has resulted from Americans’ obsession with their idea of freedom:

"The most elusive word in the political vocabulary, "freedom", is also one of the most important in the American consciousness. It is the first image the American invokes when he counts the blessings of his state. The inheritor of the English and French Revolutions, as well as of his own, he has gazed so long into the pool of freedom that he has fallen half in love with his own reflection in it."²⁸

The statement is significant in that it focuses on a major element of American ideology and thus goes far in explaining US foreign policy. Americans are so fascinated by and are so in love with the image of themselves as "free" people that they are blind to many of the realities in the world. For example, Americans assume that their conceptions of terms such as "freedom" and "democracy" are the only conceptions possible. These assumptions were the basis of policy in Jimmy Carter's human rights campaign, as it was consistently in the US model and understanding that were imposed abroad. No consideration was given to the fact that other societies define terms such as "right", "democracy", or "justice" in different ways.²⁹ It is easy to understand how this limited perspective could lead to some very misguided foreign policy decisions. Not only does this view block out global realities, it also distorts the perception Americans have of themselves.³⁰ In other words, when Americans crusade around the globe in the name of freedom, is it just a coincidence that their economic interests are being well served? It would be naïve to think so, yet the majority of Americans continue to regard themselves as selfless world benefactors who, in spite of their "good" intentions and "generosity", are continually "martyred" and "maligned."

This brings us to another aspect of self-determination ideology – private property. In the American consciousness, the notion of private property is intertwined with the idea of freedom and democracy.³¹ This economic ideology has important implications both at home and abroad. Generally, in the US, a person is judged by his/her material worth or lack of it, regardless of his/her intellectual and/or moral qualities: the dollar tends to be the supreme concern. If wealth is the greatest concern at home, Americans assume that it should be the essential motivating force abroad. US foreign policy thus reflects the marriage of political ideology and the economic interests which motivate it.³² The US armed forces implement this policy by protecting sources of raw materials, safeguarding foreign investments, and guarding commercial routes around the world.

Whereas the ideology of self-determination rests on definite notions about freedom and private property, the self-identification norm constitutes various elitist doctrines, and depends on an "US vs. others" view of the world. Americans believe that their political system and *modus vivendi* are uniquely non ideological. They view themselves as intellectually free people who see world realities through eyes undistorted by ideological constraints. The "opponents", on the other hand, are "prisoners of false ideologies and thus have a distorted world view."³³ However, the claim that American politics is non ideological, is itself ideological "because it contains an anti-intellectual bias and plays down basic conflicts of principle."³⁴

Recognition of the fact that all political thought is ideological is necessary to an understanding of how US foreign policy is formulated. The illustration that Americans are uniquely non ideological reflects an elitist doctrine of exclusivity which is confirmed by other components of the American self-image.³⁵

One such element is represented by the expression, “the American way of life.” Implicit here is the assumption that the way Americans live is substantially “different” and “better” than the life-styles and cultures of other peoples. Ideologies such as individualism, democracy and free enterprise are considered American, while all socialistic ideologies are labelled un-American, or even anti-American. The element of exclusivity in this doctrine has developed into nationalism and ethnocentrism, and the American social ideology it supports serves to rationalize the system of social relations in the US.³⁶ In this context, ideological conformity has become a test of patriotism, so that those people who fight for change in domestic or foreign policy are oftentimes labelled “un-American” or “communist.”³⁷

The American doctrine of exclusivity was apparent to Alex de Tocqueville, who rendered this analysis:

For the last fifty years, no pains have been spared to convince the inhabitants of the United States that they are the only religious, enlightened, and free people ... hence they conceive a high opinion of their superiority and are not very remote from believing themselves to be distinct species of mankind.³⁸

Although written a long time ago, de Tocqueville’s observations still apply today. Indeed, the doctrine of exclusivity has gained adherents in the past few years as a result of its being encouraged by former president Ronald Reagan. The exclusivity doctrine inevitably led to a self-righteous belief in the inherent morality of American foreign policy, whatever it might be and the resulting slogan, “My country, right or wrong”, (since it was assumed that Americans were never wrong). Implicit in this ideology are the beliefs that: American values and institutions are superior and that they should be universal; and that the world is an arena in which good and evil continuously fight for dominance.³⁹

This aggrandized self-image has been instrumental in foreign policy decisions. It led to the view that the US was the defender of world freedom, appointed by God to save the world from godless communism.⁴⁰ Soon after World War II, Americans began to regard their government as a benevolent *gendarme du monde* that was there to ensure the continuance of freedom. Along with this, went the notion that somehow Americans knew better what was good for other peoples than those other peoples themselves did. This inherently racist view was never expressed better than by Henry Kissinger, when he tried to justify the US – led overthrow of the democratically elected popular Marxist government of Salvador Allende in Chile. In Kissinger’s own words: “I don’t see why we need to stand by and permit a country to go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”⁴¹ It should not be difficult to understand why this “Father knows Best” attitude does not sit well with non-Americans. Not only do many Third World peoples feel insulted at being treated like children, they cannot help but note the inherent contradictions of the American position.⁴²

The perceptions Americans hold of themselves and of their government have come together to form the ideology of the “American way.” Based on the tenets of American self-identification already outlined, all foreign policy makers since World War II have assumed that the American system is the best in the world and that what is good for the US is good for everyone elsewhere. This belief system is maintained in society at large

by “the systematic development of the American ideology throughout school life, which is – at some level at least little short of an indoctrination program.”⁴³

The cornerstone of the US self-preservation doctrine was the perception of a “communist threat” or a “communist conspiracy” to take over the world. This doctrine was so central to the thinking of US policy-makers (before the demise of the then Soviet Union and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe) that the great majority of foreign policy decisions made were either directly or indirectly justified by the ominous presence of the Soviet Union. The word “communist” was applied loosely to any government which adopted policies distasteful to the US. This was done in order to justify US interventions which might otherwise be disapproved of by the American people. The obsession with communism and the impulse to destroy it wherever it emerged combined to form a foreign policy decision-making body permeated by anti-communist paranoia. Thus, the self-preservation ideology came to include anti-revolution and anti-nationalism.⁴⁴

Since World War II, US foreign policy has sought above all, the preservation of the status quo (except in some socialist countries). The US since became a counter-revolutionary nation in a revolutionary age.⁴⁵ In the minds of American policy-makers, revolution is equated with communism and should, therefore, be not only opposed, but also smashed. This posture is so narrow that it distorts a nation trying to rid itself of a dictator into a manifestation of international communist conspiracy. The US has, therefore, repeatedly found itself on the side of dictators and against the people. Henry Wallace warned of the danger of this policy in 1947: “Once America stands for opposition to change, we are lost. America will become the most hated nation in the world.”⁴⁶

Indeed, US policy since World War II has demonstrated consistency as far as opposition to change is concerned. From the Truman Doctrine, suppression of “insurgent” movements has remained the primary goal of US policy. Lyndon Johnson, for example, pledged to oppose all radical governments whether they came into being through foreign invasion, domestic revolution, or election.⁴⁷ In being the ugly defender of the status quo, the US has taken over the role formerly played by England. American policy-makers are committed against radical change because independent governments in the Third World could destroy the world economic and political system which assures the US of a disproportionate share of economic and political power.⁴⁸

Since most Americans, including national security managers, enjoy thinking of themselves as benefactors, rather than exploiters, an ideology was formulated to justify the US position. First, is the assumption that American interests and world interests are the same. Second, violence on behalf of the established order is tolerated (as long as it was anti-communist), whereas insurgents are regarded as irresponsible fanatics or terrorists.⁴⁹ Also key is the false belief that the misery of Third World people is their own fault (this is so despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary). This last tenet serves to absolve the US from any responsibility it might feel towards Third World people.

This trend in foreign policy is particularly disturbing because it negates the very principles upon which the US was founded. The ideal of self-determination was short-lived in US foreign policy and a nation proud of its revolutionary heritage became

quickly counter-revolutionary. US interventions number in the hundreds, the majority being in Latin America. As Chomsky stated, "... no other power in the post-war period has employed even a fraction of the military force used by the United States in its efforts to destroy the indigenous forces to which it has been opposed in other lands."⁵⁰ This is why US foreign policy can be termed anti-nationalistic as well – the aspirations of Third World peoples are routinely ignored in favour of the pursuit of points in the big power game. In the process, millions of Third World people get lost in the shuffle.⁵¹

To justify the pursuit of these goals, the doctrine of "sentimental imperialism" developed. By this doctrine, Americans became firmly convinced that they knew what was best for the world.⁵² Amazingly, what was best for the rest of the world was always best for the US. Many still cling to the notion that like everything else about the US its imperialism is "special", resulting only from the pursuit motives. The uniqueness and exclusivity of the US right to intervene whenever it deems it fit, is assumed, as the notion, that only the US has a "right" and a "responsibility" to do so. Thus, the self-preservation ideology was based almost exclusively on anti-communism and on viewing any revolutionary effort by Third World peoples as an inherent communist threat. These assumptions provide a framework for the entire foreign policy mechanism and they have proven to be immensely successful due to the fact that they can be used to justify any covert and/or overt action the US takes abroad.

From this analysis, it is evident that the American self-image is of central importance in the ideological determinants of US foreign policy. The fact that Americans naively insist on regarding themselves as inherently good and generous, their government as benevolent and all-knowing, and their system as "superior" to all other systems, leads to serious foreign relations problems in the Third World. Peoples of the Third World are quick to perceive the great chasm between the American ideals of freedom, self-determination, and equality and the realities of American society and US foreign policy in the Third World. It is this great divergence between theory and practice which fosters negative views of the US and results in repeated failures of US policy in the "peripheral" areas of the world. Having dealt at length with American ideology and the American self-image as they impinge on US foreign policy, we now turn to how the US views the rest of the world, taking into account some of the traditional elements of the American world view. In the process, we need to note seriously, the manner in which historical conditions have produced characteristic attitudes and perceptions.

The American World View: Historical Dimensions

What has shaped the American world-view? To answer this question, four characteristic features of American historical experience suffice. First, a puritan mentality marked by missionary zeal. Second, a privileged pattern of economic and political development. Third, a condition of geographic and cultural isolation. Fourth, success in war.⁵³ The puritan heritage encouraged some sort of self-righteous and crusading characteristic that nourished the American image as being "exceptional" and "exemplary." The vast good fortune in the early years of the Republic encouraged attitudes of idealism, activism, and technological optimism. The American hemispheric insularity accounted for an isolationist, provincial, and self-centred characteristics in US foreign policy. And the

successful use of violence, to the disparagement of diplomacy, accounted for the US propensity for military solutions.⁵⁴ These characteristics produced ignorance about an intolerance of conditions found in other parts of the world. They also produced a tendency to think of world events in cowboy terms of the good or evil intentions of human actors, rather than the possible or sometimes necessary consequences of certain historical conditions.

Since the days of Cotton Mather and the Salem Witch trials to the fundamentalist influence of the New Right in the election of Ronald Reagan, religion has played a strong role in American life and politics.⁵⁵ As a nation made up of religious refugees who opposed the establishment of a state church, there has always been a populist flavour to American religious practice, coupled with a proselytizing element. In opposition to the “corruptions” of the world and the evils of old Europe in particular, Americans self-consciously define themselves. Americans were to be “exceptional” people – they would resist the temptations of power politics. Thus, the constitution-makers were so timid of the corrupting appeals of high office that they instituted a checks and balances system that would prevent the potential abuse of power by anyone within the domestic arena.⁵⁶ However, fate and the requirements of foreign policy would endow the president with a power to speak and act for the nation that no constitutional check could restrain. And when he was required to exercise the power of office on behalf of American interests in the world, it more or less always had a certain flavour of zealous righteousness and rebuke that reflects the self-repressive side of American suspicion of power.⁵⁷

The American tradition of political thought is filled with moral and ethical categories, while the ordinary citizen tends to think of world affairs in terms of how he/she might treat his/her next-door neighbour. As the US became more and more powerful, a certain tension sprang up for American statesmen to act in the world. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State to President Dwight Eisenhower, was a typical example of a diplomat who felt required to engineer coups and exercise American military muscle, but who could never do so without the camouflage of moral categories. Consequently, the US views the world stage as a morality play in which the forces of good subdue the forces of evil.⁵⁸

Another factor to be considered is the condition of privilege the US has enjoyed throughout its history of development. The beginning saw a nation blessed with abundant natural resources, a temperate climate, fertile soils and plenty of living space. American colonists brought with them many fruits of European civilization – advanced technologies, political values which recognized freedom and the rule of law, institutions which provided both stability and opportunity – while discarding many of the encumbrances of old world culture and social systems. The US, possessed, from the beginning, both gifted political leadership and a large educated elite. As the economy boomed and the population grew, new territory was easily acquired without having to invest great sums in costly wars. The US assisted by both geographic isolation and the wisdom of early statesmen like Washington and Monroe, was able to establish itself outside the confines and entangling conflicts of the European balance of power.⁵⁹ In the process of industrial development, the US was still among the first-comers. Consequently, it could compete effectively in world markets with established states. The ease of development and the abundance of technical ingenuity encouraged Americans to

believe that their environment of action could be controlled, that the world could be reconstructed in the image of their own activism and idealism.⁶⁰ This same lesson was borne home in American political affairs, where Americans were proud to be among the first “constitutional engineers.” They regarded themselves as a people who “self-consciously” founded a new political community and then held up the design for “all others” to imitate. Throughout this period of development, the immediate neighbours of the US were either friendly or weak and could easily be displaced or kept in the US orbit of influence. In such conditions, Americans, especially the ruling classes, came to enjoy power, wealth and freedom of action with little effort and virtually no challenge.⁶¹

Americans, therefore, subscribe to the “bootstrap” theory of economic development when they approach the problems of Third World countries today. According to them, poverty can be conquered by the export of American technical expertise, capital and economic aid. They believe that if these fail to yield the expected result, the fault must lie in a people too “lazy” to try or the “greedy” machinations of an “evil elite” that is unwilling to allow capitalism to yield its “natural” fruit.⁶² Moreover, adopting the American free market is presumed to offer both the avenue to material abundance and protection for individual rights and liberal values. The US optimistically espouses the faith that democracy can succeed anywhere, and that capitalism can provide a technical or economic solution for all problems. In this regard, US foreign policy has most often been left in the hands of American multinationals, as if trade and investment were the essence of world affairs.⁶³

Americans are “technological optimists” who believe that any social system can be recreated, any conflict resolved, any difficult condition relieved, if only the right technique could be found. Consequently, the US finds it difficult to accept the idea that in most parts of the world, political choice lies between dictatorship of the right or the left: that economic development may never take place on any model, let alone by the path of the US; that capitalism can be a reactionary and repressive force that can destroy both individual and market freedoms; and that there are no legal or technical solutions to what are fundamentally political and cultural problems.⁶⁴ Worse still, the US is reluctant to admit that most of the world is so set in traditional ways that it cannot influence its development no matter how “good” its intentions, how many resources it spends, or how often it actively intervenes.

The third condition that has shaped US attitudes towards the world has been isolation. Of great size and productivity, the US was a market unto itself and virtually required no trading partner or economic window to the world. The Monroe Doctrine we have already referred to, British forbearance, and the preoccupation of squabbling European Powers protected the atmospheric isolation of the US. The political self-satisfaction and remarkable success kept Americans confident and self-involved. Americans defined their relationship to the rest of the world as one of an exemplary “beacon on a hill lighting the way for others.”⁶⁵ As such, they were not bothered to study or follow other peoples. Instead, it was the “barbarians” to “come to us.”⁶⁶ Historically, therefore, the US remains reluctant to encounter the world in anything but its own language, even if it means Americans know next to nothing of the culture, history, or thought of the world’s diverse peoples. In terms of foreign policy, the price has been high. This is especially so when the US blunders into intervention principally through ignorance. One of the most

memorable examples in contemporary history was when the US committed its prestige, dollars and lives in the first decade of war in Vietnam without having even a handful of experts in its politics, language or culture. The result was a humiliating defeat of the US as a superpower by the Vietcongs.⁶⁷

American provincialism rooted in geographic isolation and economic “self sufficiency” was finally dented by the two world wars, both of which the US entered “reluctantly.” With the exhaustion of all other economies following World War II, the US rose to global pre-eminence. Having inherited the colonial empires at the end of the war, the congress and the electorate could be persuaded to keep the US on the world stage by virtue of a virulent anti-communism encouraged by President Truman (and all his successors up to George Bush) as the antidote to US isolationist impulses. However, taking on the responsibilities of containment and the role of *gendarme du monde* has not saved the US from the flaws in foreign policy.⁶⁸

“Success” in war, is a factor that has shaped US foreign policy towards the rest of the world. To Americans, violence has been a successful tool of policy. This has been at the expense and neglect of diplomacy. The American revolution, which Americans naively liken to contemporary anti-colonial struggles, could better qualify as a War of Independence. Elements of civil conflict or social revolutionary turmoil were limited. It suffices to observe that conditions of freedom were already in place and were, therefore, not created, but only secured by a violent independence struggle. Success in this first war meant that Americans could continue living as they had, without the intrusions of the English monarchy or the extractions of smothering colonial policy.⁶⁹ As such, order and prosperity were virtually taken for granted and violent struggle in the nation was not required to secure them. Thus, the revolutionary portions of the American experience were included in the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787. This was an entirely peaceful episode but which was followed by the Civil War, the bloodiest and most traumatic event experienced by the US. The institution of slavery was not only sanctioned, but also included in the American constitution. Apart from becoming the major source of labour in the south, slaves also provided raw materials and stimuli for both manufacturing and shipping in the north until the contradictions and struggles between the two regions for national supremacy ushered in the bloody Civil War.⁷⁰ The lesson of the Civil War was the necessity of an active and armed central government to preserve the Union and forcibly abolish slavery.

Similarly, nineteenth-century wars of “manifest destiny” removed the Mexicans and the Indians who stood in the way of America’s westward expansion. American conquest of the continent did not trouble the American conscience until a century later, when American ill-formed vision of the world as divided between “civilized” and “barbarian”, slave and free, foundered in the swamps and jungles of Vietnam.⁷¹ The frontier experience, the “rough” justice of vigilant and lone rangers, shaped American consciousness, from Hollywood cinema to the presidencies of Teddy Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Ronald Reagan. Thus, the American view of the world was formed from behind the sights of a repeating rifle.⁷² Accordingly, Americans are not conceived as intruders, but innocents in circled wagons slaughtered by “dark”, “subhuman hordes of savages”,⁷³ a clearly racist bigotry that has been reinforced and replayed on late-night television. Thus, made heroic in war films and westerns, the self-serving and senselessly

violent side of the conduct of the US has been hidden from conscious scrutiny. As such, US foreign policy has taken on the imperial guise of every great power: the search for advantage and the extension of influence are disguised under the banner of the “Whiteman’s burden”, to “civilize” the “barbarian.”

During both world wars, the US joined as the “reluctant champion” and “saviour” of democracy. At the end of these wars, the US claimed the credit for victory, although it suffered the fewest casualties. Thus, US history of the two world wars was also written according to a heroic image of Americans. It suffices to observe that in neither case did Americans suffer significant physical damage to their home territory (with the obvious exception of Pearl Harbor). Instead, the US economy boomed, rendering the validity of the argument that whereas war was a successful tool of foreign policy, it was also a successful tool of good business. Even after the end of the war, American business class encouraged the continued mobilization of the defence economy as it stood to rip fortunes of a depression economy. The end of war also witnessed the remaking of two of the Axis powers, namely, Germany and Japan, in the image of the US, right down to the writing of constitutions. The US was the white knight of global affairs: it fought the “war to end all wars” and to “save the world for democracy”, clearly demonstrating the “arrogance of power.”⁷⁴ This status remained virtually unchecked until the humiliating military defeat of the US in Vietnam. Thus, until Vietnam, armed intervention had been an instrument of US foreign policy “from the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli.”⁷⁵ In Latin America, the US earned a Yankee imperialist image long before the Russian Revolution occurred. The roughrider advocate of the strenuous life, Teddy Roosevelt, made it the pillar of his “big stick” policy, under which he intervened in the Caribbean dozens of times. In 1914, Woodrow, the only American president ever to hold a doctorate, used the same policy to try to control the outcome of the Mexican Revolution, simply because Mexico had refused to trade or pay its bills. Thus, the US was successful not only in the installing of puppet regimes in Latin America, but also in creating an economic climate that fostered American trade and investment. Such interventions on behalf of American interests took place frequently and without vigorous challenges in both Latin America and Asia. Such interventions were taken for granted, without claiming an imperial role in a balance of power system: hence the Caribbean was regarded as “an American lake” and the forcible entry into China, Japan and the Philippines was termed an “open door” policy.⁷⁶

US Double Standards

After the defeat of the US in Vietnam, American power and virtue were diminished. Thus, the post-Vietnam epoch witnessed the bid to regain power and virtue. American ignorance, arrogance and optimistic idealism could coexist only as long as the US remained both successful and relatively isolated, operating within the circumscribed arena of hemispheric diplomacy. Once the US had to encounter the world on its own terms and to assume imperial responsibilities, the US was bound to soil its self-image with the dirty work of illiberal and occasionally immoral practices finally brought to scrutiny by the ignominy of defeat in Vietnam. In the process, the US has had to face to its split personality: The fact that there are two faces to the US and US conduct in foreign policy does not closely resemble the character of American domestic political practices.⁷⁷

However, the relative pragmatism, pluralism, competition, self-determination, human rights and respect for law that characterized democratic capitalism in the US simply do not serve as operating principles of US foreign policy. Externally, the US behaved much like other great powers in history. But many Americans are so ill informed that they do not realize this double standard characteristic of their conduct. Americans regard themselves as being humanitarian although they give in foreign aid, the lowest percent of their Gross National Product (GNP) of any industrial country. And before the end of the Cold War, the bulk of their external assistance was military in character, not economic. This was dispensed on the basis of who was to be wooed in the then Cold War, not who was “truly needy.” South Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Israel and Egypt accounted for the majority of dollars spent in the post-World War II era. The many new nations that emerged from the anti-colonial struggles of this era have gone begging. As such, the US has not been truly committed to the economic development of the Third World, despite the rhetoric of such projects as the Alliance for Progress (inspired by the Cuban Revolution and the fear that Fidel Castro’s radicalism might spread to the rest of Latin America.)⁷⁸

It must be observed that foreign aid has been dwarfed by trade and investment by private corporations, which have constituted the major element of American economic presence abroad. Whereas such corporations bring capital, technical expertise and jobs, they do so at the price of subordinating the local economy and elite to client status. Labour-utilizing technologies that might make more sense are ignored in favour of the importation of expensive machinery from abroad: local capital is diverted to production for export or luxury consumption; self-sufficient agriculturalists have turned off the land in favour of plantations that deliver coffee, cocoa, tea and exotic fruits to the tables of the wealthy; domestic industries languished and competition is fiercely suppressed; monopolistic controls are maintained on patents and licenses, while profits are rarely re-invested. In addition, political leaders are bought off to encourage concessionary agreements or to maintain a compliant and cheap labour force.⁷⁹ Capitalism, far from being an opportunity for the poorest to climb the economic ladder, is usually the agent of their unemployment, disfranchisement from the land, and even direct impoverishment. For instance, during the boom years of the “Brazilian miracle”, when GNP growth rates were soaring into the tents, the real standard of living of the poorest 40 percent was declining in absolute terms, according to United Nations (UN) estimates. Although this is not necessarily the American image of capitalism, it is some of the reasons that explain why Americans are hated. It is also the source of many social revolutions. The United Fruit Company in Central America is representative of the Yankee imperialist image.⁸⁰

The post World War II period witnessed an excessive militarization of US foreign policy. This was evident in the growth of arms aid, the creation of peacetime security pacts like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the numerous interventions abroad by American troops or their operatives. Besides, during this period, the US supported some of the most despotic and reactionary regimes in history. They include such figures as Mobutu (Zaire), the Shah of Iran, Duvalier (Haiti), Batista (Cuba), Somoza (Nicaragua), Marcos (the Philippines), Pinochet (Chile), Zia Ul-Haq (Pakistan), Diem, Ky, and Thieu (Vietnam), Chiang Kai-Shek (Taiwan), Chung Hee Park (South Korea) and many other tyrants

whose sole credentials for friendship were an unswerving anti-communism and an open door to American investment.⁸¹

The impulse by the US to play a dominant role has been most evident in the Third World. However, US-European relations also bear the marks. Although the US was generous in the eyes of the Marshall Plan, it was also willing to impose an unfair economic arrangement on its allies for almost a decade before the Bretton Woods international monetary agreements fell before universal European hostility and non cooperation. Likewise, Americans felt it necessary to dictate to Europe on all central issues of East-West relations (before the end of the Cold War), whether it be control of NATO, deployment of weapons, arms control negotiations, or export of resources from or advanced technology to the then Soviet Union. On many occasions, the US has been bullying and intolerant. Thus, the US has not behaved in world affairs to the standards it espouses for its citizens.

Rise and Challenge to US Pre-eminence

In 1945, the US was at the height of its influence. This was so because it enjoyed a virtual monopoly of political, economic and military power in the immediate aftermath of the war. World War II destroyed not only the Axis powers, but most of the Allied powers too. The Soviets suffered particularly badly since they had sustained the only front in the land war against the Nazis from 1941 until D-Day (June 6, 1944). In the process, the Soviets suffered 20 million deaths and gained a lasting fear of a resurgent Germany. They also concluded that Churchill and Roosevelt were content to let Germany and Russia maul one another, as long as there was prospect of a Nazi victory. Stalin signed the Soviet-German non-aggression pact in a Machiavellian spirit, with the expectation of sacrificing his erstwhile allies to exhaust the Nazi war machine. As it turned out, every European power was devastated, including British manpower and industrial potential, despite the absence of an invasion. Into this vacuum stepped the Americans, rescued from the Depression by war production and the unprecedented mobilization of American vast resources.⁸²

At this time, the United States virtually controlled the world economy, with technological leads in every major industry and trade dominance in every market. The US inherited the military bases, investment opportunities and access to resources that had been enjoyed by the British and French under imperial rule. Marshall Plan aid was a vehicle for the reconstruction of the European economy. It was also a means by which the US resurrected its trading partners and penetrated the European market as the dominant economic actor. The US supported the Common Market, partly to restore the European balance of power and partly as an instrument of European recovery, which was consistent with American security interests. In the short run, the goal of a united and economically resurgent Europe did not conflict with the US leadership role in the free market economies. Financially, the US enjoyed a privileged position by virtue of the Bretton Woods agreements which elevated the dollar as a reserve currency on a par with gold and forced others to make painful adjustments to American imbalances in trade and overseas expenditures. This was mainly tolerated by Europeans for so long because American dollars flowing abroad were paying for post war reconstruction and military

assistance, even if the net result was the spread of American influence, troops and bases.⁸³ Militarily, the US was the architect and senior partner in NATO and enjoyed an absolute monopoly of nuclear weapons. Politically, the US was the “guiding” hand behind the UN, obtaining vetoes on the Security Council by empowering its allies in permanent seats, and controlling the General Assembly with the reliable votes of Latin American client-states. The Third World, not yet emerged as sovereign states competing for recognition and influence, was a relatively quiescent arena – not marked by the level of revolutionary turmoil of the subsequent decades.

Thus, the test of US adaptation to its position of global power and of the utility of its foreign policy can be found in the decades since World War II. The threat to US pre-eminence that emerged in the public mind during the Carter administration was reinforced by Reagan as part of his strategy of military and moral resurgence. Depicting a picture of military decline, President Reagan’s view reflected a misreading of the arms race and a misunderstanding of how the US became powerful and why its power was declining.⁸⁴

The rise of the US to dominance as a global power can thus be explained by two factors. First, the decisive role of economic and technological determinants in establishing the power hierarchy of nuclear-armed industrial nation states. Second, the decay of European colonial powers, both at home and abroad hastened by the horrors of two terrible world wars. Whereas the first factor describes the underlying condition of state power in the twentieth century, the second factor depicts the permissive condition for the entrance of new international actors. In neither case can we lay credit for the rise of the US to power directly to its virtue or military capability, as some American conservatives would assert.⁸⁵

Thus, US pre-eminence was the consequence of special, historically transient monopolies that thrived in 1945 – these conditions were not likely to last forever. The US did not earn this position by virtue of competitive economic advantage, nobility of action, protection of freedom or the attractions of the American constitutional example. According to the Reagan Administration, US power began to decline with its defeat in Vietnam and the subsequent weakness of Carter, along with a shortfall of investment in military might to march the growing Soviet power.⁸⁶ If anything, the process began in the 1950s under Eisenhower, the causes being more economic than military and the “scapegoats” included Germany and Japan.⁸⁷

A multiplicity of crises contributed to the erosion of US power. Korea and Vietnam marked the beginning of an era in which the superpowers would fight in the constrained arena of limited war. No longer would raw power potential determine results, nor military victories be an enduring proof of prowess.⁸⁸ The US was slow to learn the lessons of insurgency, propaganda, terror, diplomatic manoeuvre and nationalist appeal that shaped the character of proxy wars in the Third World. The US proceeded to imitate the imperial follies of the French in Indo China without having any fundamental grasp of the revolutionary nationalist forces at work in the Third World.⁸⁹ The US lost the ideological battle for the principle of self-determination by intervening repeatedly to overthrow popular causes – from the abrogation of the Geneva accords (when it appeared that democratic elections might empower communist Ho Chi Minh) to the removal of

Mossadegh in Iran and Arbenz in Guatemala. This anti democratic pattern was repeated in such countries as the Dominican Republic and Chile. Gradually, the reputation of the US as a “friend” of the anti-colonial struggle was exchanged for the image of a neo-colonial agent of repression. A turning point was the negative reaction of the US to Castro’s Cuban Revolution, which although an indigenous upheaval, nevertheless directly challenged the US monopoly of the western hemisphere in 1959.⁹⁰

Meanwhile, Charles de Gaulle, Willy Brandt and Olaf Palme, inter alia, challenged the US claim to be leader of the so-called free world. NATO solidarity eroded still further over such matter as the pipeline crisis, the nuclear forces and varying perceptions of the Soviet threat. The collapse of Bretton Woods, marked by Nixon’s deflation of the dollar and the abandonment of the gold standard, was followed by the oil crises of 1973. These two episodes indicated the degree to which the US had ceased to remain competitive in world trade and had become economically dependent on the flow of resources abroad. The visible loss of US control in the global capitalist economy, and of access to resources, was inflicted not by the Soviets, but by European central bankers, Japanese entrepreneurs and OPEC oil ministries. Meanwhile American rates of economic growth, labour productivity and technological innovation were falling rapidly behind those of Germany and Japan, who became America’s leading world trade competitors.⁹¹

Simultaneously, the UN was transformed from a tame forum under American tutelage to an arena of intense criticism, where the General Assembly, now dominated by newly independent states of Asia and Africa regularly inflicted diplomatic rebukes and defeats on the US. The decade of the 1970s also witnessed major UN conferences on food, population, environment and the law of the sea. Here the US and the Soviet Union found themselves lumped together as industrial states against a militant Third World constituency that was calling down a plague on the houses of both superpowers. This, and events such as the Sino-Soviet split and Sadat’s ouster of the Soviets from Egypt, indicated the degree to which the international balance of power had shifted from bipolarity to multi-polarity, from a purely East-West conflict, to a much more complex plurality of forces and issues in which Third World considerations would play an increasing role. Whereas the claims of the poor states against the rich have not resulted in the kind of structural changes called for by advocates of, for instance, the New International Economic Order (NIEO),⁹² the dwindling success of superpower interventions in the Third World marked the end of an era that conceived of the world beyond Europe in terms of “power vacuum” and falling “dominoes.”

Economic Cost of Military Dominance, Loss of Credibility at Home and Abroad and Power without Virtue

Amidst these challenges to American power, of which Vietnam was the crowning, US defence expenditures and global military capability continued to increase conventionally and in terms of nuclear capability. The only contention was whether the rate of increase was fast enough relative to gains the then Soviet Union made. However, both moral and economic costs were incurred simultaneously; these were the hidden costs of American military clout. The US economy had become harnessed to an arms race with the then Soviet Union, with the attendant distortions of corporate concentration, loss of private

access to capital, misdirection of research and creativity, losses in labour productivity, lowered rates of growth and innovation, deficit spending, and upward pressure on interest rates and inflation. These economic ills have important roots in a permanent war economy and a Pentagon socialism that explains a rising proportion of federal expenditure.⁹³

Beyond its boundaries, the aid program of the US became skewed to military assistance, where security concerns and American anxiety to contain communism pre-empted humanitarian or economic development goals in US foreign policy. Dependence on access to strategic raw materials also encouraged the militarization of US relations with Third World countries. This included the ill-fated commitment by Jimmy Carter to protect American access to Persian Gulf oil. American political goal was the preoccupation with rivalry with the then Soviet Union thereby rendering the US as a global police resisting or retarding the process of social change in the Third World and elevating “stability” over development, democracy or justice. As a consequence, the US earned the reputation of backing right-wing dictators and engaging in CIA dirty tricks wherever these were perceived as necessary to preserve American control. The common result was short-term military victory and long-term political decline. During this period, i.e. before the end of the Cold War, the US could manage the *coups*, but not the ideological animosity and the loss of prestige that it suffered by aligning itself with reactionary causes in an imperialist posture.⁹⁴

Thus, throughout the post-war period, the US suffered increasing credibility problems, both at home and abroad. Americans learned from such incidents as the *U-2* over-flights, the Cambodian invasion and the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, that their President was prepared to lie to the public to protect a morally or politically questionable foreign policy from democratic scrutiny. Likewise, the credibility of the US abroad plummeted to an all-time low, ostensibly because the US abandoned Vietnamese allies under attack, but mainly because US – policy makers repeatedly supported or even created makeshift regimes without credibility themselves, and then punished the population militarily in the name of preserving their allegedly democratic character. President Reagan repeated this pattern in El Salvador, Lebanon and Libya, while proposing to solve American credibility problem by deploying numerous new weapons systems as symbolic tokens of American military resolve. However, costly nuclear weapons are expensive ways of gaining diplomatic clout in the Third World. Events like the Grenada invasion justified on the pretext of imminent danger to American lives only reinforced the image of a Yankee imperialist so diplomatically isolated and that it can achieve its foreign policy aims only by direct intervention.⁹⁵

The great irony of the post war epoch is that, despite American dwindling relative power and crumbling international reputation, the strategy of containment of the Soviet Union, the central principle of American foreign policy, has succeeded. Power exercised in the name of anti-communism worked to prevent Soviet military expansion, although the successful alliance of democratic capitalist powers has been secured only at the price of support of reactionary, anti-democratic regimes in the Third World. Consequently, the US suffered the moral quandary of “soiled hands” in its struggle to keep control, enjoying power without virtue. The great appeal of Ronald Reagan was the promise to restore the US to a position of righteous primacy and to resolve the psychological trauma

of eclipsed power. He rhetorically combined power and virtue once again, and promised that to rearm was to restore the place of the US in the sun. Unfortunately, the marriage of power and virtue could not be consummated outside the splendid isolation of an earlier era. Moreover, President Reagan's wasteful, destabilizing program of military expansion did not address the root causes of economic decline. It instead created deficits, and structural distortions could have sped the US down that slippery slope. In all this, President Reagan, his successors, Presidents George Bush Sr, Bill Clinton and Bush Jr, plus many Americans, blame American perceived loss of power since World War II on the then Soviet Union. However, if the US has to restore its position of authentic leadership, Americans must deal with their own arrogance and correct their misreading of America's post-war role, lest they self-righteously repeat the mistakes of the past⁹⁶ the demise of the Eastern bloc countries and the Soviet Union itself, notwithstanding.

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Indian Foreign Policy

The Concept of Great, Middle and Small Power

Unlike the US, which is the one superpower after the demise of the Soviet Union, India can be described as a middle power, when considered as an international actor. In this capacity, there are three ways of characterizing India. First, India is regarded as a medium-sized power in terms of its material capabilities. However, this definition of power is unsatisfactory as it does not specify involvement and “influence” in a specific issue.¹

The middle power coinage is, therefore, open to the usual criticisms levied on the great-power/small-power dichotomy. One source defines a small power as one which is not able to pursue its interests unaided.² But according to another source, the caution is that:

Small powers are not simply weaker Great Powers and that they must be defined in terms of something other than their relative power status. Any new definition should also take account of the fact that there is a psychological, as well as a material distinction between Great and Small Powers. The latter earn their titles not only by being weak but by recognizing the implications of that condition. Thus, a Small Power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics.³

In the above quotation, R.L. Rothstein emphasizes relational rather than quantitative power. This supports our line of contention. Nevertheless, his definition lacks an operational value because in the international system, it cannot be compared across time and space. But even if it were to be compared, its meaning and relevance cannot stand. His approach is neither to rank every power in the international system nor to rank according to indices of statistical power. Instead, he seems to partly rely on an inventory view of power.⁴ Power is derived from sources. First, the self-image of a small state that finds itself not in a position to protect its interests unaided. Second, the other side's perception of the small state's weakness.⁵ Rothstein has a problem of circularity in his definition. Is a great power an exclusive category? If so, he does not demonstrate how this is the case, because there is no definition of a great power that is independent of his

definition of a small power. If Rothstein were to suggest that a great power is the opposite of a small power, he would run into an empirical problem – that there is no great power in the contemporary international system that can pursue its interests unaided.⁶ The rational view of power, therefore, cannot be proved on the basis of the self-image and perceptions of the other side of a state's power. The self-image and the other side's perceptions may change over time. The self-image of a state may vary from the other side's perceptions as the criteria for appraising greatness and smallness may differ between appraisers. Rothstein has a small point only when he contends that one difference between a great power and a small power is that the former possesses a "systemic interest" that the latter does not possess.⁷ Even here, the problem of definition and description about the nature and extent of such an interest still persists.

His treatment of the middle-power concept is superficial. He defines a great power in terms of its systemic interests and weakness of a small state. He does not deal with the middle-power notion because it would complicate an already complicated situation.⁸

The problem is not that the middle powers are self-styled. For instance, in the Concert of Europe and in modern international relations, the great powers were/are self-styled, and yet in theory and practice, there seems to be no problem with their assertiveness. Instead, in Rothstein's view, the range of choice of a middle power is not significantly different from that of a small power. Another serious point is that a power is great due to its own achievement and not due to the weakness or disinterest of the other side. It, therefore, seems that if a middle power is able to develop a range of choice, that is sufficient to engage a great power's attention and if a great power cannot avoid interacting with a middle power due to its achievements, then a middle power can be treated as a great power or a potential great power.

The second way of studying the concept of India as an international actor is to consider the concept of a "power in the middle." Whereas the first perspective visualized a middle power in the context of the classical great-power/small-power model, the second perspective is not concerned with the ranking of power. Rather, it regards India as a "power in the middle", that is, a power that has manoeuvred itself or placed itself in such a political and strategic position that even though the superpowers did not necessarily want to interact with it, they would have no choice but to do so.

India as an International Actor

India being a power in the middle has a number of meanings. First, India sought a middle ground between the United States and the then Soviet Union. It did this by recognizing the expediency of the Cold War disputes and by recognizing its own need to structure a political and economic relationship both from a non-aligned point of view, with the superpowers in the 1950s.⁹

Second, India can be regarded as a power in the middle, if it were taken as an object in the competition of the superpowers. The premise here is that the underdeveloped world was, and remains a zone of non-nuclear, although not necessarily non-violent, superpower competition. This was what in diplomatic language referred to as the zero-sum quality of the US-Soviet competition during and after the Cold War. It included the

strategies of competing arms transfers of the superpowers to their clients in the Third World.¹⁰

This approach had a dual advantage. First, it provided an opportunity for the developing countries to obtain foreign aid. Second, it facilitated the superpowers in pursuing their competition without the danger of a nuclear confrontation or major war. The purpose of creating a zone of non-violent competition was to reduce the danger of bipolar confrontation, with the supposedly side gain of economic “assistance” to the developing countries. The premise of bipolarity was central in this scheme. Unquestionably, influence was traced by assessing the effects of the superpowers’ involvement in the developing countries on the bilateral relations between the superpowers.

The third way of studying India as an international actor reverses the order of the second perspective, which treated a third party as an object of activity or as an arena of superpower competition and as an alternative to especially a nuclear confrontation. In the third perspective, we examine the third party as a source of influence in international relations, as a challenge to bipolar activity in global politics. The challenge can be the idea of a bipolarized world. India’s strategic behaviour suggests that the challenge was related to bipolar and not to zero-sum activity. Consequent to this, it is possible to argue that a third party common divisor aimed at fragmenting rather than centralizing superpower control over key issue areas in strategic affairs. In other words, in this perspective, the source of influence was derived from a strategy of intervention rather than that of mediation.¹¹

During the period 1947-1954, India’s foreign policy statements and behaviour revealed a focus that symbolized a search for a balance along two lines: First, tying Indo-Soviet and Indo-US activities to third party actions, i.e., Indo-Soviet activity was tied to US activity and vice versa. Second, following the same style of behaviour in India-China and Sino-Soviet relations.

Two premises underlay this style of behaviour. First, all the major actors in India’s strategic environment were involved to some extent, in zero-sum activity. Second, none of these actors had preponderant power in the region; hence, no single actor or any single coalition of actors was able to function as a balancer.¹²

The central theme in the analysis of Indian foreign policy is, therefore, as follows: Indian nonalignment as a bargaining strategy that outlined a third way in the study and practice of international relations – the two-camp struggle (for instance, Zhhdhanov’s and John Foster Dulle’s two-camp thesis) and classical neutrality of the Swiss kind as the other alternatives.¹³ As such, the dominant thesis of Indian non-alignment was not a framework of “neutralism and disengagement”, as the title of one source suggests.¹⁴ It was a rejection of military alignment with one superpower and acceptance of the need to engage politically all the major powers that had influence in India’s strategic involvement.

India needed to exploit zero-sum activity in Soviet-US and Sino-Soviet relations. During the 1950-51 period, Nehru encouraged Chester Bowles to avoid military containment. This pushed China towards the Soviet Union and instead wanted to encourage Chinese disengagement from the Soviet alliance system. There is no evidence to show that a

Sino-Soviet conflict aided Indian security. Nevertheless, an inference can be made from the Nehru-Bowles dialogue. Effort by Nehru to persuade Bowles to help revise US assessments about China and to exploit Sino-Soviet tension can be seen as a purposive activity that was thought to favour Indian security. India's definition of non-alignment was made possible by the Sino-Soviet rift and by the thaw in the Cold War between East and West.¹⁵ This verdict applies not only to India's post-1962 policy but also to its post-1950 policy.

The notion of equi-distance does not apply to India's strategic behaviour but the notion of balance in India's foreign relations appears to be relevant. However, balance was and is sought through involvement, not non-involvement. The term "balance" implies foreign policy activity that is more than avoidance of war. This activity is conducted to ensure that India's position in the middle remains viable and that India retains access to material and political support of its major partners without compromising its freedom of action.

As an actor in the middle, a weak state should be able to satisfy several conditions. It should be able to mediate and to intervene. It should enjoy external recognition in terms of its diplomatic talent and its ability to anticipate external problems and inject itself on behalf of a great power, to shape an international consensus that helps a great power. A militarily weak actor in the middle should appear to reflect the voice of the world community and its views should be testable and credible. It should be able, if called upon to perform in peace keeping types of situations, that is, to act as a diplomatic and military proxy for a universal actor such as the United Nations. These conditions relate to the kinds of activities that are known as "third party" mediation, mediation being defined as help, as an ability to act as a transmission belt, as articulator of another state's interests.¹⁶ India's help to the great powers in resolving the dispute in Korea (1954), the Geneva Accords (1954), the agreement on neutralization of Laos (1962), and the partial test ban (1963) are examples of Indian contributions of this kind. India's role was that of a helper to the great powers and not as a determinant – that is, as a force but not as a factor.¹⁷

However, after 1962, India's strategic behaviour revealed a reorientation of India's diplomatic – military behaviour. It became a transition from mediating superpower disputes to giving more visibility to India's strategic problems and to developing viable adversary relations before securing "friendly" relations. The new orientation was more toward intervention and less toward mediation.

As one source suggests, national intervention of any kind is characterized by one or more of the following conditions. First, it seeks to uphold or advance an established rule of behaviour or some higher morality. Second, there is disparity of power in favour of the intervener's behaviour in contrast with his previous behaviour. Fourth, the intervention is limited in time and scope. Fifth, the intervening act is directed against the fundamental structure of the state or society. Sixth, it is irrelevant if the intervention is invited or not.¹⁸

The foregoing checklist is useful for defining the characteristics of Indian interventions. First, India's interventions in Kashmir were justified because of lack of secularism in Pakistan's two-nation theory. The intervention in Goa was justified because it meant the elimination of a colonial situation. India's argument was that because Goa represented Portuguese aggression on Indian territory, the use of force under these circumstances was not Indian aggression. Although the United States did not accept this interpretation, it

was not able to challenge India's position in the UN General Assembly. In a similar manner, the use of force in the Bangladesh crisis was described as self-defence because in the December 1971 war, Pakistan fired the first shot against Indian territory.

The second characteristic is partly met in India's interventionist behaviour vis-à-vis Pakistan and Portugal. The characteristic, however, was not applicable in India's behaviour toward China during 1959-1962. India behaved "aggressively" toward China as a tactful ploy to help improve its relations with the Soviet Union and the United States.

Regarding the third characteristic, India's behaviour has elements of departure from previous practice. Simultaneously, it has an element of continuity. There is a dual track of continuity and change, depending on how one wants to appraise the evidence. As such, India's military intervention and self-help during the Bangladesh crisis can be taken as evidence of departure, considering India's earlier acceptance of superpower and UN organized conflict settlement in Kashmir and the Rann of Kutch disputes up to late 1965. In the same vein, India's refusal to sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) can be taken as evidence of departure considering that India's previous behaviour in arms control was to support nuclear disarmament, including the partial test ban treaty.¹⁹ However, on the other hand, the revisionist acts can be demonstrated to be manifestations of latent revisionism in India's behaviour. Accordingly, the existence of Indian military force and military threats against Pakistan during the 1950s and 1960s was evidence of an Indian intent to secure a military solution as a last resort. In the same vein, the objections that India raised with regard to the NPT were precisely the kind of objections that were outlined in detail in India's statements on the question of international control of atomic energy through safeguards in the 1950s.²⁰

The fourth characteristic of intervention is that it is limited to time and scope. By "limited" is meant a single-shot military action that is unique in conception and execution. India's strategic behaviour is interventionist not only because of specific time-bound military operations such as the December war of 1971, but also because of a stretched-out nuclear and disarmament strategy – in terms of time – to alter the other side's behaviour, its values, its choices and the setting in which choices are made. It is in the latter sense that Indian non-alignment is a strategy of intervention, a method of pursuing choices and making revocable commitments for the purposes of not only exploiting the other's uncertainties, but also of minimizing one's own uncertainties.²¹

The Origin of India's Foreign Policy

The origin of India's foreign policy can be traced in the various resolutions passed by the Indian National Congress before independence in 1947. It can also be traced in the speeches and writings of Pandit Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India. According to one source, the resolutions reveal that "the Congress took deep interest in certain external questions from its inception, and that it based its position on certain fundamental principles which still shape the foreign policy of India".²² From these, the overall foreign policy resolution passed by the All-India Congress Committee in Delhi in 1921 is "a landmark in the history of India's foreign relations." This resolution "is important in as much as it was the first significant declaration on the part of nationalist India that its

interests in the field of foreign policy were diametrically opposed to those of Britain. It further laid down the basis of an independent India's foreign policy."²³ Another vital resolution was passed at the Congress session in Madras in 1927. This resolution protested against the use of Indian troops in China, Mesopotamia and Persia. It also deplored the "extensive war preparations which the British Government was carrying on in India."²⁴ Thus, the foundations of India's foreign policy had been laid down at the Madras session of the Congress in 1927.

Nehru deserves major credit for formulating free India's foreign policy as he was "the sole architect of the foreign policy of independent India."²⁵ Another source also points out that Nehru was "the philosopher, the architect, the engineer and the voice of his country's policy towards the outside world."²⁶ Thus, India's foreign policy has come to be identified with the personality of Nehru himself. Indeed, the personal complexes of Nehru have conditioned India's attitude towards the West and when translated into action, these complexes have become India's foreign policy. To confirm this observation, one source has it that "The framework was provided from time to time by Nehru: his ideas and ideology, his aims and aspirations, his judgment and impressions, his desires and ambitions, his likes and dislikes, his passions and prejudices, and sometimes, even his 'whims and caprices' constituted the timber which went into the building of that framework."²⁷

However, the policy as modelled by Nehru "is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent, in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom and inherent in the circumstances of today."²⁸ As such, the policy was not constituted at one time, but became evolutionary in nature, drawing its inspiration from past history, past thinking and declarations and the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi regarded as the father of the Indian nation.²⁹ This is the framework within which India's foreign policy was built over the years.

Indian Foreign Policy and National Interest

It is pertinent to state that national interest is basic to the structure and functioning of the state's foreign policy. As such, the promotion of national interest is always the principle objective of both the state's foreign policy and the entire government policies. Variables such as moral, religious, ideological and other considerations play a role. However, they are usually accepted only as a component of and via the medium of national interest – national interest always dominates every other consideration.

One authoritative source defined interests as what a nation feels to be necessary to its security and well being.³⁰ Interpreted in the light of the foregoing definition of national interest, Indian foreign policy is taken to be actuated by such interest. According to Nehru as he once told parliament, "I am on my country's side and on nobody else's."³¹ National interest is, therefore, the major consideration in policy formulation. However, a successful foreign policy should reflect a balanced combination of idealism and enlightened self-interest. Nehru in his letter to the Presidents of the Provincial Congress Committees during the summer of 1954 observed that a policy must be in keeping with the traditional background and temper of the country.³² Indeed, India's foreign policy is a

combination of both idealism and national interest. It is more inclined towards international interest than towards self-interest.

The foregoing observation notwithstanding, national interest overrides the thinking of the state. Nehru recognized that “whether a country is imperialistic or socialistic or communist, its foreign minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country... in the final analysis, foreign policy concerns itself chiefly with the national interest of the country concerned.”³³ Nehru emphasized the vitality of national interest by stating that whatever policy India would lay down, the art of conducting foreign policy lays in finding out what was most advantageous to India.³⁴

This, therefore, means that the principle criterion of the foreign policy of the state is the rational calculation of its national interests. It suffices to observe that although the Government of India has not distinctly expressed its national interests, military security and economic development are tightly bound together with India’s national interest. According to one author, what constitutes India’s national interests is India’s survival as a free, united and prosperous nation whose people are interested in stability and security – both internal and external.³⁵ However, for this to happen, warranted a policy of peace and cooperation in India’s self-interest. Because of this, Nehru proposed to look after India’s interest in the context of world co-operation and world peace, in as far as world peace could be preserved. He further proposed to keep on the closest terms of friendship with other countries unless they themselves created difficulties.³⁶

Thus, by attempting to define national interest, besides addressing itself to national self-interest, Indian foreign policy also recognized and responded to the wider and broader interest of the world.³⁷ It tallied with some of the ideas of one scholar who observed that a narrow national loyalty on India’s part would obscure its long-range interests where they were involved with those of a whole alliance of free nations.³⁸ In this way, Nehru’s idealism when combined with realism, dictated a liberal Indian policy in India’s enlightened self-interest.

Aims and Objectives of Indian Foreign Policy

The main goals of Indian foreign policy were straight forward, i.e., friendship with every nation, attachment to no bloc, sympathy with struggles for freedom and opposition to racial discrimination everywhere.³⁹ However, Indian foreign policy according to one authoritative source, should include the following: “Non-involvement in a third world war; Development of Indian economy and for that purpose keeping open all channels of international trade and aid; Maintenance of India’s independence in the sphere of external affairs; Winning of international support on the Kashmir question; Integration of the French and Portuguese settlements with the Indian Union; Securing a fair treatment and the dignity of the Indians settled abroad; Championship of the cause of colonial peoples; Abolition of racial discrimination everywhere but particularly in South Africa; Creation of a consultative machinery in cooperation with neighbouring and other Asian countries.”⁴⁰

The achievement of these aims has been the pre-occupation of Indian foreign policy. The difficult position in which India found itself after independence, the necessity of obtaining assistance from abroad to meet its economic needs, and the desirability of

maintaining peace for the fulfilment of the task of social and economic reconstruction, led India to adopt non-alignment and the pursuit of peace as the cardinal features of its foreign policy.⁴¹ There were other objectives which included the elimination of the root causes of war by championing the liberation of the subject peoples, the eradication of racial discrimination and the removal of want, disease and illiteracy. The Government of India was convinced that so as to successfully fulfil these objectives, it had to give qualified allegiance to the United Nations and follow an independent foreign policy.⁴²

Major Principles of Indian Foreign Policy

India has relied on three means for achieving its foreign policy objectives, namely, non-alignment, peace and friendship with all countries. Or as the Indian National Congress affirmed at its Jaipur session:

“The foreign policy of India must necessarily be based on the principles that have guided the Congress in the past years. These principles are promotion of world peace, the freedom of all nations, racial equality and the ending of imperialism and colonialism. It should be the constant aim of the foreign policy of India to maintain friendly and cooperative relations with all nations and to avoid entanglement in military or similar alliances, which tend to divide up the world in rival groups and thus endanger world peace”.⁴³

It is important to recognize that these principles have guided India’s foreign policy since 1947.⁴⁴

Non-Alignment

But what is non-alignment? The clearest statement on the meaning of the term non-alignment, as Nehru conceived it, can be found in his answer to a question addressed to him by Aldai Stevenson in 1961. According to him, non-alignment means not tying the state with military blocs of nations or with a nation.⁴⁵

By stating that India follows a policy of non-alignment is meant that: first, India had no military alliances with countries of either bloc – or indeed with any nation.⁴⁶ Second, India has an independent approach to foreign policy, not being tied down to a particular line of action through membership of a bloc. Third, India attempts to maintain friendly relations with all countries.

There are three possible misconceptions about the meaning of non-alignment. These misconceptions need to be cleared before we move into the analysis of non-alignment. First, as Nehru explained in Parliament, non-alignment (not being a party to military alliances) does not exclude close relationships with other countries. “So our policy”, said Nehru on March 8, 1949, “will continue to be not only to keep apart from alignments but trying to make friendly co-operation possible.”⁴⁷ The numerous agreements entered into by India with several nations since 1947, of cultural, economic and political (promotion of peace) character can testify to this desire to be friendly with all nations.⁴⁸

Second, non-alignment does not mean neutrality. As a policy, neutrality has little meaning except in times of war. India could be said to be neutral in as far as it decided

that it would not join either bloc in the Cold War. However, the term “neutrality” was inapplicable to India’s policy because it suggests that a country with such a policy had no positive opinions on the issues, which divided the blocs. On significant world issues, especially as they related to war and peace, India spoke clearly and with conviction. For example, it condemned the British and the French invasion of the Suez in 1956 as “naked aggression.” It belatedly condemned Soviet interference in Hungary in 1956. It also condemned North Korean troops marching into South Korea in 1950 to be “aggression.” Speaking at a press conference at the UN Correspondents’ Association, New York, in October 1960, Nehru brought out this aspect forcefully⁴⁹ and reiterated it in the Lok Sabha on November 22, 1960.⁵⁰

The third misconception is that non-alignment implied that when war broke out, India was bound to be neutral, but Nehru clarified in the Constituent Assembly on December 4, 1947 that non-alignment had nothing to do with neutrality or anything else or passivity.⁵¹ This shows that non-alignment does not mean a “middle-of-the-road policy” of “hedging and avoiding the pitfalls”⁵² or “sitting on the fence.” It is a positive, constructive policy aimed at trying to avoid hostility to other countries. Similarly, India fulfilled its obligations to the world community and took several constructive initiatives for world peace and international co-operation, sought to strengthen the UN, championed the freedom of nations and equality of races and highlighted the desirability of international co-operation for economic advancement of the industrially underdeveloped peoples. Additionally, India did not wish “to interfere in international affairs, except where we feel that we might be able to be of some help, ... but, “where India’s interests are directly threatened, whether in Goa or in Pakistan, we must have our say a loud say, a positive say. There we cannot remain quiet.”⁵³

According to one source, “non-alignment, thus, was a definite rejection of isolationist or classical neutralism and gradually dynamic involvement in the human situation.”⁵⁴ It should be observed that India’s policy of non-alignment was further linked with the economic interests of the country. The foreign policy of a country must be closely linked with its economic policy. India had achieved political independence, but not economic independence. It, therefore, needed time to make itself economically viable. A global war, or a third world war at that stage would have been disastrous to India, creating economic havoc, generating tremendous internal political and social pressures and turning it into a battle-field. Such developments could jeopardize the very existence of the Government itself.⁵⁵

Because of the need to improve the shattered economy of the country, remove social evils and reconstruct the educational system on modern lines, India was in great need of peace. One source stressed that India’s need for peace was imperative, that India had problems to face that would tax its energies and resources; that India needed peace in order to exist, in order to eat, to be clothed, housed and made literate.⁵⁶ Given these problems, the policy of non-alignment was most congenial. Apart from keeping India out of Cold War entanglements, it helped to create an arena of peace. India kept on friendly terms with both the blocs and received aid from them. India welcomed economic aid from wherever it came. Nehru observed that in accepting economic help, or getting political help, it was not wise to put all India’s eggs in one basket. Similarly, he continued, India was not to get help at the cost of its self-respect.⁵⁷

India was not prepared to subordinate its policies to those of the donor country because of aid. According to Nehru, India's policies could not be affected by such aid, that no strings should be attached to any kind of help that India got, that Indians would rather struggle through themselves without any help than have their policies affected in any way by outside pressure.⁵⁸

It can be observed that defence and security needs of India also dictated a policy of non-alignment. According to Nehru, "Every country's foreign policy, first of all, is concerned with its own security and with protecting its own progress ..."⁵⁹ Nehru further observed that a deliberate policy of friendship with other countries went farther in gaining security than almost anything else. Nehru had to adopt this stance because India was militarily very weak and insignificant at that time and this state of defence was to continue till it was adequately industrialized. As a potential great power, non-alignment would enable it to act as a go-between in relation to the two blocs, exert its influence by maintaining the balance and thereby enhancing its prestige.⁶⁰ According to one source, India's non-alignment, far from being based on a negation of power politics, was a calculated projection for power, and a move, with a difference of power politics.⁶¹

At first, several advantages accrued to India from following the policy of no-alignment. For instance, India gained a high and respectable place in world councils, disproportionate to its capacity and power. It also received aid from all sides. It was able to avoid violent conflicts and Cold War intrigues. It contributed constructively to the maintenance of world peace and was able to devote its meagre resources to the improvement of its people's standard of living.

But as an aftermath of the Chinese invasion of 1962, India's policy of non-alignment lost the unanimous support it previously enjoyed and has been greatly criticized in some quarters.⁶² For instance, one newspaper editorialized that the non-aligned countries, in deciding their foreign policies, were actually led "not to truth but fear of displeasure."⁶³ Critics also doubted the validity of the argument that non-alignment brought friends from everywhere after the lukewarm expressions of sympathy from other non-aligned countries on its appeal for support. The contention was that it was India that was isolated by its policy of non-alignment and not China. Thus, Malaya was the only country to support India openly while simultaneously it condemned Chinese aggression. It was argued that although India's non-alignment policy was not that bad, it nevertheless did not work in relation to China and, therefore, there was little reason left for the existence of the policy.⁶⁴ Thus, the Chinese attack had demonstrated the faultiness of non-alignment. The policy was further criticized in the sense that it had failed to provide security for India or to save it from a Cold or Hot war. According to one source, since aggression had occurred, there was nothing left to be non-aligned about.⁶⁵

In the same vein, on October 25, 1967, Nehru said in New Delhi that "massive invasion of India by China" had made India realize that it had been "out of touch with reality", and that he had been "shocked out of the artificial atmosphere of our own creation." Hitherto India had devoted itself mainly to economic development and paid little attention to defence. Indeed, India's defeat at the hands of the Chinese was also because of a miscalculation on the part of Nehru of the nature of Chinese intentions and their world power aspirations. India's defeat was also because of Nehru's pre-occupation with

global affairs which prevented him from paying due attention to the security problem of the country. It was only when the Chinese had entered India that India was awakened from its stupor and appealed to the West for military support.⁶⁶

According to one of the leading critiques of India's policy of non-alignment and its irrelevance in the context of the changed world situation, India was non-aligned in relation to the two opposing world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Since these powers were themselves non-aligned in their hostility to China, India, because of its own confrontation with China, was obviously in alignment with them.⁶⁷ Singh further observed non-alignment was merely a policy for national survival, not a moral concept.⁶⁸

The controversial reactions to the policy of non-alignment in the wake of the Chinese invasion reflected the failure of the Government to create a national consensus regarding its implications. Some scholars have argued that alignment with the West would have saved India from the humiliating Chinese invasion and invalidated the full significance of independence and integrity that India valued.⁶⁹ However, the non-alignment policy has been successful to the extent that the Sino-Indian conflict remained localized and did not become a cold war issue. Additionally, the representatives of both the United States and the Soviet Union themselves expressed appreciation of and interest in the continued maintenance of non-alignment by India. Non-alignment even became all the more relevant in the context of the new situation as shown by the increasing number of nations (including those in Africa as discussed later) adopting non-alignment as the guiding principle of their foreign policy and attending the non-aligned summit conferences.

However, the virtual identification of non-alignment with the whole of India's foreign policy instead of viewing it as only an aspect and an instrument of the policy, has blurred the proper perspective and tended to make it as an end in itself, divorced from national interest. As an end in itself, non-alignment is nothing but negative. A doctrinal faith in it deprives it of its realistic relevance.⁷⁰

Nevertheless, in the wake of the Chinese invasion, India's policy of non-alignment underwent some change. Until 1962, India had accepted only economic aid and rejected military aid from foreign countries, especially the US, while insisting that foreign bases and troops would not be permitted on Indian soil. But this step did not constitute a deviation from non-alignment as India received aid from both the eastern and western blocs simultaneously. In the same vein, many non-aligned countries such as Yugoslavia continued to be non-aligned while accepting military aid. As such, this development brought no fundamental change in India's non-aligned position, which remained the same even after Nehru's death.⁷¹

Reappraisal of Non-alignment

Most western analysts of Indian non-alignment view it in relation to a bipolarized world. They treat non-alignment as an effort to mediate the then superpower rivalries. In other words, as an effort to prevent global war.⁷² But this is not the only focus of non-alignment. In fact, there are more salient foci in non-alignment. It is a strategy to become involved in global politics rather than to stay away from bloc conflicts. Non-alignment is a strategy to gain influence, despite the condition of material weakness and to gain influence on the cheap, that is, at a low-risk strategy.⁷³

Similarly, Indian non-alignment is not simply a response to nuclear weapons; neither was it a response to the then Cold War, as is usually asserted.⁷⁴ Whereas there was a response to these phenomena, there was also a response to the Sino-Soviet conflict, just as there was a response against the US-Pakistan military alliance. In other words, India's reactions to US behaviour need to be emphasized more than is usually done by North America authors.

Another point to consider about Indian non-alignment is that it is not wholly true that neutralism "describes the ambition of men or states to seek by political means and, if successful, to maintain by any means, an international position equidistant in political and military terms from the great powers."⁷⁵ The notion of equidistant applies to India's rejection of military alliances. However, it does not relate to India's political-economic and cultural-intellectual relations with the United States and China and the major foreign powers; neither did it relate to India's relations with the then Soviet Union.

It is also not true that the "development of new power centres, especially in Paris and Peking, complicates the neutralist ambition."⁷⁶ Conversely, we can argue that alternative power centres (in addition to Washington and Moscow) provide an opportunity for India to offset the dependence on bipolar activity as it happened during the Cold War era.

Most western scholars have a mistaken view of Indian non-alignment. It is regarded as reactive diplomacy⁷⁷ or as a consequence, a symptom of a larger global conflict.⁷⁸ Vital suggests that non-alignment is not tenable as a doctrine because of material and technical reasons rather than due to political reasons; that the condition is as a result of dependence on foreign sources of assistance of different kinds.⁷⁹ It is also viewed as a repudiation of the traditional machinery of power politics.⁸⁰ The same source regards non-alignment to be relevant only in so far as it relates to the central balance.⁸¹

Statements from the West for and against non-alignment are that: non-alignment seeks to avoid entanglement in great-power disputes; that it seeks to avoid war and to achieve peace; that it is a posture of independence and unavailability; that it represents or appears to represent a posture of moral superiority;⁸² that it is more reactive than innovative diplomacy;⁸³ and that it is a substitute for balance of power.⁸⁴

It is important to recognize that some criticisms of non-alignment have merit. This is because statements by non-aligned nations conveyed a moral tone that invited resentment about the self-righteousness of the weaker states. Non-alignment critics are also right to suggest that, as a policy and strategy, non-alignment has the best chance of success if a non-aligned state has armed power to protect its interests.⁸⁵

That said, some criticisms need careful consideration against the background of India's past and present experiences with non-alignment. Non-alignment comprises strategic and tactical processes, which are frequently used by states both without and within formal alliances. The following observations suffice.

First, the doctrine and practice of non-alignment suggest that it is a form of power politics. The first point to note in this regard is that a non-aligned state does not seek to avoid entanglement in great power disputes; rather it avoids entanglement in a formal alliance structure while it remains free to be informally involved in great-power disputes. The second point, to do with availability, is premised upon three possibilities: the non-

aligned actor may not be available exclusively to one side; or it may not be available at all; or it may be available sometimes provided its interests are not hurt.

The third point has to do with the fact that “the availability of non-alignment as a policy has been and is related to particular phases of the power-balance,”⁸⁶ which is really obvious. However, two important questions are asked: how has the position of the non-aligned states affected the central balance? How has the changing central balance affected the viability of non-alignment?⁸⁷ What is “the” central balance? In face of the changes in the past several decades, we contend that the “central balance” is far from being central, since, for instance, in the 1970s, there were at least three kinds of prevailing balances: the Soviet-US military balance; the Sino-Soviet military balance; and the Soviet-US-Chinese “triangle” functioning as a balance.⁸⁸

According to scholars of the Cold War, the Soviet-US struggle and military balance represented the central balance. But the Sino-Soviet split compels one to regard this conflict as another central conflict that consequently diminishes the centrality of the Soviet-US conflict. There was a re-orientation in US foreign policy as a result of the Sino-Soviet split. The policy of non-alignment contributed to the changing nature of the emerging balances. So non-alignment is not necessarily on “opting out” of the big power struggle, but it can be something more than reactive. Thus, non-alignment is more than a response to an external stimulus.

Second, most Western scholars analyze non-alignment in the context of a dichotomy between great and small powers and between aligned and non-aligned states. But the problem need not be with the ranking of power; rather it is with the implication of initiative and influence that this attributed to a great power. It is important to note that the structure and process of the international system as it deals with non-alignment, is perceived and conceived as if only the great powers have effect on the behaviour of the lesser powers. The implication is one of a one-side causality, which requires scrutiny.⁸⁹

The problem concerns the range of choice, which a non-aligned actor possesses. The claim is that the range of choice is limited and that the framework of choice for a non-aligned actor is set by superpower or great power behaviour.

Third, non-alignment is tied to bipolarity and the Cold War. One source asserts that non-alignment had an “almost exclusive Cold War locus.” He further claims that up to 1962, discussions of non-alignment “had proceeded essentially on the assumption of bipolarity. More important, the non-aligned states, India included, based their policies on that assumption.”⁹⁰ The claim that India’s strategy existed “essentially” in a bipolar framework is unconvincing. India’s military-political encounter, with China in 1962 does not prove that India viewed the international system in terms of superpower bipolarity. On the contrary, the 1962 encounter confirmed earlier Indian views that the international system was permeated with bipolar activity at the nuclear level and balance of power activity at the sub—atomic level. Thus, Indian non-alignment strategy held that there were more than two policy centres in the world. The policy prescription was that more than two policy centres ought to be developed further and Asian responses to bipolarized activity ought to be developed. The concern was to reduce extreme bipolar activity, not eliminate zero-sum activity. These are two separate ideas, which most scholars from the West have failed to distinguish.

It is true that the 1962 India-China encounter invalidated Nehru's assumption that India was protected by a balance of power and that there was no immediate military danger to India from China. This, however, did not invalidate Nehru's policy approach, which involved recognizing the need to encourage zero-sum activity within and between the Soviet-US and the Sino-Soviet pairs because this was to India's advantage. The price India paid in the 1962 crisis was to alter its public view about China's sincerity and friendship. Additionally, the price included the cost of modernizing India's defence machinery. There was also the economic and political cost involved in organizing the Indo-Soviet relationship on an anti-China basis. Although the tangible cost was high, this was compensated for by access which India gained to sophisticated Soviet military equipment and by the claim India could make for Soviet support against China.⁹¹ Against this background, it is difficult to argue that India really paid an intolerable price for the 1962 crisis, other than in terms of a bruised ego. Moreover, there is no evidence to show that India's premise about the need to encourage zero-sum activity between the Soviet-US and the Sino-Soviet pairs altered after 1962. In other words, the price was in terms of India-China relations and not in terms of Indo-Soviet and Indo-US relations.⁹²

Fourth, some scholars regard non-alignment as a problem of third-party mediation and third-party intervention. Whereas some distinguish between the theoretical function of mediation and the function of balancing,⁹³ others regard it as a problem in terms of the relationship between the ability and right of third parties to intervene in the great issues that confront the great powers. According to H. Kissinger, "As for the uncommitted, they cannot eat their cake and have it too. They cannot remain uncommitted and seek to act as arbiters of all disputes at the same time."⁹⁴ But Kissinger does not explain why the uncommitted cannot act as arbiters; neither does he explain why commitment to one party to a dispute is crucial for purposes of intervention and mediation; nor does he give the impression that non-alignment implies non-commitment. Instead, he argues that non-aligned states are not necessarily wise; that they are incapable and are not knowledgeable about superpower attitudes and priorities.⁹⁵ Other Western scholars claim that non-aligned states are not impartial.⁹⁶ They claim that non-aligned states are not immune from external pressure in their domestic politics and that, therefore, they cannot be free from external influence in their third-party role.⁹⁷ Others claim that non-aligned states had a self-interest to profit from the Cold War.⁹⁸ The last argument is that non-aligned states are "advisors" rather than stabilizers in world politics, because they are generally anti-status quo.⁹⁹ This suffices as far as non-alignment as a major principle in Indian foreign policy is concerned.

Peaceful Co-existence

The principle of peaceful co-existence, which forms part of the foreign policy of India is not new. It is worthy to note that it is a recognized principle of international law and international politics that no state shall interfere in the domestic affairs of another; that the form of government is the concern of the people of the country concerned. However, India made this principle more sacrosanct by including it in Part IV of the Constitution that deals with Directive Principles. According to Article 51, "the state shall endeavour to promote international peace and security, maintain just and honourable relations between nations, foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings

of organized people with one another, and encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration.” India was eager to adopt this policy in its relations with other countries after it had become a sovereign republic because it had attained independence through cooperation and friendship.

As such, peaceful co-existence is another aspect of India’s foreign policy that is complementary to the policy of non-alignment. This policy arose from India’s vital need to accommodate different religious views and cultures. It also arose from the need to devote enough time to solve the numerous economic and social problems confronting India. Indian foreign policy is, therefore, determined by its domestic policy. India refused to join alliances, which instead of promoting peace, created an atmosphere of rivalry. This enabled it to reduce tension and assisted in implementing agreement between rivals wherever possible.

Nehru propounded the five principles of co-existence of ‘Panch Sheel’ for the first time in the preamble to the Sino-Indian Agreement on trade with Tibet on April 29, 1954. The Panch Sheel which Nehru explained as India’s answer to the doctrine of security pacts, has five norms of international behaviour. They are: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non interference in each other’s individual affairs; equality and mutual advantage; and peaceful co-existence and economic co-operation.¹⁰⁰

According to Nehru, ‘*Panchsheel*’ means “peaceful settlement, and above all, non interference” of any kind, political, economic or ideological.¹⁰¹ He explained that “The concept of Panchsheel means that there may be different ways of progress, possibly different outlooks, but that, broadly, the ultimate objective may be the same.”¹⁰² The essence of Panchsheel, therefore, is that “we welcome friendship and association with all and the flow of thought and ideas of all kinds, but we reserve the right to choose our own path.”¹⁰³ These principles governed India’s relations with China as well as with other countries. India’s major objective has always been the promotion and maintenance of world peace. To this end, India has renounced the use of force in the settlement of disputes, thereby preferring solution of disputes by peaceful means. In brief, force has been replaced by persuasion, mediation and conciliation as a means of solving disputes.¹⁰⁴

Indeed, more disputes have been solved by discussion and agreement than by resort to war. For instance, truces were secured in Korea, Indo-China and Kashmir. Progress was achieved over nuclear disarmament; the principle of international control and inspection was accepted by the then Soviet Union after years of negotiation. The canal waters dispute between India and Pakistan was settled. Similarly, the differences between the two countries over border adjustments were also successfully resolved. Thus, India has always tried to be on the side of peace in cases of conflict in global affairs. In other words, “peaceful co-existence” was and is an ethical principle as it is meant to be substitute for war. However, simultaneous, it is of expediency as its articulation was accompanied by efforts to increase India’s power.

Thus, peaceful co-existence was a strategy that appealed to India for two reasons. First, India was economically and militarily weak; so peaceful co-existence gave it valuable time to find security through diplomacy with two socialist giants who were involved in

zero-sum activity with the United States and who would have reacted strongly against India. Second, peaceful co-existence helped to reduce India's dependence on the Sino-Soviet bloc and to induce Chinese and Soviet involvement on India's behalf against US intervention in sub-continental affairs.

In other words, the strategy of peaceful co-existence was based on policy premises that differed from Western premises. It included an assessment of the role of military power in the nuclear age and the limited utility of military alliances between small states and the great powers.

Indian Policy in Relation to the United Nations

India has been associated with the UN since its inception. It is one of the fifty-one original members which participated in the drafting of the Charter of San Francisco in 1945. On October 30 of that year, India became its member. Nehru declared India's faith in and support to the UN as early as 1946.¹⁰⁵

The UN is a great source of inspiration to those uncommitted nations. According to one authoritative source, India: "urged the United Nations to develop into a truly international institution of world wide prestige."¹⁰⁶ This was the achievement of the ideals of human rights, economic development, freedom of dependent peoples and end of racial discrimination. It is worth noting that in the very first session of the General Assembly in 1946, India played a leading role in raising the question of racial discrimination against the people of Indian origin in South Africa, as we shall see later. Nevertheless, India was relentlessly opposed to the policy of apartheid until majority rule ensued in 1994, with the election of Nelson Mandela as the first black president of South Africa.

India was also opposed to the establishment of organizations for collective self-defence despite the fact that it is within the framework of the UN Charter as it leads to consolidation of power blocs. As such, India tried to do away with Cold War politics.¹⁰⁷ In the same vein, in 1950, India opposed the Unity for Peace Resolution on the ground that it would give United Nations Force a "compulsive" rather than a "mediatory role" which would not help in creating a proper atmosphere for peace.¹⁰⁸

India desired to eliminate want, disease and illiteracy that affect the greater part of the world. It, therefore, voted for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved by the UN on December 10, 1948.¹⁰⁹

It has fully participated in the work of the specialized agencies of the UN. It finds this international approach to economic and technical help more desirable than assistance through bilateral relations.¹¹⁰

India is of the view that the Charter should reflect the changing world circumstances. The object of India's policy is in the direction of maintaining peace and co-existence amidst manoeuvres of the Great Powers. India attaches greater importance to practical organization than to its structure and theoretical principles. "So, the necessity to operate smoothly the machinery of the United Nations as it stands today should be accorded greater urgency than wrangling over the changes in the charter."¹¹¹ When the Charter was being framed, India was one of the twenty-eight countries that voted for its revision

within ten years. The Indian delegate was of the strong view that the voting procedure in the Security Council be re-examined at the end of ten years.¹¹²

India favoured an increase in the membership of the UN until 1962. India vigorously, and consistently supported the representation of the Peoples Republic of China in the UN. This is because India believed that the UN should not be made an exclusive club of like-minded nations. Rather it should reflect the world as it is.¹¹³ In the General Assembly, K. Menon declared that this step would be “the most substantial contribution towards establishing stability in southeast Asia and towards providing for non-interference in the affairs of other states and for arrangements on non-aggression.”¹¹⁴ India’s stand was vindicated when China was fully admitted in the UN.

India’s policy has been one of fully supporting the UN in its work of peace keeping and peaceful settlement of disputes. It has variously sought to strengthen the peace keeping role of the UN through the work of its medical mission in Korea in 1953, its record as the Chairman of the Neutral Repatriation Commission, its contribution to the UN Emergency Force in Ghaza and Lebanon and its role in supporting the UN in finding a solution to the Congo Crisis.

Championing the cause of disarmament has also been an object of India’s policy in the UN. As such, India is a member of the 18-National Disarmament Committee. It is also a signatory of the Moscow Test Ban Treaty which was signed in August 1963.¹¹⁵

India’s faith in the UN is also evident from the fact that in spite of being a victim of Pakistani aggression, it responded to the appeal of the UN regarding cease-fire and its faith in the goodness of the world body continues. According to Nehru, “In spite of these faults, the United Nations serves an essential purpose and if we did not have it today, undoubtedly countries will have to come close to build up something like it again.”¹¹⁶

In order to achieve most of its foreign policy objectives, India has invoked the UN mainly as a vehicle of communication. As regards pursuit of peace, it has invoked the UN mainly as a vehicle of negotiations.¹¹⁷ India, therefore, favours the strengthening of the hands of the UN and making it a more effective body. Thus, among the major aims of India’s policy in the UN have been the desire to bring together the divergent points of view and to seek to heal a breach that may eventually spell disaster for humankind.

Indian Policy of Anti-Colonialism and Anti-Racialism

No doubt, India has been one of the major champions of the freedom of subjected people the world over. It has always raised its voice against the colonial and racial policies of imperialist powers. Having itself suffered at the hands of British colonialism, India sympathized with those countries that were under colonial domination. Thus, the political emancipation of the colonized, has received India’s consistent support. As Nehru said advisedly: “Let us by all means put an end to what remains of colonialism in Asia, in Africa and wherever else it exists.”¹¹⁸ India has, therefore, favoured an end to colonialism wherever it reared its ugly head, be it in Asia, Africa or elsewhere. As such, it has supported independence movements in Indonesia, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, etc. Its own interests also determined India’s anti-colonial policy, for colonialism was still strong and tenacious during the 1950s and there were foreign pockets within India itself

and colonialism was a real and live problem for the newly awakened peoples of Asia and Africa.¹¹⁹

Not only did India want the termination of colonialism because of the threat it posed to it and because it was interested in the liberation of the millions of people in Asia and Africa, it also wanted the demise of colonialism to facilitate the economic and political development of all Asian countries, including India itself.¹²⁰

As such, India was not looked upon with favour by imperialists because of its policy of “lashing out against every vestige of colonialism.”¹²¹ The imperialists could not reconcile themselves to the fact that India’s foreign policy “runs directly counter to the USA’s main aim: to line up the free nations of the world against communism.”¹²²

Abolition of racial discrimination is another principle to which India adhered strictly.¹²³ Some races, due to their progress in knowledge or invention coupled with their success in war and conquest, wrongly believe that they are racially superior and hence treat other races with contempt. They also discriminate on grounds of the colour of the skin. Historically, white people have looked down upon “coloured” and black people and subjected them to tyranny and oppression.

Until majority rule in 1994, India vigorously opposed the policy of apartheid in South Africa. It was India which initially raised the “question of the treatment of the people of Indian Origin in the Union of South Africa” and the issue of racial discrimination in that country before the UN in 1946, a year before it attained independence.¹²⁴ Since then, it has struggled in the UN to eradicate racial discrimination in South Africa despite the support Africa had from Britain, the United States and other Western powers as we shall see later.

India’s Commonwealth Ties

Upon attaining independence, India severed its links with Britain. However, it retained its membership of the Commonwealth of nations. India took this step because it did not wish to remain isolated as it set to follow a policy of “working for peace and friendship with all countries and of avoiding alignments with power blocs.”¹²⁵ However, India’s membership of the Commonwealth did not affect its sovereignty. According to Nehru, “the Sovereign Indian Republic, freely associating herself with other countries of the Commonwealth, will be completely free to follow this policy, perhaps in an even greater measure with greater influence than before.”¹²⁶ He added that a nation does not lose its independence by an alliance with another country.¹²⁷

Besides, the Commonwealth is not a “super-state.” In fact, “as far as the constitution of India is concerned, the king has no place as we shall owe no allegiance to him.”¹²⁸ This is clarified in the declaration on India’s membership of the Commonwealth of April 19, 1949 which states that: “This new Republic of India completely sovereign and owing no allegiance to the king, as the other Commonwealth countries do owe, will nevertheless be a full member of the Commonwealth and she agrees that the king will be recognized as a symbol of this free partnership or rather association.”¹²⁹

It is important to recognize that India’s association with the Commonwealth did not jeopardize its interest. On the contrary, this association proved advantageous to it.

According to Nehru, "We join the Commonwealth obviously because we think it beneficial to us and to certain causes in the world that we wish to advance."¹³⁰ India's initial association with the Commonwealth was remarkable because it did not bind it down in any way. Instead, it gave the country certain advantages without India accepting any liabilities in return. By remaining in the Commonwealth, India had better chances of being able to influence larger policies of the Commonwealth.¹³¹

India's immediate considerations in retaining its membership of the Commonwealth had to do with the problem of lack of an alternative to Dominion status, which included membership of the Commonwealth. Such a link would help retain the loyalty of the British dominated civil and defence services and facilitate negotiations with rulers of princely states for integration with the rest of India. Additionally, it was to India's interest and advantage to "retain an international connection – a window on the world which automatically came her way – at a time when she was just launched on the world scene and her foreign policy and diplomacy were only beginning to shape."¹³²

Apart from these short-term considerations, there were long-term interests, which also influenced the Indian Government's decision. These interests had to do with trade, defence, economic assistance and Indian settlers in Commonwealth countries.

Since 1947, the bulk of India's trade has been with Britain where for a long time, its exports enjoyed the benefit of Commonwealth preference. This worked to India's advantage. In the same vein, India's armed forces were organized on the British pattern. They, therefore, relied mainly on Britain for defence equipment. This necessitated India remaining in the Commonwealth.

Regarding India's interest in the well being of its nationals who had settled in Commonwealth countries, it was felt that India's membership of the Commonwealth would help India to get in touch with the "legitimate aspirations" of these people. According to Nehru, the major reason for India's remaining in the Commonwealth, was the large number of Indians living abroad in the then British colonies or dependencies would be in a better position than they would otherwise be.¹³³ However, the most important advantage was that "It gave India the opportunity to forge without any direct commitment or alignment, a partial 'affiliation' with the West."¹³⁴

India's decision to retain the Commonwealth membership was also influenced by the consideration that it would provide an additional link and channel of communication with Pakistan.¹³⁵ The major Indian objective was to neutralize any excessive British partiality for Pakistan.¹³⁶

Indian Foreign Policy in the Post Nehru Epoch

The golden epoch of India in global affairs ended with the death of Nehru. Lal bahadur Shastri, his successor, had no experience in foreign affairs, neither did he have independent views on foreign affairs. As such, there was no change from the path curved by Nehru.¹³⁷ Shastri declared in a speech in Parliament that India desired to remain friendly with all countries.¹³⁸

There were no radical innovations in foreign policy. Rather, there was further development of trends whose origin could be traced in many cases, to the last years of the Nehru administration.

Thus, although the circumstances in which non-alignment policy was propounded had considerably changed, Shastri continued to subscribe to it. In his own words, "Non-alignment will continue to be the fundamental of our approach to world problems and our relations with other countries."¹³⁹ In London, December 1964, he disclosed to the British Premier that there would be "no deviation" from the path of policy laid down by Nehru. Nevertheless, acceptance of military assistance from both the United States and the then Soviet Union, was a change in India's pre-1962 brand of non-alignment. However, it did not in itself signify the abandonment or compromise of non-alignment. Until the end of 1962, India had rejected external military assistance in the belief that it would compromise the purity of its non-alignment policy.¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, it became a symbol in whose name many policies could be pursued. These policies, a few years earlier, would have been rejected in the name of the non-alignment policy. "As long as India's promiscuity was total", according to one source, "the minimal tenets of non-alignment were considered as properly adhered to." As such, "To be aligned with every-body now seemed to be as acceptable as being aligned with nobody."¹⁴¹

However, adherence to non-alignment did not prevent its reinterpretation. Variations to the extent of changing completely the contents were allowed as long as freedom of manoeuvre on the global or international arena was preserved. As Nehru's epoch came to a close and throughout the Shastri period, non-alignment was deprived of its military dimensions with the bid to admonish the powerful states in the world. It was, instead, applied in a more modest geographic context.¹⁴²

The government of India no longer believed that non-alignment in itself could ensure security. In other words, non-alignment was no longer treated as an end in itself, but as a pragmatic and utilitarian view, that is to say, as a means of promoting India's interests. Although the policy was adopted, it could be abandoned whenever it was established that it did not promote India's interests.

It is important to observe that: "in promoting the same old objectives by the same old means, post Nehru India abandoned the idealistic and doctrinaire postures that were so characteristic of Nehru's India." As such, the Government was now much more pragmatic.¹⁴³

Thus, Shastri followed the footsteps of Nehru. Mrs. Indira Gandhi also followed the footsteps of her father, Nehru, as well as her predecessor, Shastri. Mrs. Gandhi favoured the adoption of the policy of non-alignment. However, her approach was more realistic than idealistic. Whereas her Government was opposed to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, it did not subscribe to the view that India would never "go nuclear." Thus, whereas India under Nehru enthusiastically signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, India under his daughter as Premier, declined to sign the draft nuclear non-proliferation treaty during her term of office. Her government felt that the draft was not in conformity with some of the significant provisions of the UN General Assembly resolution of November 19, 1965 and that it ignored the security interests of India in relation to China. Under Mrs. Gandhi's administration, India followed the policy of non-alignment,

although it did not make tall claims for it. India upheld the representation of the People's Republic of China. In the UN, India remained opposed to military pacts and alliances and foreign military bases although it ceased to denounce them as vocally and persistently as before. Although Nehru vehemently denounced even the possibility of foreign forces on India's soil, his successors did not even refer to the issue. One author summarizes it thus: "... post-Nehru India has learnt to avoid patently idealistic, moralistic, and doctrinaire postures, statements, and actions in world affairs."¹⁴⁴

As regards China, Nehru had insisted that there was no question of negotiation with China unless China accepted all the provisions of the Colombo proposals. However, after Nehru, there was a move towards negotiations with China. As far back as December 1964, Shastri said that India was prepared for talks with China.¹⁴⁵

During Mrs. Gandhi's administration, the talk of negotiations with China increased. On February 16, 1966, while speaking in Parliament, she disclosed that India was prepared to talk with China "should proper conditions arise."¹⁴⁶ On May 16, 1974, in an interview with two Bangladesh journalists, she reiterated her desire for friendly relations with the People's Republic of China.¹⁴⁷ She maintained this position even during her second administration.

Upon the fall of the Janata Government, Indira Gandhi once again assumed state power in January 1980 and remained in office until her assassination on October 31, 1984. During her second administration, she tried to mend fences with the US, but without impairing India's friendship with the Soviet Union. However, there were several important events that she faced.

First, the Afghanistan crisis. Since 1979, India's stand on Afghanistan had been openly pro-Soviet. Thus, during this period, India did nothing to ensure the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, a focal point on which depended, to a large extent, India's relations not only with Pakistan, but also with the big powers. As such, India concluded that the only effective solution of the Afghan problem would be a settlement between the superpowers. Indian spokesmen had often supported the Soviet stand that it would withdraw its forces from Afghan soil only if the US and other hostile powers did not interfere with a non-aligned Afghan regime friendly to the Soviet Union. New Delhi's ambiguous policy on this issue had brought it much discredit and made it a target of further criticism from the West.¹⁴⁸

The second event was the recognition of the Heng Samrin Government. In 1980, Mrs. Gandhi recognized the Kampuchean Government headed by Heng Samrin. To many observers, India took this step to oblige the Soviet Union because Samrin's government was its protégé.¹⁴⁹

Regarding Sino-Indian relations, January 1981 saw the initiation of high-level talks between India and China to sort out the pending issues. Premier Gandhi held talks with the Chinese leaders in Salsburg and Belgrade on mutual interests. In June 1981, Huang Hua, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister visited India. January 1983 saw a high-level Indian delegation visit China for diplomatic talks. Another significant development that occurred during the second administration of Premier Gandhi was the beginning of official level ticklish boundary problem.¹⁵⁰

Regarding Indo-US relations, July 1982 saw Premier Indira Gandhi visit Washington for nine days. She undertook the visit after eleven years. The visit, therefore, afforded both parties the opportunity to understand each other and remove misgivings between them. She among other things, tried to convince Washington to remove American resistance to IMF loan and supply of nuclear fuel for Tarapur. In both respects, she succeeded. Her talks with President Reagan also facilitated the resumption of annual bilateral consultation on a regular basis and led to better cooperation in the economic, scientific and technical fields. Despite this, basic differences in West and South Asia, the Indian Ocean and South East Asia, continued to persist.¹⁵¹

In March 1982, India hosted the seventh NAM Summit. During the summit, Indira Gandhi was elected its chairperson for the next three years. November 1982 witnessed the successful organization of the Asian Games in India. In 1983, the Commonwealth Summit was also held in New Delhi, in which forty-eight countries participated. The hosting of these functions demonstrated India's confidence and organizational capabilities that enhanced its image in the world, especially in the developing countries.¹⁵²

Rajiv Gandhi became Prime Minister of India after the assassination of his mother, Indira Gandhi, in October 1984. In the same year, he won a huge majority in the *Lok Sabha* election and continued in office up to December. He followed the foreign policy of Nehru and Indira Gandhi and re-affirmed his faith in the UN, the NAM, and opposition to colonialism. This was in his very first broadcast to the nation on November 12, 1984. He also indicated his determination to work for narrowing international economic disparities; develop closer relations with immediate neighbours; pursue a policy of non-interference, peaceful co-existence and non-alignment; promised to pursue the concept of common regional development of South Asia; improvement and strengthening of relations with China, the Soviet Union and the United States; to carry on relentless crusade against arms race; to promote dialogue between the North and South to build a just world economic order. He attempted to pursue the US and other neighbouring countries, but also made frantic efforts to promote international peace, nuclear disarmament and great economic cooperation between North and South.¹⁵³

An assessment of Rajiv Gandhi's record in the first four years, i.e. between 1984 and 1988, shows that he was more successful in the foreign policy sector than in his handling of domestic affairs. He was triumphant in China and Pakistan following his visit there in December 1988 and July 1989 respectively. He also succeeded in the Maldives operation. President Gorbachev's visit to India in November 1988 also added a positive mark, as six agreements were signed during his visit. Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China and Pakistan raised prospects of happier relations with both these countries. Rajiv Gandhi's China visit, the first since 1954 by an Indian Premier, opened up new vistas of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. The visits can be described as a "success within limits."¹⁵⁴

December 1989 witnessed the formation of the National Front Government headed by V.P. Singh. At this time, great changes were sweeping the entire world. The Cold War ending in warm friendship between the US and the Soviet Union. The power blocs had vanished, former rivals had become friends, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union opted

for a multi-party polity and a market economy. East Germany had been swallowed by West Germany in a unification pact. Japan and the Soviet Union were coming closer and new friendship elsewhere had been forged. It was a new world scenario. In this changed scenario, it appeared as if India would have no more role to play in global affairs. The leaders of the NAM themselves were in a state of doubt about their future. Nevertheless, it was felt that the relaxation of tension in some parts of the world notwithstanding, the policy of force, intervention and pressure was still present in several trouble spots and potential theatres of conflicts, for instance, Iraq's forcible occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 and the subsequent Gulf War One.

V.P. Singh's administration had mixed results in the arena of international relations, although India's gains exceeded the losses in terms of both prestige and concrete results.

As regards India's relations with Nepal, New Delhi had to reconcile Nepal's legitimate desire to remain non-aligned as between its two giant neighbours with India's security sensitivities. The restoration of friendly relations with Nepal, the resumption of trade ties and the implicit exclusion of other countries from "fishing" in Nepal for economic and political gains had been notable gains of the V.P. Singh era.¹⁵⁵

For India-Afghanistan relations, Singh consolidated further New Delhi's gains regarding Kabul, by maintaining close ties with Afghanistan, especially with President Najibullah, who visited India in August 1990. Both leaders called for the observance of the principles of peaceful co-existence.¹⁵⁶

The Sri Lanka adventure was in several ways, New Delhi's worst and costliest foreign policy blunder of the Rajiv era. The hastily Rajiv-Jayewardene accord of July, 1987 misfired. Singh felt convinced that New Delhi had made a mistake in sending its forces to the Island Republic. By December 1989, these forces had not been withdrawn. Singh, however, won Sri Lanka's goodwill by withdrawing all India's forces before the March 31, deadline. The improvement in relations with Sri Lanka was a remarkable foreign policy gain on the part of New Delhi.¹⁵⁷

Relations with Bangladesh also improved during the V.P. Singh era. Several misunderstandings disappeared.¹⁵⁸

However, in the case of Indo-Pakistan relations, there were setbacks. These were due to the hostile postures of the fundamentalists and the disturbing developments in Kashmir Valley for which Pakistan was largely responsible.¹⁵⁹

Relations with China involved the continuation of dialogue, maintenance of cordial atmosphere and seeking such gains through negotiations. But the territorial dispute remained unresolved. On the other hand, bilateral trade increased.¹⁶⁰

New Delhi's relations with Washington improved partly as a sequel to international developments and the gradual erosion of the pro-Pakistan bias. Washington had welcomed New Delhi's condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The US, therefore, favoured larger World Bank and IMF assistance to India in face of the economic hardships caused by the Gulf Crisis. Tough decisions were made by Washington about Islamabad. However, habitual critics in the US expressed displeasure with what they described as "muted condemnation" of Iraq by New Delhi.¹⁶¹

Relations with the Soviet Union had to take note of the situation there. By the 1989-1990 period, developments in the Soviet Union meant that the energies of the Kremlin would be increasingly devoted to the complex problems of evolving a new political structure and finding a basis for resolving its immense economic problems. The role of the Soviet Union was increasingly becoming less world oriented. Despite this, Premier V.P. Singh visited Moscow in July 1990. He and M. Gorbachev reaffirmed the two countries' traditional ties of friendship. They also agreed to readjust their economic and trade relations in the light of the dramatic changes taking place in the world. On the Kashmir issue, Moscow affirmed its stand and agreed that the issue should not be internationalized. Moscow removed the apprehension of a change in the Kremlin's stand following the détente and the changed international situation.¹⁶²

However, V.P. Singh could not lay the foundation for the substantive development of India's international relations in an era of rapid change and could not give up the approaches and strategies, which were out-dated as his Government fell in November 1990. This was just one year before the completion of his tenure.¹⁶³

In the initial months of Narasimaha Rao's administration, India's foreign policy suffered several blunders and fiasco, although it picked up with time. This is because by the time he became Premier after the June 1991 Lok Sabha elections, the process of change was making rapid strides in the world. Ideological barriers were crumbling, maps were being redrawn, power equations were re-written, old friends were no longer strategic allies, and the super-powers were no longer rivals. This was also a time when many nations with whom India had close ties were emerging from a four-decade deep freeze to discover that the old virtues of ethnic and political strife were still prevalent. In this changing world, there was an urgent need for discarding old values and out-moded techniques and initiating new moves in foreign relations. At that juncture, New Delhi required diplomatic self-confidence that it was lacking. There appeared to have been virtually no new thinking in the foreign policy arena since India discovered non-alignment. However, although the end of the Cold War shook the entire edifice of non-alignment, India continued to prefer to cling to the ideological baggage of non-alignment.¹⁶⁴

In conclusion, we concur with A. Hall that "the old foreign policy of India remains intact, and though subjected to various distorting forces, it shows a strong tendency to continue in the same channels fore-seen for it by Nehru."¹⁶⁵ In the same vein, we concur with M.S. Rajan that whatever change one may detect in Indian foreign policy in recent times, such a change would be more of "emphasis, style and tone (largely due to change of personalities at the helm of affairs) than of substances."¹⁶⁶ Although these observations were made in 1966-1967 and 1968-1969 respectively, they remain relevant.

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African Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Africa has been a region of sharp political and social contrast. With majority rule attained in South Africa in 1994, the entire continent is now liberated from colonial rule. But this does not mean that the entire continent is now homogeneous. For these liberated countries, most of them have undergone the first stage of the national liberation revolutions – the period of broad, generally similar nation wide movements and political coalitions born of the accumulated antagonistic contradictions between the entire masses of the colonies and the colonial powers. The situation began to change after the first stage and today, republics exist side by side with kingdoms and until the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, socialist-oriented countries existed side by side with neo-colonial regimes.

The Cardinal Principles and Factors in African Foreign Policy

The character of any country's foreign policy hinges on whose class interests political power in the country represents. Simultaneously, the record shows that in African countries, political power cannot grow stronger without pursuing a progressive foreign policy. New African countries differ substantially in the type of their social systems, the levels of economic development, the international ties they have established and in many other aspects. However, on the international scene, they have all been united in their anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, struggle for genuine sovereignty, economic and social progress.

The growing influence and role of liberated countries in global affairs is a distinct feature of contemporary diplomatic history. This dynamic and positive development bodes well for Africa. Today, over fifty countries in the UN belong to the African group. They account for about ten per cent of the world population. Although this is important, other factors are more significant.

In the first place, national liberation has made great strides. The people of Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principé, the Cape Verde Islands, Angola, Djibouti, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa have won their political independence at last.

Second, the positive socio-political evolution of numerous newly independent states, their choice of socialist orientation enhanced their role in the struggle for peace and international security, in the Cold War world revolutionary process.

Third, before the end of the Cold War, there was the great activity and initiative of African countries toward radically restructuring international political and economic relations.

Fourth, the stronger friendship and cooperation between African states and socialist countries before the end of the Cold War did much to determine the weight of each independent country on the international scene. The views of African countries and those of the socialist countries either coincided or loosely approximated each other.¹

Finally, there has been a change in the status of African countries in the world capitalist economy, industrial production and the system of external economic ties. The rise in the economic significance of such ties, coupled with the substantially increased share in the imports of all types of commodities from these countries to the major capitalist nations, generally enhanced the political role of the former in international affairs, too.

African countries also advocated for a system of international relations that would eliminate the disgraceful when millions still suffered from colonial exploitation. "We want détente to meet the interests of all peoples", Mohamed Said Mazouzi, member of the Political Bureau of the Party of the National Liberation Front of Algeria, emphasized in his message of greetings to the 26th Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress, "and to help those nations that are still suffering under the yoke of colonialism to gain self-determination and resist imperialism, which is continuing its attempts to impose its domination on the world, and to preserve unjust regimes and inequitable international relations."²

Elimination of colonial rule was the first issue to generate African activity in international affairs. This was jointly with the world's progressive forces. At the 15th session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union advanced the historic proposal on immediate and complete elimination of colonialism in all its forms. African countries welcomed and supported the Soviet Union's initiative. The UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and peoples. In the subsequent years, African nations and socialist countries worked finally and successfully toward its implementation. In the course of this struggle, fascism collapsed in Portugal and so did the last colonial empire in 1974. The Ian Smith's racist regime in Zimbabwe crumbled in 1979. The new victories in the anti-colonial revolution opened an important stage in the drive toward complete and final liberation of Africa. They were a serious blow to imperialists.³

African countries' growing role in world politics was amidst the distinctive political front of their own, derived from the existence of a racist minority regime in South Africa. The apartheid regime constantly threatened advancement of the liberation movement. Especially in the 1980s, the authorities of the Republic of South Africa acted under the aegis of their imperialist sponsors and tried to create the impression that they themselves changed the situation in South Africa. This was a false impression of course. Independent African countries firmly adhered to a specific program of action. Their demands included

independence for Namibia, the dismantling of apartheid and genuine political democratization in South Africa. For example, Shadrack Joshua Soko, a member of the Central Committee of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) of Zambia, emphasized in his address to the 26th CPSU Congress, and we quote him at length because of the importance of his message.

Meanwhile, against the background of a determined attempt by liberation movements, with the support of the Frontline States in Southern Africa, we have, in recent years, witnessed manoeuvres at so-called internal settlements in Namibia and so-called moderate legislation in South Africa designed to impose a puppet regime in Namibia and to pacify the struggling masses in South Africa. Those indulging in such manoeuvres hope to cling to power and the natural resources in Southern Africa. The schemes are also intended to exploit the black workers and to perpetuate imperialism and racism.⁴

It is clear from statements by many African leaders that independent Africa appreciated the assistance its national liberation movements received from socialist countries and, in particular, the fact that the Soviet Union was the only great power which maintained neither diplomatic, nor economic or trade relations with South Africa and scrupulously observed all the decisions taken by international organizations against racism.

Another reason for the growing role of independent African countries on the international scene is due to the fact that they did not confine foreign policy to exclusively African issues; they increasingly tackled problems directly concerned with all nations-détente, an end to the arms race, a ban on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and elimination of hotbeds of armed conflicts. OAU resolutions show a positive evolution in African governments' views on the ways of solving major international issues. A similar conclusion can be drawn from speeches by numerous African statesmen. For instance, Marecelino dos Santos, Secretary of the Central Committee and a member of the Standing Political Committee of FRELIMO, said in his address to the 26th Congress of the CPSU:

Proletarian internationalism has become a permanent and active factor in our people's lives. We look upon the oppressed peoples' struggle as a vital concern of our own. Socialist Mozambique will continue to be a secure stronghold for Southern Africa's people fighting for national liberation under the leadership of the African National Congress against the criminal racist Pretoria regime. We support too, in every way, the just struggle of the peoples of Namibia, El Salvador, Chile, East Timor, the Western Sahara and Palestine.... We express our solidarity with the Afghan revolution. Afghanistan is a sovereign state that knows who its friends are and who its foes are. The Afghani revolution will win through in spite of all imperialist actions and intrigues.⁵

And yet another reason for the growing role of African countries on the international scene is the result of their contribution to the change in the global balance of political forces to the disadvantage of imperialism before the end of the Cold War. For instance, the 29th session of the UN General Assembly refused to recognize the credentials of the South African delegation largely due to the votes of African representatives who made up almost one-third of the UN membership. There was also the decision taken by that

same session to put the Palestinian question on the agenda and invite the Palestine Liberation Organization to attend the meetings. At all subsequent UN General Assembly sessions, especially at the 36 session, African countries supported resolutions aimed at eliminating the threat of nuclear war, preserving peace and restricting imperialist expansion both in Africa and throughout the world.⁶

Having outlined some of the factors that have contributed to the growing role of African states in the international scene, it becomes imperative to sketch the social roots of African foreign policy. Against the background of the rivalry between the socialist and capitalist socio-economic systems, international relations during the Cold War period became the scene where social contradictions clashed on the one hand and on the other, where class solidarity prevailed.

The foreign policy objectives and directions of African countries took shape in the course of the liberation movement. From the very beginning, both revolutionary-patriotic and nationalist programs aimed at consolidating national sovereignty, de-colonizing society, abolishing foreign domination and one-crop structure of the economy, and establishing a new economic order in the exchange of goods and services.

Briefly, the foreign policy of post-colonial African countries depended, in social terms, on the path of social development they chose. External ties reflected internal social contradictions and interests.

Oriented differently in social terms, African countries pursued foreign policies that were far from identical. Simultaneously, they had three fundamental principles - anti-colonialism, unity and non-alignment. These three principles have been a common achievement of African liberation revolutions. They have been recognized throughout the world because they determined Africa's place in world affairs.⁷

Anti-colonialism comprised both the struggle for the liberation of the last two African countries, which were still under racist and colonial domination – Namibia and South Africa – and the drive to eradicate the entire social after-effects of colonialism and against neo colonialism. The intensity of de-colonization was different in different African countries. Socialist-oriented countries were the most dynamic and consistent in this regard. Simultaneously, common anti-imperialist interests made it possible, on the basis of anti-colonialism, for all post colonial African countries and the socialist nations to pool their efforts both to secure complete de-colonization and to fight neo-colonialism.⁸

The other foreign policy principle, African unity, manifested in the OAU, stems from the realization by African governments that collective guarantees are needed to preserve and strengthen liberated countries' sovereignty and to regulate their relations without interference by the former colonial or other imperialist powers. The OAU was, therefore, the rallying point for peace in Africa and for African unity in the face of neo-colonial and re-colonization threats.

The third foreign policy principle, non-alignment, was meant to ensure an independent position for newly liberated countries on the international scene, to erect a psychological and legal barrier between them and imperialist powers. Having refused to join military and political blocs like the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) or South East Treaty

Organization (SEATO), liberated African countries began to expand their cooperation with other nations, including socialist ones - hence conforming with the numerous resolutions passed in conferences of non-aligned countries reiterating the right of each non-aligned country to freely choose its partners in international cooperation.⁹

The role of nationalism in shaping the foreign policy of African countries cannot be underestimated. The historical and social roots of nationalism itself can explain the impact of nationalism on African foreign policy and the way this policy reflects it. This was formulated by Lenin in his address to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, thus: "You will have to base yourselves on the bourgeois nationalism which is awakening, and must awaken, among those peoples, and which has its historical justification."¹⁰ This important observation is indispensable for arriving at a historically correct assessment of nationalism as a factor influencing African foreign policy.

The impact of nationalism on foreign policy changed depending on the path of development chosen by a given country, the rates at which the social content of national liberation intensified, the character of nationalism and its evolution in a given country. The major stages can be singled out in the dynamic inter-relationship between nationalism and African foreign policy: the stage of pan-Africanism, and the period in which revolutionary, anti-imperialist nationalism was, in some cases, replaced with conservative, reactionary and pro-imperialist nationalism.¹¹

Given the post colonial history of African foreign policy, these periods overlapped one another in everyday foreign policy practice. In the first years after winning political independence, African nationalism remained largely anti-colonial and preserved its pan-African character. The striving of African people for national self-assertion was expressed in the struggle to strengthen the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of newly free countries. Geared toward consolidating political liberation, nationalism influenced the emergence of anti-colonialism, unity and non-alignment as the leading principles of African foreign policy. In the post-colonial years, the leaders of the national liberation movement realized that it would be practically impossible to safeguard independence and secure complete African liberation without unity and without rejecting persistent imperialist attempts to draw them into power blocs. Ali Mazrui offered this interpretation of such foreign policy: "Unity is power and neutrality is freedom."¹²

It is important to observe that the ideological and political convictions held by advocates of pan-African nationalism contributed to the establishment of the OAU and formed the basis of its Charter. Pan-African trends were reflected in foreign policy programs of many African countries.

To a large extent, pan-African ideas motivated new African governments to aid the fighters for complete liberation of Africa. In that period, nationalism was aimed at imperialism and African foreign policy was bent on tackling issues of the national liberation revolution.

As more and more new countries replaced former colonies, African nationalism changed and weakened its unifying function. From pan-African nationalism, nationalism began to turn into the political ideology of the ruling cliques of individual African countries. Such

narrow nationalism undermined the position of African countries in the struggle against neo-colonialism and imperialism. Nationalistic slogans began to be used to back claims some African countries had on others, to the detriment of common African interests. Thus, narrow or local nationalism, which contrasted itself to pan African goals, emerged as an important factor in the foreign policy of many African countries.¹³

As it preserves its general democratic content, typical of the nationalism of the oppressed nations and dependent peoples, local nationalism mainly reflects the distinctive and far from identical interests of the ruling quarters. It not only confuses the masses but also often generates clashes between neighbouring African countries. The struggle against backwardness turned into a slogan and the struggle against one's neighbour turned into a permanent factor. This was verified by the very first serious inter-African conflict in North-West Africa. Commenting on this conflict, which remained acute for a long time, the press noted the "intransigent and demanding nationalism" of l'Istiqlal Party, which "irritated" Algiers.¹⁴ It became more difficult to overcome the inter-African contradictions rooted in nationalism.

Local nationalism, it must be observed, is heterogeneous. It reflects virtually all types of nationalism that existed in the former colonial world.¹⁵

Local nationalism complicates inter-African relations at all levels - local, regional or continental. For example, when regional economic groups began to emerge in the late 1960s, any difficulties in their organization stemmed, *inter alia*, from nationalism in which inter-African contradictions were expressed. Such was the case with implementing the plans for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).¹⁶ Nationalism also acted as an obstacle to the creation of the East African Common Market.¹⁷

Local nationalism repeatedly caused serious difficulties in the then OAU. It, for instance, disrupted the unity of action in drawing up a common strategy on the assistance rendered by the OAU Liberation Committee to national liberation movements. The problem of "dialogue" with racist South Africa also seriously split the ranks of the OAU. So did resolutions on sanctions against the apartheid regime and the rebel minority regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia. These sanctions touched on relations between OAU member-states and the imperialist countries - the latter threatened to impose sanctions on the former in return.¹⁸

Outside Africa, local nationalism negates the unity of the African group at the UN and lies at the root of dissent in tackling global problems that directly affect African interests. This refers to issues like a ban on nuclear weapon tests, zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean and the like.

Local nationalism also restricts the field of vision of the ruling quarters in some African countries and obstructs their view of genuine national and long-term interests with considerations of short-term profit. The most graphic example of this type of foreign policy was the approach of the ruling clique in Egypt, their betrayal of the common progressive objectives of the Arab world, and of the liberation struggle of the Arab people of Palestine. One Soviet source emphasized that "the revolutionary, anti-

imperialist nationalism of Gamal Abdel Nasser was replaced by the conservative, reactionary, pro-imperialist nationalism of Sadat.¹⁹

Although the role of national ideas may change, nationalism retains its influence on the foreign policy of a large number of African states. In those states that chose the capitalist path, with the intensification of class antagonisms and ideological contradictions, nationalism acquires a typically capitalist class and political orientation, becoming increasingly bourgeois and perceptibly losing its general democratic content. That is why it becomes a weapon of indigenous exploiter strata who strive for their mercenary objectives under the cover of nationalist slogans. A number of socialist scholars on Africa observed in the 1970s that in Africa, the bourgeoisie had not consolidated itself into a dominant class either economically or politically, and therefore, it was too early to talk of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie even in capitalist oriented countries.²⁰

The situation in the 1990s was no different. Business and representatives of the bureaucratic and commercial bourgeoisie, as well as some in the middle urban strata continued to stick to nationalism because it reflected their business and social interests. These strata either have their own men and women in the ruling circles, which shape foreign policy or can pressurize those who do.

The bourgeois nationalism of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s was harsh on many African countries. With the end of the Cold War, many of them have openly shifted their foreign policy to the right thereby enhancing their pro-Western orientation. Besides, in today's Africa, the "national bourgeoisie" is heterogeneous. It, therefore, has different strata, which can have different, sometimes even conflicting goals. These can exert decisive influence on the foreign policy of the countries whose leaders once declared that they had chosen the socialist path - Somalia being a typical example.

The socialist-oriented countries were no better. There, the nationalists were not homogeneous either. Indeed, their right wing often acted contrary to national interests. Since these countries hardly broke free of the world capitalist system, neo-colonialism all along tried to divert them from the chosen path, *inter alia*, by encouraging bourgeois nationalism. The indigenous right-wingers willingly cooperated with foreign capital, hoping it would become their ally. No wonder after the end of the Cold War, virtually all the former socialist-oriented countries, including Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola etc., have abandoned their socialist rhetoric and have wholly embraced the policies of the Western-backed financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Others have hidden under the rubric of "mixed economy", which no longer makes sense with the demise of the Eastern bloc. These changes in the global arena have affected Africa and this means a re-orientation of the foreign policy of many African countries during the current phase of globalization.

Brief History of African Diplomacy

In terms of colonialism and the regaining of their independence, it is plausible to suggest that African countries are perhaps the youngest in the world. Historically, only Ethiopia, Liberia and Egypt can be said to have a long diplomatic experience in as far as modern diplomacy goes. The other countries' contemporary diplomatic history (Ghana being in the vanguard with 46 years of contemporary diplomatic experience) ranges from roughly

35 years to only thirteen years – with the regaining of Namibia's independence in 1990. This is in as far as contemporary diplomatic history of Africa is concerned.

This does not, however, mean that diplomacy in Africa started with the European colonization of Africa in the nineteenth century, as apologists of colonialism would like us to believe. It can only be said that there has been total lack of studies in this field, as the 1973 research symposium in Bristol noted that African diplomacy leads “the investigator onward into regions on inquiry which, until comparatively recently, were as little trodden by scholars as was the African continent by European explorers before the nineteenth century.”²¹

It can also be argued that diplomacy and diplomats are not new to Africa. Their history can be traced to ancient Egypt and Carthage.²² And in pre-colonial Africa, there existed independent states which had to tackle international issues of war and peace. They also had to regulate political and economic relations with neighbouring countries and other states.²³ For instance, in 1824, the king of Benin and his vassals from Anim (present city of Lagos), were among the first to recognize the independence of Brazil after it had liberated itself from Portuguese colonialism. They deposited their instruments of recognition through a special envoy. Thereafter, the ties between African states and Brazil gradually developed and grew stronger until they were ruptured by the European colonization of Africa.

Similarly, diplomatic relations between Africa and the United States date “from the very dawn of American independence.”²⁴ The Moroccan Sultan corresponded with George Washington after the latter became the first President of the US in 1776. The diplomatic correspondence culminated in the American-Moroccan treaty of 1787, a treaty that has ever since been in force. The Tunisian Government also concluded a similar treaty with the US in 1797. Liberian diplomatic relations with the US go back to 1816. Sultan Seyyid Said of Zanzibar also concluded treaties with the US in 1837. And in 1903, the US established diplomatic relations with Ethiopia.²⁵

During the colonial period, African states and peoples continued their participation in international life and practice: their national liberation movements became an integral component of the world revolutionary process.²⁶ Encouraged by the Great October Revolution of 1917 in Russia, African peoples began turning from objects into subjects of international law even before the liquidation of colonialism in the continent. Their move in this direction was accelerated by the victory of the anti-Nazi coalition during World War II – a war that thousands of Africans participated in.²⁷ It was after the war that African national liberation organizations remarkably stepped up their international activities. For instance, in October 1945, their leaders held a Pan African Congress in Manchester, the sixth of such conferences. They also addressed the United Nations as petitioners on several occasions. And of course they participated in the historic Bundung Conference in 1955.²⁸ During the “international self-government” period, some African states established bureaus for Muslim pilgrims in Sudan and Saudi Arabia, consular offices in Gabon and Fernando Poo, a trade mission with consular functions in London and communications mission in Washington.²⁹

In essence, the history of African diplomacy confirms that the post-colonial states in Africa cannot be divorced from their past; neither can they from international relations as

a whole. More active involvement of African people in modern international diplomacy was facilitated by the collapse of colonialism. After regaining their independence, African states had the opportunity to pursue independent foreign policy. They also had the opportunity to choose the major objectives, principles and means of realizing them.³⁰ It will be observed that their choice was to a great extent identical with that of other newly independent states of the Third World. There are, however, differences between the foreign policy of African states and the foreign policies of the western capitalist powers and the then socialist bloc countries.

Salient Attributes of African Diplomacy

The salient objectives of African foreign policy can be summarized thus: efforts calculated at creating international conditions most suitable for the eradication of colonialism in those parts of the continent that were not yet free, i.e. Namibia and South Africa itself; strengthening the political independence of post-colonial states; efforts aimed at economic emancipation coupled with accelerating socio-economic development; and attaining total equality for African states in world affairs. These objectives constitute part of the OAU charter.³¹ Continentally, the OAU was the major forum where the common problems of the African states were tackled. Globally, OAU member-states worked in close collaboration with other Third World countries (through the Non-Aligned Movement – NAM), the “Group of 77” and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in seeking solutions to the problems these states faced in common, especially the North-South economic problems of trade, transfer of technology, commodity prices and terms and conditions of international aid.³²

Certain foreign policy objectives and principles of African states – that of liberating Africa from colonialism and racism permitted the use of both peaceful means and force.³³ This, however, has been only in theory, because over a quarter of a century of independence, the continent has witnessed armed conflicts and the threat and use of force. Nevertheless, in virtually all cases, African states have had to resort to armed struggle for purposes of liberating themselves from the shades of colonialism and for defending themselves against imperialist aggression, and racist provocations instigated by imperialist and reactionary forces, and mercenary attacks.

It is important to note that armed conflicts between neighbouring African states, deriving from the partition and re-partition of Africa during the days of colonialism and from imperialist instigation are normally short-lived. Perhaps the only exception was the Tanzania-Uganda war in 1978-1979.³⁴ Otherwise up to 1977, there had been brief armed conflicts, which often ended not in victory in the battlefield, but in diplomatic compromise at the OAU negotiating table. Examples of such negotiations are too numerous to be covered in this chapter. It is, however, worth noting that the total duration of fighting in all inter-African conflict is rather insignificant compared to the overall duration of peaceful foreign policy conducted by the post-colonial African states.³⁵

The record of African foreign policy demonstrates that most African states, guided by OAU principles, oriented their foreign policy toward renouncing aggression and the use of force, toward peaceful co-existence with their neighbours and other countries of the

world and peaceful settlement of disputes.³⁶ This position was well articulated by Kwame Nkrumah, two years before the formulation of the OAU when he observed that the people of Africa had a vested interest in peace in the world, because an enduring peace would enable the new countries to consolidate their hand on freedom.³⁷

From the outset, therefore, independent African states opted for peaceful means of foreign policy. Thus, an analysis of the role of diplomacy as an African foreign policy instrument involves, among other things, an understanding of the forms of revolutionary struggle, which V.I. Lenin propounded.³⁸

In the case of the new states of Africa, diplomacy has been the cardinal form of struggle on the international arena. This is because it is almost the only means of safeguarding their independence, and the only means of developing and fostering political relations with their neighbours and other countries beyond. Additionally, almost half of African states are categorized as being among the least developed in the world economically. Because of this, they cannot use other foreign policy means effectively. They are, therefore, left with diplomacy only which they try to use as widely as possible. There have been only a few cases of armed force.³⁹ An economic pressure in inter-African relations has been rather minimal.⁴⁰ Thus, the majority of African states use diplomacy as the most feasible and acceptable means of realizing their foreign policy interests. Moreover, domestically, diplomacy proves efficient in shaping the political sentiment of the people.

There are some additional significant factors that have made African states opt for diplomacy as the leading foreign policy means: the world socialist community (before the end of the Cold War), the world working class, and the national liberation movements. The development of African foreign policy has thus been greatly influenced by the then socialist foreign policy. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) program noted that socialist foreign policy contrasted with imperialism.⁴¹

The intricate process of ensuring collective international action by the multiplicity of dissimilar post-colonial African states found its practical expression in the OAU. The formation of this international organization, the largest regional grouping in the world (in terms of constituent members), was in the eyes of the government of the then Soviet Union, one of the greatest political achievements of African peoples.⁴²

For the thirty-eight years of the OAU's existence, this opportunity was realized through coordination of African diplomatic efforts in accordance with Article II of the OAU Charter both at the organization's fora and in the African groups at the United Nations and in other international organizations.⁴³

Thus, it is possible to speak not only of the diplomacy of individual African countries, but of African diplomacy simultaneously, i.e. joint diplomatic activity of OAU member-states in solving certain foreign policy tasks common to them in the struggle against both external and internal forces of destabilization.⁴⁴ It must, however, be observed that the expression "African diplomacy" is both relative and conventional. We apply it here only in reference to the socio-political differentiation of post-colonial African states, their salient interests and disagreements and individual member-state's foreign policy and diplomacy.

The term, therefore, implies collective efforts of OAU member-states, a new brand of diplomacy pursued by African states, echoing similar features in the diplomacy of the NAM generally.⁴⁵ In other words, we are anatomizing the diplomacy of OAU member-states, although aware that present-day Africa does not represent a “diplomatic monolith.” In other words, multi-lateralism in African foreign policy has its own problems.⁴⁶

Thus, in their approach to specific international issues, OAU member states were divided into two or three camps, each camp trying to pursue its own diplomatic course. These camps were divided by the actual attitude to their major foreign policy purposes and principles and by the degree of their racial and consistent implementation.

The acceleration of social differentiation as national liberation revolutions evolve into national-democratic ones determines the diplomatic activity of a given state. This activity also reflected the character of development-clash between the two socio-economic systems – socialism versus capitalism. This ideological division before the end of the Cold War, was increasingly being noticed in African foreign policy too. It is true that socialist oriented member-states of the OAU were in the vanguard of progressive, anti imperialist forces in Africa. They were, however, challenged by the capitalist-oriented member-states who tended to appease the imperialists and the former acted as the latter’s resident allies in the continent. The third camps comprised what can be called the centrists – those member-states whose diplomatic tactics is to follow others.⁴⁷

Because Africa is still going through a period of transition, social and foreign policy differentiations are still far from being identical. Social differentiations are not yet traceable in foreign policy and diplomacy. Moreover, there is an increasing role of personality in shaping foreign policy and diplomacy and because of the frequent military coups, a change in the leadership involves a change especially in diplomacy.⁴⁸ Or as J. Chikwe observed, the character of the ruling party and the leaders’ personal dislikes may lead to decisions often starting from the point of view of a strict scientific analysis.⁴⁹

Thus, it would be an over-simplification to demarcate African states into politically stable groups and simultaneously label one as totally reactionary. This is because such demarcation is artificial, relative and indeed, uncertain. This is for the reason that the general content and trend of a country’s diplomacy can change even with relation to one and the same question.

So the existence of states with progressive regimes was no reason to list all the developing countries as “reactionary.”⁵⁰ From the point of view of international politics, the camp of progressive African states consisted not only of those states with revolutionary democratic parties and socialist tendencies, it was much wider particularly in matters which impinged on the independence of Namibia and the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. In such matters, even the regime of former President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, with all its capitalistic tendencies, often took firm stand in favour of the majority Africans in Namibia and Azania.

It can, therefore, be deduced that despite the social, economic, ideological, political and other differences among post-colonial African states, there remains the foundation of solidarity among them. This solidarity is realized because of their past struggles for

independence, their common historical destiny, similar development problems, and similar foreign interests. OAU experience demonstrates the organization's vitality despite the fact that it lacked a uniform class basis, and because it was not a supranational body, it was an inter-state entity and consisted of heterogeneous states, which often conflicted with one another. Essentially, the joint African diplomacy of OAU member-states emerged in the global arena as a political force to reckon with, despite all its contradictions. In the words of Lenin, such conflicting historical developments are "patchwork reality" which "We cannot cast aside ... however inelegant it may be ... We cannot refuse to recognize what actually exists, it will itself compel us to recognize it."⁵¹

"African Unity" and the Joint Diplomacy of the OAU

In the early years of African independence, it was common in the metropolitan countries to write about Africa's "false start."⁵² This claim was made for the economic and political activities, as well as the diplomacy of African states. It is, however, questionable whether really the contemporary history of African diplomacy had a "false" start. Such labels are unrealistic and are not derived "from concrete realities", but "from abstract postulates."⁵³ It is from this that we acknowledge the successful development process of African diplomacy. This does not mean that African diplomacy is devoid of problems. Indeed, it encounters a multiplicity of difficulties – which difficulties emanate from the socio-economic, political and ideological conditions in the continent and from the distinctive features of today's system of international relations.

From the outset, African states carefully chose their major foreign policy goals and the diplomatic tactics, forms and methods to achieve them. We contend that they have made an important achievement in these directions, which include: the development and strengthening of African unity efforts to ensure equality and self-determination in the continent and non-alignment. We do not intend to go into the details of what African unity means or should mean. Indeed, there are problems in trying to define unity much as "the problem of African Unity" itself has engaged the thinking of many scholars⁵⁴ concerned with African international relations. For our part, the acknowledgement of success was the strengthening of African anti-imperialist unity within the OAU. Despite the forces of destabilization emanating from especially the western powers, African states regarded this unity not as an end in itself but as a means for accomplishing important economic and political objectives. They did this by adopting common diplomatic positions and joint diplomatic action in African groups at the UN and in other international organizations.

Thus, the OAU and African groups functioned as conventional bodies that coordinate African foreign policy and diplomacy. African UN diplomacy is carried out in consistence with the principles enunciated in the UN Charter itself. And so as to facilitate speedy attainment of their objectives, African states developed the tactic of coalition building within the framework of the system of the UN.⁵⁵

We can, therefore, state that the OAU won world-wide recognition as an instrument of peace in international relations. Indeed, it was the only regional grouping in the world empowered by the UN to act as a body that tried to maintain peace and security in its region. Ever since 1964, when the Security Council adopted a resolution asking the OAU

to assist in the settlement of the Congo crisis,⁵⁶ the UN repeatedly recognized the OAU's right to search for "African solutions to African problems."

OAU diplomatic activities in the UN involved coordination of common interests of African states, with the bid to protecting these interests in sessions of the UN General Assembly. Sessions of the OAU appointed special representatives for raising important questions that affected African peoples and for securing support for African decisions and documents. OAU sessions also nominated African candidates for top UN posts. Thus, the UN recognized the OAU and extended the status of a permanent observer to it.⁵⁷

In these OAU diplomatic activities, African Unity earned strong political support from the world's anti-imperialist forces, especially the then Soviet Union and the former socialist power bloc. Such support, however, did not guarantee total success for OAU diplomacy. In the continental body was the result of a compromise among the founding fathers. As such, its decisions, statements and activities were also premised upon compromise. To this can be added that the OAU was not a supranational legislative organ, it was merely a consultative international body whose Charter had no provisions for effective implementation of resolutions. Neither did its Charter have provisions for disciplinary measures to be taken on member-states who did not comply with its resolutions. In fact, H.M. Basner made a realistic assessment of the OAU Charter and of the achievements of the May 1963 Addis Ababa Summit. According to him, the charter was a piece of paper that could not unite Africa, only the masses of Africa, once mobilized, could unite the continent.⁵⁸

Indeed, at Addis Ababa, the radical states of the Casablanca group even failed to convince the majority who belonged to the moderate Monrovia group of the urgent need for immediate political union of Africa. Nkrumah's plea of "unite or perish" was not closely adhered to. Instead, what emerged was a loose organization and some limited forums of cooperation, and the general desire was to protect and preserve national sovereignty.

It is true that the OAU was an instrument for achieving African unity. However, it was not only constitutionally but also structurally defective. The goals as listed in the Charter were inconsistent with each other, and the principles were not in harmony with the declared objectives. Similarly, the cardinal organs of the continental body – the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat, the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration and the Specialized Commissions either lacked powers or were inappropriately structured.⁵⁹ Additionally, their powers and functions were not all that well distributed to lessen jurisdictional disputes and the institutions were elitist both in structure and orientation. Indeed, among the main problems of the OAU were: lack of funds, inadequate number of skilled manpower, the dependence of its member-states on external powers and ideological and other divisions among its members.⁶⁰

Because of these and related problems, the adoption of common diplomatic positions on critical international issues and the adoption of agreed resolutions in the OAU were, in most cases, the result of heated debate. Contradictions were especially glaring between "revolutionary" and "conservative" states. At times, conservative regimes ostentatiously

opposed most of the other member-states to the detriment both of the entire continent and their own national interests.

Ironically, the overall course toward greater OAU unity and joint basis in African diplomacy was maintained by some of the principles of the Charter we have just described as being defective: principles of inter-African relations as sovereign states, equal cooperation of member-states, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, condemnation of subversive activity, mutual respect for the existing borders and territorial integrity of member-states, non use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes. Any departure from these generally accepted principles by member-states upset African unity and weakened the effectiveness of the joint diplomacy of the OAU.

Because African unity is still a process, one way of effecting such unity was for the OAU Charter to be revised. The style of functioning of the OAU also had to be transformed, because to wait for the time when there are no local differences, suspicions and hostilities, is to wait forever.⁶¹

Thus, under the compromise approach to OAU solidarity, its common diplomacy alternated. And although there were in most cases vacillations and sharp differences in the Pan-African body, eventually a position acceptable to virtually all members evolved and stabilized. We can, therefore, observe that a typical feature of OAU diplomacy was the relative stability of its major trend. This makes it possible to forecast African diplomacy in today's international relations.

We wish to emphasize that all-African anti-imperialist unity of the OAU underwent yet another test of its strength between 1970 and 1982. Developments in that period confirm L.I. Brezhnev's observation in 1978 that the "imperialist forces and their accomplices in Africa are now placing their main hopes on undermining the unity of African countries."⁶² Under the pretext of preventing a "second Angola" they rallied African "moderates" to the struggle against socialist-oriented member-states, thereby sparking off dangerous conflicts. Cases of such conflicts include the still unresolved Western Sahara issue, the Somali-Ethiopia war of 1977-1978, the Chadian civil war and the anti-Quaddafi campaigns that nearly wrecked the OAU in 1982.⁶³

Responding to these imperialist – instigated conflicts, the socialist oriented member-states closed their ranks and strengthened coordination of their action. Thus, the struggle was between advocates of stronger anti-imperialist solidarity of non-aligned and socialist oriented member-states and proponents of Africa's "equi-distance" from blocs.⁶⁴

With the struggle going on as can be reiterated, certain changes in the OAU Charter and in the organizational forms of African diplomacy were necessary to ensure the smooth development of African unity and joint diplomacy of the OAU. The path of unity must remain an important facet of African foreign policy if the African revolution is to be accomplished.

The Major Trend of African Diplomacy

Ensuring equality and self-determination of African peoples is the major trend in African policy and diplomacy. This is evidenced by the fact that the OAU Charter opened thus: "CONVINCED that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny

...⁶⁵ Or as the UN General Assembly in 1960 revealed and stressed the broad content of self-determination, by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.⁶⁶

It is toward this trend that most OAU member-states pooled their diplomatic efforts to try and eradicate colonialism and racism in the continent and achieve economic independence. They aimed at reducing their economic dependence on the imperialist core states (de-linkage), charting their own path of development and expanding constructive international ties – including their effective participation in solving international problems. In this drive, African states used both domestic and foreign policy means, although at times with difficulties. Part of the difficulty is that African states remain within the orbit of the world capitalist economic system – through their economic, trade, financial, technological and other dependence on the former colonial powers and other imperialist powers. This is more so with the end of the Cold War.

Despite these limitations, the process of total de-colonization of the continent continued vigorously until independence and majority rule was attained in Namibia and South Africa respectively. This confirms the effectiveness and vitality of African diplomacy. The direct collective pressure of member-states was perhaps the most effective method in the struggle against aggression and interference by the imperialist powers. For instance in 1980, the OAU Summit in Freetown demanded that Britain restore to Mauritius the Chagos Archipelago and the island of Diego Garcia where the US had constructed a military base.⁶⁷ This opened a new chapter in the joint struggle of African states for the removal of the base.

As for economic independence of Africa, the OAU member-states worked on the forms and methods of joint diplomacy to achieve it.⁶⁸ For instance in May 1973 the OAU adopted an economic program of African diplomacy which focused on the following principles: constant and joint protection of the inalienable sovereignty and control of African states over their natural resources; asserting the common African interests at all international economic and currency negotiations, especially with capitalist countries and their economic alliances; coordinating positions and intensifying trade and cooperation between African and other countries; strengthening the common front with the developing countries of other continents.⁶⁹

These principles have since been implemented by African diplomacy. For instance, the OAU used them in its negotiations with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 and 1974. The result was that African states secured certain concessions from the EEC under the 1974 Lome Convention.⁷⁰ Together with the Caribbean and Pacific countries, African states held talks with the EEC from July 1978, culminating in the signing of the Second Lome Convention in September 1979.⁷¹

Thus, African states have realized the necessity of using collective economic pressure against the neo-colonialist powers and monopolies which, to a large extent, depend on African raw materials and trade. In the non-aligned and other developing countries, the OAU was the vanguard in the struggle for changing the entire system of international economic relations based on equitability and mutual benefit.⁷²

At the UN, the overall course of African diplomacy was geared toward maximum advantages for individual OAU member-states and for regional and continent-wide African projects, as well as effective and full representation of African states at the UN and its specialized agencies. There has been an increase in the membership of African states in the UN. This rapid increase in the number of African states in the UN is of a double significance. First, it signalled Africa's new-found determination to participate fully in international relations not as an object, but as an actor.⁷³ Second, it secured great African representation in the Security Council and other UN bodies, as well as the choice of Africa as the host continent for some of these bodies and for sessions of others. This meant that African issues and problems would henceforth receive greater international attention than hitherto had been the case.⁷⁴ Indeed, African diplomats successfully preside over sessions of the UN General Assembly and its bodies. They also hold top-level posts at the UN and its specialized agencies, and the African group is one of the most active regional groups at the UN in raising vital international questions to the discomfort of some Western powers. Indeed, as early as 1972, the West began talking about a "paralysis of the UN", "tyranny of the majority", and such claims as one made by the West German periodical *Afrika heute* that "ruthless attacks against the imperialist powers led into an impasse."⁷⁵ This is certainly not true of African diplomacy. Rather, it is the imperialist powers which subvert the UN, for instance, through their veto power in the Security Council. In such cases, African states are the losers, because their interests run counter to those of the imperialist powers.

It is in the foregoing light that most African countries, after liberating themselves from colonialism, sought new allies in the international arena and forums. This led to rapprochement with the socialist countries of the world headed by the Soviet Union, as a diplomatic means of balancing their international ties and reducing dependence on the West.

This does not, however, mean that the African states' relations with the former colonial powers and other capitalist powers have lessened; they only differ from the expectations born out of de-colonization and the independence slogans of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Indeed, whether socialist-oriented or not, all post-colonial African states have virtually retained broad contacts with their former colonial powers.⁷⁶

Nevertheless, the trend toward restricting the preferential treatment of former colonial powers and curtailing their political influence in Africa is increasing. Indeed, ties have been established with other Western countries – with the European Union (EU) countries, the US and Japan – for especially economic purposes. This has dismantled the monopoly of the former colonial powers in influencing African international relations.

African diplomacy has also forged close political ties with other developing countries, beginning with Bandung in 1955 to Colombo in 1975⁷⁷ and beyond. The Afro-Asian group at the UN was the platform for such cooperation. Another form of cooperation commenced in the 1970s between the OAU and the Arab League. The 1970s also saw the emergence of the Islamic Conference based on "Muslim solidarity." This was an entirely new form of Afro-Asian organization.

On the global scene, on the basis of anti-imperialist solidarity, there was growing cooperation between African states and Asian and Latin American countries and other

developing countries. The struggle of these countries was for political equality, a radical transformation of international economic relations, and social and economic liberation. Therefore, the long-term and dominant trend of African diplomacy is the strengthening of political solidarity among these countries. In this task, the ideology of non-alignment became crucial, a subject we now turn to.

Non-Alignment and African Diplomacy

In their participation in world politics, post-colonial African states, via the OAU, adopted the principle of non-alignment. Asian countries were the first to apply this principle, and the OAU simply adopted it. Indeed, one of the major principles of the OAU Charter was an “affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.”⁷⁸ The notion of “African non-alignment” implies that OAU member-states had to coordinate their foreign policy bearing in mind that non-alignment does not mean passive neutrality but positive neutrality and beyond as was discussed earlier.

Because of the dangers posed by African involvement in political and military blocs stemming from the former colonial powers and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) powers, African non-alignment has, from the very beginning, been anti-imperialist. In fact, virtually all OAU member-states joined NAM, despite imperialist machinations. The Colombo summit of 1976 acknowledged the continent’s contribution by declaring that “Africa gave a firm anti-colonial and anti-racist content to the movement.”⁷⁹

The record, however, shows that African non-alignment to blocs was often feasible in organizational terms only. For instance, in politics, a number of African states were not able to remain “non-aligned.” To a certain extent, this rooted in ideological proximity or hostility, likes and dislikes and even identical or different political interests. While refusing to join blocs, most African states’ positions tended to be closer to those of the socialist countries than to those of the former colonial powers or the US especially at sessions of the UN General Assembly. This was so, because of the objective interests of African states.

It is not hard to find out the factors that contributed to the closeness of African states and the then socialist countries in international affairs. These factors included: decolonization, the strengthening of world peace and universal security, curbing the arms race and disarmament – factors that are anti-imperialist. This is partly why African diplomacy supported the initiative of the former Soviet Union at the UN, especially in regard to the Soviet Union’s policy of détente of the 1970s. This African diplomatic position was acknowledged even in the West, as is evidenced by one Western source, *The Diplomatist*: “Whether knowingly or unknowingly, whether with determination or reluctance, Africa, both Arab and black, is now as solidly behind communist diplomacy as any third party could possibly be.”⁸⁰ This does not mean that it was the general rule for all African states. Indeed, there were only a few exceptions. Otherwise, African diplomacy did not tend to side with imperialist diplomatic initiatives.

Despite this, generally and theoretically, African states, like other states in the periphery, belonged neither to the imperialist camp nor to the socialist one. Simultaneously, most African states are still tied to the world capitalist economy, although in a disadvantaged

way: This, certainly was duality in the policy of African and other non-aligned countries. This was an obvious contradiction between their foreign policy implemented covertly and sometimes even overtly. Because of this, non-alignment has been variedly interpreted – depending on a given state. Whereas some African states interpreted it in purely anti-imperialist terms, others based their interpretation on “complete neutrality” or “equidance.” Yet others based it on the notion of “neither left nor right nor in the middle.”⁸¹

All the same, in Africa, non-alignment was often regarded not as a foreign policy principle but rather as a tactical diplomatic means of relating with the rich north which comprised both the Western and the Eastern bloc. In this divide, Africa belonged (and still belongs) to the “poor nations of the south.”⁸² Thus, in their economic diplomacy, Africa and other non-aligned countries use the term non-alignment to make the same demands on all “rich nations”, given that the world is increasingly being divided in terms of wealth.

Apart from using the non-alignment approach in their economic diplomacy, African states also used it in their political diplomacy. For instance, in November 1975 - January 1976, half of the OAU member-states demanded that foreign intervention in Angola stop forthwith. They also made no distinction between the South African aggressors with their imperialist backers and the Soviet Union and Cuba who had been invited by the Angola government to assist in resisting and expelling the aggressors.⁸³

Thus, African non-alignment tended to be more stable. Although at times there were conflicting positions of individual member-states, all-African diplomacy levelled them out, and assisted these countries in arriving at a common and generally acceptable position.

The anti-imperialist element in African non-alignment was one of its major trends. This is especially true of the evolution of African diplomacy vis-à-vis the Middle-East conflict. Previously, during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, most African states invoked the principle of non-alignment and tried to avoid expressing their views on the conflicts, others only made public statements from the position of neutrality, which in fact played into the hands of Israel. As such, African diplomacy split between its Arab and non-Arab components.

The turning point came in 1968, and from then on, African diplomacy closed in as the result of the growing anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and anti-American feelings in Africa. Indeed, the Middle East problem began to be viewed as concerning all Africa,⁸⁴ a position that even resulted into the severing of diplomatic relations between OAU member-states and Israel following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Henceforth, OAU decisions unequivocally condemned Israel as the aggressor against the Arabs, and expressed solidarity with the Palestinian people, despite later restoration of diplomatic relations with the Zionist state by some OAU member-states.⁸⁵ The middle-east conflict, therefore, provides the first issue on which African diplomacy pursued an anti-imperialist course. Then comes Israel's close links with racist South Africa - links that received vicious attacks by the OAU. These links provide the second reason why African diplomacy increasingly became anti-Zionist.

Close involvement in questions of peace and universal security fuller and direct African participation in their solution and greater democracy in international relations emerged as new developments in African non-alignment and African diplomacy. Another salient feature of African non-alignment concerns “African solutions to African problems.”⁸⁶

The dictum “African solutions to African problems” has not been without problems. In recent years, it was the subject of heated debate in the OAU. At the start, it was meant to be used by the anti-imperialist camp within the OAU to prevent imperialist interference in African affairs, and to check, covert and overt aggression by imperialist powers. However, during the course of its new counter offensive against the forces of national liberation and social emancipation in the continent, imperialism began to lend widespread support to the dictum, with the express purpose of turning this anti-imperialist method of African diplomacy against the Soviet Union, Cuba and the entire world socialist community. By so doing, imperialism camouflaged its interference in African affairs and defined the dictum according to its own geo-political interest, thus trying to render non-alignment null and void.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we observe that diplomacy remains the major means of which African foreign policy continues to be implemented. The principal areas of this policy include: intra-African relations with the former Eastern-bloc countries, with the former colonial powers, the US and other capitalist powers, and activities in international organizations.

African foreign policy, like the foreign policy of any nation, requires concrete scientific analysis, methodologically premised on the basis of class. According to Lenin, “it is fundamentally wrong, un-Marxist and unscientific, to single out ‘foreign policy’ from policy in general, let alone counter-pose foreign policy to home policy.”⁸⁷ This Leninist thesis is relevant to the African condition. An increasing feature of African foreign policy is differentiation, not on national, but on class terms. Within individual states, certain differences in their foreign policies reflect the polarization between pro-imperialist and reactionary tendencies on the one hand, and forces of social progress and genuine national independence on the other. An organic element of African foreign policy is the struggle against imperialism, neo-colonialism, re-colonization and for genuine economic independence.

African foreign policy, like the foreign policy of any nation, always reflects the political ideology of the ruling parties which policy is shaped and implemented according to the interests of the dominant class or social system. Foreign policy factors exert an increasing influence on the general development of post-colonial African states. African states and their domestic institutions are participating in various ways in international affairs – for instance, the role of politics in international economic relations.

The impact of foreign policy factors on the development of post-colonial African states and the shaping of their foreign policy remains strong. As a result, the contradiction between the generally anti-imperialist foreign policy of most African states and the capitalist-dominated system of their foreign economic ties has intensified. African states have also focused their foreign policy on issues of war, peace, and universal security because they stand to benefit. This trend has continued.

Although there has been some measure of political unity between African states and other non-aligned states, serious contradictions still affect these relations. These contradictions are especially fuelled by neo-colonialism. Despite these differences, the trend toward joint action by these states on the international arena is strengthening. For instance, their joint action in restructuring international economic relations runs counter to the interests of the imperialist powers. Similarly, the trend of African foreign policy is toward minimizing old ties with the former colonial powers and diversifying international contacts for purposes of strengthening their solidarity and ensuring greater independence in political and economic spheres. In all these matters, instruments of diplomacy have been used, hence African foreign policy hinges most on diplomacy.

Having so far analyzed the foreign policies of the US, India and Africa we now turn to an analysis of bilateral relations among the three.

Notes

1. Gromyko, *African Countries Foreign Policy*, p.11.
2. *The Words of Friends. Greetings Extended to the XXVI Congress of the CPSU by Communist, Workers', National Democratic, and Socialist Parties*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982, p.363.
3. Gromyko, *African Countries Foreign Policy*, p.13.
4. *The Words of Friends*, p.410.
5. Ibid., p.451.
6. Gromyko, *African Countries Foreign Policy*, p.14.
7. Ibid., p.17.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p.18.
10. V.I. Lenin, "Address to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, November 22, 1919", *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977, p.162.
11. Gromyko, *African Countries Foreign Policy*, p.19.
12. A.A. Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africa: A Study of Ideology and Ambition*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967, p.165.
13. Gromyko, *African Countries Foreign Policy*, p.20.
14. *Le Moisen Afrique*, No. 14, fevrier, 1967, p.8.
15. *Asia and Africa Today*, No.1 1980, p.9.
16. For details regarding ECOWAS, see, for instance, A.Y. Yansane, "West African Economic Integration: Is ECOWAS the Answer?" *Africa Today*, Vol. 24, No.3, 1977; O. Udokang, "ECOWAS and the Problem of Regional Integration." *Nigeria: Bulletin of Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 6, No.3, 1976.

17. P.G. Okoth, "The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States and its East African Community Heritage." *Journal of Eastern African Research and Development*. Vol. 20, 1990, pp.167-168.
18. Gromyko, *African Countries Foreign Policy*, p.21.
19. *Asia and Africa Today*, No.1, 1980, p.9.
20. *Social Shifts in Independent African Countries*. Moscow, p.131.
21. *Foreign Relations of African States*. Proceedings of the Twenty Fifth Symposium of the Colston Research Society held in the University of Bristol, April 4-7, 1973, London: Butterworths, 1974, p.X.
22. For details, consult C.A. Diop, *The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality*. Translated by M. Cook, New York: Lawrence & Co., 1974. W.E.B. DuBois, *The World and Africa*. New York: International Publishers, 1965; S.K. Glanville, ed., *The Legacy of Egypt*. London: O.U.P., 1942; A.A. Mazrui, *The Africans: A Triple Heritage*. Boston, Toronto: Little Brown & Co., 1986.
23. For details, consult, for instance, R.W. July, *History of the African People*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, Second Edition, 1974.
24. B.I. Obichere, "American Diplomacy in Africa: Problems and Prospects." *Pan African Journal*, Vol. VII, No.1, Spring, 1974, p.67.
25. *US Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 72, No. 1608, April 20, 1970, p.513; also P.G. Okoth, *United States of America's Foreign Policy Toward Kenya, 1952-1969: Issues, Application, Implications*. Nairobi: Gideon S. Were Press, 1992, Ch.1.
26. K. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*. London: Panaf, 1963, pp.194-204; K. Nkrumah, *Towards Colonial Freedom: Africa in the Struggle Against World Imperialism*. London: Heinemann, 1962.
27. For details, consult, for instance, V.N. Mackay, *Africa in World Politics*. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.
28. For details, consult V.B. Thompson, *Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan Africanism*. London: Longman, 1969; V.N. Mackay, *Africa in the United Nations*. New York: Macfadden Bartell Corporation, 1967; V.N. Mackay, *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy*. London: Pall Mall, 1966.
29. Gromyko, *African Countries Foreign Policy*, p.25.
30. For details, consult I.W. Zartman, *International Relations in the New Africa*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 196; O. Aluko, ed., *The Foreign Policies of African States*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1977.
31. On the OAU Charter, consult, Z. Cervenka, *The Organization of African Unity and its Charter*. New York: Praeger, 1969.
32. G. Erb & V. Kallab, eds., *Beyond Dependency: The Developing World Speaks Out*. Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1975.
33. This theoretical position was best illustrated by N.M. Shamuyarira, "The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa." *The African Review*, Vol.1, March 1977.

34. P.G. Okoth, "The OAU and the Uganda-Tanzania War, 1978-1979." *Journal of African Studies*, Special Issue on Tanzania, Vol.14, No.3, Fall 1987.
35. It can be agreed that African peaceful foreign policy is in opposite to the armed foreign policies of Southeast Asian and Middle East countries.
36. Thompson, *Africa and Unity*, p.184; article II, OAU Charter.
37. K. Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology*. London: Heinemann, 1961, p.241.
38. V.I. Lenin, "Guerilla Warfare." *Collected Works, Vol.II* Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972, p.214.
39. For details, consult K.W. Grundy, *Guerilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and Preview*. New York: Crossman Publishers, 1971; G. Cheliand, *Armed Struggle in Africa: With the Guerillas in :Portuguese" Guinea*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966. K. Nkrumah, *Revolutionary Path*. London: Panaf, 1973.
40. Quaddafi's Libya led in the 1973 OPEC – oil weapon war which shocked and indeed briefly paralyzed the US and its European allies. For details, consult I.F.I. Shihata, *The Other Face of OPEC*. London: Longman, 1982.
41. CPSU Program, *The Road to Communism*. Moscow: foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961, p.503.
42. *Pravda*, May 25, 1973.
43. Gromyko, *Africa Countries Foreign Policy*, p.28.
44. P.G. Okoth, "O.A.U: Forces of Destabilization." *Ufahamu*, Vol.XIII, No.1, Fall, 1983, pp.148-164.
45. W. Beling & G. Totten, ed., *Developing Nations: Quest for a Model*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1970.
46. C.M.B. Utete, "Foreign Policy and the Developing State." In O.J.C.B. Ojo, *et al, African International Relations*. London, New York, Lagos: Longman, 1985, p.49.
47. Grymyko, *Africa Countries Foreign Policy*, p.29.
48. R.H. Jackson & C.G. Roseberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982.
49. J. Chikwe, *World Marxist Review*, Vol.15, No.1, January 1972, p.27.
50. *Ibid.*, p.21.
51. V.I. Lenin, "English Congress of the R.C.P. (B)." *Collected Works, Vol.29*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977, p.169 & p.174.
52. R. Dumont, *False Start in Africa*. London: Andre Deutsch, 1966.
53. V.I. Lenin, "The Second Congress of the Communist International." *Collected Works*, Vol. 31. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974, p.240.
54. See, for instance, K. Mathews, "The OAU and the Problem of African Unity." *Africa Quarterly*, Vol. XXIII, Nos.1-2 (no year given), pp.1-27; J. Mayall, African Unity and the OAU: The Place of Political Myth in African Diplomacy." *Yearbook of World Affairs*. London, 1973; Z. Cervenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU* and

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US-Indian Relations

It is true that the US and India are two of the largest democracies of the world that share numerous common values and institutions. Apart from the proximity of ideology, both countries envisaged the construction of a similar post-war world order based on the principles of peace, security, cooperation and development. When the US and India entered into an interface relationship, there were hardly any direct bilateral disputes between the two. As such, one would have expected both Washington and New Delhi to work together in their common endeavours on world affairs.

But it appears rather paradoxical that even after over four decades of their interface experience, much of the hope and optimism have generated into an ordinary relationship devoid of any deep and enduring rapport, particularly at the state-to-state level. In other words, at the people-to-people level, there exists an abundance of good will and warmth for one another; yet at the state-to-state level, there appears to be a lack of understanding and support for each other's position in vital spheres of activity.¹

The cultural milieu of both countries have considerably influenced their respective supreme goals. As far as the US is concerned, the world is divided into black and white or caught in a non zero-sum game situation. As for India, there is no quarter in the world which monopolizes truth or falsehood; that instead, there is an immense grey area, namely, an area in which elements of truth as well as selfish advantages seem to lie hidden in rival sets of argument.² Or as C.A. Moore, put it: while the West, including US, is exclusive in its outlook, India takes an inclusive view point.³ Though India and the US share some common values, they seem to differ in their approaches owing to their cultural milieu.⁴

Another problem in US-Indian relations is one of perception and image. According to one American source, Americans claim that Indians are “effete, soft, weak, unresilient, timid, no muscles, effeminate, lack virility, are not very good fighters....”⁵ Additionally, the image of India projected in the US through text books, the mass media and the academic literature is one of poverty and helplessness.⁶

Lack of rapport at the leadership is yet another problem in US-Indian relations. The US attitudes towards India took deep roots during Nehru's time, which greatly influenced US-Indian relations. As such, the US found Nehru difficult to deal with. It is possible the Americans did not understand his complex personality or his political philosophy fully.⁷ Indeed, both governments paid a great deal of attention to the personality factor: that is,

the US to Nehru and Krishna Menon and India to Dulles and Nixon.⁸ What is important to note, however, is that the individual characteristics of decision-makers, namely, the skills, personalities, beliefs and psychological dispositions, have influenced the content and conduct of the foreign policies of the US and India to a great extent. Similarly, they have also at times influenced the inability to establish personal rapport between the policy-makers in both countries.⁹

Another problem in the bilateral relations of both countries lies in the short-term goals of both countries. For instance, in the US, there have been diplomats such as Henry Stimson, George Kennan, and many others who have emphasised that the needs and goals of US foreign policy be set out in long-term perspective, while others like James Byrd, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, — have preferred to adopt a more “down-to-earth” or immediate interests perspective of the policy.¹⁰

Thus, the problem in US-Indian relations can be attributed to a large extent, to the mix-up of the long-term goals of the US and its short-term interests. Before the end of the Cold War, the threat posed by the then Soviet Union and the conveniences offered by Pakistan could be treated as elements within a set of given policy parameters by the US tilting towards Pakistan could satisfy the short-term goals of the US vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. A policy of excluding or antagonising India could be an unwise policy for the US in the long-run.¹¹

Over the years, US foreign policy has presented a clear pattern of unwillingness either to accommodate India on equal terms or accommodate India's vital national security interests in the region. In contrast, the other super power, the then Soviet Union, exhibited such a readiness, or at least that is the impression it generated in India.¹²

Nevertheless, India acknowledged that the US has vast responsibilities in world affairs. If at times there have been differences of opinion as to how these responsibilities might best be expressed and discharged, especially in relation to India, its neighbour and other states of Asia, this does not mean a negation of the general recognition by New Delhi of Washington's responsibilities.¹³

India recognizes that although great hazards accompany the possession of great power, the US has wielded its power in such a manner that the world has avoided major conflicts. India is also grateful for the large measure of economic assistance rendered by the US, especially in times of crisis such as the Chinese aggression of 1962 and the food shortage of 1966. In connection to this assistance, Radha Krishnan stated in his address of February 14, 1966: “In particular, we would like to thank the President of the United States and his administration for this generous help, at this time of need.”¹⁴

Open US-Indian relations began in an atmosphere of mutual sympathy. During World War II, President Roosevelt had lent America's moral support to the Indian struggle for independence. In return, Indian leaders were grateful and wanted to see the development of friendly relations with the US.¹⁵ In 1941, the first diplomatic establishment of the US Government, the Office of the Personal Representative of the US President, was set up in New Delhi. Following the formation of the interim Government at the centre in 1946, the Personal Representative's office became the Office of the American Commissioner.

After India had regained its independence in 1947, the office was elevated to a full-fledged embassy. The US, thus became the first country outside the Commonwealth that Nehru visited after becoming Premier.

The US had hoped to capitalize on Nehru's visit to Washington in late 1949 to bring him within the western orbit. However, Nehru who had already indicated that India would follow the policy of non-alignment in regard to world affairs by his unequivocal declaration that India would definitely follow the policy of non-alignment as we saw earlier, dashed whatever little hope the Americans had of aligning India. This policy disillusioned American policy makers and Nehru came to be regarded as anti-American and pro-Russian. From then, US attitude toward Kashmir gradually turned in favour of Pakistan and US policy makers decided to make Pakistan a military ally in order to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the British from India. Further American attempt to befriend Pakistan was blessed by the victory of the communists in China.

Ever since, the relations between US and India have suffered from a curious sickness, a sudden alternation between warm cordiality and bouts of either hot anger or a deathly chill. The only thing that has kept the relationship alive is the realization by both countries that it is imperative to keep it alive. However, a fruitful and vigorous relationship, though it has always seemed possible, has always eluded them.¹⁶ This is unfortunate because there are many basic similarities between them.

Similarities between the US and India

It is important to recognize that the aims and objectives of the foreign policies of the US and India are similar. These are: the maintenance of the sovereign and independent states in the world; the pursuit of peace and security; support for the United Nations; support for the right of self-determination of the nations (non-self-governing territories); a feeling of anti-imperialism and anti-racialism, etc.

Apart from the similarity in foreign policy objectives, India and the US have "a striking identity on basic fundamental matters which determine the structure of a country and its political philosophy."¹⁷ First, the US and India share a common historical heritage. Both were under the yoke of British colonialists and they had to wage a long struggle for freedom, although their methods of achieving freedom were different. Whereas Americans fought a war of independence, Indians adopted the path of non-violence and non-cooperation to shake off foreign rule. It is true that the Americans sympathised with the aspirations of the Indian people but it is also true that Indian political leaders found a platform in the US to propagate their views. As such, Indians have always looked upon the US as a country which not only became free itself, but has always stood for freedom and has helped dependent countries to achieve freedom. The American Declaration of Independence made a profound impression on the Indian patriots.

Additionally, there is immense similarity between the tone of early American and present Indian foreign policy. The keenness and interest of the early generations of Americans in the independence of other colonial areas were very much like the manner in which Indians criticised colonialism wherever it existed in Africa and Asia. It is worthy noting that the suspicious and assertive attitude of early American policy-makers strikes a familiar chord in Indian minds.¹⁸

India's policy of non-alignment is merely a vindication of the US policy of neutralism in the early decades of its independence. Like the US in the post-independence period, India also faced the problems of consolidating a fiscal civil and military structure weakened through partition; of integrating the five hundred princely states; laying foundations for a more viable economy; and most importantly, protecting its borders from external threats. Thus, India's own economic and security interests dictated a policy of peace which could be achieved by avoiding entangling military alliances and the two Cold War camps into which the world was then divided.

The other area where American and Indian views coincide is the value they attach to the high ideals of democracy – rule of law, freedom of thought and expression and government by consent based on universal adult franchise. Though India has adopted the British system of parliamentary democracy instead of the American presidential system, the Indian constitution has freely adopted the basic principles of the American constitution, namely liberty, equality and respect for the rights of individuals.²⁰

Differences between the US and India

The foregoing analysis reveals the fundamental similarities of US and Indian foreign policies. Despite this, however, the relations between the two countries have not been as friendly as expected. The recurrent crises and misunderstandings that plague US-Indian relations suggest a tendency to readily misconstrue each other's motives as well as a fundamental difference of approach and philosophy on international problems between the two countries. Self-righteousness on either side blinds them from seeing the other's viewpoint and exaggerates the differences.

From a theoretical point of view, two explanations suffice. First, in India's view, American policy supports, in practise, policies and powers without due regard for the justice of India's own viewpoint. Second, India's policy, in practice similarly appears to the US as inadequately appreciative of the American viewpoint and interests.²¹

There are three major areas of differences. First, in the realm of non-alignment. In this regard, is to be seen, US misconception of the orientation of India's foreign policy. US irritation over the reluctance of some non communist countries to support openly the US in the "Defence of the Free Word" has led to the simplistic conclusion that those who were unwilling to join the US were, for sure, against it. But India rightly disagrees with such a conclusion. In India's view, the US transgresses its limits when it demands that countries that wish to befriend the US must also consider those enemies of the US as their own enemies. Moreover, as we saw earlier, India's policy of non-alignment and friendship with all nations was adopted at the very outset of India's independence. As such, this Indian policy was not a covertly pro-Soviet response to US overtures, as American policy-makers believed, but an expression of Indian foreign policy.²²

India's policy of neutrality evolved in the backward social and economic condition of the country. This necessitated peaceful co-existence in order to develop its resources and to raise the living standard of its people. But the American response to India's position on neutrality is that, it is based on an unrealistic view of the then so-called communist threat to the world.

The nature of communist threat constituted the second major area of differences between the US and India. Their estimates of Soviet foreign policy were very far apart. These differences arose from the two countries' domestic situations and capacities, from threats to national interests that they perceive, and from the tasks that are engaging their attention.²³

These differences were most evident in the major policy patterns, particularly in security matters. Fear of the Soviet Union and the urge to gain military advantages as a deterrent to war, were the tenets of US policies. From the outset, the US adopted a hostile attitude towards communism and was immensely shocked by the behaviour of the Soviet Union which emerged as the major citadel and principal exponent of communism at the end of World War II. So the utter most problem in the eyes of the US policy-makers was to stem the tide of Soviet expansionism and, therefore, the whole of US foreign policy was geared toward that dire need.²⁴ Feeling threatened by communism and possessing enough power to offer a decisive measure of opposition to Soviet designs and/or desires, the US tried to prevent communist expansion through diplomacy, military muscles, subversion, etc. The US, over the years, not only increased its own military establishment and aided in building up the armed strength of those nations in Europe, Asia and Latin America which shared its concern, but also used its vast resources – natural, human and otherwise – to prevent the spread of international communism by counteracting militarily, as in Korea, and extending economic aid to Third World countries.

The Indian view is the opposite. In India, there was no fear of and hostility toward the then Soviet Union as was the case in the US. Indian policy-makers did not share the view that the Soviet Union would undertake the spread of communism by military conquest. Neither were they of the opinion that the power of the Soviet army and airforce would be unleashed against India or any other country. Moreover, Indians felt that as fellow Asians, they were better able to understand and appraise Soviet policies and motives than the Americans. Additionally, being remote from the atmosphere of crisis that revolutionized US policy and fascinated by the Soviet Union's anti-colonial propaganda and support for freedom movements in especially Asian countries, India decided not to embrace the imperialist line regarding the Soviet Union but rather to follow a neutralist, independent foreign policy. It is this policy that caused great misunderstanding between India and the US. For instance, in December 1956, Vice President Nixon condemned the "brand of neutralism that makes no moral distinction between the communist world and the free world." To which Nehru replied that he did not believe that "the world can be divided up into good and evil" and that "it is not democracy to want all people to think the same as you do".²⁵

India was also of the view that US policy of entangling alliances and armed intervention was not the real answer to communist expansion. India's stand was that, there was a greater threat from communist infiltration and subversion from within than from communist aggression. For this reason, the solution lay in boosting and strengthening the economies of the Third World in order to minimise the danger of internal subversion.²⁶

The point of view of the US was expressed in a better remark by Styles Bridges, Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee thus:

I lose patience with those nations which are not only neutralist in their military position, but insist on neutralism in their moral position. I know of no worse offender in this regard than Nehru, who proclaims himself the moralist of Asia. I know of no instance of Nehru having openly and sincerely taken the side of freedom and democracy. I know only of weasel words and prententions.²⁷

The triumph of the Communists in China further deepened the US-Indian differences: so did the close relations that came to be established between New Delhi and Peking. The US considered the establishment of communist regime in China and the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Alliance as an extension of the threat to its security already posed by the Soviet Union. This was further confirmed by Chinese aggressiveness in Tibet, Korea and Indo-China. The US, therefore, decided to deny recognition to the Peoples' Republic of China and to prevent its entry to the UN. The US also decided to draw a 'cordon sanitaire' around China by establishing defensive bases in Korea, Formosa and southeast Asia.²⁸

On India's part, it extended immediate recognition to communist China and also took the lead to preserve Peking's claim to China's seat in the UN, in open opposition and defiance of the American stand on the issue. India also voted with the Soviet bloc against the US-sponsored resolution of February 1951 in the UN General Assembly to condemn Chinese aggression against Korea. In the same vein, India also strongly opposed the US policy of containment of China. It also repeatedly advocated the restoration of Formosa and the offshore islands to China.²⁹

The third area of disagreement regards the best methods of maintaining peace and security. This is despite the fact that both the US and India have, as their major objective, the maintenance of international peace and security. According to the veteran Indian leader and former Governor-General of India, C. Rajagopalachari, "The great difference between America and India... is that the means America is adopting for establishing peace on earth do not appeal to India."³⁰

The question which concerned both the US and India is whether it is possible to ensure peace without defensive arrangements or whether adequate defensive arrangements are a pre-condition to the security on which peace depends. Whereas the US held the view that aggressive powers could only be kept in check by the fear of massive retaliation, India insisted that it was inherently wrong to always think in terms of force; that armaments and military alliances only created tension and alarm and that the so-called aggressive powers could be won over by patience, trust and friendship.³¹

Beliefs and attitudes of both countries regarding the best way of ensuring peace and security and under contemporary conditions are yet another area of differences between the two countries. The position of the US is that the avenue to peace is through collective security of the so-called free world, while India's view is that "One does not seek peace through security, but security through peace."³² As such, whereas the US considered the formation of such defensive alliances as NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact as of vitality for security against communist aggression, India regarded them as basically wrong because they tended to create insecurity, uncertainty and instability. But to the US, they were "an armour but not a lance, a shield but not a sword." To India, they were a provocation to those powers whose aggression they were designed to check. India felt

especially concerned about those pacts as Pakistan, its 'distant' neighbour, was a signatory to both the SEATO and Baghdad Pacts.³³ This policy did two things. First, it brought the Cold War to India's frontiers by disturbing the balance of power in the sub-continent. Second, it estranged India from the US.³⁴ This, therefore, forced India to seek friendship with the Soviet Union against US military aid to Pakistan.

Colonialism and Racialism

Indian impression of the American attitude towards colonialism is another source of misunderstanding in the bilateral relations. Both countries are opposed to colonialism. However, they approach the issue from different angles. Until the end of the Cold War, US policy was conditioned by a new form of imperialism, that is, communist imperialism. Viewing the US as the champion of the freedom of colonial peoples, India expected the US to extend unequivocal support without taking into consideration its anti-communist policy. The US could not, however, take a clear-cut stand on colonialism since communism, its greatest bogey, was aligning itself with the national movements and aspirations of the subject peoples of Asia, especially in Malaya, Indonesia and Indo-China.

As such, the US advocated an evolutionary approach to the problem of colonies and supported the colonial powers aligned to it, wherever it seemed that a nationalist movement was dominated or led by the communists.³⁵ According to one source, "Whenever the United States was caught between the issues of colonialism and communist expansion, she had always defended the former."³⁶

Colonialism is far greater a problem to India than communism. This is because India had no direct experience of communism as was the case with colonialism whose memory is still fresh in the minds of many Indians. Thus, to India, a country that practices or condones colonialism, is worse than that which advocates communism. India was, therefore, impatient with the US for its failure to take a clearer cut position on this issue.³⁷ Unlike Americans, Indians refused to confuse the two issues of colonialism and communism. This was clarified by Nehru in a statement in Parliament on March 17, 1953, thus: "It is no good telling us that we have to support some colonial power because if we do not, communists will enter there."³⁸ These differences of view points dictated how the US and India approached the question of Indonesian independence.

Still on the point of colonialism, whereas India was completely against colonialism because it considered it virtually exclusively as an abstract moral issue rather than a mosaic of concrete political problems, the US did not hesitate in siding with the colonial powers when its national interests were at stake.³⁹ No wonder on the question of Goa, Daman and Diu, Malaya and Indo-China, the US supported the colonial powers.

Similarly, as regards racialism, the stand of the US was diametrically opposed to that of India. The issue of the mistreatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa was brought by India before the UN General Assembly. But South Africa's stand was that the matter lay within its domestic jurisdiction and that the General Assembly had no competence to deal with the matter.⁴⁰ Though this stand was rejected by the General Assembly, the US delegate supported the South African position that the matter be

referred to the International Court of Justice for a decision as to whether the General Assembly was competent to deal with the question.⁴¹ This US attitude displeased India.

Additionally, the incidents of racial bigotry in Southern parts of America of which Little Rock became the symbol, also raised doubts in Indian minds of the capacity of the Americans to deal on terms of equality, justice and mutual respect with the coloured peoples of the world.⁴² Besides, racial discrimination of black people in the US still persists.

Such differences in the attitudes and foreign policies of both countries have been reflected in the past in their positions on various issues. Conflicting positions were taken on the issues of Dutch rule in Indonesia, Hyderabad and Kashmir, the establishment of the communist regime in China, the Korean crisis of 1950, the Japanese Peace Treaty (1951), the US attempt to keep the Tunisian question from being put on the Security Council Agenda in April 1952, the Suez Canal dispute, Cambodia and Vietnam and the American Military Aid Pact with Pakistan (1954). Thus, US-Indian relations have suffered from serious setbacks in the period prior to the Chinese invasion of 1962.

The Chinese Invasion and US-Indian Relations

In October 1962, China invaded India. This invasion brought the US and India to a level of understanding never reached before. For the first time, the views of the national interests of both countries converged and they displayed the same degree of eagerness to cooperate with each other to manage this unexpected crisis. Because India was not prepared for such an eventuality, it was in its self-interest and self-defence to obtain military aid from wherever it came. The US, on the other hand, provided military and material aid as part of its global strategy to maintain the balance of power in Asia against the Communist Powers.

Since 1949 when the communists took over power in China, relations between India and China remained very cordial except a few differences on Tibet that existed. India was one of the first countries to recognize China. India had also adopted a policy of friendship based on the five principles of Panch Sheel. i.e. mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. This symbolized the opening of an era of demonstrative amicability between India and China. But it did not mean that Nehru was unaware of the political dimension in which India and China operated – a situation of rivalry in Asia particularly, and in the world generally. Nehru believed that despite such rivalry amidst opposing systems, relations between India and China needed not to be spoilt. Because of this belief, he actively supported the case of communist China to be represented in the UN.

Thus, relations between India and China remained warm for a decade since the 1949 Chinese revolution. However, on January 23, 1959, Chou-En-Lai, the Chinese Premier, in a letter to Nehru, for the very first time queried the established boundaries between India and China. He contended that the "Sino-Indian boundary had never been delimited" and that the so-called "Mc Mahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China", and as such, an "illegal line."⁴³ Seven months later, on September 8, 1959, specific territorial claims were made with regard to 500 square

miles of Indian territory.⁴⁴ The Chinese action was a deliberate attempt to seek a quarrel with a peaceful India. It suffices to observe that China was silent regarding territorial claims when the 1954 Agreement on Tibet was negotiated and also when in October 1954 and in 1956, Nehru complained to Chou-En-Lai about Chinese maps that showed a wrong boundary between the two countries.⁴⁵ Chou-En-Lai had on those occasions clearly accepted the Mc Mahon Line as the border between India and China.⁴⁶ India again protested to the Chinese regarding a map in an official Chinese magazine, *The China Pictorial*, which showed five divisions of India's North-East Frontier Agency and large areas in Ladakh and Chinese territory. This was on August 21, 1958. India's desire was also to have the maps revised without further delay as the Chinese Government had been in power for almost nine years.⁴⁷ Chou-En-Lai, in his reply to Nehru, admitted that there was a dispute regarding the territories and that if China had not raised the question at the time of the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet region of China and India, it was because "conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement."⁴⁸ This demonstrates that the Chinese leaders were shrewd and marked time for the opportune moment when their troops were firmly entrenched in Tibet and in a strong position to subject the issue to arbitration of arms.

In 1957, China consolidated its position by building a road across the Aksai Chin area of India. In a note to Peking dated October 18, 1958, the Indian Government reacted to the discovery of the Aksai Chin road by expressing surprise and regret that the Chinese should have taken such a step unilaterally. But the Chinese were not bothered. From 1958 onwards, they began to occupy parts of Indian territory through clandestine invasions of remote areas. In reply to a protest, the Chinese referred to their "frontier guards" having detained the Indian patrol because they were in "Chinese" territory. This was during the summer of 1958. A year later, in July 1959, the Chinese entered Khurnak Fort in Ladakh and arrested an Indian Patrol party in Aksai Chin and made other incursions across Indian territory. In October 1959, they further penetrated Ladakh and opened fire on an Indian patrol near the Kongka Pass, killing nine Indians and taking ten others as prisoners. In essence, therefore, by 1959, China had already embarked on the course of aggression.⁴⁹

India desisted from taking any drastic steps. Nevertheless, Nehru took a very grave view of the situation and warned that should necessity arise, India would not hesitate to talk in the language which the Chinese seemed to understand – that of force – in defence of its territorial integrity.⁵⁰ Nehru declared in a statement in the Lok Sabha on August²⁸, 1959 thus: "While I do not wish to take alarmist view of the situation, we shall naturally be prepared for any eventuality and without fuss or shouting, keep vigilant."⁵¹

The deteriorating situation was reviewed in April 1960 during the meeting of the Prime Ministers of India and China. Unfortunately, it merely served to confirm the serious differences in regard to the understanding of even basic facts about the border. However, it was agreed that officials of the two Governments should meet and examine the relevant documents. As a result, three meetings of officials were held in Peking, Delhi and Rangoon during the later half of 1960.⁵²

In 1961, with a view of calming public opinion and taking action short of conflict, Nehru formed the "forward policy" whose purpose was to establish some symbolic posts both in

Ladakh and in NEFA, so as to assert India's control over these areas. By the end of 1961, India had established about fifty posts along the border.⁵³

In his book, Maxwell⁵⁴ has demonstrated that contrary to the Indian claim that China was responsible for the war, it was India's "forward policy" on the Northern frontiers that actually led to a headlong clash. Maxwell referred to Nehru's position that the northern frontier with China was not negotiable.⁵⁵ Thus, Nehru had taken the step that was to transmute a boundary problem into a dispute and the dispute eventually into a border war.

In other words, China reacted to the "forward policy" with more aggressiveness. Indeed, in early 1962, Chinese troops stepped up their forward patrolling in the western sector. For instance, in July of that year, Chinese troops encircled an Indian post in the Galwano Valley. And on July 26 of the same year, the Indian Government conveyed to the Chinese Government its desire to start discussions on the basis of the report of the officials as soon as the tension had subsided. However, as notes were still being exchanged as preliminary discussions to ease the tension, Chinese troops on September 8, 1962, suddenly marched across the well established boundary in the Eastern Sector, the Mac Mahon Line. The big bang came on October 20, 1962, when China mounted a massive attack on both the western and eastern sectors, thereby overwhelming the limited Indian frontier posts. The "frontier guards", as the Chinese armies were described by China, penetrated about 100 miles of Indian territory. Nine days later, premier Chou-En-Lai put across his three-point proposal for cease-fire and disengagement.⁵⁶ India, however, rejected these proposals as they suggested that China would retain its fruits of aggression and negotiate in respect of other territorial claims. Instead, India advanced a counter proposal of its own which called for the restoration of the status quo on September 8, 1962, followed by discussions between the two countries. China replied with further massive attacks on Indian territory. Suddenly, in a dramatic move on November 21, China announced its decision of unilateral cease fire and withdrawal. The Chinese forces then withdrew twenty kilometres behind the Mc Mahon Line which they called "the 1959 line of actual control" in the Eastern Sector and also twenty kilometres behind the Mc Mahon Line behind their latest aggression in Ladakh, which they identified with the so-called "1959 line of actual control" in the Western Sector. China still illegally possessed about 14,500 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh including the fruits of their latest aggression in this sector. Though India did not agree to the unilateral terms of the aggressor, it decided not to alter the cease-fire. India again repeated its demand for the restoration of the status quo as on September 8, 1962 as a pre-condition to a mutually agreed cease-fire. A stalemate ensued as the Chinese rejected the Indian proposal.⁵⁷

In the interim, at the initiative of Mrs. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon, six non-aligned Afro-Asian countries, namely Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, United Arab Republic and Ghana, met at Colombo from December 10 to 12, 1962 in a bid to break the dead lock and provide a basis for agreed cease-fire arrangements. The proposals,⁵⁸ Colombo proposals as they came to be termed, envisaged two things. First, that in the East, the Chinese had to withdraw to the Mc Mahon Line and Indian forces had to be allowed to reoccupy their positions right up to that line. Second, in the West, the Chinese had also to withdraw twenty kilometres and the area vacated by withdrawals

was to be regarded as a demilitarised zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides until a negotiated settlement of the border. India accepted these proposals in total. However, China, while announcing acceptance of the proposals “in principle”, outrightly rejected retiring from its military positions in the West.⁵⁹

In a note to the Government of China dated April 3, 1963, India suggested a number of constructive steps, including international arbitration, to resolve the problem.⁶⁰ On October 9, 1963, China rejected the proposals. It also accused India of having proposed these steps “to make negotiations impossible by setting up an array of obstacles.”⁶¹ China was not only apathetic to the discussions on the basis of the Colombo proposals; it also declined to submit the dispute either to the International Court of Justice or International Arbitration. The Indian Government, on October 16, 1963, wrote to the Chinese Government expressing the hope that “wiser counsels would prevail and the Chinese Government would revert to the path of peace.”⁶² The intransigence and rejection by China of the various proposals resulted in a long stalemate which has ever since continued.

But what was the logic of the Chinese aggression? India had gone out of its way to befriend China and had tirelessly worked to secure Chinese interests even at the risk of earning the displeasure of the US. One then fails to understand the motives behind the Chinese attack. However, the nature and weight of the attack make it certain that it was the result of a long and careful planning calculated at securing positions on India's natural frontiers in order to render India completely vulnerable. China felt that India was the only large democracy in Asia and, therefore, if it could be humbled and humiliated, the rest of the continent would easily be subjugated. Thus, according to Ashok Mehta, leader of the Socialist Party of India, the Chinese threat was not a momentary aberration but a planned strategy to impose Communist ideology on unwilling people.⁶³

The other possible reason could be the growing understanding between India and the US after 1957, just when Communist China had adopted a policy of intensifying the struggle against the US. A gradual change had manifested itself in the policies of both the US and India. Nehru had realized that the era of rigid polarization was ending and that the US Government was abandoning the Dullesian view of neutralism as immoral. Although this transition in US policy had begun in the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, it became more pronounced in the time of President Kennedy.⁶⁴ According to one Indian journalist, the reason why indo-US relations were friendly was that President Kennedy and his advisors had accepted India's idealistic approach to global problems.⁶⁵ Additionally, there had been a much greater degree of acceptance of India's non-alignment which was by then the official posture in world affairs of about sixty countries. Upon visiting Washington D.C. in November 1961, Nehru was hailed by President Kennedy as “a world leader of the stature of Abraham Lincoln and D. Roosevelt” and “whose example caused not just his own country but also the peoples of the world to look up to him.”⁶⁶ Of Kennedy, Nehru commented that he shouldered “perhaps the greatest responsibility in this world.... So we look up to you and to your country and seek to learn from you.”⁶⁷ However, these mutual tributes did not symbolize any shift in their basic positions on foreign policy. The US continued to be the leader of military alliances against the expansion of communism. India, on the other hand, remained non-aligned.

Nevertheless, there was a greater appreciation of each other's point of view of less annoyance at the differences existing between them.

This growing friendship between the US and India did not please China. Thus, from 1958 onwards, New Delhi and Peking began to move in opposite directions. While Indian interests lay in lessening tension and promoting detente, the Chinese felt that their national interests could not be served by a Soviet-American detente but by heightening tension. China was interested in creating a militant, anti-American front. In the same vein, China was an avowed enemy of those who sought friendship with the US. Thus, India became suspect as it refused to toe the Chinese line.

The cardinal objective of China in India was two fold. First, the territorial aggrandisement. Second, gaining some strategic advantage by occupying large areas in Ladakh and establishing itself deep inside Indian territory. But the major aims of China were three fold. First, to demonstrate to Asia and the world that China was the only power to reckon with in Asia. Second, to demonstrate that the policies of peaceful co-existence and non-alignment followed by India were unsound. Third, to topple Nehru's Government.⁶⁸ To Krishna Menon, the Chinese aim of attacking India was that they wanted to discredit India in the eyes of South East Asia.⁶⁹

US Policy and Chinese Aggression

Chinese invasion of India in the Fall of 1962 reversed the low ebb tide to US-Indian relations and set in motion forces that brought about a profound change in their attitude towards each other. According to one American source, "Unwittingly, this act of China led to a remoulding of Indo-US relationship, breaking down of American resentments for the present, and there came about re-alignment of forces in the Free World of incalculable impact in the coming decades."⁷⁰

The threat posed by China to India's territorial integrity devastated much of India's international image. It became clear that India could not defend itself from an advancing Chinese army without effective military aid from the West, especially the US, which regarded China as a real or potential enemy. Thus, India sought American assistance and the US responded favourably, as the security interests of both countries coincided at that time.⁷¹ However, with the idea of retaining a semblance of non-alignment between the US and the Soviet Union, Nehru appealed for military assistance generally. He simultaneously emphasized that both the Soviet Union and the US had been approached.⁷² Late in the night of November 20, 1962, Nehru made an urgent and open appeal for the intervention of the US with bomber and fighter squadrons to go into action against the Chinese.⁷³ His plan was that American aircraft would strike against the Chinese troops on Indian cities if the Chinese air force raided them. The US responded immediately by dispatching an American aircraft carrier. However, as the crisis passed twenty-four hours after Nehru made the appeal, the aircraft carrier turned back even before it reached the Bay of Bengal. Nevertheless, the appeal for transport aircraft – C-130s – was fulfilled immediately.

Kennedy's message to Nehru was one of sympathy and appreciation of Nehru's patient dealing with the Chinese.⁷⁴ Kennedy offered material assistance to India. The US ambassador to India, John Kennedy Galbraith, played a very active and vital role. He did

his very best to encourage the swing of Indian opinion towards the US. In this regard, he issued a statement that his Government recognized the Mc Mahon Line as the international border 'sanctioned by modern usage.' It is important to note that this was the first clear cut statement of the American view point on this matter. Before then, the US had deliberately avoided any commitment and Galbraith had to overcome the reluctance of the State Department before he was authorised to endorse the Mc Mahon Line.⁷⁵

The US extended military aid.⁷⁶ Without hesitation, India accepted it. This marked the real crisis in Indian foreign policy regarding non-alignment and non-acceptance of arms from either power bloc. These two elements of Indian foreign policy were jeopardised immediately.

It is important to recognize that Nehru had always explained his earlier resistance to acceptance of military aid by pointing out that to incur such dependence upon other governments would inevitably entail a reduction in India's independence. But with the Chinese aggression, American jets landed in India at a rate of eight flights daily, carrying automatic rifles, heavy mortars, recoilless guns, etc. Nevertheless, Nehru maintained that because the supplies of armaments were "unconditional and without any strings", they did not affect India's non-alignment.⁷⁷ Additionally, there was a fundamental challenge to the conceptual structure of non-alignment due to China's open defiance of both the US and the Soviet Union and its desire to be recognized as the world's third big power and Asia's first. This affected a qualitative change in the post-war power structure. Nehru was in a serious dilemma. Despite this, Kennedy did not ask for a formal alliance. Instead, he commented positively on India's non-alignment. American arms were rushed to India without any condition at all. Nehru himself confirmed that the US had never raised the issue of India giving up non-alignment or joining any military alliance. He also pointed out that the US would not especially be interested in getting directly involved in India's then conflict with China which a military alliance might warrant.⁷⁸ Ambassador Galbraith voiced similar thoughts as Nehru.⁷⁹ The ambassador reflected the views of the US Government and those of informed military, political and non-official opinion of the US on direct "alignment" with India.

From then onwards, Nehru's efforts to stick to non-alignment were taken seriously in Washington to the extent that care was taken to see that Indian non-alignment was not further jeopardised. Because the US wanted to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet rift, it was inclined to do anything which could embarrass the Soviet Union which was helping India against China. In this way, India's non-alignment became useful for both the US and the Soviet Union because both regarded India as the only Asian country which could, to some extent, contain the expansion of China. China has been a great rival of the US in the Far East as well as in South-East Asia and to deter it was the major policy objective of the US. Thus, Chinese aggression in India offered the most desirable opportunity to the US to win over India and contain communist China.

Concerning the India-China border dispute itself, the US had always sympathised with India. As early as December 1959, Eisenhower had supported Nehru's China policy and criticised the use of force by China to settle the border dispute.⁸⁰ But since Nehru had not anticipated that China would attack India, by so doing, Nehru lamented that China let

him down.⁸¹ This statement, however, contradicts an earlier one he had made in 1954 when he remarked, "But in say twenty years' time, when they are strong and modern, then the picture will be quite different and they will probably be a menace."⁸² This demonstrates that Nehru anticipated the Chinese invasion but wanted time. He, therefore, stuck to the position that "under the present circumstances, India is not to seek United States aid to resist Chinese aggression."⁸³

Nevertheless, it did not take long for India to request the US for the purchase of defence stores in view of the flare-ups on the border. The request was made in the first week of February, 1960.⁸⁴ The US reaction to the request was positive since the American policy-makers believed that both India and China were racing for the economic and political leadership of Asia. Senator Kennedy, speaking before the Economic Growth Committee on May 5, 1960, pleaded for such American aid because it would enable India to "overtake the challenge of Communist China." He stressed that India followed the path of human dignity and individual freedom.⁸⁵ Kennedy further stated that the real battle was not the flare-up over the Chinese troop movements around disputed boundaries; nor was it the war of words over China's annihilation of Tibet; that the real India-China struggle was equally fierce although less obvious. He stressed that the struggle was for "the political and economic leadership of the East, for the respect of all Asia, for the opportunity to demonstrate whose way of life is better".⁸⁶ This meant that the US was willing to assist India against China.

Kennedy entered the White House in January 1961. Upon becoming President of the United States, Kennedy continued the policy of friendship with India of aiding and assisting India to withstand the challenge posed by China. The US continued to help India economically and even backed India in its quarrel with China. This was despite Nehru's visit to the US in November 1961 – which visit reportedly left Kennedy disappointed in his expectation that in the next few years, India would be "a great affirmative force in the world or even in South Asia." In June 1962, Senate Sparkman, then Acting Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee observed: "We know right now that India is pressing very hard against Communist China upon her north-eastern frontier", and advised that it would be unwise to discourage India by reducing aid, "at the very time that she is moving in the direction that we have been wanting her to move for a long time."⁸⁷

Nehru's visit to the US also resulted in the recognition, by the US, of India's special position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The US realized that "while world communism is the objective of the Soviet Union, in the immediate future, the Soviet Union is interested in seeking Indian build-up as a counter-poise to China."⁸⁸ Convinced that India would not go the communist way, the US expressed so much interest in India that it was ready to provide military equipment at low cost against China if a request was received.⁸⁹ The US also assured India of its support in the event of China's attack on it.⁹⁰

In line with its policy, the US Department of State issued a statement on November 17, 1962, by which military aid was extended to India in the wake of the Chinese invasion.⁹¹ On November 20, 1962, President Kennedy made a statement in this regard.⁹² Kennedy sent Averell Harriman to India with a team of high-level State Department and Pentagon advisers and General Paul Adams, Commander of the mobile strike force which the US

kept in readiness for emergency ground action. Despite China's announcement of cease-fire, the Harriman mission arrived at New Delhi on the evening of November 22, and were immediately taken to meet Premier Nehru. Although Nehru and Harriman met as friends, there was great restraint in the Prime Minister's attitude.⁹³

Following a ten-day visit to India, the Harriman mission recommended that the US would have to take major decisions on the degree and nature of the military aid to India and to continue the emergency arms aid shipments that started a month earlier. The mission further recommended that the US had to prepare the ground for substantial military assistance to India over the following three years, under an agreement reached between Kennedy and the British Premier, Mac-Millan, at Nassau.⁹⁴

US policy-makers considered the emergence of a dynamic and expansionist China as the most significant post-war development. Chester Bowles argued that if China advanced towards S.E. Asia, it would come into direct conflict with the US. As such, "a counter-balance must be created." This could be achieved if India and Pakistan found an acceptable agreement on Kashmir. Thereafter, the defence against China would be "a lot easier if those two countries would pull together."⁹⁵ Pakistan, however, was among the bitter critics of American military aid to India because it feared that the arms would be used by India against it. Accordingly, Pakistan declined to appreciate the Indian predicament caused by the Chinese aggression and the Indian case for military aid from the US. But the arms aid to India by the US continued despite Pakistan's protest until Pakistan's attempt to gain Kashmir by force sparked off the three-week war in 1965. Following this war, American arms aid was terminated and India turned to the Soviet Union for military aid.

After the Chinese invasion, a definite change occurred in the thinking of Indians. They were grateful to the US for its timely help without strings. The US and the Soviet Union were no longer put on the same pedestal despite the desire to keep the Soviet Union too on India's side in the struggle against communist China and its ally Pakistan. Emphasis was now laid on the ideological similarity between both countries. During his visit to the US, President Radhakrishnan observed: "It is not merely a question of imposing a military defeat on us, of defeating us on the battlefield, but of disrupting our way of life and making people feel that Communist China makes more rapid progress, that democracy is slow and cumbersome."⁹⁶ Another Indian newspaper, in its editorial, had this to reveal: "The Chinese threat to India is a threat to the whole democratic world and the United States as the world's mightiest democracy, has a special responsibility to stand shoulder to shoulder with India, the world's largest democracy, in facing this challenge."⁹⁷ Most Americans agreed with Chester Bowles that "a free, prosperous and peaceful India is a primary requirement for a stable and free Asia and that a democratic India will constitute a long step forward toward a democratic and free world society."⁹⁸ Thus, a strong and democratic India was in accord with US national security. It was also in harmony with their goal of sovereign democratic nations.

Besides, the Chinese war generated complex and often conflicting forces in US-Indian relationship patterns. Though at the Government level both countries tried to examine the problem from the controlling point of national interests, within the Government of India, there were contradictory elements pulling in diverse directions. The traditional "pro-

American” forces in India asserted themselves and tried to bring it into the camp of the West. They argued that India could not rely forever on Soviet support and that national defence against communism could best be secured by joining the Western camp. These were supported by a section of cabinet ministers as well.⁹⁹

India’s non-alignment policy, therefore, became the subject of attack from various quarters, both within and outside India. According to one American newspaper, “It is this Chinese presence which has forced the new India-US relationship. India will henceforth, remain ‘unaligned’ *de jure* but she has been forcibly aligned, ‘*de facto*’ with the West.”¹⁰⁰ However, the general mood was best reflected in an editorial of one Indian newspaper which emphasised that war taught a country many valuable lessons.¹⁰¹ Nehru himself confessed that the invasion had made India realize that it was getting out of touch with the realities of the modern world.¹⁰²

Nevertheless, India did not really align with the West. It merely shared a mutual defensive concern with the US in order to thwart the design of Chinese aggression against India. There was no formal alliance although it was contemplated. It, however, did not materialize due to Kennedy’s assassination and Nehru’s death.¹⁰³ The US did not give any undertaking to aid India with its own forces if the Chinese invasion recurred, although it agreed “to consult”. Additionally, India continued receiving defence materials from the US and also received missions in which the US was represented. It gave extraordinary facilities to these missions to inspect its defence installations. Discussions took place between Indian representatives and American and British military officers on measures for strengthening Indian air defence. Nehru also revealed that runways and radar installations would be improved for possible use by the air arms of “friendly nations” in the event of an all-out Chinese war. This shows that there had occurred a significant development in US-Indian relations, a new military relationship.¹⁰⁴ And as Ambassador Galbraith stated, “...certainly when American planes deploy Indian troops or ferry ammunitions from one military base to another, there has been some change in the military relationship between our two countries.”¹⁰⁵ This signified an unwritten alliance for defensive purposes. The advantage of such an alliance was that it enabled India to collaborate freely with the Soviet Union and exploited the Sino-Soviet rift while simultaneously reaping the deterrent of effect of an implied American and British assurance of direct aid should China act again.¹⁰⁶ As such, India gratefully accepted arms from the West, although it simultaneously tried to persuade the Soviet Union to make at least a token supply of military aircraft. Kennedy was also guided by similar calculations. He was not anxious to pressurise Nehru as it was not in the interest of the US to narrow the Sino-Soviet rift.

Nevertheless, the charm surrounding this new US-Indian relations soon began to fade. American policy-makers had expected a reorientation of Indian foreign policy and changes in India’s external posture and policies. These changes were, to the Americans, logical due to India’s demonstration of the validity of their view of the world’s major problems, particularly communism. The removal of Krishna Menon from the Union Cabinet was regarded as the beginning of a real reorientation of India’s foreign policy and a welcome step. The subsequent speeches and statements made by Nehru, however, shocked US policy-makers. According to a leading American newspaper which reflects the thinking of American government officials, India’s policy was a three-legged stool;

two were gone and the Prime Minister teetered on a third leg, hoping that one day the Soviet Union would be able to shake off its commitments to Peking and back India.¹⁰⁷

American hopes were dashed and once again the US became disillusioned with India. In other words, the warmth generated in US-Indian relations by the Chinese attack cooled off. But later when it was realized that the Soviet Union was also siding with India against China, the US recognized the wisdom of Nehru's policy and modified its criticism.¹⁰⁸

Indo-Pakistan Relations

The Pakistan factor is the touchstone of US-Indian relations. India's relations with Pakistan have moved in a vicious circle since the birth of both countries as sovereign states in 1947. Ever since, every dispute promoted an added element of strain and tension. This has contributed to deterioration in US-Indian relations.

According to one Indian source, "The area of Indo-Pakistan relations is by far the most crucial in the entire compass of India's foreign relation."¹⁰⁹ This is because of the entire background that has been poisoned by the long and bitter conflict between the Muslim League, which ruled Pakistan after 1947, and the Congress, which ruled India. The mutual suspicions and fear have all along made relations between the two countries unfriendly. India accepted the creation of Pakistan as final. This was clarified by Nehru to the effect that the Pakistani fear of India was totally unjustified because under no circumstance did India wish to interfere in Pakistan; that India wanted Pakistan to be an independent and flourishing country. Nehru only favoured a close association with Pakistan – not a reunion with it.¹¹⁰

Despite this assurance, Pakistan has all along been suspicious that India has designs on its territorial integrity and independence, because the Congress was always opposed to the partition of the country and only agreed to it as a last resort; as a means of achieving freedom for India. Furthermore, the extremists on both sides have clamoured for war as the only final solution of the differences between the two countries.

Thus, the study of Indo-Pakistan relations is one of conflict which emanates from and manifests itself in many political problems between the two countries. The conflict of interests and objectives, of ideology, image and power between the two countries characterised their relations.¹¹¹

All these years, the Pakistani posture has been dictated by its dominant psychological fixation of hostility to India, of hurting India where possible.¹¹² It is clear, therefore, that the problems of Indo-Pakistan relations arose out of the fact that their mutual relations did not pose the normal problems of relations between two separate nations. As such, it has not been easy for the present generation of Indians and Pakistanis to forget the past and evolve a normal attitude towards their neighbour. The two countries relate with each other through facts of history, geography, culture, language and memories of the recent past. This is how India and Pakistan began to function as sovereign states and found themselves engaged in conflicts over many issues, of which Kashmir is one.¹¹³

There have inevitably been high costs in India-Pakistan relations due to the tensions generated by rivalry. These include the economic burden of defence expenditure, the

socio-political effects of a state of tension and the resultant harmful dependence on outside support. There has also been the loss of positive benefits which can accrue to both countries from a cordial relationship: the economic cooperation between the two countries. Both countries could jointly have played an important role in that part of the world when it was faced with threats.

Pakistan, therefore, occupies the dominant position and is one of the major determinants in India's foreign policy. The impact of India on Pakistan's foreign policy is much greater. But on the other hand, the influence of Pakistan on Indian foreign policy is no less significant.

The attitude of India towards other countries, particularly the US, like that of Pakistan, was greatly determined by its mutual antipathy and by the way other countries viewed quarrels with Pakistan. But hostility towards Pakistan did not impinge on India's foreign relations directly. For example, India's policy of non-alignment was formulated in terms of its global operation and not with reference to Pakistan.¹¹⁴ India's shift from non-alignment to qualified non-alignment was determined by China's growing aggressiveness, and Pakistan's role in this matter was restricted to its attempted collaboration with China to harass India.

After independence, one major foreign policy move of India was to acquiesce in China's domination and colonization of Tibet. As such, India agreed to dismantle a wall of defence across the northern frontier which an independent Tibet might have constituted. This lack of consciousness can only be explained by an excessive concern for the Pakistani threat. India was busy countering the Pakistan moves — Pakistan behaving as its number one enemy. India, therefore, thought that China would be placated by India's recognition of its suzerainty in Tibet and would extend support to India's stand on Kashmir against Pakistan. India equally failed to recognize China's expansionist designs and so neglected its defence on the north eastern frontier while concentrating its troops on the Indo-Pakistan border. It would, therefore, be correct to surmise that India was too much preoccupied with the Pakistani threat to appreciate the long term consequences of the Chinese thrust into Tibet. For this matter, involvement with Pakistan could rightly be regarded as the Achilles' heel of Indian diplomacy.¹¹⁵

Another factor that affected India's policy was Pakistan's membership of the Western alliance. Though India continued to adhere to the policy of non-alignment, in reaction, its attitude towards Pakistan hardened to a large extent. Although in August 1953 an agreement with Pakistan was virtually in sight, a year later, in August 1954, it had completely vanished. India has since then adopted the position that, with Pakistan's participation in the western system of military alliances, the circumstances had completely changed. This is because it brought the Cold War to the Indian sub-continent and made India more vulnerable to external threat. For this reason, it increasingly became difficult to settle the Kashmir dispute plebiscite – wise.¹¹⁶

Thus, as Pakistan moved closer to the West, India took several steps to oppose Pakistani and Western moves. India also moved to forge closer links, both economic and political, with the powers of the eastern bloc, and asserted its neutrality more vigorously. India patched up its differences with China in reaction to the American military aid to Pakistan on April 29, 1954, when an agreement was concluded between the two countries. This

agreement defined India's relations with China and Tibet in terms of the Five Principles of Co-existence. With this in place, India's strong, independent stand on Korea, Indo-China, on the question of admission of China in the UN and over the broader issues of the Cold War, was intensified.¹¹⁷

Until this time, India's policy has been to steer clear of the hostile and friendly approaches and adopt a character that appears to be in "the middle course."¹¹⁸ The essence of India's policy toward Pakistan has been to live with it, to reassure it of India's peaceful intentions, to refrain from adding, in anyway, to Pakistan's immense problems of stabilising a structurally novel state so as to make generous concessions to Pakistan on minor matters in dispute. The idea was to make no concession on the one issue which, partly as a result of the elimination of other problems, became the focal point of all Pakistan's demand on, and grievances against India, namely, Kashmir. In brief, the posture of India has been a status quo one, that is to say, its policies have been directed toward guarding a regional status quo in face of the seeming and inevitable urges of Pakistan to disturb the status quo.¹¹⁹

The US and the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent

US interest in Pakistan grew in the Cold War context. The spread of communism had to be contained both in Europe and in Asia. The US choice was India – which was made a counter force to communism in Asia. However, the US was disappointed when Nehru refused to be drawn into the Cold War and instead decided to follow the policy of non-alignment or equal friendship with both power blocs. Thus, having failed to secure India's support for its policy, the US eventually turned to Pakistan. Pakistan was more than willing to ally itself to the US.

In reality, Pakistan wanted to be strengthened by the US against India. Pakistan needed modern weapons in large quantity to counter-balance India's power position. Pakistan was unable to acquire such arms with its own financial resources. Thus, it eagerly joined the western SEATO and CENTO Pacts which enabled it to easily obtain arms and also to get support on the Kashmir issue.¹²⁰ As a matter of fact, Pakistan prepared to stand against a possible threat of invasion by India rather than just dealing with India on the Kashmir issue. In other words, Pakistan sought the aid "as a counter force to the confirmed neutralism of Jawaharlal Nehru's India."¹²¹

India's protests against the 1954 Pact went unheeded. The only effect of the opposition was to annoy the US as it was regarded as an uncalled for interference in US defence and foreign policy by India. The American reaction was explained by the Washington correspondent of the *New York Times* "As a matter of fact the opposition of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India was so pronounced that the State Department felt the US had to go through with the agreement or face up the consequences of turning the leadership of South Asia over to neutralist India."¹²²

The move by the US was a significant benchmark in US-Pakistani relations. The move had an immense impact on US-Indian relations. These relations were embittered and anti-American elements and sentiments were strengthened in India. The US found itself on the side of division. The military aid pact, far from promoting stability on the sub-continent, often proclaimed as a vital objective of US policy, instead intensified division,

encouraged Pakistani and Indian intransigence in regard to prominent issues and thereby blocked Indo-Pakistani reconciliation. The immediate, and of far reaching effects, was the collapse of the negotiations that had reached an advanced stage for the solution of the Kashmir question. Moreso, instead of acting as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism, it provided an opening for the entry of Sino-Soviet influence in the sub-continent.¹²³ The Soviet Union now came out in full support of India. For the US, it failed to exploit its great economic leverage to draw both countries together. Simultaneously, it lost whatever capability it had to influence New Delhi in furthering US policy objectives.

The arousal of mistrust in India of Pakistani intentions and marked increase in the tensions between the two countries constituted other political consequences of the pact. Nehru gave an authoritative expression of the reactions of the Government and people of India when he said on March 29, 1956 that no body in India had imagined that the Pakistani Government had entered into the pact because it expected some imminent or distant invasion from the Soviet Union.¹²⁴

The context of the problems between India and Pakistan was changed by the US military Pact with Pakistan. The bilateral Indo-Pakistan relations now assumed a triangular relationship, with the US as the third party. As such, the military alliance sharpened Indo-Pakistan tensions.¹²⁵

The cost of this blundering US decision (which had only a marginal and doubtful military advantage) was very heavy in political and diplomatic terms to all the three parties involved, namely, the US, Pakistan and India.¹²⁶ For India, "What began as an emotional outburst has hardened into an enduring sense of injury." A good number of Indians concluded that it was "essentially anti-Nehru manoeuvre" calculated at forcing his hand. Accordingly, "The military necessity (for the aid) is so questionable and Pakistan's preoccupation with India so conspicuous that it makes sense to them only in these terms, they cannot seriously believe the great US simply blundered into a mistake."¹²⁷

US active role in the sub-continent thus began. Thereafter, the US came to be regarded as anti-Indian and pro-Pakistan. India displayed mistrust and extreme sensitivity to every step that the US took in relation to India and Pakistan with far-reaching consequences for the subsequent US-India relations. The Jan Sangh was known for its anti-Sovietism and pro-US bias. Yet one of its leaders, Deen Dayal Upadhyaya, could not help expressing concern and anguish at the American attitude towards Pakistan vis-a-vis India.¹²⁸ On the damage caused to the US by aiding Pakistan, Walter Lippman commented that the US had alienated India and Afghanistan by its meddling in their affairs.¹²⁹ This implied that there was a dire need on the part of the US to re-examine India's role in South Asia. To this, meant the US aiding India militarily.

US Military Aid to India, 1962

Following developments in the field of ballistic missiles and polarise nuclear submarines and thaw in the frozen relations of the US with the Soviet Union, US leaders began to have a more balanced evaluation of India's role than was previously possible. They had, even earlier, sought to counteract the adverse impact on Indian opinion of US military aid to Pakistan by continuing economic assistance to India. However, it was with the

advent of Kennedy that there appeared a marked improvement in US-Indian relations. Kennedy began to talk in terms of creating a climate of peace. He did not, therefore, pay the same attention to Pakistan as was previously done. Like his predecessor, Kennedy announced that the establishment of close relations between India and Pakistan was "a major policy objective of the United States." The Chinese threat to India in 1962 led to a further re-orientation of the US policy toward India and as has been demonstrated so far brought India and the US very close to each other. Thus, the US sympathised with India's request for aid to meet the Chinese invasion. The US promptly rushed American arms and equipment without pressurising India.

American policy-makers grasped the significance of the Chinese attack on India. They realized that containment of China depended on collaboration between India and Pakistan together. In a confidential communication, Kennedy urged Ayub Khan to make a friendly gesture to India in its hour of great peril. Kennedy suggested that Indian troops posted in Kashmir could safely be withdrawn to fight against the Chinese invaders. This appeal was made to Ayub. According to Kennedy, such an offer would win Indian goodwill and put them in a favourable frame of mind for a settlement of the Kashmir issue. But Ayub brushed aside the appeal.¹³⁰ Pakistan's response to the Indian and Anglo-American moves was cold and disappointing. On October 29, in a meeting between the US Ambassador and Pakistan's Foreign Minister, the latter indicated that if the US insisted on supplying arms to India, Pakistan might have to do some rethinking about its membership of the Western military pacts and reassess its alignment.¹³¹ On November 5, president Ayub issued a statement expressing his concern over the Anglo American military aid to India, thus: "For one thing, it may have the effect of enlarging and prolonging the conflict between China and India and secondly, add to the serious concern already existing in the minds of our people that these weapons may well be used against them in the absence of an overall settlement with India."¹³²

On November 14, the Indian Government agreed to provide facilities to the US representative to observe the use of armaments supplied for the defence of India against the Chinese aggression and gave the assurance that any military assistance received would be used only to repel the aggression of Communist China.¹³³ A similar agreement was reached with Britain on November 27, 1962. Pakistan, therefore, informally promised the West that it would not attack India during the Chinese attack on Indian frontiers.¹³⁴

Some Indian leaders also realized the importance of settling differences with Pakistan. There was a Congress Party group that was urging reconciliation with Pakistan. Nehru also told Harriman of his "concern for a settlement that would make possible a common defence of the sub-continent."¹³⁵ This sentiment was appreciated in the US where the officials held that the defence of the sub-continent called for collaboration between India and Pakistan.¹³⁶

In other words, only the sub-continent as a whole could meet a Chinese attack by a united effort, by common defence which would enable both India and Pakistan to spend less on military preparedness and yet achieve much more and make it possible for the US to render more effective aid with more positive results. Moreover, the US could consider it to be a major gain if it could stabilize the political and emotional situation in the sub-

continent. This would achieve effective containment of China.¹³⁷ Whereas some years back the US supported Pakistan against India, in 1962 Kennedy declared that “Pakistan needed a strong and independent India for her very survival.”¹³⁸

Averall Harriman of the US and Duncan Sandys of Britain made attempts for an Indo-Pakistan rapprochement. This was between November 23 and November 29, 1962. Eventually, Sandys managed to prepare an agreed draft which was issued by President Ayub and Premier Nehru as a joint statement simultaneously from Rawalpindi and New Delhi on November 30, 1962. By this statement, Ayub and Nehru “agreed that a renewed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other related matters” and “decided to start discussions at an early date with the object of reaching an honourable and equitable statement” that would be “conducted initially” at the ministerial level and “at the appropriate stage” directly by Nehru and Ayub.¹³⁹

Ayub hailed the statement as an “historic document.”¹⁴⁰ Both Harriman and Sandys were happy about it. In the US, satisfaction was expressed in various circles, including the Press.¹⁴¹ *The New York Times* for the first time editorialized that “the plebiscite... may not be the only possible solution for the Kashmir problem. Partition acceptable to the majority peoples of the separate parts may be attainable and a condominium might be workable.”¹⁴²

However, the talks began in an atmosphere in which both sides took a rigid position from the very beginning. After some talks at the official level, details of the talks about to commence were finalized. The venue was to be Rawalpindi and the talks began on December 17, 1962. India’s Minister for Railways, Sardar Swaran Singh and Pakistan’s Minister for Industries, Natural Resources and Works, Z.A. Bhutto, were appointed as leaders of the respective delegations. Between December 1962 and May 1963, the two delegations held six rounds of talks before they admitted failure.¹⁴³ Nehru disliked what he regarded as unfair Anglo-American pressure on the Kashmir issue. He even suspected that Washington was trying to undermine India’s policy of non-alignment by insisting on joint air exercises and Voice of America (VOA) deal.¹⁴⁴ This feeling was because of change in the military situation on the border and ineptitude of Washington’s diplomacy. On November 20, 1962, the Chinese had announced a unilateral cease-fire, and a decision to withdraw troops back to the other side of the Mac Mahon Line. To a great extent, this obliterated the physical fact of aggression. The invasion was practically over by the time the Harriman mission arrived at New Delhi. As such, the Indian Government was no longer under the pressure of Chinese advance to be compelled to make a dramatic gesture to Pakistan. On the other hand, the US could not persuade Ayub to make a positive gesture to India because it was too late.¹⁴⁵ The Pakistani attitude had hardened and the Chinese Government had made a notable diplomatic break-through in Pakistan.

Pakistani leaders were put in a nightmare by the prospect of prolonged US assistance to India to meet the Chinese challenge. This was in complete disregard of Pakistani concern and protest. They, therefore, openly criticised both India and the US. President Ayub had himself warned that any move to provide military assistance to India “would put a strain on our relationship with America.”¹⁴⁶ Ayub took US assistance to India as a direct threat to Pakistan’s security. Pakistan’s contention was that this aid might be used against it by

India despite India's earlier assurance to the US and its Western allies that these arms would exclusively be used against the Chinese. President Kennedy assured President Ayub that the limited assistance the US was providing India would not pose any threat to Pakistan and that there would be no diminution of the even greater US aid that Pakistan was receiving.¹⁴⁷ However, these assurances failed to assuage the fury and anguish of Pakistani leaders. Ayub, in his reply, said that large-scale supply of military equipment would not further the cause of peace and international understanding between India, Pakistan and China.¹⁴⁸ Indeed, Pakistani leaders refused to be pacified even by the clear statement of Defence Secretary Mc Namara that the joint US-Commonwealth team was to recommend only modest expenditures.¹⁴⁹

Nevertheless, the US persisted in its policy of continuing to assist India and ignored Pakistani objections. President Kennedy and Premier Macmillan, on June 30, 1963, reaffirmed their "policy of continuing to help India by providing further military aid to strengthen her defences against the threat of renewed Chinese Communist attack."¹⁵⁰ Pakistan termed this announcement as an "unwritten alliance" between the Anglo-American bloc and "uncommitted India." The Pakistanis resentfully observed that, "without entering into a formal alliance with the Nehru administration, President Kennedy and Premier Macmillan have now decided to bestow upon India many of the 'benefits' and security normally accruing to members of a military alliance."¹⁵¹ However, speaking before the Senate sub-committee on Defence Appropriations in February 1964, Defence Secretary Robert Mc Namara expressed his inability to share Pakistan's concern over the modest military aid that India was receiving from the US.¹⁵²

Whereas it was expected that the Chinese aggression against India and the timely assistance of the US would help cement US-Indian relations, this did not happen for a variety of reasons. On the part of India, Nehru felt that the US was exerting undue pressure on him to make concessions on Kashmir. On the other hand, the Americans were irked by Nehru's refusal to make concessions to Pakistan, his reluctance to publicise American military aid, his lack of enthusiasm for joint air exercises, his repudiation of the VOA agreement and his adherence to the concept of friendliest possible relations with the Soviet Union. President Kennedy was actually disenchanted "by the news stories coming out of Delhi-Nehru's resistance that non-alignment is as good as ever; that this is the policy that we really want, and that our aid is being played down to protect the sensitivity of the Soviets." The US Ambassador to India also complained to Nehru and warned him that, "we cannot decently help someone who is afraid to be seen in our company."¹⁵³ Washington also complained that New Delhi's requests for military hardware were unreasonably high.¹⁵⁴ But India suspected that the US was dragging its feet either because it wanted to extract some concessions or because it was not sufficiently interested in strengthening India's defence capability.¹⁵⁵

According to the editorial of one Indian newspaper, therefore, Kennedy, by his inability or unwillingness to revise US policies towards India and Pakistan, failed to extract the maximum benefit from the Chinese attack.¹⁵⁶ However, in a press conference on September 12, 1963, President Kennedy stated the dilemma that confronted the US. Much as the US wanted to sustain India, it did not want India to be helpless.¹⁵⁷ Similar thoughts were expressed by F. Bradford Morse in the House of Representatives on June 24, 1963.¹⁵⁸ However, the US dealt with Pakistan with remarkable patience and restraint,

though it noted with concern Pakistan's overtures to China in the context of Sino-Indian conflict.¹⁵⁹

Despite growing Pakistani friendship with China, the general feeling among Americans was that Pakistan was genuinely anti-communist and a loyal ally of the US. If it was moving towards China, it was due to fear of India. The US believed that by aiding India militarily, it had lost the friendship of its ally, Pakistan. If only India could accede to Pakistani demands in regard to Kashmir, Pakistan could be prevented from moving closer to China. Instead of being annoyed with Pakistan for its pro-Chinese move, the US was inclined to show more annoyance with India. The US simply ignored the repeated claims made by Pakistani leaders that even if the Kashmir problem was satisfactorily settled, under no circumstances would Pakistan go against China. But the US still believed that once Kashmir was out of the way, Pakistan would join India in the defence of the sub-continent, a belief not shared by India, in view of the clear statements to the contrary by Pakistani leaders.¹⁶⁰ The Indian attitude was that if the US was prepared to be black-mailed by Pakistan, that was its own business but the US had no right to expect India to pay the price demanded by Pakistan.¹⁶¹

In 1965, hardly three years after the Chinese aggression, Pakistan, with the aid of China, embarked on a course of aggression to settle the Kashmir dispute. China declared its open support for Pakistan and labelled India as aggressor. China's increased activity on the Indian borders forced the Indians to keep a large part of their army on the Chinese borders and thus helped the much smaller Pakistan to fight the Indians to a standstill.

India, US and Kashmir

The beginning of the deterioration in US-Indian relations can be traced to the inability of the US to appreciate the essential justice of India's stand on Kashmir. Unlike other princely states that acceded either to India or to Pakistan on the lapse of paramountcy, Kashmir did not accede to either Dominion. Though India was interested in Kashmir due to its strategic position, it did not pressurize it to accede to the Indian Dominion. This was despite Kashmir's entry into a standstill Agreement with Pakistan soon after August 15, 1947.

Initially, Pakistan tried hard to force Kashmir to accede to Pakistan by applying economic pressure and stopping the supply of essential commodities such as food grains, salt, sugar and petrol. But these tactics failed. So Pakistan sent armed bands of raiders into Jammu in October. They occupied a large part of Jammu province, particularly in the Poonch area. On October 24, they broke through Muzaffarabad and started marching towards Srinagar.

The Maharaja of Kashmir, unable to cope with the situation, asked India for arms and ammunition. On October 25 and 26, the Defence Committee considered the grave situation in Kashmir and the Maharaja's request to India to intervene with armed forces and accept Kashmir's accession to India. India finally accepted the accession. But it was conditional upon the holding of a plebiscite after law and order had been restored.¹⁶²

On October 27, Indian forces were air-lifted to Kashmir. They drove back the invaders and recovered the Kashmir valley. India then repeatedly requested the Government of

Pakistan to prevent “the use of its territory for aggression of India.” Pakistan paid no heed to it. India was thus obliged to formally refer the matter to the UN Security Council on December 30.¹⁶³

A five-man UN Commission on India and Pakistan was instituted to work for peace. As a first step towards peace, the commission succeeded in effecting a cease-fire on January 1, 1949. Efforts were subsequently made by the UN to solve the problem through mediation but they proved abortive due to the failure of India and Pakistan to reach mutual agreement. Pakistani forces occupying a part of Kashmir remained there.

The Government of Kashmir decided to convene the Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution for the state as part of the Indian Union. By February 1954, the Constituent Assembly had ratified Kashmir’s irrevocable accession to India. Between May and December 1963, the process of integrating Kashmir with the Indian Union went unchecked. On January 30, 1964, India categorically told the Security Council that “under no circumstance can we agree to the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir.” This background is necessary for the proper understanding of the US position in trying to find solution of the Kashmir problem.

The American posture on Kashmir is a complex phenomenon. When it was first brought to the Security Council, the US largely followed the British line of thinking which was characterised by sympathy for Pakistan. This was because the logical implementation of the Mountbatten formula about accession of the princely state should have brought Hyderabad to the Indian Union and Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan.¹⁶⁴

However, subsequently, US position on the Kashmir issue was largely determined by its Cold War strategy. At this time, the major concern of the US was containment of Communism and because Pakistan was on the front line of the “ring of deterrence”, it involved US security¹⁶⁵ hence, US interest in the Indo-Pakistan disputes as a whole and Kashmir in particular. In its zeal to combat communism, the Eisenhower Administration, without closely studying the sequence of events that had made the holding of plebiscite difficult for India, aggravated the difficulty by signing a military alliance with Pakistan much to the chagrin of India. Ever since, Kashmir became involved in US Cold war policies in South Asia and the Northern Tier of the Middle East. US support for Pakistan brought about the counter-balancing Soviet support for India. Until the end of the Cold War, this situation largely prevailed.

When the Kashmir problem cropped up, communist expansion was rapid and the US fear was based on the delicacy of the situation. According to one author, Kashmir could prove to be “the graveyard of the remaining Anglo-American position on the sub-continent of Asia.” At the very least, it could impede Washington in what was apparently its then tendency to look toward India “as a partial policy substitute for China.”¹⁶⁶

Thus, between 1947 and 1948, the major concern of the US was that the dispute might not conflagrated into a general war as this would weaken both countries and, therefore, push either of them into the arms of communists. This fear was expressed by Raymond A. Hare, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. He said in a statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 22, 1966 that

South Asia was the heartland of non-communist mainland Asia and, therefore, needed to be secured from Chinese communist influence.¹⁶⁷

American policy-makers also believed that the partition of India was based on the two Nations Theory – Hindu state and Muslim state. Thus, the “disposition of Kashmir” was the basic issue before the UN which had become “interwoven with a complex of religious feelings, national prestige, legal subtleties and economic pressures.”¹⁶⁸

As such, it was America’s most, “earnest desire to see the two great states of the sub-continent join together to assure their mutual peace and security as well as their mutual prosperity,”¹⁶⁹ the Kashmir issue being a “concern” of the US from the very beginning due to its impact on the policies and progress of India and Pakistan, including their policies towards the US. According to Phillips Talbot, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “Kashmir is only one aspect, of course of our larger interests in the sub-continent of South Asia.”¹⁷⁰

The US thought that an equitable solution of the Kashmir problem could be found on the basis of the principle of self-determination.¹⁷¹ The US thus endorsed the UN resolution of January 5, 1949. The US representative to the UN by the name of Cross, speaking on this occasion, said: “In our view it is eminently fair and sound, and in fulfilment of our duty as a member of this Council dedicated to peaceful settlements, to recommend to the parties that they accept a principle which strengthens the concept and value of the cease-fire line and avoids the risk of an extension of military activity.”¹⁷²

Thus, the US favoured any course of action that would produce a settlement of the Kashmir problem. But only rarely did either side show any interest in bilateral negotiations with a firm and specific agenda.¹⁷³ The US wanted to play a role in the settlement of the dispute. US representative to the UN, Braco, said in the Security Council that the US considered the Kashmir issue on the merits of the case and that the US “seeks to assist both India and Pakistan – and I say this with great sincerity – in finding a just and equitable solution of the Kashmir problem. We again urge them to cooperate to that end.”¹⁷⁴ However, fundamental to this US assistance was that the settlement could be achieved only if it was acceptable to both parties. Or else Kashmir would turn into “an irritant which will effectively prevent the bringing about of peace and security in South Asia.”¹⁷⁵ In a speech before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, Secretary Acheson made this more explicit. He said that the US was willing to help.¹⁷⁶ Secretary Marshall extended support to the continuation of mediation and negotiation between the great nations of India and Pakistan with respect to Kashmir, so as to bring to a conclusion, an issue that had been charged with great dangers.¹⁷⁷

US representative to the General Assembly, Ernest A. Gross, once summarised the principles that guided US stand on the Kashmir issue thus:

In the first place, a lasting political settlement must be an agreed settlement. Secondly, the Security Council will always welcome agreement of the parties which they themselves can reach on any theory that will settle the dispute which is consistent with the principles of the Charter. Thirdly, it is the role of the Security Council to assist the parties in seeking to reach agreement. In this case, the Security Council has made available the services of Dr. Frank Graham

as UN representative. Fourthly, agreement most frequently is reached step by step through negotiations and negotiation involves an element of compromise. Finally, the Security Council should consider with care the views and the recommendations of its representative and indicate to him and the parties its view on the positions he has taken.¹⁷⁸

The position of the US on the Kashmir question, therefore, corresponded to its position on other outstanding international disputes. The US was primarily interested in a peaceful settlement of disputes. But it was disappointed by the persistent refusal of India and Pakistan to settle their differences on a realistic basis.

In 1962, President Kennedy proposed that India and Pakistan avail the good offices of Eugene R. Black, President of the World Bank, to settle the Kashmir dispute. But the initiative was turned down by Nehru.¹⁷⁹

India's view about the legality of Kashmir's accession to it, deserves analysis. India contended that "Kashmir has at no time been recognized as a sovereign state under international law. It has always been considered an integral part of India."¹⁸⁰ On March 28, 1961, during a debate on Foreign Affairs in Parliament, Nehru declared: "The accession of Kashmir to India is entirely in conformity with the Indian Independence Act and the negotiations that preceded it, it is also in accord with all that has happened in case of the other princely states which acceded to India."¹⁸¹

Nehru further observed that "neither the UN Commissions nor the Security Council has suggested that the accession was tacitly accepted by the UN commissions and the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir territory had been declared to be inconsistent with international law."¹⁸² It was, therefore, unjust, according to India, for the US to sponsor or support the stand that Pakistan should have a voice in matters of military security vital to legally recognized Indian territory and that Pakistan should have equal status with India in the final settlement of the issue.¹⁸³

Additionally, the UN mediator, Sir Owen Dixon, declared that Pakistan's action in moving its forces into Kashmir was inconsistent with international law. India, therefore, felt that the US did not adequately appreciate the facts of the case when it supported the view that Pakistan had equal right with India, to be consulted on matters affecting demilitarization and the conduct of the plebiscite.

As such, India was not prepared to be treated on equal terms with Pakistan, because according to Nehru, it was the aggrieved party.¹⁸⁴ To Nehru, it was not the plebiscite but "The fundamental factor is the aggression of Pakistan on Indian territory, secondly the denial of the fact of aggression, thirdly, the present admission of the fact."¹⁸⁵ Since 1948, three brigades of Pakistani troops occupied Kashmir territory. This certainly constituted a material change in the situation. Nehru, therefore, declared on March 29, 1956 in reply to a debate on Foreign Affairs in the Lok Sabha that talk of plebiscite was beside the point because Pakistan had to withdraw its armed forces first.¹⁸⁶

The belief that partition occurred on religious basis has struck on most Americans, something India vehemently opposed. According to most Americans, India was partitioned between Hindus and Muslims on the theory that they constituted two different nations. However, the Indian Congress never accepted the validity of the "Two Nation

Theory". India accepted the partition because there was no other avenue for winning independence. They failed to understand how Americans, themselves being a multi-religious people, could believe in the medieval and anachronistic concept of a religious state. Yet they, Americans, agreed to Pakistan's claim that Kashmir, having a predominantly Muslim population, should join Muslim Pakistan rather than join Hindu India. In a statement before the Security Council on June 22, 1962, Krishna Menon, the Indian representative, declared: "We are a secular state, all of our organization is political and has nothing to do with the religious aspect of a people. We are not prepared to face a position where religious fanaticism is to be or is protected."¹⁸⁷ In another statement before the Security Council in February 1964, M.C. Chagla, the Indian representative, said that India's position on Jammu and Kashmir was that Pakistan had to vacate its aggression and that under no circumstance could India agree to the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir.¹⁸⁸

Both the US and India held conflicting views on the Kashmir issue. Thus, Kashmir made up the most sensitive point in US-Indian relations. Although American officials, in the speeches, advocated friendly relations with both India and Pakistan and favoured peaceful and conciliatory measures to settle the dispute, in the UN as well as outside, they in practice favoured the Pakistani claims on Kashmir.¹⁸⁹

Neither did India favour the Anglo-American draft resolution of February 21, 1951. Nor did it favour a joint Anglo-American resolution passed by the Security Council on November, 1952, fixing the quantum of forces to be maintained by India and Pakistan.¹⁹⁰

The decision by the Americans to aid Pakistan militarily also had negative consequences. India regarded it as having changed the entire context of the situation. It, therefore, suspended an agreement with Pakistan to appoint a plebiscite administrator by the end of April 1954. India termed the US decision a "form of intervention" in Indo-Pakistan relations.¹⁹¹ In reaction, India demanded the withdrawal of the American military observers in Kashmir.

While Kashmir was being discussed in the Security Council in May 1962, a US Senate Committee voted for a twenty-five percent cut in US aid to India. Menon's presence in the Security Council contributed to it because many Americans found him unbearable. In an effort to stave off the Kashmir debate, President Kennedy suggested mediation by Eugene Black but India rejected, while Pakistan accepted the suggestion. This angered Kennedy and his enthusiasm for India declined considerably. He thus, postponed economic aid to India. But he later realised the importance of such aid to, the largest democracy in the world. On July 30, 1962, at its meeting, the consortium, with Kennedy's strong support, sanctioned India a generous amount of 1.07 billion dollars. Nehru reciprocated with an exceedingly warm letter to President Kennedy.¹⁹²

In appreciation of its military aid, the US pressurised India to reach a final settlement of the dispute with Pakistan. India and Pakistan then held a few rounds of talks. However, they failed to achieve any agreement as the Chinese threat had by now receded and India could act independently of the US.¹⁹³

The Security Council, during its February–May, 1964 deliberations, discussed the Kashmir dispute again. M.C. Chagla, Minister of Education, presented the Indian case.

He reiterated that Kashmir was already part of India and that India would not permit its unity, integrity and solidarity to be sacrificed. He also raised Pakistan's flirtation with China. He emphasised the vitality of Kashmir in the defence arrangement of India. He argued that India was the only democracy in Asia, the only country capable of checking China's forward policy. However, the Indian argument made no positive impression on the US, whose spokesman suggested that both India and Pakistan accept a mediator to peacefully settle the dispute. In spite of US-Indian differences on Kashmir and military assistance, the US continued its economic aid to India.¹⁹⁴

The hitherto US posture over Kashmir was modified by three variables. These were: the emergence of China as a major power; Pakistan's flirtations with Peking; and the estrangement between Peking and Moscow. Before 1963, that is, the Sino-Pak Axis the US had always sided with Pakistan in the Security Council. However, since Pakistan became interested in China and particularly the 1965 Indo-Pak war, a slight shift became apparent in US policy on Kashmir. The US refused to support Pakistan in the Security Council and insisted on bilateral talks between India and Pakistan in order to reach a settlement of the dispute. The Indo-Pak war was a blow to the Americans as they cherished the friendship of both India and Pakistan. They supported an immediate cease-fire and even welcomed the Soviet efforts to bring about peace in the sub-continent.

The US and Indo-Pakistan War, 1965

Although India continued to be positively inclined to the US for its military and economic assistance, this did not last long. During the summer of 1965, Pakistan committed aggression in Kutch in which American arms were used without hesitation. This confirmed India's fears which persisted since the conclusion of the Military Aid pact between the US and Pakistan. New Delhi protested to Washington and dispatched photographs of the equipment to the State Department. The US in turn protested to Pakistan against the use of American arms in violation of the mutual defence agreement. Washington was, however, not able to prevent the fighting.¹⁹⁵ Though the US wholly supported the attempts to reach cease-fire between India and Pakistan, it conveyed to both countries its anxiety to avoid such disputes which could lead to more serious trouble.¹⁹⁶ But the US did not show any clout in dealing with its CENTO and SEATO ally. Instead, the State Department was eager that India should not emulate Pakistan and capture some Pakistani territory and hold it as "hostage" for the areas illegally occupied by Pakistan. The US preferred India telling Pakistan to withdraw from the illegally occupied territory.¹⁹⁷

A critical point was soon reached among the three, namely the US, India and Pakistan. This was during the undeclared war of 1965. India was of the view that the responsibility for the twin Pakistani aggression of 1965 rested entirely on the US, despite US claim that it had been misled by Pakistan's false talk. In March 1954, President Eisenhower had made assurance to the effect that Washington would take action if anyone misused American arms. So there was no excuse. The point, however, is that Washington would have been tempted to get the facility of certain air and espionage bases in the northern part of West Pakistan which was useful to its concept of security. It is, therefore, plausible to conclude that if Washington had not provided Pakistan with a large arsenal

of arms, it would not have tried this adventure. Premier Shastri also made this point during the Kutch crisis.¹⁹⁸

It is possible that the US encouraged the Kutch crisis as a diversionary move to divert the focus of world opinion from the Vietnam crisis. Some commentators have even gone to the extent to suggest that President Johnson stopped the visits of both Premier Shastri and President Ayub because he had prior knowledge of the clash. This means that the Kutch dispute was planned in advance with at least the acquiescence, if not connivance, of Washington.¹⁹⁹

However, a counter argument can be advanced. With its hands tied because of the Vietnam crisis, Washington was hardly in a position to take the initiative for a major intervention in any other Asian theatre. Moreover, in terms of political advantage, the US prestige in India was badly eroded as a result of the Kutch crisis. In line with this argument, Washington, after having pumped in an enormous amount of arms into Pakistan, found itself unable to prevent Pakistan using them against India – just as Nehru had predicted years earlier.

Pakistan was encouraged by both its success in Kutch and the US policy of appeasement to conclude that aggression paid. So in August, 1965, it embarked on the course of pulling Kashmir from India by force. Infiltrators crossed into Indian Kashmir from Pakistani side, with the hope of inciting a successful revolt among the people of Kashmir. Their calculations, however, misfired. Pakistan continued to deny its complicity with the infiltrators. But the reports of impartial sources, especially General Nimmo of the UN Observer Group, confirmed that infiltrators had entered India from Azad Kashmir.²⁰⁰ *The Washington Post* also carried news:

Reports reaching here from a variety of sources in Srinagar and the information gained from Kashmir and Pakistani sources last week in Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Karachi, leave little doubt that at least 1500 Pakistani-offered commandos have crossed the cease-fire line since August 5. They have moved in darkness regrouping in company formations at agreed points within Indian held territory and proceeding on pre-planned missions to bomb bridges and army despot.²⁰¹

India's repeated warnings to Pakistan to withdraw the infiltrators, or else it would use force, were ignored by Pakistan. India then crossed the cease-fire line and occupied three posts in Kargil to defend its supply routes. Following this Indian action, Pakistan declared open hostilities with India. The war was eventually brought to an end because of intensive efforts of the UN Secretary General, U. Thant, and the cooperation of the Soviet Union and the US.

The Indians were completely disillusioned with the US after the war. Indians strongly felt that the US was responsible for the war. Indeed, had Washington not supplied arms to Pakistan, this war would not have occurred. Even some Americans blamed their Government and held it responsible for the war. Senator Church, speaking in the Senate on the Military Assistance and Sales Act of 1966, said that the arms the US supplied caused the war between India and Pakistan; that after receiving the arms, Pakistan sought a military solution.²⁰²

B.K. Nehru, the Indian Ambassador in Washington, lodged a strong protest with the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, on September 3, 1965 against the use of American equipment that included Patton tanks, F-86 sabre jets and F-104 supersonic fighters, by Pakistan in Kashmir. He also pointed out that this violated the assurances given to India by President Eisenhower in 1954 that equipment supplied to Pakistan would not be used against India. The Government of India on the other hand had afforded American military officers the opportunity to satisfy themselves regarding use of American weapons by India. This was in response to charges made by some highly placed American officials that both India and Pakistan used American weapons. According to one Indian author, such charges were factually inaccurate because what India had received as military aid was mainly meant for mountain warfare and, therefore would have been of very little use in fighting against Pakistan.²⁰³

The US did not intervene in the armed conflict for over three weeks. The impact of the long drawn out proceedings at the UN was that instead of wasting time over investigation as to who started the conflict, it was more useful to achieve a cease-fire. U. Thant's appeal for cease-fire evoked a warm response from the US and Britain. Dean Rusk dispatched a cable to New Delhi appealing for an immediate cease-fire. The American delegation to the UN also claimed that the immediate task was cessation of conflict.²⁰⁴ President Johnson stopped both the arms and the economic aid to India and Pakistan when the two countries had almost exhausted and paralysed their military potential. According to Arthur J. Goldberg, US representative to the UN, in a statement to the Security Council on September 17, 1965, the US wanted to enjoy friendly relations with both India and Pakistan.²⁰⁵

The US did not play any active role in bringing the two belligerents to the conference table. Nevertheless, it desired a cease-fire and peace in the sub-continent and was partly responsible for the eventual agreement between India and Pakistan.²⁰⁶ At the beginning, Pakistan had cold-shouldered the Soviet offer of help partly because of suspicion of the Soviet Union's partiality for India and partly due to the hope of gaining US goodwill for Pakistan. Indeed, on September 15, Ayub Khan appealed in vain for US or Commonwealth intervention to effect a cease-fire. On November 15, President Ayub told the Pakistan National Assembly that he accepted the cease-fire, "because we were given an assurance by the Big Powers-particularly the USA, the Soviet Union and the UK – that they would use their influence and good offices to bring about a settlement of the Kashmir dispute."²⁰⁷ Pakistan was, however, disappointed because: President Johnson was no longer willing to play the Pakistan game; because of Pakistan's misuse of American arms against India; Pakistan's increasingly close relations with China; and due to the erosion of Pakistan's alignment with the West. Instead, Washington advised him to seek settlement through the Security Council resolution of September 20, which Washington had supported. Johnson even welcomed and blessed the Soviet initiative to arrange the Tashkent meeting. Because Pakistan entirely depended on the US for economic and military aid, and could not easily make up for the losses incurred during the war without American aid, and furthermore, because the US supported the Soviet initiative, President Ayub was eventually forced in November to accept the Soviet offer to arrange a meeting with the Indian Premier to settle their differences on the negotiation table.²⁰⁸ On its part, Washington was content to see Moscow play the role of the

mediator, to settle the hostilities through the famous Tashkent Declaration. In London, there was a belief that the US and the Soviet Union co-ordinated behind the scenes their efforts to get India and Pakistan to Tashkent.²⁰⁹

Indeed, the US applauded and praised the Tashkent Declaration as beneficial, not only for India and Pakistan, but also for US-Indian relations. It was in the interest of Washington to have India and Pakistan reach peace and amity.²¹⁰ According to President Johnson, "The United States values deeply, the friendship of both India and Pakistan. Nothing we know is more painful or more costly to all concerned than a falling out between one's friends."²¹¹

Chinese designs on the sub-continent made war between India and Pakistan all the more undesirable to the US. The US Ambassador to the UN, Arthur J. Goldberg, while addressing the National Press Club at Washington on April 19, 1966, said: "It [1965 war] was of course all the more alarming to the United States, because India and Pakistan are two very important nations whose friendship and progress we highly value because just over the Himalayas, Red China was sitting, eagerly waiting for a chance to pick up the pieces."²¹² There was also the American misconception that once the Kashmir problem was settled, then India and Pakistan would be good neighbours once more and act as a bulwark against Chinese aggression. But even if the Kashmir problem was solved, Pakistan would still pursue its anti-Indian policy because of Pakistan's own creation and history, including the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign state.

There was a change in Washington's attitude in contrast to its reaction at the time of the Kutch crisis. It had greatly hurt India that Washington treated the Kutch affair as an annoying side issue although it was the American ally that had committed aggression.²¹³ Whereas B.K. Nehru had found Talbot very stiff towards India during the Kutch conflict – threatening to openly support Pakistan in case of any counter attack by India – this time, he found Rusk in a different frame of mind, expressing concern, and not refuting the Indian charge of Pakistani complicity in the Kashmir clashes. The US Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, also reported the participation of external elements in the clashes in the Kashmir Valley, thereby confirming the Indian accusation of Pakistani infiltration.²¹⁴

The US approached the whole problem with caution and restraint. It also refrained from making moral judgements about the Kashmir issue. It kept its self-assumed righteousness under firm control.²¹⁵ It is significant to note that the pro-US Lobby in New Delhi openly criticised Ayub and even the Swatantra Party deviated from its traditional pro-Pakistan stand. This reflected the changed attitude towards Pakistan's action in Kashmir.

The war changed American attitude towards Kashmir. It also brought into focus "the American helplessness to do anything more effective in the matter more than the lodging of verbal protest, and that too in diplomatic privacy, has exposed the hollowness of American assurances to India, the utter undependability of Pakistan as a military ally; and the remarkably insignificant influence that the United States has acquired with Pakistan inspite of years of pampering with unduly military and economic aid."²¹⁶

The need to reconstruct their economies in the aftermath of the 1965 conflict, forced India and Pakistan to concentrate their efforts on obtaining the resumption of foreign aid.

To India, this meant an endeavour to woo the US into resuming economic aid without which India had no real chance of economic survival. To Pakistan, it adopted the policy of playing upon American fears of China. Both used the “fancy packaging” surrounding the real purpose of the Tashkent Agreement to influence Washington. India attempted to settle essentially non-political matters arising from the September war. Although progress was made on some minor matters, on major ones concerning the resumption of communications and the normalization of commerce, Pakistan was uncooperative, in the hope of pressurising India to discuss Kashmir. Washington had made the resumption of full-scale foreign aid contingent on the confidence that India and Pakistan would not go to war again. India pointed out Pakistani intransigence as evidence that it was not its fault that the ‘Tashkent spirit’ had not carried the two countries further towards reconciliation and friendship.²¹⁷

There was a re-orientation of US attitude towards economic and military aid. This attitude was underlined by the fact that Washington should channel all economic aid via the World Bank rather than via bilateral transaction. Although Washington had no intention of allowing the Indian economy to run down into chaos, it was prepared to re-arm either India or Pakistan so that they could go to war again when either of them felt like it.²¹⁸

India was thus forced by this attitude to parade the Chinese bogey with the hope that it would frighten Washington into giving military aid for defence against China. However, Washington did not seem to have accepted the Indian interpretation of China’s intentions. There seemed to be little or no appreciation of Premier Gandhi’s thesis, expressed during her Washington visit, that India offered a political alternative to China and that it was India’s mission to provide for Asia, a model of success through democratic socialism. Washington, however, seemed to believe that any attempt to build India alone as a bulwark against the Chinese would only perpetuate instability in South Asia by antagonising Pakistan. Despite the severe strains in the US-Pakistan relationship, Pakistan occupied a key position in US defences which continued to contribute to them. General Wood, Director of US Military Assistance, assured Congress in April 1965, that “thus far, Pakistan has not by any particular action, affected the essentials of our alliance relationship.”²¹⁹ Thus, Washington was more disposed to abandon an ally in response to Indian complaints than it was to take Kashmir from India in response to Pakistani complaints. Despite this, Washington was fully aware of the importance of some positive rapprochement between Islamabad and New Delhi and US think bent towards approaching the problem via economic cooperation.

It was also clear that Washington no longer viewed Pakistan’s friendly relations with China with the same horror as it did before the September conflict. This, therefore, means that both Islamabad and New Delhi failed to use China as a bargaining counter with Washington.²²⁰

Although the Security Council resolutions of September 1965, which called for a cease-fire, referred to the Kashmir issue (and Bhutto had threatened that Pakistan would walk out of the UN if a satisfactory solution to Kashmir was not found), Pakistan had virtually made no move in the Security Council to resurrect the issue in the last years of the war. This could be the result of a realistic appraisal on the part of the Ayub Government as to

the attitude such a step might evoke from the Great Powers without whose backing no resolution could be passed in the Security Council.²²¹

It became clear that Washington was in no mood to take sides in the Indo-Pakistani dispute. The US Ambassador, Keating, at a press conference at Lucknow, made it explicit that it would keep its hand off the “dispute”, desiring that the parties involved should settle such issues between themselves. He said: “We want to see harmonious relations between India and Pakistan: we do not want to intervene.”²²² Washington could, therefore, at the most, be expected to endorse the Security Council resolutions of 1948 and 1949.

Arms Sale Resumption by Washington

The US Government, on April 12, 1967, announced its policy to sell spare parts for equipment already supplied on cash purchase basis to the countries in the sub-continent. This did not mean resumption of military aid suspended at the outbreak of the 1965 war. By this policy, supply missions in Rawalpindi and New Delhi were also to be closed.²²³ A prime objective of the US Government in revising US policy was to encourage the reduction of defence expenditure in the sub-continent to achieve arms limitations.²²⁴ Richard Nixon, former Vice President and prospective Republican candidate for presidential election, also pleaded that the US decision to stop military aid to the two countries but to resume supply of spare parts for lethal weapons on a cash purchase basis should not be hastily judged. He expressed optimism that it would be judiciously implemented in order to weaken India against China and not to encourage Pakistan into a new military adventure against India. He also mentioned the American determination to “damper down” the two countries before they start moving towards another conflict.”²²⁵

Nevertheless, all the explanations provided by Washington failed to convince the Indians. In the Lok Sabha, grave concern and resentment were expressed against this decision. Members also questioned the intentions of the US. S.M. Banerjee, V. Krishnamoorthi and Venkatasubbaiah regarded this help to Pakistan as a serious threat to India’s security and intended to maintain the balance of power and foment external conflict between Islamabad and New Delhi. Foreign Minister Chagla told the Lok Sabha that considering that Pakistan was the major beneficiary of this policy, since India had not acquired any appreciable quantity of American arms while Pakistan would increase its offensive strength, the Indian Government protested to the US Government, pointing out that the new policy was bound to reactivate the entire war machine of Pakistan, and hence, posed a severe threat to peace in the sub-continent. Rejecting the US contention that “this policy is directed solely to serve the interests of peace and to reduce tension, and that they do not intend to act to the detriment of our security interest”, he declared it to be “prejudicial to India and far from working for peace and will increase tension between Pakistan and India.” He regretted that Washington always equated India with Pakistan. By appearing to be impartial and objective, the US was acting in a manner prejudicial to Indian interest. India, therefore, could no longer rely on American assurances since they were unable to enforce them.²²⁶ Whereas India too could buy for cash, spare parts for equipment previously supplied by Washington – but since Pakistan had been given about fifteen times the military supplies India had been given – Pakistan

obviously stood to gain considerably from the new policy. Additionally, the equipment Pakistan received for tanks, bombers, fighter bombers, was meant to step up the offensive potential while the equipment India received contributed to a modest reinforcement of its defensive strength. Thus, Washington was interfering with the natural balance. Speaking to pressmen on April 17, C.S. Jha, India's Foreign Secretary, said it was a pernicious doctrine for any country to say that it has a right to decide as to where the balance was tilted.²²⁷

Again in May 1968, the members of the Indian Parliament were greatly disturbed by the supply of US tanks to Pakistan via Italy. Whereas some members asked the Government whether it was contemplating "concrete action beyond sending protest notes to the US", others suggested that such military aid to Pakistan be declared an "unfriendly act" on the part of the US. Mrs. Gandhi assured the members that the Government had already protested to the US and Italy. Broadly, three arguments were advanced by American officials to justify the decision to sell West German tanks to Pakistan via Italy. First, to prevent Pakistan getting closer to China. Second, the Indian purchases from Moscow had caused apprehension in Pakistan. Third, Moscow could sell hardware to Pakistan and thus supplant the US in Rawalpindi as it had already done in the case of New Delhi.²²⁸

But India was not satisfied by this line of argument. India also denied that it had discussed the matter with the US at every stage and Bali Ram Bhagat, the Minister of State for External Affairs, pointed out how its policy affected the military balance in the region.²²⁹

Indeed, American explanations failed to lessen Indian resentment over resumption of supply of lethal weapons to Pakistan. Ambassador Keating's statement in Cochin that there was no reason to think that "the very limited American offer to sell several military items to Pakistan will contribute to an arms race" was not convincing. Similarly, his statements that what the US offered to Pakistan was a "drop in the bucket compared to what Pakistan has been receiving from either the Soviet Union or Communist China", or that the items involved in the American offer would not upset the military balance between New Delhi and Islama bad, failed to assure India.

But the American supply was not all that limited. Nor was its effect inconsequential on the military balance. Washington had offered to supply 18 F-104 Star fighters, 7 B-57 Bombers and 300 armoured personnel carriers. These are all lethal and offensive weapons. The F-104 planes are certainly sophisticated weapons, although the B-57 Bombers may not be regarded as highly sophisticated. This was bound to upset the military balance and, therefore, India could not ignore the bolstering of Pakistan's military strength.²³⁰

What was even more annoying to India was that the US could not prevent Pakistan from using US military hardware against India. Thus, an official spokesman of New Delhi warned that "Any attempt by the USA to make arms available to Pakistan, whether directly or indirectly, will be contrary to India's interests and against the peace and stability of the area."²³¹ Premier Indira Gandhi also told the visiting US Secretary of State, William Rogers, that Washington's decision to resume arms sales to Pakistan could seriously damage US-Indian relations.²³² Swaran Singh considered Washington's

decision really regrettable at the time “when we were beginning to see some hope of normalising relations with Pakistan.”²³³

The conspicuous absence this time of any American assurance that the arms would not be used against India worried New Delhi even more. Thus, it was feared that the supplies might have been offered by Washington with the full knowledge and belief that these would be used against India in offensive action not in self-defence, contrary to the previous stipulation when the US originally agreed to give massive arms aid to Pakistan. The argument advanced by Secretary of State, Rogers, that the move was meant to win Pakistan away from China and that it was only a “one-shot affair”, did not find favour with India, especially as Washington had not cared to make the assurance public and there was no guarantee of a re-occurrence of “one-shot affair.”

Additionally, in the radically changed circumstances of Pakistan’s alliance with China, reinforced by the receipt of military supplies and financial aid from the latter, there was no way, how the Government and people of India could agree with the argument that, strengthening Pakistan would help in containing China which had never concealed its aggressive intentions. If there was any justification in the past to arm Pakistan as CENTO or SEATO ally, that ground no longer existed as Pakistan could no longer be expected to fight on the side of the US against China. Pakistan had unequivocally declared that its only enemy was India. Even if Washington had thought of arming Pakistan with a view to making it less dependent on China, to whom it had turned for arms supply when US military aid was cut off, it could not be regarded as realistic, for Pakistan had established close collaboration with China at a time when US military aid was pouring in huge quantities. To expect contrary results would be naive especially in view of President Ayub’s repeated statements that nothing would prevent Pakistan’s friendship with China. Nor was any further arms supply by Washington going to stop his successor, Yahya Khan, from going over to China. If the global policy of the US was not to appease Pakistan at the cost of India, the alternative was to take corrective measures, otherwise, India would be forced to take appropriate measure against fresh accretion of armed strength by Pakistan as it happened in 1971.

The US and Indo-Pakistan War, 1971 and the Emergence of India as a Dominant Power

US-Indian relations touched their lowest point in November-December 1970 when another full scale war between India and Pakistan, the second in six years, erupted. The war started when the Pakistani military rulers, having received assurances from the Nixon Administration and Peking, being unable to bring the situation in Bangladesh under control, and annoyed with India’s open support to Bangladesh, bombed eight Indian bases on December 3, 1971. In this war, whereas the US supported Pakistan, the Soviet Union supported India. The Soviet Union had already concluded with India, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation on August 9, 1971. Much to the chagrin of India, the Nixon Administration sided with Pakistan and showed great hostility to India. It branded India as aggressor, cut all military and economic aid to India, moved three resolutions, in the Security Council and one in the General Assembly, in support of Pakistan, threatened to invoke against India its treaty obligations with

Pakistan, secretly planned the supply of American arms and spare parts, in utter disregard of public opinion in the US itself, and to crown it all, even sent the US task force (7th Fleet) into the Bay of Bengal to demonstrate its support to Pakistan and exert psychological pressure on India.²³⁴

Despite these provocative acts, however, the US refrained from direct military intervention. Even before the war began, the US had made its position clear. Secretary of State, Rogers, stated that the US regarded both India and Pakistan as its “good friends.” He added that in the event of war between the two, the US would keep out. Perhaps this was what President Nixon meant by the phrase “special relationship” with India; relationship that was as important as Washington’s treaty relationship with Pakistan. This was for the first time since the beginning of the Cold War, that US had proclaimed neutrality in a key area. This declaration was based on a rational assessment that Washington’s interests could be safeguarded regardless of what happened in the sub-continent. No wonder the Nixon Administration did not even criticise the Indo-Soviet Treaty. Equally, outside the Administration, public opinion showed sympathy towards India even after the treaty was concluded and it was believed that it was because of the Administration’s attitude that India was forced to turn to Moscow for security against a possible Pakistani-Chinese alliance.

However, what annoyed India was that Washington kept quiet when Pakistan massed its troops along India’s western borders and expressed concern only when India took counter-measures. Even with regard to the refugees, Washington’s attitude was far from satisfactory to India. Whereas American leaders offered lip sympathy for India’s suffering at the huge influx, there was no move from Washington to create conditions in Bangladesh for the refugees to return.²³⁵

Despite unhappiness at Washington’s attitude towards Bangladesh, Premier Gandhi declared her intention to disregard it, since no useful purpose could be served in aggravating the already existing differences between the two countries. She went to the extent of saying that even if the US decided to suspend economic aid, there would be no point in making an issue out of it. It was a “small” matter and no “fuss” need be made about it. This was a completely new line of thinking and it was the result of a rationalization of foreign policy.²³⁶

We, therefore, note that there were strong differences of views between the US and India regarding Bangladesh. Despite these differences, there was an underlying desire on the part of each of them not to let relations deteriorate further.

After the Indo-Pak War of 1971, India emerged as the dominant power in South Asia. The US was, therefore, forced to accept this new reality in the sub-continent. However, while the US conceded, in theory, India’s role as the leader of the sub-continent, in reality US policy remained designed to prevent India from assuming that leadership role because if India did so, the US would find it difficult to promote its policies in the area, in the context of superpower politics. Although the US was not able to revive its old policy of maintaining parity between India and Pakistan, it remained committed in supporting the integrity and stability of its ally, Pakistan. In the years following the 1971 war, therefore, Premier Gandhi was haunted by a deep suspicion that the US was waiting for an opportunity to topple her from power. She and other members of the Government

often charged “a certain foreign power” with creating domestic troubles for her, and asked the people of India to fight against the machinations of that foreign power. On its part, however, the US felt that Premier Gandhi was exploiting the tension in US-Indian relations to her own advantage. Washington often expressed its resentment of such statements by Indian leaders.²³⁷

The US resumed reapplying the old policies in the sub-continent in 1979. The effects of these policies had been temporarily nullified by the 1971 war. Since 1979, therefore, the sub-continent more again became embroiled in the superpower Cold War and Pakistan was assigned the key role in American strategy to contain the Soviets. Washington also warned India that its insistence on non-involvement would strengthen Pakistan’s claim to parity with India. However, India claiming sub-continental primacy, required flexibility in global politics to consolidate its stability and independence and was thus interested in avoiding Cold War or political commitment to neither the US nor Soviet Union.²³⁸

Regarding bilateral relations, President Nixon had suggested that new relations would be based on “reciprocity and mutuality of interest.” This was repeated by Indian leaders as well. But there was no significant progress, because at this time, India emphasised improvement of relations with its immediate neighbours. Thus, a new policy towards the US did not emerge although the world situation had undergone transformation after 1971. Most of the problems, namely, Pakistan, Vietnam, China, the Soviet Union and Israel, which had bedevilled US-Indian relations in the past, seemed to be fading. Indeed, Bangladesh had become a reality. Both the US and Pakistan had recognized it. The repatriation of Pakistani Prisoners of War had cleared the way for steps to be taken to normalize relations between India and Pakistan. There had been a Soviet-American detente as well as a Sino-American detente. A settlement had been among the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam and South Vietnam and the US Governments and following a short West Asian War in October 1973, US initiatives in solving the crisis seemed to be bearing fruit. Disengagement had been reached among Israel, Egypt and Syria. An agreement regarding the disposal of PL 480 Funds had also been reached between India and the US, thereby facilitating the atmosphere more conducive for a reassessment of their relations. It, therefore, seemed reasonable to hope that US-Indian relations would lose most of their irritants and a better understanding would develop between the two countries. These hopes were soon dashed as new issues emerged, thereby generating new tensions in US-Indian relations.²³⁹

US Presence in the Indian Ocean and US Attitude Towards India’s Nuclear Policy

The issue of US presence in the Indian Ocean, for instance, had far reaching implications for India as it was linked with its subsequent role in the region. India could not, therefore, remain indifferent to a naval competition between the US and the Soviet Union in an area which was so close to it. India was, therefore, strongly opposed to the increasing naval presence of the US in the Indian Ocean and the expansion of the base facilities in Diego Garcia.

Another issue that had far reaching implications for India was its nuclear policy which did not please the US as Washington wanted it restructured. But Premier Desai made it

explicitly clear that his Government did not agree to a restructuring of India's nuclear policy along lines that sought to delink issues of nuclear energy from those of nuclear proliferation. He also warned that in the event of a breach of agreement by the US, India would not be bound to observe the 1963 agreement, and could make alternative arrangements for fuel for the Tarapur plant. Despite this, in November 1978, India agreed to the US proposal for an international panel of nuclear scientists to tackle the question but the panel proved a non-starter because of differences over its composition and criticism in India.²⁴⁰

Charan Singh's Caretaker Government also took a strong stand on the nuclear issue. On August 15, 1979, he unequivocally declared that if Pakistan persisted in its efforts to make an atomic bomb, India would be forced to reconsider its earlier decision of not making a nuclear bomb. Thus, the Indian stand on the nuclear issue posed a great challenge to President Jimmy Carter and his policies. Contradictions emerged in Washington's approach to its nuclear relations with India. Politicians and technicians voiced different views. India's stand was unequivocal and unambiguous. President Carter's visit to India did not improve matters either. As a result, this vital issue is still a thorn in the flesh of US-Indian relations.²⁴¹

Meanwhile, Pakistan pressurised the US for supply of more sophisticated weapons. Washington succumbed to this pressure when it agreed to lift its embargo on sale of arms to India and Pakistan in February, 1975 despite India's strong protests. New Delhi reacted strongly and Premier Indhira Gandhi, replying to a debate on the President's address in the Rajya Sabha, declared that the resumption of arms sale by the US to Pakistan amounted to reopening the old wounds and that it hindered the process of healing and normalising relations between India and Pakistan. The External Affairs Minister, Y.B. Chavan, cancelled his impending visit to Washington in March. However, Washington remained undaunted in its decision.²⁴²

The antagonism between the two governments was aggravated by the declaration of Emergency in India on June 15, 1975. President Ford announced his decision to cancel his contemplated visit to India later during the year. He labelled the imposition of emergency as "a very sad development." The Indian Government reacted sharply to the comments of the American President, pointing out that the steps taken had been provided for in the constitution. However, the announcement that elections would be held in March, 1977, was warmly welcomed in Washington.

Fresh American Military Aid to Pakistan and its Regional Implications

The US initially offered Pakistan a tentative two-year economic and military aid package of \$400 million. Additionally, on January 20 1980, President Carter declared in a T.V. interview that if necessary, Washington was prepared to take military action to protect the security of Pakistan. Pakistan's President, Zia-ul-Haq, however, described the offer as "meagre" and demanded ten times as much. Pakistan further wanted guarantees in three areas, namely: use of military equipment as it chose; improvement of its industry; and a go-ahead with its nuclear programme. Pakistan also desired to replace the 1959 defence agreement with a new defence treaty. In response to all these, in February, 1980,

the US Presidential Advisor on National Security, Zbigniew Brzezinski visited Pakistan and offered an aid package of two billion dollars which could be increased if Pakistan continued to play its role in the long-term plans of the US in the region.²⁴³

Washington, following great hesitation and bargaining, finally offered Pakistan a six-year \$3.2 billion military and economic aid package with a separate \$111 billion cash sale of forty F-16 aircraft. The decision to supply these F-16 aircraft to Pakistan was vociferously opposed by India as the latter felt that in the event of war with Pakistan, the risks would be greater for India because Pakistan could use F-16s to destroy airfields, oil depots and nuclear installations like Tarapur, Trombay and strategic centres in Bihar would also become vulnerable to a surprise attack. This is because F-16s are a formidable multi-role airborne weapons system. The Indian Air Force, therefore, had an immense job to do to counter such a sophisticated aircraft. To somehow restore the balance, India had to acquire Mig-25 and Mirage 2000s, in addition to Jaguars.²⁴⁴

It is, therefore, important to note that the Reagan Administration's decision to rearm Pakistan to the extent of even providing F-16 fighter bombers to Islamabad on a priority basis resulted in the most serious crisis in US-Indian relations. The Reagan Administration fundamentally altered the rationale for military assistance to Pakistan. It did not justify arms aid solely or primarily in terms of the threat posed by Soviet forces in Afghanistan. It acknowledged that Pakistan desired aid mainly to build up its military posture vis-a-vis India.²⁴⁵

The Reagan Administration also hoped that if Washington provided security assistance to Pakistan, Pakistan's interest in acquiring its own nuclear weapons would decrease. But Pakistan showed little restraint. It continued to expand its technical ability to produce nuclear weapons and began to accumulate significant quantities of weapon – grade material in apparent violation of what the US had assumed was a commitment not to do so.²⁴⁶

It, however, suffices to note that both India and Pakistan have an impressive ability to produce nuclear weapons. Only political constraints remain in the way of crossing the nuclear threshold unambiguously – either by testing or stock-piling “finished” nuclear weapons. India has an impressive missile capability that could serve as a delivery vehicle for nuclear warheads. On the other hand, Pakistan is developing its own long-range missile capability. These developments have implications for US interests in the nearby Persian Gulf where the US and its allies continue to have vital interests. This is where the Indian ambition extends and is in consonance with India's push for a regional super power status – which creates several dilemmas for the US. The US could move closer to India as its relative power grows. But if India were to remain the dominant power in the region, it would also want the US to reduce its presence. But Pakistan dreads Indian domination of the region. Its strong ties with the US are, therefore, part of its efforts to resist Indian dominance. Nevertheless, the US has vital interests in the region. Remaining engaged, therefore, is the best way for Washington to protect these interests.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it becomes imperative to state that the history of US-Indian relations is a chequered one, with good patches following bad ones. On the whole, one continuity can

be discerned, that is, the basic policy perceptions of both countries differ resulting in the periodic bouts of strained relations. Right from the beginning, India's policy towards the US has had a sustained adversary character. However, since both democracies have common values, they have been able to absorb the shocks of repeated discords.

The Nixon Administration, during the period 1969 to 1971, evolved a new strategy of rapprochement with China to consolidate its position in Asia and constrain Russia's expanding role. The help of India was now no longer needed to contain China. Nixon, therefore, adopted the policy of offsetting India's close ties with the Soviet Union by continuing American support to Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan were treated on a par. But India, determined to defy the US, inflicted a severe military defeat on Washington's ally, Pakistan. In this way, India administered a severe diplomatic reversal on the Nixon Administration, thereby determining the US policy of Indo-Pakistan military parity. Thus, US-Indian relations continued to be strained up to 1977.

Following Carter's assumption of the US presidency in 1975-1976 and the Janta Party assumption of power in India in 1977, a new phase in US-Indian relations was ushered in. New Delhi regarded Carter as another Kennedy. Additionally, most Janta Party leaders were closer to the US than to the Soviet Union.

This was in contrast to the leaders of the previous ruling Party Congress (I). The Janta Government declared its intention of adopting genuine non-alignment. This meant that the earlier policy of a tilt towards the Soviet Union would be restructured so as to establish more cordial relations between India and the US.

It is imperative to observe that President Carter also expressed his desire for closer relations with India. This was exemplified by his recognition of India's regional power status. He even visited India to make the Indian public opinion more sympathetic to the US.

However, by 1980, with both Carter and Janta Party no longer in office, US-Indian relations once again took a turn for the worse. This phase of cordial relations was due to the interplay of personalities. It was also because during this period, the global and regional perspectives of both the US and India coincided.

During Reagan's presidency in the US and Mrs. Gandhi's premiership in India, the rift between the US and India began to widen. The Reagan Administration's decision to arm Pakistan meant reinforcing India's image of a hostile US. Their policies in the subcontinent drove the US and India further apart. Nevertheless, they were ready to pay the price because the advantage of these policies outweighed the costs of alienating India, a dominant regional power.

Thus, even with the demise of the Soviet Union and hence that of the Cold War, the prospects of reviving cordial relations seem bleak. It would, therefore require a conscious effort to put US-Indian relations on a stable basis only if both countries arrive at some kind of understanding on the subject and devise a framework within which differences can be contained, if not resolved, without giving rise to hostility.

Notes

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US-African Relations

African Perceptions of the US

Americans see themselves in a positive light. Because of this, it is often difficult for them to understand the less flattering remarks directed at their country from abroad. Americans are obsessed with what other people think of them. They seem to want to be re-assured that indeed they are good. When a person from another part of the world goes to the US and that person is not entirely pleased with what he or she finds, Americans usually conclude that it reflects a deficiency in him or her, not in their country.¹ Correspondingly, when confronting criticisms of the US in the foreign policy arena, Americans assume that the critics fail to understand “benevolent” American motives, since the policies themselves “must be sound.” Rarely do they examine themselves or their country’s foreign policy to see if the criticism is justified.² This ethnocentrism deprives them of the insights which can be gained from self-examination, and often, twists US foreign policy into something of which the majority of Americans, if they were aware of the facts, would probably disapprove. Another problem the exceedingly positive, uncritical American self-image produces is inflated expectations of gratitude, particularly vis-a-vis Third World countries.³

It is assumed that the US is the largest foreign aid contributor because the American self-image is one of benevolence and generosity. Along with this, are expectations of approval and praise by the aid recipients, especially those of the Third World, since it is assumed that they receive the majority of American aid. When Americans are not met with love and gratitude but rather with criticism and hostility, their instinctive response is to lash out at their critics, labelling them “ungrateful” or during the Cold War period, “communists.”⁴ This clash is particularly apparent in Latin America, the traditional US sphere of influence, but in Africa as well.

It is of particular importance that Americans have an understanding of the reasons behind African criticisms of the US. It is, therefore, essential for Americans to build this bridge of understanding if they are to have any hope of improving US-African relations. First, it must be stated that the US has done fewer bad things in Africa than elsewhere (notably in Latin America). But correspondingly, it has done fewer good things in Africa.⁵ Until the relatively recent times of flag independence, the US, for all practical purposes, ignored the African continent. This fact alone evokes a negative reaction among enlightened Africans. Generally, negative African perceptions of the US fall into one of the following categories: historical, political, racial and economic. Although many elements relate to more than one

group, these classifications represent the major determinants of African perceptions of the US.

The Historical Determinants

After ignoring Africa for centuries because it was regarded as the domain of the European powers, the US finally began to formulate an Africa policy in the 1950s. This sudden interest was spurred by African demands for independence and the concern of US policy-makers that European withdrawal could leave a “vacuum” that the Soviet Union might fill. Theoretically, the US supported the end of colonialism because of its ideals of freedom and self-determination. Practically, however, it refused to take a stand against its European allies, with whom most Americans felt some degree of racial and cultural affinity. Africans, aware of the fact that when the chips were down, the US backed the colonial powers, immediately formed a negative view of US foreign policy, viewing it as inherently hypocritical. This perception was confirmed by the role of the US in the Congo crisis of the early 1960s and continued US support for the colonial powers, in particular, Portugal, well into the 1970s. The majority of equipment and assistance in Portugal during the wars of liberation in Angola and Mozambique came from the US.⁶ The US also voted against or abstained from all UN resolutions that condemned Portugal.⁷ Thus, the US positioned itself against freedom, self-determination and African nationalism.

This history of US support for colonialism indicates how US foreign policy was closely allied with that of the western European countries. The US thus becomes “an extension of Europe and European ideologies, of that European culture which has swept over the globe through colonialism, commercial imperialism and religious expansionism.

African attitudes to all forms of colonialism and imperialism are essentially negative and hostile.”⁸ For this reason, Africa tends to react negatively when the US intervenes in the affairs of Third World countries. For instance, US intervention in Vietnam created the image of the US as an imperialist monster.⁹ This image was re-confirmed in the US invasion of Grenada in 1983;¹⁰ in US bombing of Libya in 1986;¹¹ in US intervention in Somalia in 1992¹² and in recent times, in US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. So the negative African perceptions of the US do not rest solely on the history of the US in Africa, but also on past US actions in the rest of the Third World.

The Political Determinants

Africa generally identified three major areas in US foreign policy which it found unacceptable: over-emphasis on the East-West struggle during the Cold War era; neo-colonialism and the hypocrisy of US human rights policies. The US is perceived as pursuing policies which frustrate the goals of African dignity and progress.¹³

Soon after his election in 1981, President Mitterand stated that US foreign policy saw the Third World merely as a series of strategic points on a military map and that American cooperation with South Africa “shows no concern for what goes on in the rest of black Africa.”¹⁴ This statement depicts the resentment Africans feel at being mere dots on America’s global map. Former President of Tanzania, the late Julius Nyerere, referred to the competition for Africa as “The Second Scramble.”¹⁵ Africans believed that the US was

interested in them only in terms of the East-West conflict and which side they would join. The validity of this accusation is reflected in the American press which covers African countries only when disasters provide opportunity to emphasise the indispensability of “massive” American aid.

US Neo-colonialism in Africa is another factor that has been heavily criticised. The main contention is that US foreign policy for Africa is geared towards perpetuating and maintaining a neo-colonial structure in the continent. Indeed, the US had picked up from where Europe left. As one author noted, “...the rapid growth of American trade, investment and economic influence has followed hard on the heels of political independence.”¹⁶ US interventions plus a large American economic presence, leave many Africans with the feeling that independence was in name only and that the US, as the leader of the Western world, makes more decisions about the lives of Africans than Africans do themselves. To worsen matters, many of the African politicians who publicly criticise neo-colonialism, perpetuate it privately only too willingly. The actions of this comprador class and its foreign partners have been depicted by Ngugi wa Thiong’o in his novels, *Petals of Blood* and *Devil on the Cross* and discussed in collections of his essays entitled *Barrel of a Pen* and *Decolonising the Mind*. In one essay, he refers to Kenya as a country in which hundreds of girls working as barmaids are “dancing to the tune of the US military bases, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.”¹⁷ Africans have thus concluded that the US, along with its European allies, has removed their right to determine their own destinies. This has, therefore, contributed much to their negative image of the US.

The third and probably the most crucial negative political determinant of African perceptions of the US is the obvious gap between ideals and actions on human rights issues. From past experience and present US policy, Africans have concluded that, contrary to the ideal of equality, Americans view the human rights of non-whites as somehow less important, something that can be put off, whenever they conflict with white interests.¹⁸

Nowhere was this better demonstrated than in the US support of the South African apartheid regime which collapsed in April 1994, with the arrival of majority rule spearheaded by Nelson Mandela and his African National Congress party (ANC). Congressman George W. Crockett, Jr. put it succinctly upon his return from Africa: “Both the White House and the US Senate have taken positions detrimental to the interests of black Africa and have, in formal or informal ways, let Africans know that our commitment to justice in South Africa is a very flexible ideal.”¹⁹ He also noted that all over Africa, there was resentment and outrage that the US, “with its supposed democratic ideals and its claimed abhorrence of racial discrimination”, continued to support apartheid.²⁰

Although the discrepancy between American theory and practice vis-a-vis South Africa was foremost on the minds of Africans, they were also irritated by American support for other repressive regimes around the world. Most of the Organisation of African Unity, OAU member states also strongly resented the unconditional American support of Israel which implicitly views the Palestinians as an expendable people. Africans also note American support of dictators, past and present, at the expense of millions of Third World (mostly non-white) peoples. All these contribute to the African view of the US Government as self-serving, hypocritical and racist. This leads us to the third category: racial determinants.

The Racial Determinants

Africans have a justifiably negative reaction toward racism and particularly toward racism in the US. Their reaction to American racism is very strong because of the contradiction between the American ideal of equality and the actual plight of African Americans. As Anise states, “the black people in America are denied in practice what they are grudgingly granted in law.”²¹

Africans are suspicious that when Americans speak of democracy, they really mean white democracy; that although African-Americans have equal rights legally, they actually have much less opportunity than white Americans, and are thus relegated to perpetual poverty and second class status. To Africans, the bottom line is that in most instances, Americans are not ready to accept African-Americans or Africans as equals in every sense of the word.

Another reason for negative African perceptions of the US is what Africans believe Americans think about them. M. McCarthy concludes in his study of the American image of Africa that Americans see Africans in highly unfavourable terms. In his own words, “Detailed information about the continent was delivered within the context of arrogance, contempt and condescension.”²² The negative American view of Africa begins with the notion that Africans had no worthwhile history or civilization before the coming of the Europeans. Africans naturally resent foreigners blotting their culture and changing their history to serve colonial purposes. As Anise states, “In Euro-America, advanced technology, commercialism and materialism have become confused with cultural superiority and moral excellence.”²³ Africans resent being depicted as *uncivilized, racially inferior, violent, poor* and are correct when they charge that the American media covers only those stories which reinforce these stereotypes.

The Economic Determinants

The fourth area which contributes to African perceptions of the US falls within economic determinants. Since Americans identify themselves as leaders of the capitalist world, Africans regard them likewise. To many Africans, though, capitalism is a negative rather than a positive system. In a situation where the majority of the people have been exploited by capitalist powers for hundreds of years, socialism seemed much more appealing to some, especially during the Cold War era. Capitalism and US domination are viewed as continuance of European exploitation. Multi-nationals, especially American owned ones, are thus usually viewed with suspicion, as it is understood that they are not in Africa for the benefit of Africans. Instead, the West benefits much more than Africa from these investments.²⁴ Africans resent this continuous drain and see it as a deliberate attempt on the part of the US to establish a system of dependency under the guise of development.

Apart from the conflicting perceptions that Africans and Americans hold of the US attitude towards human rights, there is probably no other area which demonstrates the difference between the American self-image and the perceptions Africans have of the US more clearly than the issue of aid. US policy-makers believe they are doing a favour to the world's poor when they give money to a cause such as famine relief. Many Africans, aware of the tremendous amount of money the US takes out of Africa, see it differently. As Nyerere

said, "I am poor because you are rich." Thus, foreign aid is "a matter of right", not "of charity."²⁵ In other words, many see aid as the least Americans can do to return some of what they have taken out of Africa.

The second point is that informed Africans are aware that Americans are not really all that generous. In fact, they are one of the least generous peoples of the western world, especially when it comes to Africa. US aid to Africa, percentage-wise, never high to begin with, has been steadily decreasing since 1962. But unlike aid to Israel, aid to Africa is given mostly in the form of loans. Thus, Africa does not have much for which to be grateful to the US although American citizens believe that their money helps to feed the hungry.²⁶

Famine in Africa has been a crisis which clearly demonstrates the wide divergence between the American self-image and African views of the US. The first problem is that most Americans have little understanding of the real causes of famine in Africa. They assume that there is just not enough food to go round. On the contrary, there is more than enough food. The problem is distribution, not scarcity. The rich have no difficulty in obtaining food. It is only the poor who are deprived. This is because food is treated just as another commodity in the West and although it is a necessity, it is not always thought of as a basic human right.²⁷ The real causes of famine are mostly unaffected by aid, for aid does not go to the root of the problem, but instead, merely serves as a bandage for a gaping wound. Most Americans are uninformed about how much aid actually goes to famine-stricken areas. Consider the fact that in 1985, most American agricultural exports went to well-fed nations, not to famine-stricken ones.²⁸ The reality is that "Rather than the rich feeding the poor, the poor feed the rich", as the main sources of protein flow from impoverished nations to the developed world.²⁹

Additionally, food aid, like any other form of aid, creates another structure of dependency. Most Africans believe that more dependency on the West is the last thing they need. Rather, they would like to see fundamental changes in economic, political and social structures. This is what most Americans are so opposed to, as they fear that drastic changes can deprive them of their "privileged" position in the world. So they continue to throw some crumbs down now and then to the people they exploit, and then proceed to part themselves on the back for their "compassion and generosity." Tolstoy expressed this situation succinctly:

"I sit on a man's back choking him and making him carry me, and yet I assure myself and others that I am very sorry for him and wish to ease his lot by any means possible except getting off his back."³⁰ The advocates of mere aid-giving are in this category. Fortunately, the question to most Africans is not aid or lack of it, but of getting off their backs so that they can develop national economies and hence, an independent political line and culture.³¹

Apart from the out right negative perceptions of the US by some Africans, there is the intense curiosity expressed by African visitors to the US.

African Ambivalence about the US

It is true that the US is a land of baffling contradictions. This is why it has attracted lively comments from foreign travellers and thinkers for a long time. Since it was founded in 1776, many visitors, including those from Africa, namely students, reporters, artists, diplomats and social critics, described, analysed, promoted and attacked this “peculiar civilization” which has suddenly emerged into the society of nations as a distinct personality.³² During the nineteenth century, very few free “black” Africans went to the US – about thirty a year. The number rose to one thousand annually by 1914, but dropped drastically during the 1920s due to restrictive immigration legislation and the depression.³³ After World War II, the numbers of African immigrants rose again. Between 1951 and 1960, about 14,000 Africans entered that country. In the 1970s, the figure was 60,000.³⁴ Most “black” Africans now in the US are students. The number in the US grew from 2,192 in 1960 to 13,442 in 1970 and during the 1980/81 academic year, there were 37,425 students from Africa enrolled in American schools.³⁵

Many experiences pertain among the various categories of African visitors to the US. However, there was a common sense of intense curiosity about the US as the country of the future. The prominent South African novelist and essayist Lewis Nkosi, upon arrival in New York in January 1961, was perplexed by the flurry of American life. To him, it seemed that everybody was in a hurry to get out on the road and go somewhere, because of the cheap availability of the automobile to all social classes.³⁶ In 1968, a Kenyan historian, William R. Ochieng’, while in Los Angeles, reacted with similar ambivalence. He hated the individualism, racism, loneliness and artificial and rapid pace of life in Los Angeles, immediately he arrived there.³⁷ In 1983, P. Godfrey Okoth, a diplomatic historian from Uganda, reacted to Los Angeles in more or less the same way as did Ochieng’. Okoth recorded in his diary that he found Los Angeles socially unpalatable because of the patronising racism of white Americans and the naive arrogance and the false sense of superiority of African Americans.³⁸

Perhaps the most indicative African response to the US emanated from the famous Nigerian poet and playwright, J.P. Clark. He wrote in his book, *America: Their America*, how he detested white civilization that thrived at the expense of the “dark”.³⁹

Thus, throughout its development, the US has served the world “as a lighting rod” for opinion and confusion about the various changes in modern life.⁴⁰ This started right from the beginning. For instance, the Declaration of Independence appealed to the conscience of humankind in general, and in particular, to the oppressed and exploited peoples of the Third World. The Declaration of Independence states, “...that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain Unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” Similarly, although liberalism, democracy and republicanism did not begin in the US, that country constituted the first theatre of new ideas, social experiments and scientific and technological innovations. Reinforced by the ideals of freedom, these innovations led to rapid economic and social changes.⁴²

Ochieng’ further observes, in an interesting way, that America has always had a way of disconcerting even its most ardent admirers and defenders, down-grading their expectations. According to him, the land of milk and honey is also the land of irritating poverty among certain groups and classes; and the land that preaches liberalism is also an

epitome of intolerance and racism.⁴³ The foregoing observation is a confirmation of the double face of the US. This double face is important in analysing the history of US-African relations, whose details constitute the rest of the pages in this chapter.

The Historical Legacy of US-African Relations, 1776-1959

Bilateral relations between the US and Africa can be traced “from the very dawn of American independence.”⁴⁴ Bilateral diplomatic and commercial ties were established with a number of North African states during the early years after independence. Morocco, for one, recognized the US in 1786. A series of diplomatic posts were established in 1792, in the drive to mitigate the mal-treatment American sailors received from the North African pirates.⁴⁵ Similarly, an American Consulate was set up at Algiers in the same year. Furthermore, diplomatic posts were set up at Tripoli and Tunis in 1795 and at Tangier in 1799.⁴⁶ Ties with Washington and “sub-Saharan” Africa were instituted much later toward and during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. For instance, in 1799, an American post was established at Cape Town in South Africa.⁴⁷ The US concluded treaties with Sultan Seyyid Said of Zanzibar in 1837. In 1853, Washington initiated commercial and diplomatic relations with Portugal’s territories, followed by Liberia in 1863, and then Congo in 1884.⁴⁸ In 1903, Washington established diplomatic relations with Ethiopia.⁴⁹

During the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference on the partition of Africa, the rules for the scramble of Africa were formulated. It was during that event that Washington issued its first policy statement regarding, especially, “sub-Saharan” Africa as a whole. In this statement, it endorsed free access for American commerce in Africa.⁵⁰

This was despite Secretary of State, Bayard’s declaration that Washington was “unprepared to accept political engagements in so remote and undefined a region as that of the Congo Basin.”⁵¹ This statement only confirms the ambiguity and inconsistency that have over the years characterised American policy toward Africa. This is because this policy has historically involved a diverse range of key socio-economic and political forces, including certain segments of the American bourgeoisie and the governing elite on the one hand, and the masses of the American people, on the other.⁵² This is why concrete measures were not taken to ensure the implementation of the American statement at the Berlin Conference. President Cleveland could even afford to refuse to offer it to the Senate for approval.⁵³

Nevertheless, it is true that US interest in Africa was less before World War II compared to the situation after the war. After the Berlin Conference, official US interest in Africa declined until the war. Both the Boer War of 1888-1902 and the partition of German territories among the victorious European powers after World War I, did not arouse official American interest.⁵⁴ Even in the realm of business, it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that small amounts of American capital found its way into the Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Morocco, Rhodesia and South Africa.⁵⁵

From a personal point of view, President Roosevelt’s own interest in Africa in turn encouraged a degree of interest in Africa among Americans. When he left the White House, he made a hunting trip of Africa, sailing in March 1909, accompanied by one of his sons and a small party. In April of the same year, he landed in British East Africa. He covered Uganda, Kenya and the Sudan and a small section of the Congo.⁵⁶

Thus, between the Berlin Conference and the beginning of World War II, only two issues within Africa South of the Sahara aroused official American curiosity. First, Liberia's economic and political difficulties. Liberia, a refuge for freed American slaves, found its economic viability increasingly dependent on the financial assistance from the US in the first quarter of the twentieth century. In 1912, it received a loan of \$1.2 million from American sources. Subsequent years saw Liberia request large credits from the Senate. By the end of the 1920s, an American financial adviser had an influential role in the Liberian budget process.⁵⁷ Reports of slavery in Liberia during the 1920s and 1930s also aroused government attention.⁵⁸ Second, the Italian Invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. A tiny section of Americans supported Mussolini, whereas the majority of the American public favoured the Ethiopians. Pacifists, believers in the League of Nations, anti-Fascists of all persuasions united with especially Jews and African-Americans, to condemn Mussolini's adventure. Simultaneously, American public opinion insisted that the US should remain neutral at all costs, that the job of thwarting Mussolini's ambition should be left to the League of Nations and above all - to the British and the French. August, 1935 saw Congress adopt a Neutrality Resolution that imposed a mandatory embargo on arms and ammunitions exports to the belligerents in the event of war. The hesitant policy of the League on sanctions gave little encouragement to official appeals to Americans, to limit to normal amount, their sale of oil and other merchandise useful to war. For sure, neutrality, as in the Boer War, favoured the aggressor.⁵⁹

A tug-of-war ensued between the president and the isolationists in the Senate over the precise terms of neutrality legislation. Whereas the president preferred discretionary powers, the isolationists insisted on rigid legal requirements. They feared that discretionary powers would allow the president to follow whatever action the League of Nations might take, thereby involving the US with the League of Nations. During the month of August, 1935, as the Italian concentration of troops in Eritrea and Somaliland was stepped up, the Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie, appealed to Washington under the Kellogg-Briand Pact, but because he had already appealed to the League of Nations, he did not succeed. Meanwhile, if the US joined in any way of collective action, the isolationists would be outraged. On the other hand, if the US refused or failed to support any kind of collective action, efforts of the League of Nations to endure peace would be nullified.⁶⁰

After the president and Congress had resolved the terms of neutrality and legalities by compromise, the resultant proclamation of an embargo upon war materials was narrowly limited to actual munitions and weapons, which Italy was not procuring in the US and which Ethiopia could not obtain in the US. Oil, vital to modern armies, was not embargoed. Were it to be embargoed, Italy would presumably obtain it from the US.⁶¹

Washington, therefore, found itself at the thick of an African dilemma. The dilemma was two-fold. First, how to remain a part from the League of Nations and avoid even the appearance of cooperation while supporting and assisting the League's efforts to thwart an aggressor and stop a war. Second, how to maintain peace in a tense world and simultaneously avoid any involvement in international effort. The dilemma was not resolved until the rapidity of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia seemed to make the issues obsolete.⁶² The Italo-Ethiopian crisis, however, left a deep imprint on black consciousness in the US. Once more, a white nation had treacherously invaded a black people. The black Americans perceived this attack as one against the black race and felt a new sense of

identity with Africa. They saw in fascist imperialism, a danger to liberty and democracy. Moved by indignation, they constituted several committees for mutual aid and the defence of Ethiopia such as the American Aid for Ethiopia Society and the Friends of Ethiopia. They mobilized public opinion in favour of Ethiopia and appealed to the League of Nations to prevent Italian aggression. They even planned the unsuccessful recruitment of volunteers to send to Ethiopia.⁶³ But Emperor Haile Selassie, the “Lion of Judah”, had heroically tried to defend his country. While in exile, he continued to plead the fate of both his country and that of the whole world. Enlightened black opinion became even more firmly attached to the progressive alliance among New Dealers, anti-Fascists of all persuasions, labour, and particular ethnic minority groups such as the Jews, in what seemed to all participants as the cause of humanity as a whole.⁶⁴

Despite these actions, US interest in Africa before World War II was limited. Washington could have benefited from World War I to renew its involvement in Africa. However, this did not occur because President Woodrow Wilson favoured the mandate system and, therefore, turned down any colonial responsibilities in Africa for the US.⁶⁵ Indeed, by the beginning of the war, the US had only “three legations, three consulates general, eight consulates, and one consular agency on the continent.”⁶⁶ Moreover, most official decisions that concerned Africa were made in the State Department Division of European Affairs. This was so, despite the fact that African topics had theoretically been assigned to the Near Eastern Division in 1937.⁶⁷

During the pre-World War II era, African issues hardly occupied great attention among American policy-makers. True, humanitarian rhetoric occasionally came up as demonstrated by the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the criticism of Liberian forced labour in the 1920s and 1930s. However, this rhetoric was not accompanied by tangible or concrete policies.⁶⁸

Although the pre-World War II witnessed limited American interest in Africa, this is important for two reasons. First, for the dis-inclination of Washington to obtain a territorial foothold in Africa South of the Sahara with concomitant financial connections. This was a factor in the low priority accorded African issues by the US government in the years to come. It was also a factor in the failure of Washington to develop a considerable group of African experts in the governmental circles. Also, a failure in academia capable of formulating policies, which included an understanding and appreciation of the internal African dynamics and global atmosphere. This state of affairs proved detrimental to subsequent US African policies, although it was corrected only partially in the post World War II period.⁶⁹ The second reason partly deriving from the first one, was that Washington permitted Western Europe to take lead in Africa. For this matter, Washington rarely questioned the legitimacy of Western European initiatives in Africa. Whereas there were factors such as Washington’s pre-occupation with the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific, this too had a negative impact on subsequent US global and African strategic interests.⁷⁰ Clearly then, lack of attention to the internal dynamics of Africa and acquiescence to Western European actions on the Continent were the legacy of US behaviour prior to World War II. However, following the outbreak of World War II, the international order based on Europe’s supremacy crumbled. The war increased Africa’s strategic importance and it appeared that a more active and independent US African policy would emerge.

Africa's new strategic importance was manifested in North Africa's provision of a place for Allied troops to re-group. In 1942, American troops landed in North Africa. Central Africa and Southern Africa offered the badly needed vital minerals such as uranium and chrome. West Africa, especially Senegal and Liberia, straddled important Atlantic sea routes. Liberia attracted a considerable American military contingent. There was fear of an invasion of the Western Hemisphere from West Africa which raised a serious concern in early stages of the war.⁷¹

An African section was organized in the Near Eastern Division on August 19, 1943, thereby marking the increasing importance of Africa in the State Department.⁷² In the same vein, American officials led by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, began to challenge European colonialism. July 23, 1942 had seen Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, state thus: "In this vast struggle, we Americans stand united... with those who are fighting for the opportunity to achieve freedom."⁷³ And on August 1943, Henry Villard, assistant chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, stated that Washington had a political and economic stake in Africa.⁷⁴ Early 1944 saw Secretary Hull reiterate his call for self-determination in dependent territories, declaring that: "there rests upon independent nations, a responsibility to...help the aspiring peoples...to self-government."⁷⁵ But there were double standards in Washington's approach to the question of decolonization in Africa. Whereas Federal Officials overtly expressed their support of self-determination for Africa, covertly and simultaneously, they assured the European allies of US backing of their stand on the colonies.⁷⁶ All the same, a new assertive US African policy had been outlined and seemed to be taking shape, although such a policy did not materialize. This is because the United States emerged from the War with an anti-colonialist reputation, but failed to maintain that reputation after the War. The Truman administration concentrated on countering Moscow's threat to American security.⁷⁷

Indeed, the period immediately after the war was marked by increasing tension between Washington and Moscow. As such, the bold cries for self-determination of the World War II period were relegated to a pre-occupation with containment of the Soviet Union.⁷⁸ For Africa, this meant that the colonial powers were not to be undermined as they served well Washington's objective of fighting Soviet expansionism. The colonial powers also sought to use the Cold War for their own interests. For instance, France and Italy threatened to disrupt the unity of the West on account of Algeria, Libya and Eritrea. Similarly, Britain and France, claiming that the Soviet Union and its communist allies instigated nationalist agitations, castigated Washington for its initially, strong anti-colonial position.⁷⁹

The Truman presidential period, 1945-1952 was one in which the philosophical basis for containment was formulated and early efforts of implementing this philosophy initiated. Although an Office of African Affairs had been designated in the Near Eastern Division of the State Department, in the main, Africa lost the importance it had been assigned during World War II.⁸⁰ Indeed, the Truman administration's inability to distance itself from the colonial powers created the impression in the minds of the Africans and their American supporters that the US opposed African independence.⁸¹

In terms of Washington's African policy, the first half of the Eisenhower administration retained continuity with the Truman administration. The death of Joseph Stalin, one month after Eisenhower made his first foreign policy address to the Congress on March 5, 1953,

gave hope in some circles of US foreign policy community that a thaw in the Cold War was in store. But this illusion was shattered in August 1953 when the Soviet Union successfully exploded a hydrogen bomb.⁸² No longer was the Soviet Union militarily inferior to the US and, therefore, it no longer needed to feel vulnerable in the face of US nuclear superiority.⁸³ Washington's military response was to plan for every possible contingency, ranging from limited war to general conventional war up to all-out nuclear war. Thus, the Eisenhower administration built upon the Truman administration's policy of containment by placing less emphasis on its economic component. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State often expressed his hatred for neutral Afro-Asian states which were against Washington's leadership in an anti-Communist coalition.⁸⁴ He was also intolerant of socialist experiments in the Third World, which rejected the ethos of capitalism. Indeed, Dulles saw Nasser as an opportunist in the Cold War as well as an Egyptian nationalist rebelling against European dominance.⁸⁵ Thus, the early 1950s was a period that hardly saw the emergence of a creative African policy, because as a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Study had admitted with regard to Truman's Point 4 Programme 1949-1952, Sub-Saharan Africa "had no immediate strategic significance."⁸⁶

During the first term of the Eisenhower administration, however, two points emerge. First, emphasis was put on military-security issues as opposed to issues related to economic and political development. The administration's African policy was to check Soviet expansion.⁸⁷ This was so although much of the European economic aid to its colonies was indirectly extracted from Marshall Plan funds during this period.

The second point to note is that European interests would assume supremacy over African interests. Accordingly, therefore, Washington would spend little effort to promote decolonization. This policy position was contained in a speech delivered by Henry A. Byroade, the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, on October 30, 1953.⁸⁸

This policy was not without critiques. One of the most thought provoking critiques was by the former governor of Connecticut, Chester Bowles. He advocated for a coherent American policy toward Africa. According to him, "...the most powerful nation in the world...cannot declare itself to be a non-participant in the affairs of a Continent boiling with change without abdicating its position of leadership."⁸⁹ He then pleaded for the application of moral principles into Washington's African policy. He considered these principles to be the main weapons in the battle against penetration of Africa by the Soviet Union. These principles were to be included in US policy through economic and political means. He advocated for considerable amounts of economic aid to Africa. This was to be without political strings attached. He also argued for an institution of a high profile anti-colonial policy with calculated dates for independence.⁹⁰

Other critics of Washington's African policy included the then Senator John F. Kennedy. He was at that time Chairman of the Sub-committee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He charged that the administration's policy had a pro-colonial basis. He focused his speech on Washington's position on the Algerian independence drive. On July 2, 1957, he introduced Senate Resolution 153 (85th Congress), which urged Washington to place the influence of the United States behind efforts to achieve a solution that would recognize the independent personality of Algeria and establish the basis for a

settlement with the neighbouring states.⁹¹ This critique was, however, interpreted by some Americans as a general critique of the administration's colonial policy.⁹² Secretary of State, Dulles, commented the same day that the "problem of Algeria is one of exceptional difficulty." He added that "...if anyone is interested in going after colonialism, there are a lot better places to go after it than in the case of France", and cited Latvia, East Germany and Hungary.⁹³ Washington was cautious, knowing very well that France had been humiliated at Suez. Accordingly, it maintained a policy of strict silence on Algeria until Kennedy's attack was called: "the most comprehensive and outspoken arraignment of Western policy toward Algeria yet presented by an American in public office."⁹⁴

Kennedy's attack, on the other hand, received hostile reaction from within and outside the US. For instance, in the US, President Eisenhower complained about "young men getting up and shouting about things."⁹⁵ Dulles commented that, if Kennedy wanted to tilt against colonialism, he should have concentrated on the communist variety.⁹⁶ Dean Acheson described the speech as: "foolish words that wound... a dispirited ally."⁹⁷ Even Stevenson, the administration's most consistent critic, denounced the remarks as "terrible."⁹⁸

In France, the speech provoked an even more furious outcry. Paris's largest daily, *Le Figaro*, remarked: "It is shameful that our business is so badly directed that we are forced to endure such idiocies."⁹⁹ *US News and World Report* observed that "An American has unified France-against himself!"¹⁰⁰ French President, Rene Coty, responding to Kennedy's speech, told the French Senate that France would "never negotiate with cut-throats since independence would give the 1,200,000 Europeans living in Algeria an alternative – leaving their homeland or living at the mercy of fanaticism." André Morice, French Defence Minister, publicly wondered whether Kennedy was "having nightmares." He said, talk of independence "will cost many more innocent lives."¹⁰¹

In Algeria itself, there was indignation among European colonists. French authorities warned American newsmen and residents to keep off the streets to avoid reprisals. Two days after the speech, a bomb exploded outside the US consulate in Algiers. Robert Lacoste, the French Resident Minister in Algiers, called the bomb "a Communist joke." He then challenged Kennedy to step foot in Algeria, which Kennedy of course declined.¹⁰²

But had Kennedy made a costly political blunder? He telephoned his father, Joseph P. Kennedy to seek his opinion. "You lucked out", his father replied, "You don't know it and neither does anyone else, but within a few months, everyone is going to know just how right you were on Algeria."¹⁰³ Chester Bowles also reassured Kennedy that such sniping editorials would quickly be forgotten.¹⁰⁴ The speech had its intended effect of generating some liberal and African-American support for Kennedy.¹⁰⁵

Kennedy's major rival for the presidential nomination, Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, also denounced Eisenhower's African policy. However, unlike Kennedy, Humphrey raised the issue of Washington's support of apartheid. He also ridiculed Washington's voting record in the UN and the reluctance of officials to speak out against South Africa. He concluded that: "Cultivating racism, whether under Hitler or *apartheid*, is an evil humanity will not tolerate."¹⁰⁶

The gradual growth of civil rights as an issue in the US also increased American politicians' attention to Africa and race. In the late 1950s, black American leaders became

more vocal in their attacks on segregation at home and cooperation with South Africa and Portugal abroad. The National Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples (NAACP), contended that Washington's support of apartheid was costing it the friendship of new nations in Africa and Asia and their votes at the UN. Washington was urged by the NAACP to condemn apartheid and in turn urge Portugal to plan for the independence of its African territories.¹⁰⁷ The NAACP joined the American Committee on Africa and other liberal organizations for a "Day of Protest" on December 10, 1957, to commemorate the UN Declaration of Human Rights and to draw attention to South Africa's refusal to sign it. Martin Luther King, (fresh from his successful leadership of the Montgomery bus boycott), and Eleanor Roosevelt led the demonstration. This group circulated "Declaration of Conscience" against apartheid signed by King, Roosevelt, Walter Reuther, the Reverend James Pike, John Gunther, and international celebrities such as Pablo Casals, Bertrand Russell, Arnold Toynbee and Martin Buber.¹⁰⁸

Black Americans also tried to export their successful tactics of passive resistance and economic boycott from the American South to South Africa. The Civil rightists helped Africans organize a boycott of the buses in Johannesburg in 1957. An American activist by the name of Mary-Louise Hopper, was temporarily imprisoned and finally expelled for her activities. Although the boycott ultimately lowered fares, it failed to end discrimination.¹⁰⁹

In September 1957, the crisis over the integration of the high school in Little Rock, Arkansas, directly raised the issue of race and US Foreign policy. Reports by US representatives in Africa and Asia, of the devastating propaganda impact of the opposition to integration, eventually influenced Eisenhower to reconsider his African policy. Although he felt no burning commitment to integration, he became convinced that discrimination hurt the image of the US abroad, especially relations with the "new" Africa.¹¹⁰

These and other events that had occurred in the mid 1950s, forced the Eisenhower administration to reassess its African policy. First, decolonization was gaining momentum. The Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian countries occurred in 1955, and French and British colonies in Africa were beginning their march toward independence. Second, the US was experiencing increasing tensions with its European allies as demonstrated by the Suez invasion in 1956.¹¹¹ Additionally, by the mid 1950s the economic and political presence of the Soviet Union in Africa, was growing.¹¹²

Once independence began to be achieved, Washington quickly moved to increase its direct diplomatic links with various African states. This was a way of Eisenhower administration's reaction to the events of mid 1950s. The administration sent the then Vice President Nixon, who headed an American delegation for the celebration of Ghana's independence on March 6, 1957. The delegation then proceeded to tour eight African states. In his report of April 7, 1957, to President Eisenhower, Nixon made a number of recommendations which included an increase in the US consular representation, a cautious commitment to decolonization, an enhancement of both private and government aid and the creation, within the US Department of State, of a Bureau of African Affairs.¹¹³

Thus, 1957 was a benchmark in the Eisenhower administration's African policy. Thereafter, it began to adopt a more sophisticated multi-dimensional approach to Africa in four major ways. First, an institutional setting for the handling of African policy was established. July 8, 1958, saw the authorization by Congress, of a Bureau of Africa Affairs

with its own Assistant Secretary.¹¹⁴ The Bureau was established on August 20, 1958.¹¹⁵ This act was an involuntary recognition that Africa would no longer be regarded as an extension of Europe, but as an independent area for which Washington was to conduct its own active policy. Second, loans and grants in Africa from the Mutual Security Act, which had totalled \$120.3 million in the fiscal years 1953-1957, were increased. In 1958, an amount of \$82.4 million was provided to Africa and in 1960, the figure rose to \$169.7 million.¹¹⁶ Third, in 1958, Washington supported UN proposals to accelerate the movement of UN Trust Territories in Africa toward independence.¹¹⁷ Fourth, an assortment of US governmental agencies expanded their activities in Africa in the late 1950s.¹¹⁸

The “new approach” to African issues was most vivid at the UN. During the 1953-1958 period, the US abstained from or opposed all resolutions critical of South Africa. Nations that used to annually introduce resolutions condemning South Africa were surprised, when in 1958, the American delegation made it known that it would support a diluted version of a resolution mentioning South Africa. Thus, sponsoring countries changed the language from “condemning” South Africa to “expressing regret and concern” over its racial policies and Washington voted in their favour. Washington also reversed its opposition to resolutions that “call attention” to individual governments’ violations of the UN Charter. George McGregor Harrison, the American delegate, defended his vote in favour of a resolution singling out South Africa by saying that: “apartheid was inconsistent with US principles and with the UN Charter.”¹¹⁹

Although to many US officials this change in UN policy was significant, by 1958, it was clear that votes for diluted UN resolutions would not satisfy either domestic or foreign critics of apartheid. Although South Africa was outraged by American actions, the UN resolutions did not influence it.

Despite the votes in the UN, African demands for American support of decolonization in southern African intensified. Ghana’s delegate to the UN bluntly pointed out to Washington that it needed to do more than vote for resolutions. The delegate contended that the US had to decide whether it favoured the Africans or the “white exploiters” in Pretoria and Lisbon.¹²⁰ Tom Mboya, the Kenyan trade union leader, on a tour of the US, repeatedly charged Washington with hypocrisy for condemning Chinese and Russian violations of freedom while it remained silent on apartheid.¹²¹

The administration was also attacked by the Liberals. In 1959, the American Federation of Labour (AFL) – Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) – passed a resolution calling for an end to white rule in Africa and urging Washington “to speak in a clear voice condemning the racism of South Africa.” It organized an emergency defence fund to support political prisoners in South Africa. G. Mennen Williams, Michigan Governor, later Kennedy’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, told an African Freedom Day rally in New York that: the US “must exert leadership against the policy of apartheid.”¹²² Charles Diggs, Black Representative of Michigan, assailed Eisenhower for allowing NATO countries to dictate US policy toward Africa.¹²³ The Democratic National Committee issued a report on US foreign policy charging that the administration was unconcerned about human rights abroad.¹²⁴

Eisenhower was also prodded for some action by Republicans. Senator Jacob Javits of New York criticised the American embassy in South Africa for refusing to employ black

foreign-service officers and for not inviting blacks to official functions. A month later, American ambassador, Henry Byroade, broke precedent by asking a black American newsman to an embassy reception attended by South African officials.¹²⁵

Once more, in 1959, Washington voted for a UN resolution expressing “deep regret and concern that the Government of South Africa has not yet responded to appeals... to conform to the UN Charter.” Although State Department officials endorsed the vote, some of them were worried that Washington was being “stampeded” toward a confrontation with South Africa. Although they recognized the need to gain influence with the new nations and to moderate domestic criticism, they warned that South Africa remained strategically and economically vital: that South Africa was a bulwark against communism in Africa. Bureaucratic fears were that if pushed too hard, Pretoria could close its ports to American ships, curtail its mineral exports, and place more restrictions on the black population. In other words, there were fears of a clash with South Africa which prompted one presidential aide to sarcastically note: “Some officials at the State Department are trying to carry on in the splendid British white dinner jacket tradition.”¹²⁶

Thus, one can see a subtle change in the Eisenhower administration’s policy in the late 1950s. The changes were accompanied by an ambivalence, which sometimes resulted in contradictory policy pronouncements, confusing both Africans and Europeans alike. The policy changes were not motivated by abstract moral considerations. To the contrary, they were based on the cold calculation that Soviet bloc in roads could best be opposed by a varied policy which did not relegate itself to the military card: hence, the legacy of US-African relations.

US-African Relations in the 1960s

At the end of Eisenhower’s second term, a discernible American approach to Africa was emerging. First, the influence of the Soviet Union in Africa was to be limited as much as possible. Its allies were to be kept out of Africa, or at least they were to be prevented from exerting a sway over the policy decisions of individual governments. In this regard, Africa was to be encouraged to retain strong links to the West – both economically and diplomatically. Second, Africa was to continue receiving low attention globally in terms of US commitment of physical and human resources. Finally, Washington would continue to adjust its policy to European concerns on African issues. But these premises were not complementary: they were contradictory. The last two premises made the first one difficult to achieve. This was especially so, when the prevention of encroachments from the Soviet Union and its allies required appropriate resources, and policies which conflicted with those of the Europeans. Indeed, by 1960, there were more than 1,500 Soviet and Eastern European technicians in Guinea. Sékou Touré and Khrushchev were in close touch on both South Africa’s apartheid policy and the Congo crisis, which were two issues, which also concerned the entire world. Eisenhower administration officials, as reported in the press, identified Sékou Touré as another communist “dupe”. But Sékou Touré angrily responded to the charge, telling a reporter for *The New York Times*: “If you insist Guinea is Communist, that settles it.”¹²⁷

But even if Guinea were to be Communist, who were to blame? Washington definitely shared the blame. Guinea had attained political independence in 1958, to the displeasure of

the French who had pulled out removing all administrative records and stripping their colonial offices even ripping phones out of the wall. A desperate Sékou Touré appealed to the US for economic assistance. The US, however, ignored the request, out of deference to its affronted ally. When Sékou Touré sent another request to Eisenhower for a small amount of military aid, the administration again did not reply. The State Department initially claimed that it had never received the letter, although it later admitted receiving “an irregular request.” With this negative attitude, Sékou Touré had to look elsewhere – to the East. Czechoslovakia, a leading distributor of Soviet weaponry, subsequently made an unconditional arms offer to Guinea, which Sékou Touré readily accepted.¹²⁸

Similarly, when a whole series of African states attained political independence in 1960, “Africa’s years of independence”, the Eisenhower administration hesitated to name separate ambassadors to each state, especially in the former French territories. This again was partly out of deference to French sensibilities.¹²⁹

In early 1960, two African issues concerned Washington. First, was the Sharpeville massacre. Second, was the Congo crisis. In March, 1960, black protesters were massacred at Sharpeville in South Africa. This was a decisive event in US-South African relations in the Eisenhower period. During the 1950s, police in South Africa had attacked African demonstrators protesting apartheid several times. But the confrontations near Johannesburg at Sharpeville was violent and apparently unprovoked. It, therefore, drew instant and sustained international attention. As Africans marched on a police station in a non-violent protest of the pass laws, police opened fire, killing sixty-nine and wounding over two hundred. Washington’s response to the massacre exposed the rift within the government over apartheid. Whereas the massacre provoked strong official criticism of Pretoria, it also revealed the deep fear of many in Washington of challenging the Nationalists.¹³⁰

The response of the State Department to the killings was swift and independent of the White House. Upon learning of the shootings, Department officials, without consulting Eisenhower or Christian Herter, Secretary of State, hurriedly drafted a statement condemning the massacre. According to Press Officer Lincoln White, “while the United States ...does not ordinarily comment on the internal affairs of governments with which it enjoys normal relations... the gravity of the matter warrants a direct response”. He announced that Washington “condemns violence in all forms and supports the right of the African people of South Africa... to obtain redress for legitimate grievances by peaceful means.”¹³¹

Nevertheless, White’s statement was a watered down version of an earlier draft that had attacked the whole policy of apartheid as inevitably provoking violence. Even the milder comments that were released were far too strong for many in the administration. Herter was annoyed that neither he nor Eisenhower had been consulted. He, therefore, “Disowned” the statement.¹³²

Fear struck other senior officials at the State Department, the White House and the Pentagon (Defence Department), to the effect that South Africa would respond to the apparent encouragement of African protest by terminating the sale of strategic minerals, by closing Capetown to the US fleet, or by protesting American plans to fire a missile from Florida via South Africa to the Indian Ocean. President Eisenhower declined to defend the

State Department release, calling apartheid: “a touch thing”, and claiming that many in South Africa itself were working for peaceful change and “human understanding.”¹³³

But Washington’s fears of South African reprisals proved to be groundless. Pretoria responded to the American statement in a relatively routine fashion. It summoned American ambassador, Phillip Crowe, for a fifteen-minute lecture on the dangers of meddling in South Africa’s internal affairs – including incitement of further violence. Pretoria was, however, more upset with Washington’s announcement that it would support a special session of the UN Security Council to investigate the incident. At the session, Lodge, the American representative, denounced apartheid by name for the first time. He went further to vote for a resolution which stated that, if continued, the apartheid policy “might endanger international peace and security.” He also joined the others in urging South Africa “to abandon its policy of apartheid and racial discrimination.”¹³⁴

The American public was not indifferent to the Sharpeville massacre. Public outrage was registered. Virtually all American magazines and newspapers ran features on apartheid. Indeed, many contrasted the violence in South Africa with the relatively peaceful reaction to the sit-in demonstrations sweeping the American South. Celebrities, ranging from Harlem Republican Adam Clayton Powell, to evangelist Billy Graham, condemned the massacre in particular and apartheid as a whole. The American Committee on Africa announced plans for a “united front” to organize a boycott of all South African products.¹³⁵

Pretoria responded with its usual mixture of bombast and public relations. It dismissed the State Department statement as: “low level”, although it was angered by American television coverage of the incident. It reminded Washington of the major business Americans were doing in South Africa. Within South Africa itself, the government banned the organizations responsible for the protest at Sharpeville and H. Verwoerd assailed London and Washington for abandoning “their only true friend in Africa.”¹³⁶

There is no doubt that the criticism of South Africa had an impact on the Nationalists who conceded that: “It is a better thing to be forced into the role of the skunk of the world.”¹³⁷ Following its initial defence of the violence of Sharpeville, the South African regime began a more detailed analysis of the causes and effects of the tragedy. The Sharpeville tragedy took place in the “year of Africa” as sixteen African countries regained their independence. Whereas Britain, France and Belgium had accepted the inevitability of decolonization, South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia realized that they were the last bastions of white rule in Africa. They believed that their European and American allies had abandoned them. The famous “wind of change” speech by the then British Premier, Harold Macmillan in South Africa only a few weeks before Sharpeville, convinced a number of Afrikaners that Britain would soon pressurize them to grant political rights to the African majority. Indeed, some militant Nationalists claimed that the protests at Sharpeville were in response to Macmillan’s public “sell-out” to African nationalism.¹³⁸

Pretoria was also concerned with the growing protests of segregation within the US. The sit-in movement and other organized opposition to racial discrimination would increase pressure on Washington to denounce apartheid, many concluded. Being an election year, American politicians would vie for the black vote by assailing Pretoria. So the Nationalists decided to undertake a major effort to court Washington by explaining apartheid and reiterated South Africa’s vitality as a Cold War ally.¹³⁹

Thus, following the Sharpeville massacre, Pretoria embarked on a propaganda campaign that resembled its earlier public relations efforts of the mid 1950s. Pretoria's ambassador to Washington, Wentzel C. du Plessis, wrote an article for *US News* contending that all nations practised some form of discrimination. He, for instance, compared his country's racial policies with American treatment of women, claiming that discrimination was "based on a fact of nature", rather than prejudice: that just as men and women have different talents, interests and functions, so, too, do the races.¹⁴⁰ Foreign Minister Louw followed a tough line approach. He claimed, in a speech to the National Press Club in Washington, that the US would follow a policy similar to apartheid if it were confronted with the problem of a black majority. He stressed that "South Africa's strategic position...is of the greatest importance to the Western countries as a bastion against Communist penetrating.... I suggest that the Union of South Africa is an ally worth having – and worth keeping."¹⁴¹

Realising that speeches alone would not adequately counter the growing criticism of their racial policies, the Nationalists decided on a more sophisticated propaganda campaign in the US. As such, Pretoria hired the Hamilton Wright Organization, a New York public relations firm, to coordinate a major effort to create a more favourable image of South Africa within the US. The Hamilton Wright Organization embarked on writing and distributing pamphlets on apartheid and produced numerous films showing the prosperity and diplomatic vitality of South Africa.¹⁴²

The explosive situation in the Congo in the summer of 1960 was more influential in limiting American efforts against South Africa. Following its independence from Belgium on June 30, the Congo rapidly degenerated into a crisis which was both internally and externally inspired. Early July saw Congolese troops mutiny against their white officers. Moïse Tshombe declared the mineral-rich province of Katanga in secession from the central government. As President Josheph Kasavubu tried to dismiss Premier Patrice Lumumba, Colonel Joseph Mobutu captured state power in a military coup. The Congo rapidly divided into three rival governments: namely, a central regime at Leopoldville headed by Kasavubu and Mobutu; another government headed by Lumumba and Antoine Gizenga in Stanleyville; and the secessionist state of Katanga led by Tshombe, the pro-Western politician.

The details of the dynamics at play are beyond the scope of this chapter. The UN intervened in the Congolese crisis to "preserve order and to restore a unified state". But in the process, the UN itself became a party to the crisis. The US role, as usual, was double edged. Whereas on the one hand, it appeared to be in favour of crushing the Katanga rebellion, the US had vital interest in the mineral-rich province and therefore it was sympathetic to Tshombe and tried to block revolutionary nationalism by working against Lumumba whom it labelled pro-communist. The crisis led to Lumumba's death in January 1961 and US policy in the Congo was to blame for the death of the revolutionary nationalist, because the killing of Lumumba was implemented by the C.I.A..¹⁴³

The 1960 events introduced Africa into the USA presidential campaign. Nixon was forced to defend Eisenhower's African policy and to explain the complicated issues involved in the Congolese crisis. He singled out his visit to Africa, support of the Bureau of Africa Affairs and efforts to "maintain" Congolese "unity" as examples of the administration's interest in Africa. To Kennedy, however, Republican diplomacy in Africa was a fiasco as it

demonstrated the failure of leadership and the decline of US prestige during the two terms of the Eisenhower presidency. He made also five hundred references to Africa in his campaign speeches. He chastised Eisenhower for neglecting the new African nations and for his reluctance to support African independence. He courted black voters by promising to post more black diplomats to Africa. He also made numerous gestures to confirm his interest in Africa. Following the refusal by the State Department to authorise funds to transport African students to the US, Kennedy, through Tom Mboya of Kenya, arranged for the Joseph Kennedy Foundation to pay the \$100,000 cost.¹⁴⁴ During the campaign, he sent veteran diplomat Averall Harriman on a “fact-finding” tour of Africa. He also criticised the Republicans’ refusal to “accept the inevitable triumph of nationalism in Africa.”¹⁴⁵ Kennedy also chartered a helicopter to fly President Sékou Touré to Disneyland for a meeting.¹⁴⁶

The campaign advisers of Nixon knew that Kennedy effectively used the Africa issue to appeal to black votes. They, therefore, urged Eisenhower to arrange a public meeting with African representatives at the UN to demonstrate the administration’s concern and interest in Africa. He accepted but with a rather superficial reception at the White House on the eve of the election.¹⁴⁷

Although Eisenhower and his aides supported Nixon’s campaign, and were not insensitive to Kennedy’s attack, they cared more about Washington’s strategic interests in Africa. South Africa announced in the middle of the campaign that it would allow the US to establish three missile-tracking stations in the Transvaal and to expand telecommunication facilities for US submarines patrolling the Indian Ocean. The timing appeared calculated at reminding the US of the vitality of maintaining cooperation with Pretoria.¹⁴⁸ But to Kennedy, Africa was more than just a campaign issue. He regarded Africa as a major opportunity for gain in the Cold War. The moralising by Dulles and the indifference by Eisenhower had created an aura of potential Soviet expansion, but also a source of possible triumph for the new administration. To him, the battle against the Soviet Union in Africa was being lost due to the inaction and misunderstanding of African nationalism by the US.¹⁴⁹

Thus, both Africans and whites in Africa assumed Kennedy’s victory would result in a new approach to the problem of colonial Africa. In other words, the inauguration of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy on January 20, 1961 and the installation of a new Democratic administration were widely interpreted at the time as meaning that US policy toward Africa would be managed by a group of policy-makers willing to support African nationalism and to pressurise the pace of decolonization throughout Africa. African nationalists were encouraged to place their hopes on the new administration by Kennedy’s decision to appoint a number of important liberal politicians and spokesmen to prominent positions in the foreign policy-making apparatus.¹⁵⁰

Among the most prominent were Adlai Stevenson who was sent to the UN as the American ambassador; Chester Bowles who was appointed Under-Secretary of State; the number two position in Special Adviser to the President for African, Asian and Latin American Affairs; G. Mennen Williams, who was made Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; and J. Wayne Fredericks who took the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs under Williams.¹⁵¹

The Kennedy administration also decided that each African country would have its own ambassador. He also sought to arrange meetings with as many African Heads of State as possible. Kennedy also posted presumable “sympathetic” ambassadors to Guinea¹⁵² and to the United Arab Republic (UAR),¹⁵³ two countries with which US relations had been somehow strained.

Williams proved to be the most effective and durable defender of a new approach to Africa and, therefore, advocated a vigorous new African policy. He contended that Washington “would need a strong African policy even if there were no Europe”, due to its interest in African “oil and minerals” as well as “matters of direct security concern” on Africa. These concerns included military and communication bases, space programme bases, need to fulfil Kennedy’s promise to land man on the moon by the end of the decade, and the votes to African states in the UN. Additionally, Williams emphasised that the end of colonialism in Africa was inevitable: that the major question was whether the vacuum that he believed would result from the lessening of European power would be filled by Washington or Moscow.

However, Williams also contended that Europe also “has important interests in Africa and it is in the US interest that Western Europe have an important place in Africa.” His thesis was that “a strong US European policy is complete only in conjunction with a strong US African policy and that the two support each other.” According to him, it was the “fact of the matter that an American presence in Africa is in the best interests of keeping Western Europe in Africa and could even be essential.”¹⁵⁴ Williams made a specific suggestion that a stronger US presence in Africa would enable the US to play several vital roles as the following quote indicates:

The United States can perform an important function both for the independent African countries and their former metropolises by providing an expanded association within which they can comfortably continue to do business with each other without being suspect of neo-colonialism.

Not only is the US presence a foil or cover for continued European relationships but sometimes the US can act as an honest broker where lines have been broken. [Guinea and Tunisia were given as examples].

The United States has also been able to help directly in the matter of keeping down Soviet presence in areas where the former metropole has been unable to maintain their exclusion, for example in Morocco and Mali.

Finally, returning to the matter of the African vote in the United Nations, while it is true that France and sometimes Britain has a voice with this vote, more often than not, it is the United States that must seek to moderate African positions vis-a-vis Europe, e.g. Portugal or UK.¹⁵⁵

Thus, Washington’s ability to play a moderating role depended on a large measure upon Washington’s strong African policy, according to the “Africanists” in the State Department. In contrast, the “Europeanists” contended that the tactics advocated by the “Africanists” would jeopardise Washington’s strategy to containment by undermining American influence on the European colonial powers while simultaneously undermining the political and economic stability of the colonial territories. Unlike the “Africanists”, they

were convinced that it was more important to cooperate with the European colonial powers and to maintain stability in the colonial territories than to promote reforms in colonial policy, which might disrupt the unity of NATO or impede American and European access to the sources of strategic raw materials, which they required in order to pursue the strategy of containment.¹⁵⁶

The “Europeansists” did not believe that Africa was unimportant to the US. Neither did they believe that continued European colonial rule was preferable to African independence. Instead, they argued that the US strategy of containment could be pursued more successfully if Washington continued to rely on what they saw as the reliable support of the colonial powers.¹⁵⁷

Despite the tactical differences between these competing groups, to Kennedy, it was not a matter of forcing Africa to choose between East and West as the Republicans had tried to do. To him, neutralism emerged from the colonial experience: Africans could not align with their former rulers because they feared compromising their newly won independence.¹⁵⁸

Neutralism and non-alignment were interpreted by Kennedy on the basis of his critique of Republican diplomacy. This critique shaped his own response to Africa. Kennedy and his advisers did not advocate a passive acceptance of the policies of the Third World, although they claimed to “welcome a world of diversity.” To the New Frontiersmen, there was an acceptable form of neutralism (sometimes called “true” neutralism “real” neutralism, or “objective” neutralism), that comprised a balanced criticism of both Washington and Moscow, a mixed economy, tolerance of political dissent, and the maintenance of stability and order. Washington could, however, not tolerate a neutralism that disguised partiality toward Moscow and Marxism. If African states embraced “real” neutralism, it would directly be beneficial to the US. Washington “welcomed diversity but the Communists cannot”, argued Kennedy. By encouraging and preserving “true” neutralism, Washington would triumph. Thus, with different methods, the containment doctrine could be applied to independent Africa.¹⁵⁹

Despite its stronger African leaning, the new administration needed to develop specific policies. It faced four areas of immediate concern. Most pressing was the ongoing Congolese crisis. The second was the anti-colonial insurrection in Portuguese-Angola, which threatened to become a prototype of Krushchev’s war of national liberation. Third, Kennedy had to deal with the continued problem of US policy toward the white minority regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Four, he confronted “non-neutral” countries such as Ghana and Guinea which had not embraced the American-made “true” neutralism.

As regards the Congo, Kennedy’s policy was rather cautious. For almost two years, the President had resisted any clear military commitment to UN forces, despite repeated urging by his advisers. Even at the end, he had allowed only a fact-finding mission, rather than direct support. His administration was deeply divided over the role of Washington in the Congo. He, therefore, sought a middle path between withdrawal and a direct use of American power. His fear of failure led to indecision rather than boldness: his policy was “the product of pure caution.”¹⁶⁰

But it can be observed that despite such caution, the Kennedy administration policy was geared toward preventing the growth of “communist” influence in the Congo. For instance, at his first news conference, on January 25, 1961, Kennedy referred to the Congo, in addition to Cuba and Laos, as an area threatened by communism.¹⁶¹ George Ball, Under Secretary of State, in Los Angeles, California, on December 19, 1961, asserted that the “immediate objective” of US policy in the Congo was to stabilize the country and prevent its conversion into a Soviet stronghold, adding that it was crucial that the Congo maintained major ties with the West.¹⁶² Williams commented a few months later that Washington desired a strong Congo that could stand up against the blandishments of communism.¹⁶³ US policy was to promote ties between the Congo and the West, hence, Washington’s support of the government of Premier C. Adoula.¹⁶⁴ The need to counter Soviet initiatives remained the key element of the Kennedy administration’s Congo policy.

In the same vein, the Kennedy administration worked hard to prevent Communist penetration into South Africa. Two schools of thought emerged on how best to achieve this goal. On the one side were the voices of caution represented by Secretary of State, Dean Rusk and US Ambassador to Pretoria, Satterthwaite. They emphasised the need to maintain good relations with Pretoria due to the important role South Africa played as a regional ally in the world-wide struggle against communism. They cautioned that excessive pressure on Pretoria to change its policies would only provoke greater intransigence on its part.¹⁶⁵ On the other side stood UN Ambassador Stevenson, Under Secretary of State and Special Representative for Asia and Africa, Bowles, Williams and Fredericks. They shared the International Communist threat. But they added that, unless Pretoria was compelled to change its policy on South-West Africa (Namibia) and its internal apartheid policies, the Soviet Union would be availed with new opportunities.¹⁶⁶

The policy that emerged was an interplay of the two schools of thought. It had four elements. First, were stern public rebukes of Pretoria for its South-West Africa and internal policies, done at the UN and elsewhere.¹⁶⁷ Second, an embargo on US arms shipment to South Africa was to start by the end of 1963.¹⁶⁸ Third, Washington opposed UN resolutions requiring economic sanctions against South Africa, or the use of force. This was to avoid a breach that would damage US strategic connection with Pretoria.¹⁶⁹ And South Africa was not to be expelled from the UN.¹⁷⁰ Lastly, loopholes were created in the embargo on arms sales to South Africa.¹⁷¹

A consensus was developing regarding an increasingly firm policy toward Pretoria by end of the Kennedy administration. Sections of the administration, especially in the State Department, favoured cutting off US government loans and credits to South Africa. They also endorsed discouraging private investors from entering South Africa. This information was contained in a memorandum addressed to McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s national security adviser, in early November, 1963.¹⁷² These foreign policy measures were aimed at averting Communist encroachment into the country.

Nevertheless, Washington’s South African policy transcended a conscious concern for European feelings. Washington’s emphasis on sustaining its European ties caused it to place parameters on how aggressively it would pursue measures directed against Pretoria. The British had closer economic ties with South Africa than any other power and did not intend to endanger them. As such, they held reservations about stern measures advocated

by “Africanists” in the Kennedy administration. Thus, when the State Department Planning Group met to consider an embargo of arms intended for South Africa, it was warned by one member that it should coordinate its policy with Britain.¹⁷³ A subsequent meeting, of what was dubbed the State Department Tuesday Planning Group, decided to follow this course of action.¹⁷⁴ The most avowed anti-South African members of the administration failed to prevail in the internal policy debate. This can partly be attributed to the primacy placed on European ties initiatives.¹⁷⁵

Washington’s approach to the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique was also affected by American relations with the metropole. Initially, however, the Kennedy administration, had chosen Holden Roberto as a recipient of covert American aid. This was a bold measure against one of its NATO allies.¹⁷⁶ At the time, Roberto was supported by the then two most radical independent African governments – those of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Sékou Touré in Guinea. Thus, initially, the Kennedy administration took firm measures in response to Portuguese conduct in Angola. But it did not take long for US policy to considerably soften. Washington’s concern over access to the Portuguese controlled Azore islands contributed to a diminishment of its support for anti-Portuguese UN resolutions.

Additionally, the Kennedy administration did not provide an explicit definition of ultimate self-determination for the Portuguese colonies. In this way, the administration allowed the metropole to largely formulate its own definition. Stevenson, in an address in March 1961, spoke of the dangers of early independence for Angola and the need for Angola to attain political maturity before independence could be attained.¹⁷⁷ Subsequent addresses by other high ranking administration officials reiterated this theme.¹⁷⁸ A 1962 memorandum addressed to Mc George Bundy, provides evidence of how the Kennedy administration policy on the Portuguese colonies question evolved from a virtual confrontation with the metropole to what was largely an accommodation to its desires. According to the memorandum, there was a suggestion that Washington was to convey to the Portuguese that it “fully supports continued Portuguese influence in Africa.”¹⁷⁹

Regarding Southern Rhodesia, the same tactical differences stood on the way of developing an effective American policy. In fact, Washington accepted the initiatives of its European partner, Britain. Washington overtly supported Britain’s right to determine the destiny of its colony. As early as February 1961, US Consul General in Salisbury, John F. Emmerson, in a memorandum on the “Outlook for the Federation”, concluded that: “British policy has been astute”, the major problem being that the positions of London and Washington were misunderstood by white settlers in British Central Africa.¹⁸⁰

He also emphasised, as did Williams, that if “the United States, through the production of a possible partial or complete vacuum in these areas, should be called upon to assume greater responsibilities, we should be given fair notice [by the British government].”¹⁸¹

The overt support for Britain’s right to determine the destiny of its colony was most clearly articulated at the sixteenth session of the UN General Assembly in June, 1962. The US representative stated that Rhodesia was Britain’s responsibility.¹⁸² But this view conflicted with that of independent African states, which advocated immediate independence for Rhodesia.

Unlike Emmerson and Bingham, Williams was less optimistic about the British astuteness and about their ability to maintain the necessary balance in their policy toward the Federation. Following his second trip to Africa in August 1961, which included a visit to the Federation, Williams submitted a report to Secretary of State, Rusk. Whereas Williams described British policy as “consonant” with US policy, he added that it was important to raise the question of “whether the British authorities can bring about, and the white minority will accept, a rate of change commensurate with the moving force of African nationalism.”¹⁸³ Despite this, American diplomats in the Federation continued to submit favourable reports on the ability of the British to implement proper “middle of the road” policy.¹⁸⁴ Rusk himself echoed Emmerson’s view of British policy in the area. Rusk remained convinced that Britain had not made any radical changes of course. He, therefore, believed that the British were following the paper “middle of the road” policy and their efforts were proving to be successful.¹⁸⁵

However, Williams continued to question Britain’s sincerity and commitment, especially with regard to South Rhodesia. In April 1962, on the eve of his departure for another trip to Africa, Williams dispatched a letter to Rusk expressing his doubts.¹⁸⁶

The concerns of Williams were supported by the views expressed by senior US representatives at the UN and by career diplomats in the State Department. In May 1962, R.B.N. Wetmore, Minister for Rhodesia and Nyasaland Affairs at the British Embassy in Washington met with William L. Wright Jr., Deputy Director of the State Department Office of Southern and Eastern African Affairs, and expressed his “fears that the US might be adopting a critical and ‘overly pro-African’ attitude towards the Federation.”¹⁸⁷ Bingham, like Williams, questioned the sincerity of the British and believed that the British government might prefer “washing its hands of the whole matter” to taking forceful action to impose majority rule on the white settlers of Southern Rhodesia.¹⁸⁸

“Africanists” in the Kennedy administration were frustrated by “Europeanists”, in influencing US policy in the region. But the “Africanists” were also to partly blame for their sometimes ambiguous and self-contradictory logic that although the Federation was a British responsibility, the duplicity and ineffectiveness of British policy required Washington to take direct role in the conflict.¹⁸⁹ They failed to convince senior policy-makers that Southern Rhodesia was a greater threat than the Congolese crisis, which was not the case anyway. On the other hand, the “Europeanists” were obsessed with what they regarded as Communist or Soviet-controlled nationalist movements. Moreover, Kennedy was on the side of the “Europeanists” as he did not intervene on the side of the “Africanists”, because he believed that Third World nationalist movements were tools of a Soviet strategy calculated at shifting the global balance in favour of the Soviet Union. However, radical Marxist critiques of US-African relations during the period are that US policy was determined not by the politico-military competition between Washington and Moscow, but rather by the economic demands of Western capitalism for markets and access to natural resources: that the West, headed by the US, supported continued white domination of Southern Africa primarily so as to maintain control over strategic raw materials.¹⁹⁰

The foregoing observation, notwithstanding, Kennedy’s goals in the Congo, Angola, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were to restore American prestige among Africans and to

prevent the rise of Moscow's influence for purposes of monopolising these countries because of their mineral wealth. His policy toward independent, neutralist African countries had the same objectives. Although the claim was that the new frontier welcomed a world of diversity, Kennedy and his advisers nevertheless continued to regard Africa as an area of Cold War competition. Whereas pro-Western or "truly" neutral countries constituted US victories, countries close to Moscow were regarded as defeats. Top in the list of such "defeats" were Guinea and Ghana. The Eisenhower administration had taken them to be pro-Soviet. Although Kennedy shared this interpretation, he believed that a combination of personal diplomacy and US power could bring both of them to "real" neutralism.¹⁹¹

By the time Kennedy took office, most officials in Washington regarded Guinea as firmly in the Soviet camp. However, the new Ambassador, William Attwood, persuaded President Kennedy that "the time is ripe for an American initiative" to win Guinea from Soviet control.¹⁹² Attwood courted Touré and suggested that the US would provide significant economic assistance if Guinea cut its ties with Moscow. Kennedy also sent Sergeant Shriver, head of the new Peace Corps, to Guinea to woo Touré. Upon Guinea's acceptance to receive volunteers, Shriver told Kennedy that the Peace Corps could help "move a country from an apparently clear [Communist] Bloc orientation to a position of neutrality or even one of orientation to the West."¹⁹³

The most important factor to work in Washington's favour was the failed Soviet attempt to overturn Touré government. In December 1962, Guinea expelled the Soviet Ambassador and refused further Soviet Aid. Touré was soon invited to the White House by Kennedy. There, Touré made a plea for aid. But he was told by American officials that aid depended on his country's display of "objective" neutralism: that Guinea had first to expel all "bloc technicians as quickly as they can be replaced by technicians from the Free World." Touré was also to refrain from his frequent criticism of US foreign policy and racial problems.¹⁹⁴ Touré complied with US demand as he was desperate for economic assistance. He became pro-American.

The Kennedy administration, however, had a more difficult time in its attempts to influence Ghana and its President, Kwame Nkrumah, to follow "true" neutralism in the Cold War. Nkrumah was the leading African critic of neo-colonialism. He criticized US foreign policy and strongly supported the Soviet Union at the UN. Under him, Ghana had welcomed Soviet economic aid. Secretary of State, Christian Herter, publicly announced toward the end of 1960, that Nkrumah "was very definitely in the communist camp."¹⁹⁵

To force Nkrumah to alter his policies, Kennedy used the Volta Project which Eisenhower had, in 1958 intended to approve. This was after Washington's stormy withdrawal from the Aswan Dam Project in Egypt, two years earlier.¹⁹⁶ Because of Nkrumah's support of the Soviet Union and criticism of US foreign policy, Eisenhower had delayed formal approval of loan guarantees for the Volta Project. Kennedy continued to delay final funding with the hope that Nkrumah would change to the side of the Americans. This followed the advice of the American Ambassador to Ghana, F.H. Russell.¹⁹⁷ But eventually, after debates among administration officials, Kennedy formally approved a \$37 million loan to Ghana and \$96 million in loan guarantees to the American consortium.¹⁹⁸ Despite this, Kennedy remained suspicious of Ghana's neutralism throughout his presidency.

In the short term, the Kennedy administration's African policy was a success. In the Congo, Washington managed to have a pro-Western government by Mobutu. In South Africa, Washington did not lose access to the missile and space tracking facilities. The US remained with the bases on the Portuguese controlled Azores, and Washington's security interests in Africa did not appear to be in immediate danger when Kennedy's term of office was cut short by the President's assassin.

In the long run, however, the Kennedy administration African policy did not contribute to a stable world order more resistant to the rise of anti imperialist forces. Although he was persuaded of the importance of Africa in the Cold War, Kennedy was not willing to adopt a clear "African first" position that would have endangered relations with Washington's European allies. The split within the administration between "Africanists" and "Europeanists" reflected a division in Kennedy's own thinking about Africa. He did not side with either faction because he shared some of the assumptions of both camps. With the "Africanists", he agreed that Africa had a major symbolic significance in the Cold War and required sustained US involvement. But he also accepted the "Europeanist" view that Africa did not carry such immediate and crucial strategic interest to Washington as to warrant major policy risks. Neither did Kennedy believe that new friends should be made at the expense of old allies did.

As such, the administration's African policy was the outcome of compromise. Whereas the President accepted US involvement in the Congo, he did not commit American power to the destruction of Katanga. Similarly, whereas he pressurised Portugal to grant Angola independence, he did not want to endanger the Azores base or European solidarity to force the issue. Although Washington engaged in symbolic protest of South Africa's apartheid policy, he rejected economic sanctions. To the administration, African neutralism meant African support for the West. In the end, Kennedy's policy did not satisfy the "Europeanists" or Europeans. Nevertheless, it helped him meet his goal of not losing Africa to the Soviet Union. Finally, although Kennedy knew that an independent Africa required a new US diplomacy, he did not want to abandon Washington's European allies in NATO. In the same vein, he did not want to neglect the prevailing priorities of anti-communism and containment of the Soviet Union.

Following the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Baines Johnson assumed the presidency on November 22, 1963. Although he had inherited a dangerous world, where the US-Soviet contest had potential for a nuclear holocaust, Johnson retained most of the foreign policy advisers who had served his predecessor, including Assistant Secretary Williams. Thus, the Johnson administration did not abandon the major premise of US African policy. For instance, anti-communism as a vital component of a global strategy continued to be the pivot of Washington's African policy. This was evident in public speeches by administration officials. Right from the beginning, Johnson, like Kennedy, continuously referred to the communist challenge posed to the West. Thus, economic aid to Africa was regarded as a major tool in the East-West struggle. According to the President, "We must strengthen the ability of free nations everywhere to develop their independence...."¹⁹⁹ Williams later repeated this theme in an address before the House of Representatives Committee on Freight Affairs.²⁰⁰ Johnson's stress on the need for economic aid in his major speech on Africa in May 1966, was partly motivated by Cold War considerations.²⁰¹ Earlier on, in 1964, Williams had articulated the position of keeping

Africa out of the Communist Orbit as being in connection with the aspirations of the NATO allies: that “a friendly Africa provides a protective flank to Europe and is important to the success of the Atlantic alliance....”²⁰² Or as he said in a 1965 policy statement: to assist African nations to develop effective governments, to assure peaceful progress for their people, among other objectives.²⁰³ The foregoing observation clarifies that the real aims of the Johnson administration African policy were essentially to ensure that the new African states remained within the orbit of capitalism. An assessment of this policy, albeit briefly, on individual issues, clarifies this posture further.

Under Johnson, Washington did not alter its Congo policy – Congo was the focal point of Washington’s anti-Communist efforts in Africa. The belief in Washington was that Communist powers were supporting Congolese rebels. There were numerous reports to this effect. For instance, an August 15, 1964, memorandum from Rusk notes that the Chinese in Congo (Brazzaville) and Burundi were supporting rebels in Western Congo.²⁰⁴ Similarly, a CIA report of January 5, 1965, points out that arms manufactured in the Eastern bloc countries had been discovered in the north-east.²⁰⁵ Additionally, in September 1965, American Ambassador to the Congo, McMurtrie Godley, in a telegram addressed to the Department of State, reported the presence of Soviet technicians and Cubans in rebel areas.²⁰⁶

Thus, the Johnson administration did not abandon the Kennedy administration practice of providing assistance to the Congo to suppress insurgency. Following the departure of American troops in June 1964, much of the assistance was bilateral, the details of which space does not allow us to tackle. However, American reticence, regarding taking major military steps in the Congo continued for the duration of the Johnson administration.

Washington’s South African policy during the Johnson administration was also formulated within the context of the East-West conflict. In the first place, there was rhetorical opposition to the apartheid policies of Pretoria. Second, there was a continuation of old measures directed against Pretoria. Third, there was the implementation of new measures if they were primarily diplomatic, and not overly confrontational. Fourth, there was opposition to the imitation of economic or forceful military measures.²⁰⁷

Regarding the third and fourth ingredients, the Johnson administration frequently displayed a willingness to support diplomatic steps meant to convince Pretoria to loosen its hold on Namibia, and improve the conditions of its own non-white people. Pretoria, in 1964, showed intentions of extending apartheid to Namibia. But the numerous members of the international community were not happy about it. Washington, however, urged caution in the UN, stating that no action was to be taken against Pretoria over Namibia until the International Court of Justice ruled on the status of the territory.²⁰⁸ Washington also rejected economic sanctions, claiming that they were not justified because Pretoria posed no threat to peace. On June 16, 1964, US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, stated that the American “government continues to believe that the situation in South Africa, though charged with...dangerous implications, does not...provide a basis under the charter for the application by the Security Council of coercive measures.”²⁰⁹ Thus, Washington and some of its European allies preferred a soft approach toward Pretoria, as opposed to the militant approach of most Third World countries represented at the UN. Washington cushioned Pretoria at the UN against the wishes of the majority of Third World countries

that wanted a tough approach in dealing with South Africa's apartheid policies within the republic and its hold on Namibia. For instance, in December 1968, Washington opposed efforts to bar South Africa from membership in the UN Commission on Trade and Development.²¹⁰

As far as Namibia was concerned, the Johnson administration did not achieve the level of agreement with interested European parties as it did on the Congo issues. Some wanted Britain to be involved in formulating Pretoria's regional policy: that the policies of Washington and its European allies on these problems be compatible.²¹¹ However, in subsequent years, the administration's performance on these goals was mixed. Although consultation was maintained, policy disagreements between Washington and its European allies surfaced. One accusation was that the Europeans, including the British, were not taking an active enough role in resolving the South African problems. The US lament was contained in a memorandum from Thomas Hughes, State Department director of intelligence and research, to Dean Rusk, in July 1966.²¹²

Regarding the arms embargo against Pretoria, Washington, during the Johnson administration, observed it more scrupulously than many European allies. London, for one, did not follow the embargo as closely as Washington.²¹³ In the same vein, France and Italy "...had not interpreted the arms embargo resolution" directed against Pretoria as strictly as the US.²¹⁴

Nevertheless, the most important elements of the Johnson administration South African policy coincided with that of its European allies. Washington, together with London and Paris, were of the opinion that those coercive measures aimed at Pretoria would be counter productive. All of them opposed economic sanctions and the expulsion of South Africa from the UN. They, instead, preferred the use of diplomatic channels to encourage modifications of its policies.²¹⁵ In other words, most high officials, under both Kennedy and Johnson administrations, doubted that a "tough" policy would really influence the Afrikaners to change their racial laws. Although Liberals, Blacks and Africanists in the government tried to convince the policy-makers that Washington's action could produce significant changes in apartheid, they were not able to convert either Kennedy or Johnson to their side.²¹⁶

Like South Africa, global strategic concerns also dictated the Johnson administration's attitude toward Portuguese colonies in Africa. The administration continued a trend that had developed in previous administrations. A primacy was placed in US access to the Azores, which would be used as a base of operation for Europe, in the event of war with the Soviet Union.

No doubt, therefore, lip service was paid to the concept of self-determination for Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. However, little effort was devoted to defining what this would entail. The administration's position was not to rule out a continued link with Portugal or another political arrangement as acceptable political options for the colonies.²¹⁷ No pressure was exerted on Portugal to accelerate the movement of its colonies toward independence. The energy exerted on behalf of self-determination was only diplomatic. Additionally, Washington encouraged third parties to talk to Portugal's leaders on the desirability of some form of self-determination for its colonies. For instance, in 1964, it tried to arrange talks between the Ivory Coast's conservative leader Houphouet Boigny and

representatives of Portugal. Washington hoped that talks about ties between the Ivory Coast and France would convince the Portuguese that a close relationship could be maintained “between African states and a former metropole.”²¹⁸ The Portuguese did not accept the idea and this was to their disappointment. Telegrams from the American Ambassador to Portugal to the Department of State, in late January and mid February 1964, confirm the refusal of Portuguese leaders to respond positively to Washington’s proposal.²¹⁹

Thus, by the mid 1960s, Washington had largely washed its hands of any concrete involvement in the issues of self-determination for the Portuguese colonies and Namibia. Weak diplomatic initiatives could not do away with this fact. Portugal remained as intransigent in 1965 as it had been in 1961. Despite the last meeting between Williams and Johnson on August 19, 1965 to try to revive interest in African liberation, the former urging the latter to take some “action on self-determination to improve our position in Africa”, Williams found Johnson too pre-occupied with Vietnam and unwilling to risk the Azores or any loss of European support for the war.²²⁰

Previously, Washington had given covert support to Roberto and Mondlane. However, in 1965, it refused even to acknowledge a desperate appeal from Mondlane, the FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) leader. To the contrary, in May 1965, the CIA began “Operation Sparrow” to provide Portugal with American aircraft for use in Africa. A CIA front company, Intermountain Aviation, sold seven B-26 bombers to Lisbon to attack rebel positions in Angola and Mozambique, in direct violation of the long-standing pledge not to sell any weapons that would be used outside Europe. As usual, Washington denied any knowledge of the deal.²²¹

Although the Justice Department prosecuted officials of Intermountain Aviation for violating the Munitions Control Act, they were acquitted because testimony revealed that they were under contract of the CIA and that the State Department officials had approved the sale and the American military personnel had assisted in the transfer of the planes.²²² Thus, official American position was one of inaction, and this was to the delight of Lisbon. However, African leaders denounced Washington’s retreat as a cynical attempt to generate European support for the Vietnam War. When Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach toured Africa to explain the war, he was confronted with outright opposition.²²³

Lisbon’s importance to Washington was strengthened by the decision by Charles de Gaulle to withdraw France from NATO’s military operations in Asia in 1966. The new US Ambassador to Portugal, Tapley Bennett, the following year, supporting Washington’s continued refusal by Portugal to grant independence to its colonies, urged Washington to remain silent rather than risk any further disruption of NATO.²²⁴ Thus, as the 1960s were coming to an end, the fate of the Portuguese colonies was no longer an issue of great concern in Washington. At the end of the Johnson administration in January, 1969, US policy was a real captive of the desire to have access to the Azores and maintain good relations with Portugal, a NATO ally.

Regarding Rhodesia, the Johnson administration’s policy only differed in form, not in substance from its policy on the Portuguese colonies. For Rhodesia, Washington was committed to a greater voice for the African majority, coupled with stiff economic and

diplomatic sanctions, unlike in the case of Portuguese colonies. This was done to curb the growth of Soviet influence in Rhodesia and also because of the importance of Britain in the Western alliance.

Although Rhodesia had been a “problem” for American diplomats for almost five years, it (Rhodesia) was President Johnson’s “crisis”. This was because unlike the Portuguese colonies and South Africa, Johnson and his advisers faced an issue virtually unencumbered by previous American commitments. Despite its claims that it was committed to racial equality in Rhodesia, some Americans feared London would ultimately give in to white demands for independence without enough guarantees of African rights. This is because many in the African Bureau were certain that both British power and resolve were on the decline. Thus, early 1962 saw Williams warn Rusk that Britain might sacrifice the Africans to maintain close relations with the white minority. He cautioned that the US “be careful that the British don’t pull out altogether” leaving the Africans unprotected in an independent Rhodesia.²²⁵ To many in the African Bureau in the State Department, London did “not have an overall African policy.” There was greater alarm in Washington with the victory of Winston Field and the hardliner Rhodesian Front over the “liberal” Whitehead in late 1962. Bowles predicted violence between the Africans and whites in Rhodesia unless London acted decisively to control Field and his group in Salisbury. According to Williams, Rhodesia was “the new African time bomb.”²²⁶

Thus, when Johnson assumed the presidency of the US, Rhodesia was divided between factions with conflicting views of its future. Whereas one faction comprised a white minority which preferred independence from Britain and a minority-controlled government, the other faction incorporated Africans who opposed independence without majority rule, although they differed in tactics. By April 1964, a right-wing white group led by Ian Smith, had gained ascendance and begun to push for independence through negotiation.²²⁷ On November 11, 1965, the Ian Smith-led government issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).²²⁸ The subsequent years saw the Johnson administration conduct its Rhodesian policy in accordance with the parameters laid down by Britain.²²⁹ This was with minimum economic and diplomatic sanctions. The other aspect of the Johnson administration on Rhodesian policy was refraining from any steps that would include American military role in Rhodesia. This, because UDI was “primarily a United Kingdom problem and the US should follow and not lead in taking measures.”²³⁰ In addition, Washington’s assistance to London was to avoid use of American forces in Africa,²³¹ although the British were not to “count on” American troops.²³² In the same vein, it was acknowledged that the British – sponsored economic sanctions would not restore British authority.²³³

Washington’s objectives in Rhodesia had been an end to Smith’s rebellion, a negotiated return to colonial status and a peaceful transition to majority rule. This goal remained constant from the announcement of UDI to the end of the Johnson administration. Apart from its willingness to endorse mandatory sanctions, Washington’s policy on Rhodesia was quite similar to its policy toward South Africa and the Portuguese colonies. But in a sense, US policy was a failure. This is because it did not achieve its major goal of ending the rebellion. However, the Johnson administration’s opposition to Smith succeeded in achieving some secondary policy objectives. Its firm enforcement of sanctions won the admiration of many African countries. Its action against Rhodesia also regained the support

of African-Americans and liberals disillusioned by Washington's policy elsewhere in Africa. Finally, although American diplomacy did not "win" majority rule in Rhodesia, it somehow won the good will of some Third World countries.

If the Johnson administration's Africa policy was one of avoiding conflict, the Nigerian Civil War of the later 1960s was a vivid example of such behaviour. 1966 saw Nigeria torn apart by coups and nationality violence. This gave birth to massacre of people from Ibo nationality in northern Nigeria, and a secession by the Ibo controlled region of Biafra in mid 1967. During the war, Washington supported the unity of Nigeria, although it refrained from any active form of intervention or military and economic assistance. However, "humanitarian" aid was given.²³⁵ Speaking before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa in July, 1968, Assistant Secretary Palmer explained Washington's policy. He argued that it was not Washington's intention to interfere in Nigeria's military or political affairs.²³⁶ In September of the same year, Palmer reiterated the theme that Washington supported a peaceful resolution of Nigeria's problems and advocated Nigerian unity.²³⁷

In all, like during the Kennedy presidency, bureaucratic constraints proved to be the road block in formulating and implementing moderate US African policy during the Johnson administration which ended on January 20, 1969. Conservatism and lack of imagination of US policy-makers prevented the Johnson administration from developing a more vigorous policy toward Africa to march Washington's global strategic needs over the long-run.

US-African Relations from Nixon to the End of the Cold War

During the Nixon-Ford years, that is, from 1969 to the beginning of 1977, two phases in US policy toward "sub-Saharan" Africa were in place. The first phase was between 1969 to April 1974, at the time of the Portuguese coup. This phase was characterised by the assumptions that flowed from the policy option adopted in response to "National Security Study Memorandum 39" (NSSM39) of 1969.²³⁸ The second phase started following the Portuguese coup and culminated in Secretary Kissinger's policy declarations of Lusaka, Zambia, in April 1976. The phase was characterised by policy improvisation by Kissinger as the configuration of power in the Southern Africa region and the Horn of Africa.

Memorandum, "NSSM 39" was conducted by an inter-agency group headed by David Newsom, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.²³⁹ Although five options were listed by the report of the group, four were rejected by Kissinger and President Nixon.

The first option, which was rejected, recommended a dramatic improvement in relation to the white regimes. Such relations would have been executed without regard to protests from independent African countries. This option stressed the enhancement of economic and strategic ties with the white minority regimes of the region.²⁴⁰ The other three options were rejected because they would have maintained the Johnson administration policy of limited sanctions against Pretoria and Salisbury and would have rendered Washington as an inactive actor in the region. Only option two was approved by Nixon in early 1970, following a January 1970 recommendation by Kissinger. The option was constructed on the assumption that overt confrontation with the white minority regimes would be counter productive.²⁴¹

The most prominent feature of US policy toward Africa during the Nixon administration was, therefore, a desire to maintain close links between Africa and the West, with the notion of keeping the former out of the orbit of the Soviet Union and its allies. This was despite the fact that Kissinger regarded containment as a doctrine in which choices would have to be made between core and non-core interests.²⁴² According to him, more than any top policy-maker since the previous two administrations, containment in Africa was to be executed largely by Washington's European allies.

Thus, in "option 2" dubbed "tar baby" by State Department critics, the position was that "the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists."²⁴³

During the Nixon administration, official statements incorporated the "general desire" of Washington "to minimise as far as possible the advances of adversaries in Africa...."²⁴⁴ Often, references were made about Washington's support of African independence.²⁴⁵ Such references were frequently accompanied by expressions of concern about the new imperialism emanating from the East. Nixon himself believed that US policy in southern Africa was primarily the product of a "misguided idealism" that failed to recognize that the Soviet Union wanted southern Africa for its mineral wealth. He also argued that communists controlled the Liberation movements in Rhodesia, Angola and even South Africa.²⁴⁶ Even appeals for American assistance to Africa were often couched in the language of the East-West conflict. For instance, according to Newsom, while speaking in California, in January 1972, the Soviet Union and China "extended more credits to three African countries in the last six months than we have provided through the Agency for International Development in two years."²⁴⁷

The Congo (renamed Zaire in 1967), was a buffer against the Soviet Union in central Africa. As such, the central government of Joseph Mobutu (Mobutu Sese Seko Wazabanga after 1970), had to be supported. No wonder "President Nixon was delighted to work with the anti-Communist Mobutu."²⁴⁸

The policy of "communication" and a relaxation of pressures against Pretoria was influenced by the geo-political judgement that, it was a bulwark against Moscow's inroads. It had the capacity to protect western interests in the region as the predominant power there. Thus, US relations with Pretoria were upgraded politically, economically and even militarily.²⁴⁹ And between 1967 and 1972, American aircraft sales to Pretoria increased four times. Additionally, communications equipment sales to Pretoria tripled during the same period.²⁵⁰ As regards Namibia, whereas Washington criticised its occupation by South Africa and inhabited investment, there it "discouraged" stronger measures.²⁵¹

In the same vein, the Nixon administration policy toward the Portuguese colonies was based on its global strategic priorities. Although "the people inhabiting the colonies are entitled to...self-determination,"²⁵² lip service was paid to the desirability of self-determination for the colonies. Washington did not prevent commercial and military transactions with Portugal, and claimed that Export-Import Bank credits for American exporters interested in the Portuguese market did not help Portugal in its colonial wars.²⁵³ This assistance would be partly interpreted as a reward for American use of the Azores and Portuguese collaboration with NATO.

During the Nixon period, the internal situation in Rhodesia worsened. In 1969, Rhodesia declared itself a Republic.²⁵⁴ It then increased its internal repression and showed little interest in accepting majority rule.²⁵⁵ Washington's response showed indifference about the course of events in Rhodesia. The initial feeling in Washington was that Marxism was not an imminent threat in Rhodesia. The Nixon administration was, therefore, ambivalent on the Rhodesia issue. The Nixon administration's behaviour was characterised by timidity and lack of time investment by top officials on the crucial question of sanctions.

From 1969 to the Portuguese coup of April 1974, Washington's Africa policy was characterised by a reliance on European actors to prevent communist encroachments and "assist" the continent economically. The coup introduced new powers into the southern Africa region. A right wing government bent toward maintaining direct control over its African colonies indefinitely was replaced by a government eager to terminate Portugal's massive military involvement in Africa. Soon, events were set in motion in Angola. These culminated in independence, a civil war, and the introduction of Cuban troops.²⁵⁶ Portugal could no longer be relied on to assume an active role in African affairs. An escalation of the guerrilla war in Rhodesia and the overthrow of a pro-imperialist government in Ethiopia in the 1974-1975 period accompanied this development. The complacency which had characterised the outlook of top US government officials on most African issues since the early 1960s, was shattered. The emergence of a string of Marxist governments in Africa, a scenario dismissed since the early 1960s, was becoming a reality.²⁵⁷

Washington's reaction to this turn of events was slow. This was due to two important and inter-related reasons. First, the Watergate scandal which led to the resignation of President Nixon in August 1974. Second, the emergence of Gerald Ford as president sapped their energy.

However, by the 1975-1976 period, a changed US African policy was taking shape. Under Kissinger's guidance, a policy distinguishable from that which prevailed during the Nixon era was being forged. First, the anti-Soviet thrust of US policy was retained, and Africa's peripheral status in the context of Washington's global interests was to be altered. Second, more was to be spent on Africa by top level officials and the flow of resources to Africa was to be increased. Third, the decline of European influence in Africa forced Washington to adopt a higher profile in Africa.

To confirm the Ford administration's promise of taking Africa more seriously than during his predecessor's term of office, Kissinger, borrowing a phrase from G. Mennen Williams, made the following observation: "Africa for the Africans means Africa for the Africans and not Africa as a hunting ground for alien ambitions."²⁵⁸ Although Williams' comment had been construed by many in the early 1960s as a critique of Western European colonialism, by 1975, traditional Western European colonialism was no longer a factor in Africa. The activities of the Soviet Union and its proxies were a factor.²⁵⁹ It was these activities that drew Kissinger's wrath. The search for new means to curb the growth of Soviet influence warranted the tactical policy changes by Kissinger in 1976. In a speech in Lusaka Zambia on April, 25, 1976, he "endorsed self-determination, majority rule, and equal rights for the inhabitants of southern Africa."²⁶⁰ During the same trip, Kissinger revealed his motives for these changes. While referring to the Soviet Union, he proclaimed that "external intervention could only diminish African self-determination."²⁶¹ In May, 1976, before the

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Kissinger blasted “massive extra-continental interference” in Africa, which extended from southern Africa to the Horn.²⁶²

Neither Zaire nor South Africa was a focal point of the Ford administration’s African interest. Despite this, Zaire retained the strong backing of the administration’s high level officials. However, Washington’s concerns, which de-legitimised the central government, centred around the deterioration in the economy due to the sharp increases in oil prices, the drop in copper prices and corruption by Mobutu and other officials.²⁶³

As regards South Africa, Kissinger considered it as an actor with the capability to assist the movement of Rhodesia and Namibia toward self-determination under governments free of Soviet tutelage. He also considered South Africa as a regional anti-Soviet power. These factors prevented him from discarding the policy of communication with Pretoria. In October, 1974, therefore, Washington vetoed a resolution in the UN Security Council to expel South Africa,²⁶⁴ and Washington’s commercial ties with Pretoria continued.²⁶⁵ Moreover, there were limited exceptions to the policy of communication, as was the case in 1975, when Washington halted shipments of enriched uranium to South Africa until it accepted provisions of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.²⁶⁶ Washington also supported a UN resolution in January 1976, which called on Pretoria to accelerate the pace of Namibia’s movement toward self-determination.²⁶⁷ On the other hand, the US under Ford vigorously opposed undertakings in the UN and elsewhere to punish South Africa through economic and political means for its behaviour in Namibia.²⁶⁸

Angola was among African trouble spots which Ford inherited, following Nixon’s resignation. It, therefore, had the most serious ramifications for the global balance of power during the Ford administration. It was in Angola that Ford tried to reverse the decline in Washington’s willingness to exert its will abroad. Having just undergone a humiliating defeat in Vietnam, Angola was to be a new testing ground for American resolve. While speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-committee on African Affairs in February 1976, William Schaufele, who had served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, had asserted that Angola was an example of Soviet-sponsored aggression, initiated to change the global configuration of power.²⁶⁹

Earlier on, Ford and Kissinger were determined that the “improper” group, the Soviet-supported MPLA, should not gain control in Angola. To ensure this, in January 1975, the CIA requested \$300,000 in emergency covert support of Roberto, arguing that the FNLA offered the “most stable and reliable government”, and that Zaire would be threatened if the MPLA triumphed. Kissinger, the chairman of the “40 committee” that had approved covert aid, found the CIA presentation “compelling” and the plan was approved. However, the committee refused a second CIA request for \$100,000 for the National Union for the Total independence of Angola (UNITA).²⁷⁰

However, Washington’s decision, rather than insuring a “stable and reliable government”, helped to escalate the conflict in Angola. Moscow responded by immensely increasing its assistance to MPLA. From March to July, the Soviet Union supplied MPLA with over one hundred tons of weapons with an estimated value of nearly \$30 million. To march the Soviet Union’s effort, Ford and Kissinger increased Washington’s support for both FNLA and UNITA. Washington approved \$14 million more in military support for the rivals of MPLA in July. This was increased to \$25million in August and to \$32million in

November. These acts were executed in spite of the strong opposition from the State Department, especially from Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He resigned in protest.²⁷¹

The Soviet Union was forced to increase more aid to MPLA due to the deepening American commitment in Angola. In turn, South Africa and Zaire intervened. MPLA was clearly threatened by two thousand Zairian troops in the north and five thousand South African troops in the south and by increased American aid to its rivals. MPLA thus appealed to Cuba for assistance. The number of Cubans steadily increased from three hundred in the summer, to over one thousand by September, to over ten thousand by January 1976, following a second South African invasion in October.²⁷² The Cuban influx into Angola made a dramatic impact on Ford and Kissinger. A new “communist” assault in Africa seemed to be in the offing following the American defeat in South Vietnam by the Viet Congs in April 1975. President Ford was convinced the MPLA and the Cubans were mere proxies for the Soviet Union.²⁷³

Although to Ford and Kissinger the solution in Angola was greater America aid and, therefore, despite their pleas that abandoning Angola would mean appeasing communism, Congress was fed up. The Senate turned down the administration’s requests for more money, and even went further, when on December 19, 1975, it passed Senator Dick Clark of Iowa’s amendment prohibiting any future covert aid to Angola. Although Ford condemned the action as “an abdication of responsibility” by “liberal democrats”, and despite Kissinger’s testimony that the US would “emasculate itself in the face of massive, unprecedented Soviet and Cuban intervention.” Thus, competition between Washington and Moscow over Angola became intense.²⁷⁴

It is, therefore, clear that Washington failed to control the course of the Angolan liberation struggle. The increased American covert aid to MPLA’s rivals did not work. Instead of a peaceful transition to a pro-Western, independent Angola, Washington was faced with a Marxist regime supported by Moscow and Havana, alienated from the US officials. Whereas some argued that the results showed the folly of intervention in liberation struggles, others contended that American action had come late. But to both Ford and Kissinger, they were convinced that they would have to adopt a new approach to the second area of continued armed conflict, namely, Rhodesia.

Kissinger targeted Rhodesia for his new strategy. He argued that independence in that country be realized within two years of the end of negotiations. He also asserted that Washington would strengthen its sanctions policy to accelerate this process.²⁷⁵ September 1976 saw Smith announce his support of majority rule, following the time-table of the Americans and the British.²⁷⁶

Kissinger’s interest in the result of the conflict in Rhodesia and Namibia represented a maturation of his treatment of African issues. He applied his personal brand of shuttle diplomacy to Africa. He displayed his unusual stamina and negotiating brilliance in trying to arrange a compromise between African nationalists and the White minority that would be supported by South Africa and by neighbouring states, although he eventually failed. His actions were cut short by Ford’s election defeat in 1976.

US policy in Rhodesia was coordinated with that of the British, although the latter became increasingly outspoken on the question of independence. During his Lusaka speech, Kissinger mentioned that Washington supported the British proposal of Rhodesia.²⁷⁷ Additionally, he promised financial help-which was publicised as a joint venture with Britain and other parties.²⁷⁸

All in all, the US acquired a higher profile in Africa during the Ford administration era. Generally, the Nixon-Ford administrations saw the major tenets of US foreign policy toward Africa modified. From detachment, if not indifference toward Africa, the policy had evolved to relatively active involvement, despite the fact that policies could have been forged to more effectively meet Washington's security needs. The centralization of power which characterised the Nixon and Ford administrations, and the relative insulation of African issues from major domestic constraints, gave Kissinger, the balance of power theorist, the opportunity to formulate a better African policy. However, the onset of the Jimmy Carter administration in January 1977, signalled the end of eight years of Republican dominance of the White House. By this time, American security interests had already been seriously compromised. The strategic picture in Africa was such that the Congolese faced an impending invasion from Angola.²⁷⁹ South Africa was far from recognising the need for systematic internal changes. Conversely, the machinery of repression had been stepped up with the uprisings in the black townships of Soweto and elsewhere.²⁸⁰ The Rhodesia war continued. New Marxist regimes were in place in Angola, Mozambique Guinea-Bissau and Ethiopia.²⁸¹

Like his predecessors, Nixon and Ford, Carter responded to the problems of southern Africa within the broader framework of East-West conflict. Carter regarded southern Africa as a perfect area in which to apply his cherished concerns about racial equality and human rights in foreign affairs. Being the first President from the deep South since the nineteenth century, Carter was convinced that he had a special sympathy for and understanding of the struggle for civil rights in the US and that this affinity qualified him to deal with racial equality in Africa. Thus, the belief was expressed in many circles that Washington's African policy would undergo significant changes. His appointments of Andrew Young to the UN and Donald McHenry as Young's aide, were meant to demonstrate his sympathy with African-Americans and Africans in the continent and to symbolize his intent to realign US policy toward Africa. The President's controversial emphasis on human rights as a basis for American diplomacy designated South Africa as a major target of this approach.²⁸²

During the early term of administration, Carter and his aides emphasised that they wanted to clarify American support of racial equality, majority rule, and basic freedoms in South Africa. For instance, in May 1977, Carter stated at Notre Dame that "Americans were committed to majority rule in all southern Africa."²⁸³ Vice President Walter Mondale similarly stated after a meeting with the South African Prime Minister: "Every vote should be equally weighted."²⁸⁴ In May, 1977, Young pointed out that the Carter administration was committed to "justice in southern Africa."²⁸⁵ When he visited South Africa in the spring of 1977, Young went to Soweto, the scene of riots a year earlier, and urged Africans to engage in mass civil disobedience similar to that of black Americans in the 1960s. He had earlier called for "limited sanctions" against South Africa, calling it "illegitimate." Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, noted:

"In no other area of foreign policy did our administration differ so fundamentally from that of our predecessors" as in relations with South Africa. Thus, Vance, Mc Henry, and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose, verbally attacked South Africa regularly during the first year of the Carter administration.²⁸⁶

However, the new tone in Washington provoked a strong reaction within South Africa among conservatives in the US. The Nationalists, instead of moderating their racial policies, intensified them. September 12, 1977 saw Steve Biko, the activist, die while under Police supervision in a South African jail. His death unleashed a series of condemnation of the South African regime. A month later, the regime began mass arrests of black leaders and the banning of black organizations. The Carter administration condemned Pretoria for its crack down and Congress passed a "resolution of concern", and Washington voted in favour of a UN resolution protesting Pretoria's actions.²⁸⁷

The President's human rights campaigns against South Africa also caused a reaction at home. Although Carter had called for curtailment of investments in South Africa, business leaders openly defied his calls. Conservatives in Congress denounced his attack on South Africa as selective enforcement of misguided idealism. National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski was skeptical of the anti-South African rhetoric. A "Europeanist", Brzezinski was opposed to and worked against any strong pressure on South Africa. He instead, repeatedly advocated for greater "flexibility" in dealing with the Nationalists.²⁸⁸

The Carter team ceased to castigate Pretoria as ardently as it had in the past. They began to openly articulate their belief that American influence over South Africa had been exaggerated. Anthony Lake, the head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff expressed this sentiment in October 1978 when addressing a gathering in San Francisco. He favoured the promotion of peaceful change.²⁸⁹ The administration now valued the crucial role played by South Africa in Western plans for the movement of Namibia and Rhodesia toward independence and hence attempts to punish South Africa would be counter-productive. Washington sought deliberate change to the Southern Africa region which would discourage the escalation of conflicts conducive to Soviet penetration.²⁹⁰ There were now attempts to work with South Africa. These changed tactics were successful, as reflected in South Africa's modest internal reform programme and its willingness to accept a regime change in Zimbabwe.²⁹¹ Assistant Secretary Moose sounded a moderately optimistic note, in the latter part of Carter's tenure when he stated that opposition to apartheid had taken root among some members of the Afrikaner community and the South African military.²⁹² However, it would be inaccurate to argue that all pressure tactics aimed at South Africa were abandoned during the administration's second stage. For instance, the arms embargo was extended to include a prohibition on all exports to the police and armed force.²⁹³ In June 1980, Washington supported a UN Security Council resolution which advocated for release of all political prisoners by the racist regime.²⁹⁴ But these were exceptions to the administration's adoption of a spirit of conciliation in its interaction with Pretoria.

Carter's Namibian policy was also less confrontational. The policy was to encourage discussions based on finding a mechanism for free elections in Namibia under UN supervision leading to independence for the territory.²⁹⁵

As regards Namibia, Washington departed from the position of the more conservative members of the Western Contact Group, especially Britain. This is evidenced by the early threat that Washington might not impede sanctions. Nevertheless, Washington's positions on Namibia were essentially formulated in collaboration with the Contact Group.²⁹⁶ This strategy strengthened the ability of the Western powers to influence policy outcomes on Namibia. Although the Carter administration had succeeded in locking the Soviet Union out of a direct role in resolving the Namibian problem for a few years, its efforts to create a stable independent government in Namibia which could institutionalize conditions favourable to containment on a long-term basis failed.

In Zaire, Washington, appalled by the pervasiveness of corruption, initially tried to detach itself from the Mobutu-led government. This was due to two reasons. First, it was a derivation of Carter's human rights policy. Second, it was an effort to avoid poor relations with a successor government if Mobutu were to be toppled.²⁹⁷ To administration officials, containment was not enhanced by identifying the US with governments devoid of a popular base. By 1978, US policy toward Zaire had undergone a change. Invasions of Zaire's Shaba Province in 1977 and 1978 by exiles based in neighbouring Angola could not be wholly discarded.²⁹⁸ Mobutu's continued stay in office did not negate this judgement. Subsequently, the administration's Zaire policy would incorporate a mixture of military, political and economic measures closer to those of previous administrations.

During the latter part of Carter's Zaire policy, the Carter officials distanced Washington from Mobutu. By so doing, they broke ranks with some European parties who found the human rights posture of the administration objectionable. Yet, when Zaire was invaded in 1977 and 1978, France, and to a lesser extent, Belgium and Morocco, fulfilled the security functions the US was unwilling to undertake. The invaders were defeated by Belgium and Morocco.²⁹⁹ Mid 1978 saw Vance tell the Senate sub-committee on Africa that, in Zaire, it was US policy to work with European states in meeting local military requirements.³⁰⁰

The Carter administration continued advocating for reform. March 1979 saw Richard Moose state that US policy in Zaire took "into account...reforms since all else hinged on it."³⁰¹ He made a distinction between political, economic, and security reforms. To him, political reforms included elections, and economic reforms incorporated a reduction of Zairian sovereignty on financial questions. A foreigner was designated as head of the Zairian central bank. Foreigners were also placed in the Ministry of Finance. On the other hand, security reforms incorporated an alleviation of hostilities with Angola.³⁰² The reform package was reiterated by Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Lannon Walker, in March 1980.³⁰³ But what was significant about the Carter administration's behaviour toward Zaire as time evolved, was its decision to stick with Mobutu through thick and thin. Military concerns surfaced. Having endorsed the decision to provide direct military assistance to Zaire in 1977 and 1978, as requested by the French, Belgians and Moroccans, Washington stepped up its own military requests for Zaire.³⁰⁴ Whereas reform was acceptable, systematic change was not.

In Rhodesia, the belief by the Carter administration officials, during the first stage, was that the realization of majority rule would strengthen containment. The administration, therefore, promoted majority rule in Rhodesia. One of its important steps was active advocacy of the repeal of the Byrd Amendment.³⁰⁵ Repeal would contribute to an

improvement of human rights by accelerating the movement toward racial justice in Rhodesia. Both Julius Katz, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs and Secretary Vance, testified before Congress against the Amendment. They argued that its repeal would bring the US back to compliance with the UN Charter and that US industry did not rely on Rhodesian chrome.³⁰⁶ Another challenge to the ultimate emergence of majority rule came in April 1977, when Ian Smith proposed an internal settlement which would have prevented the participation of nationalist forces who were battling the minority government. The Carter administration emphatically rejected the endeavour. William Schaufele conveyed the administration's stance in April 1977 by stating that an "internal solution cannot last...to attempt it would...lead to increased bloodshed..."³⁰⁷

The administration's devotion to majority rule was firmly established by mid 1977. Washington endorsed the British proposals of majority rule.³⁰⁸ Subsequent months saw the surfacing of an Anglo-American peace plan for Rhodesia. This plan included a call for free elections in which the entire population could participate.³⁰⁹

Thus, the Carter administration Rhodesian policy was openly coordinated with the British. Vance and Young met with British Foreign Secretary Owen on Rhodesia in August and September 1977, respectively.³¹⁰ The process of meetings between American and British officials continued over the next few years as Rhodesia moved hesitantly toward independence with majority rule. In March 1979, Moose and Vance made statements on behalf of sanctions.³¹¹ In April, 1979, elections were held in Rhodesia limited to the white minority government and its African allies. Despite intense lobbying by conservative groups and congressmen on behalf of lifting of sanctions, the Carter administration held its ground.³¹² June 7, 1979 saw President Carter observe that "the April elections...preserve extraordinary powers for the four percent white minority....I cannot conclude the...elections were...fair. [It is not in the] best interest of the US to lift sanctions."³¹³ A few days later, Vance explained the administration's reasoning: that lifting sanctions would adversely affect Britain's legal status in Rhodesia and diminish the prospects for peace; that it would also harm US relations with independent African states.³¹⁴ In December 1979, the Rhodesian negotiations were successfully concluded.³¹⁵ Although the Carter administration played a minor role in these negotiations, its willingness to maintain sanctions contributed to this outcome, because it contributed in convincing Rhodesian officials that they were largely isolated in the international arena.³¹⁶ The final negotiations over Rhodesia at Lancaster House in London in 1979 took place without American participation or consultation. In February 1980, Robert G. Mugabe, a leader of the Patriotic Front, won the election for the Prime Minister with a landslide victory.³¹⁷ April 18, 1980, saw Rhodesia become the independent state of Zimbabwe.³¹⁸ Although the Carter administration continued to draw distinctions between pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet radicals, it did not disown Mugabe. To the contrary, it made concerted effort to cultivate ties with the new government.³¹⁹ It is in the administration's Rhodesian policy that can be found the most sophisticated expression of its containment policy in Africa, on top of a principled advocacy of government by consent. This policy continued when the administration adopted a more orthodox approach in other parts of Africa.

As regards Angola and Mozambique, the Carter administration's security concerns played a big role. However, these concerns did not contribute to a resurrection of the covert

military activities of the Ford administration. Conversely, diplomatic means and economic mechanisms were applied to encourage ties between Angola and Mozambique, and the West. The situation in Mozambique was easier. Soviet bloc troops were not a major threat there. As such, diplomatic relations were maintained and economic assistance continued.³²⁰ The assumption in Washington was that these measures would enhance President Samora Machel's pragmatic outlook on international affairs.

The administration's Angola policy was complicated by the presence of large numbers of Cuban troops.³²¹ During the early years of the Carter administration, the policy was one of non-recognition. Diplomatic recognition would depend on the withdrawal of the Cuban troops regarded as Soviet proxies.³²² But the administration's later attempts to subtly nudge Angola and Mozambique closer to the West were successful only partially. Hostile approaches were avoided. Economic self-interests encouraged capital-starved Mozambique to cultivate ties with Western Europe. In Angola, the American firms of Texaco, Gulf and Boeing were allowed to expand their commercial interests. In the same vein, Export-Import Bank loans to Angola were not jeopardised.³²³ Although the retention of Cuban troops was used by the administration not to recognize the MPLA government, Angola nevertheless played an important role in resolving regional disputes by supporting the Namibian settlement and by striving for a less contentious relationship with Zaire.³²⁴ The administration behaviour toward Angola and Mozambique increased the probability that Washington could improve relations with them in the future, thereby lessening their dependence on the Soviet Union.

The Horn of Africa was another area of Washington's concern about the Soviet threat. Following the demise of Ethiopia's pro-Western government in the 1974-1975 period, Kissinger expressed concern over this Soviet threat – concern that continued into the Carter administration period. However, in mid 1977, when Somalia invaded Ethiopia and terminated its ties with the Soviet Union, the US refused to get involved militarily.³²⁵ Washington felt that a shipment of arms to Somalia would aggravate the conflict and heighten the chances of Superpower clash in the region. March 1978 saw the Ethiopians assisted by thousands of Cuban troops to repulse the Somali invasion.³²⁶ Thus, the administration's first phase to formulate an approach to containment, took cognisance of regional realities.

However, the military component of containment assumed increasing importance in the Horn of Africa and in Liberia, during the latter years of the Carter administration. In February 1979, Richard Moose articulated the desire to minimise arms shipment to the Horn.³²⁷ Steps that could exacerbate regional tension were de-emphasised. By early 1980, changes in the administration's Horn policy were evident. After setbacks to Western interests in Iran and Afghanistan, Washington concluded that a revamping of US global policy was necessary. So, containment was broadened, and the ability to project military forces abroad was emphasised. Thus, the US sent an aircraft carrier into the Indian Ocean to underline its concerns in the region.³²⁸

Washington also made effort to get access to overseas bases in exchange for military aid. Bilateral agreements between the US and Somalia, Kenya and Oman, began to reach the public in February 1980. American military forces were to be given the privilege of using military facilities in these countries.³²⁹

In Liberia, a bloody military coup in mid 1980 brought a low ranking military officer, Sergeant Samuel Doe, to power. The aftermath of the coup saw massacres executed against the deposed Americo-Liberian elite.³³⁰ The administration issued statements of regret about the lives lost, and eventually attempted to increase its military and economic aid to Liberia.³³¹ The administration did this in order to dissuade Liberia from turning to the Soviet bloc. This was part of the administration's global containment policy.

In Uganda, the Carter administration imposed an embargo on Ugandan coffee, the major foreign exchange earner for that country. This was because of the heightened violations of human rights in Uganda. This was part of Carter's overall human rights policy in Africa. This policy, however, showed glaring double standards. While Carter's human rights policy was strictly enforced economically, some American companies and state agencies continued privately to do business with the Amin regime.³³²

On the other hand US relations with Uganda during the Amin period was also couched in Cold War terms. By the end of the Amin regime in 1979, the Soviet Union was the biggest supplier of arms to the regime. The fear of Soviet influence in East Africa via Amin's Uganda led the Carter administration to support the removal of the Amin regime once war between Amin's Uganda and Tanzania erupted in 1978.³³³ But way back in 1971, the US, together with Britain and Israel, had helped to remove President Milton Obote, because of his socialistic policies which were detrimental to the West and installed Amin who they thought would be pro-Western.³³⁴ Washington aided in maintaining Amin in power and when it no longer needed him, the Carter administration in 1979 aided in getting rid of him through Carter's human rights policy which was also against Soviet influence in Uganda, and replaced him with its own favourites.³³⁵

Thus, under Carter, US policy was not altered drastically, especially during the first two years of the administration. During this period, there was de-emphasis of the premise that all American actions abroad should be viewed through the looking glass of East-West conflict. However, the globalist approach to containment was not totally discarded, although there was greater effort to view African events in regional terms than had been the case before.³³⁶ As such, the level of concern or rather the energy devoted to African issues reached a level surpassed only briefly since 1960. But Carter's African policy did not see major departures from the policies of previous administrations.

The policy shifts of the Carter administration began, in a limited way, in early 1979. In Africa, some of the geo-political catalysts included the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, the invasion of Zaire by insurgents from Angola in 1977 and 1978 and the deployment of Cuban troops in Ethiopia starting in 1977.³³⁷ Nevertheless, the administration's concern for African issues declined during its latter years. During this period, regional events were often viewed in the context of the US-Soviet conflict. Early attention to Africa had been a derivation of the administration's desire to elevate the status of human rights and North-South economic issues. Ties had been drawn between these issues and the East-West contest for global hegemony. Some African issues which received attention during the latter years of the administration were related to these issues. Among them were North Africa and the Horn of Africa, Zaire, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Somalia, Liberia and Morocco.

Thus, pre-occupied by domestic constraints and the presiding geo-political interests, the Carter administration during its latter days, conceded that Africa would regain a European domain. In this respect, the administration's African policy must be given mixed reviews.

Carter failed to sustain his human-rights diplomacy. This, coupled by his lack of progress especially on Namibia, paved the way for another shift in US policy following the election of Ronald Reagan and his assumption of the presidency in January 1981. Reagan had been a critique of both Ford and Carter in their dealings with Southern Africa. He had accused Ford of being too harsh on Smith's government in Rhodesia. Reagan had also attacked Carter's campaign against South Africa as unrealistic. Reagan argued that the real violations of human rights were in the communist nations. As such, he viewed southern Africa as an arena of conflict between communism and stability. He, therefore, indicated that he would return to the Nixon-Kissinger policies of more "communication" with the racist regime in Pretoria. Thus, Reagan and his new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, announced that they would replace the "confrontation policy" of Carter with one of "constructive engagement" with the racists in Pretoria. One of Reagan's top African advisors had admitted in a pre-election interview: "The problem with Reagan is that all he knows about Southern Africa is that he's on the side of the whites".³³⁸

The Reagan administration made it clear that the targeting of "international terrorism" was a high priority on its foreign policy agenda. Within a few days of his inauguration, he declared, "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behaviour are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution."³³⁹ On January 28, 1981, the day after this warning, the then Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, concretised the President's remarks, spelling out a shift in focus from the Carter administration's human rights policy. "International terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern", Haig said, adding that the Soviet Union was "training, funding and equipping terrorist activities" in the Third World. Two days later, a South African commando unit invaded Mozambique, attacking the homes of South African refugees on the outskirts of the capital city. South Africa began to behave more aggressively towards its neighbours and it ruthlessly suppressed opposition at home confident that Reagan would condone its actions.³⁴⁰

The Reagan administration refused to condemn South Africa's brutal raid into Mozambique. This was perceived internationally as tacit support for South Africa's actions. Mozambique responded by expelling in early March 1981, six American citizens because they had participated in CIA intelligence-gathering activities and were supplying information to the South African security forces. When in a CBS television interview, Walter Cronkite asked the President what the US attitude should be toward South Africa, Reagan responded that the US could not abandon South Africa because of South Africa's strategic importance to the West in its production of minerals.³⁴¹

Soon after, the Reagan administration restored military attachés to the US delegation in South Africa and allowed South African military officers to train at US facilities. The Department of Commerce also approved the sale to Pretoria of computers and other forms of technology that had been banned under Carter.³⁴² Under administration prodding, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a \$1.1 billion loan to South Africa despite protests from Democrats, the UN, and civil rights groups.³⁴³ Reagan also restored cultural

links with South Africa that had been eliminated by Carter. The administration, for instance, permitted the South African rugby team, the Springboks, to enter the US for a series of exhibition games. This was after the Springboks had been met by violent protests when they toured New Zealand in the fall of 1981. Although five US cities refused to allow the Springboks to play, the team nevertheless managed to play one match in Racine, Wisconsin, on September 19, 1981.³⁴⁴

Despite these and other indications of “constructive engagement”, the Reagan administration continued to pursue a settlement in Namibia.³⁴⁵ It was in Namibia that the threat of heightened Soviet penetration cast a shadow over Western interests on the sub-Continent; hence the Namibian negotiations. Reagan’s Namibian policy was based on four premises. First, pressure tactics against South Africa would harm American regional goals. Such moves would produce a domestic counter-reaction precluding a Namibian compromise. As such, soon after Reagan took office, Jeane Kirkpatrick, US Ambassador to the UN, vetoed a resolution calling for South African sanctions over its Namibian conduct.³⁴⁶ Additionally, Reagan administration officials were more apprehensive than their predecessors about singling out South Africa for verbal castigation over Namibia. However, there were exceptions as in May 1983, when the administration supported a Security Council Resolution criticising South Africa for its “occupation of Namibia” and urging a “speedy independence” process.³⁴⁷

Second, in conformity with “constructive engagement”, Reagan officials attempted to assuage South African concerns over constitutional and electoral provisions for Namibia. At first, the concerns revolved around a constitution to protect Namibia’s non-Ovambo minority.³⁴⁸ Although this idea was not compatible with earlier UN plans for Namibia, Washington did not treat it as illegitimate.³⁴⁹

Third, Washington continued a policy of consulting parties involved directly or indirectly with the Namibian issue. These included South Africa, the South-West-African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), Angola, members of the Western Contact Group, OAU member-states and the Soviet Union.

Fourth, the concept of linkage became an integral component of the Reagan administration’s Namibian negotiating package. Although assigned a variety of euphemisms in deference to Angolan sensitivities and those of other OAU member-states, its outline was clear by mid 1981. Namibian independence was contingent on withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.³⁵⁰ Thus, linkage was a logical consequence of “constructive engagement.” Periodic American consultation with the Western Contact Group members continued regarding Namibia.³⁵¹

Throughout Reagan’s two terms in office, Washington’s interaction with Angola and Mozambique was dictated by its policies of containment and “constructive engagement” with South Africa. As far as Angola was concerned, Reagan’s concerns were the removal of Cuban troops and continued warm relations with South Africa and prospects for a Namibian settlement. These concerns aided in spawning linkage and efforts to end congressional restrictions on aid to Angolan guerrilla groups. They also played a role in the way Washington greeted South African raids into Angola.³⁵²

Washington's deference to South African security interests in Angola and Namibia during the Reagan administration was somehow balanced off by its support of an Export-Import Bank loan to Angola and willingness to hold talks with the Angolans. More importantly, it promoted a February 1984 disengagement accord between Angola and South Africa.³⁵³

The Reagan administration policy toward Mozambique, like that toward Angola, was mainly a function of its desire to enhance ties with South Africa. The administration did not firmly rebuff South Africa for attacks into Mozambique in late January 1981, May 1983 and October 1983.³⁵⁴ The tension generated by South African raids did not preclude an improvement in US relations with Mozambique. This pattern accelerated in 1983 and 1984 as Mozambique sought American economic help and assistance in discouraging South African raids.³⁵⁵ In February 1983, Chester Crocker observed that the character of American ties with Mozambique was good.³⁵⁶ In August 1983, a new American Ambassador to Mozambique was appointed. Thereafter, Mozambique signed the Nkomati accord, a non-aggression treaty with South Africa and Washington took steps to resume direct economic aid.³⁵⁷ The Republicans claimed credit for the March, 1984 Nkomati accord and for what they called improved American relations throughout southern Africa.³⁵⁸

The Reagan administration policy toward Zimbabwe initially did not change much from that of the Carter administration. This was to the surprise of many right-wing Americans and liberals alike. The administration's Zimbabwe policy was predominantly an outgrowth of the political assessments of Crocker and others, rather than reflecting the scholarly approach of Anthony Lake who had written about the country. Although Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe was prone to radical rhetoric, he was independent of Moscow. It was in the geo-political interest of the US to maintain good relations with Zimbabwe, discouraging any drift away from the West.³⁵⁹ For this matter, in 1981, the administration pledged \$225 million over a three year period.³⁶⁰ Additionally, Washington encouraged private investment in Zimbabwe.

Although Zimbabwe moved toward a one party state, intolerant of dissent, the period from 1982 to early 1983 saw affirmations of Washington's commitment to Zimbabwe from Crocker and other members of the State Department's African Bureau.³⁶¹ However, the second half of 1983 saw the administration's attitudes toward Zimbabwe cool as it adopted a critical stance toward the US in the UN. Despite this, the administration's fiscal year 1984 economic aid request for Zimbabwe was still the fifth largest for Africa south of the Sahara.³⁶²

Nevertheless, US-Zimbabwe relations throughout the two terms of the Reagan administration were characterised by different ideological visions shaped by the Cold War. Zimbabwe's option of socialism and non-alignment was not palatable to the US. Different ideological visions of the world spilled over to the rest of other regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and Southern Africa. These regions represented areas in which the US and the Soviet Union confronted each other indirectly through proxy wars and ideological contests.³⁶³ For instance, Zimbabwe's position on Nicaragua was one of supporting Daniel Ortega's Marxist-Leninist government. On the other hand, throughout the Reagan administration, that is, from 1981 to January 1989, Washington backed the Contras, a right-wing guerrilla group that was fighting the Ortega

government. In the same vein, the Palestinian question divided both countries, with Zimbabwe supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state while the US, a guardian of Israel, supported a broad solution within the context of the Middle East, a strategic region for US economic and military interests.

The administration's Horn of Africa policy did not change much from that pursued by Carter. Instead, there was an intensified fear of growing Soviet influence in the region.³⁶⁴ Regional and global containment of a predominantly military nature was the dominant theme. The ports of Berbera in Somalia, and Mombasa in Kenya, components of the regional network for the American Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), were improved.³⁶⁵ Friendly relations with Somalia were preserved, and military aid offered after attacks by Somalia dissidents and Ethiopians in July 1982 and July 1983.³⁶⁶ Thus, the administration advocated for military mechanisms in the Horn of Africa. This was reinforced by the Ethiopian offensive and displays of anti-American sentiment in the top hierarchy of the Ethiopian government.³⁶⁷ Looming in the background were American fears of Soviet gains in the Horn. Thus, the Reagan administration was determined to establish its military credibility there. This posture implied economic assistance programmes which sought to reward "friends" handsomely and served notice to "enemies" in the region that the US was prepared to use arms to "buy peace."³⁶⁸ As such, the budget for fiscal year 1983 committed more than \$1 billion for the development of RDF's capabilities. This meant the preparation of bases and port facilities in countries friendly to the US in the Horn and the Middle East to accommodate American troops and equipment, should the need arise. Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan became the beneficiaries of American military and economic aid. On the hand, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Libya continued to receive military aid from the Soviet Union.³⁶⁹ Thus, the US, during the Reagan presidency, largely pursued a globalist strategy in the Horn of Africa.

In Liberia, Chad and Morocco, the Reagan administration sought to display its willingness to actively back pro-Western elements. The administration's anxieties about Chad, and to a lesser extent, Morocco, were based on expansionism by the perceived Soviet Surrogate, Libya.³⁷⁰

US military and economic aid was stepped up in Liberia. This followed President Reagan's meeting with the Liberian Head of State, Samuel Kanyon Doe and Chester Crocker's statement of the need to help Liberia rebuff Moscow's overtures.³⁷¹

The administration's Chad policy was premised on the following: First, opposition to Libyan designs on Chad and a rejection of a Libyan/Chad merger plan.³⁷² It also backed the OAU and French initiatives to reconcile internal factions and discourage further Libyan encroachments.³⁷³ In the same vein, the administration provided assistance to the OAU peace-keeping force.³⁷⁴ The administration also backed pro-Western forces in Chad under Hissen Habré, before and after his capture of state power.³⁷⁵

At first, it appeared that the result of this policy would depend largely on OAU and French opposition to the Libyans. This would be a clear victory to the West. In November 1981, Libyan troops were withdrawn.³⁷⁶ OAU forces began to arrive the same month, and in June 1982, Hissen Habré took over state power.³⁷⁷ However, it was an immensely costly victory. Mid-1983 saw a Libyan backed force begin a major invasion of Chad. Although it

succeeded in the early stages, it soon encountered a stalemate with French governmental troops.³⁷⁸

During the Reagan administration, new overtures were made to Morocco. Arms sales were increased. They were no longer considered contingent upon progress in the Western Saharan conflict, of which Morocco was a party.³⁷⁹ A joint military commission was set up and US military transit rights negotiated. These were done on the understanding that Morocco was a strategic partner of Washington, sharing its aversion to communist influence in North Africa and the Middle East.³⁸⁰ In essence, however, Morocco, during the Reagan administration, continued to play the conduit role of US imperialism in North Africa and the Middle East.³⁸¹

In North Africa, apart from Morocco, it was Egypt that continued to enjoy warm relations with the US during the two terms of the Reagan presidency. Indeed, the Reagan presidency witnessed an unprecedented flow of diplomatic, economic and military resources from Washington to Cairo. During this period, the US Congress appropriated more than \$23 billion in various forms of aid for Egypt. Few foreign leaders were more highly regarded in official circles in Washington than the Egyptian President. The two countries were often portrayed as particularly close friends and allies.³⁸²

The major reason for this apparent success of US-Egyptian relations was the achievement of peace between Egypt and Israel and the willingness of successive American Presidents and Congress to support high levels of economic and military assistance to Egypt. During the early stages of the second term of the Reagan presidency, i.e. in the mid 1980s, Egypt was also able to benefit, in some American circles, from the perception that it was a “strategic asset” in the struggle against Soviet influence. This was at a time when the Cold War atmosphere was sometimes feverish.³⁸³ During the Reagan Presidency, Egypt became the second largest recipient of American economic and military assistance – next to Israel. This placed Egypt well ahead of such long-standing American allies in the Third World as Pakistan and the Philippines in its claim on American resources.³⁸⁴

But it was also in North Africa (Libya), where the Reagan administration had one of its worst enemies in the entire Third World. It was in Libya that Reagan’s policy of targeting “international terrorism” manifested itself most. Seven months after assuming office, on August 19, 1981, the Reagan administration authorised two US navy F-14 aircraft carriers to carry out provocative manoeuvres in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Gulf of Sirtre near the Libyan coast. This was inside the waters, claimed by Libya territory. Two Libyan airforce planes were reported by the US as having been destroyed in the ensuing clash.³⁸⁵

Reagan’s aggressive policy toward Libya climaxed with the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi on April 15, 1986. It is important to understand the events that led to the bombing of the two Libyan cities. In March 1986, the US navy crossed “the line of death”, an imaginary line drawn by Colonel Gaddafi along the 32.3 parallel in 1973, marking Libyan territorial waters. This, therefore, was an act of provocation. Admiral Kelson, who was commanding the Sixth Fleet navy, carried out Reagan’s directives and ordered his ships to penetrate Libyan waters and his planes to violate Libyan airspace, thus forcing the Libyan government and army into military action. According to a British radar engineer who is reported to have been working for Libya at the time, “the two US F-14 Tomcats had also crossed the twelve mile limit and flown missions over Libyan land breaking

international law.” The engineer continues: “I watched the planes fly approximately eight miles into Libyan airspace.... I don’t think the Libyans had any choice but to hit back...the US war planes made their approach using a normal civil airline traffic route and following in the wake of a Libyan aeroplane so that they could be masked by its radar blips.”³⁸⁶ Following Libyan missile retaliation on that occasion, Reagan, seething with arrogant fury, instructed Admiral Kelson to order a direct air missile attack on Libyan missiles and radar bases at Sirtre as well as on the Libyan navy.

Tripoli and Benghazi were hit by no less than 150 tons of bombs. In the residential areas of the two cities, no less than thirty houses—including the embassies of France, Japan, Austria and Finland, a children’s playground, and other civilian and military facilities were hit and/or destroyed. About fifty civilians, including children, were killed and over one hundred were injured. As the intention was to eliminate the leaders of the Libyan revolution, cause chaos and panic, thus creating a vacuum for pro-Western counter-revolutionaries to pounce on and take over political power in Tripoli. A total of eight aircraft with four guided bombs each concentrated their bombing on the Headquarters of Gaddafi.³⁸⁷

This act of state terrorist trespass which was labelled by the Reagan administration as “freedom of navigation exercise,”³⁸⁸ was the eighth of its kind since the August 1981 attack. The bombing of the two cities was perhaps the biggest by the US anywhere else in the world since its inhuman massive bombings in the Korean and Vietnam wars in which US imperialists, supported by almost all the imperialist powers in the West, were decisively defeated by the people’s revolutionary forces of the Koreans and Vietcong. The claim by the Reagan administration that Gaddafi was supporting international terrorism was a sheer cover-up for the real short and long term causes of, and intentions for, that raid. For this reason, the raid was strongly condemned as an act of “jungle law” by progressive, democratic and peace-loving people the world-over who also termed it as an “arrogant disregard for international law.”³⁸⁹ Tanzania, one of the African countries that had been in the frontline of the African liberation struggle, termed the US aggression as “both unacceptable and a dangerous precedent”.³⁹⁰ Tanzania argued that if the US had “irrefutable evidence” that Libya was about to launch an attack against American citizens, Washington should have sought the intervention of international bodies, especially the UN. The facts, however, were different and covered up under the political machinations and chicaneries of the Reagan administration.³⁹¹ However, the real reasons for the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi can be summarised as follows: Libya under Gaddafi resisted imperialist attempts to re-establish foreign rule there. Libya was determined to chart its own destiny independently, and in a revolutionary manner. Libya, being anti-imperialist was caught up in the Chadian anti-imperialist struggle which had also taken on an intra-imperialist orientation. Thus, it received the maximum force of a supra-imperialist power, the US, which sought dominance not only over Libya and Chad, but also over France and, therefore, over France’s spheres of influence and those of the other imperialist powers in Africa and the whole world.³⁹²

Libya was also attacked, partly, as a strategically positioned staunch African and Arab ally of the Soviet Union, and the socialist revolutionary forces of the East and the World. As the Libyan Mediterranean coast line is such a long and strategic line facing the West-dominated trade-route as well as the southern flank of the NATO countries, the US and all

NATO countries read nothing else but danger in the Libyan-Soviet (Eastern bloc) relationship. The Reagan administration saw Libya as a strategic facility for the Soviet Union's and other Eastern countries' military support for Angola, Mozambique and liberation movements in southern and "sub-Saharan" Africa.³⁹³

The US also intended to demonstrate, advertise and popularise an image of itself as the country with the most advanced military technology in the whole world. This is why all the latest models of the US airforce's jet fighters were deployed in that raid-including those operated manually as well as those guided by computer and by laser. Because Libya used to get military assistance, technological and expertise advice mainly from the Soviet Union and some other socialist countries, the Reagan administration and its military industrialist supporters intended to undermine the confidence of the peoples under imperialist domination in the technology and science of the Soviet Union and socialist countries.

Gaddafi's Libya also posed a revolutionary threat to US dominance in the Mediterranean sea-route. The destruction or paralysis of the Libyan revolution would, therefore, remove, or at least minimise the anti-imperialist force in North Africa and around the Mediterranean Sea, which threatened US and other Western commercial and military adventures which are anti-people.³⁹⁵

Gaddafi's Libya has been one of the staunchest supporters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the struggle of the Palestinian people. While the US has been, on the opposite side, the leading supporter of Zionist massacres in Lebanon, genocidal dictatorship in the occupied Palestinian territories and all Zionist sub-imperialist adventures in the Middle East. Thus, the attack on Libya by the forces of the US dominant classes was partly one of the most determined and concentrated US state terrorisms in support of Zionist state terrorism and sub-imperialist adventures. It was actually partly an attack on the power-sources of the PLO liberation and revolutionary front. It was intended, therefore, to seriously weaken the Libyan support for the PLO.³⁹⁶

The attack on Libya was an attempted re-capture of diminished US international dominance. The success of revolutions such as the Cuban, Nicaraguan and, more especially the Vietnamese one, and the anti-US imperialist struggle such as the one in Iran, affected US dominant influence in the world, and boosted the working peoples' anti-imperialist struggle for liberation and revolution. The attack on Grenada a few years back by the US marines and rangers was like an attack by a giant of the now extinct dinosaurs against the smallest of the mosquitoes. It did not, therefore, quench the thirst of the dominant and ruling forces of the US in their search for the retrieval and restoration of the diminishing position of an invincible supra-imperialist power of the whole world. The bombing of Libya, a country much larger and more powerful than small Grenada was, therefore, intended to contribute to that struggle for the restoration of the diminishing dominant position of the US. It was supposed to be a bigger victory for bigger claims.³⁹⁷

As a whole, the Reagan administration African policy was a disaster. It was a policy based on heightened Cold War considerations. It was a policy of destructive engagement in the entire African continent.

US-African Relations and the End of the Cold War

By the end of 1988, when President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union paid a quick visit to New York, where he met for the last time with President Reagan, who was accompanied by President-elect George Bush, the Cold War was winding up. Reagan and Gorbachev had agreed on an armistice and it only remained for Bush and Gorbachev to work out the terms of the final peace settlement. This process began in their summit conference at Malta in December 1989, after some initial hesitation. However, by then the revolutionary upheaval in Eastern Europe threatened to overwhelm the superpowers. Not surprisingly, each tried to reassure the other that the new order that would emerge from this revolution should unfold peacefully and gradually. The two confrontationists suddenly found themselves sharing a common interest in European stability.³⁹⁸

The Cold War had been the most important, expensive and dangerous phenomenon of the second half of the tumultuous twentieth century. Thus, 1989 was the best year for East-West relations since World War II. The Cold War started in Eastern Europe and ended there.³⁹⁹

The end of the Cold War, therefore, warranted a major re-orientation of US foreign policy since 1947. By 1989, four major processes of change were at work reshaping East-West relations, namely, liberalization and reform in the Soviet Union: the democratisation of Eastern Europe; the determined move toward economic integration in Western Europe; and a new, apparently irresistible drive toward unification of East and West Germany. The conjunction and cumulative impact of these changes promised to transform Europe - and the US role there.⁴⁰⁰

However, events in Europe have had a significant impact on US-African relations. Shortly before the end of the Cold War, it was envisaged that "A New US Policy for Africa" in the 1990s and beyond would be necessary.⁴⁰¹

With the collapse of communist rule and of the Soviet Union in 1992, there emerged what President George Bush termed the "New World Order." The "New World Order" is economically bipolar and militarily unipolar. It defines the relationship between the rich North and poor weak South. It has demands which the poor South cannot accept - which include UN occupation forces, peace monitoring teams, peace keeping forces such as those in Rwanda, Somalia and Uganda.⁴⁰²

It is within the "New World Order" arrangement that the impact of the end of the Cold War on Africa can be analysed. Economically, socialist experiments were abandoned in preference to the market economy. Angola, Tanzania and Mozambique led the way in this endeavour with their leaders hoping to reverse the flight of capital witnessed in the 1970s and 1980s.⁴⁰³ Despite this, Washington's already meagre interest in Africa has diminished further, now that the geopolitical competition with Moscow no longer drives US foreign policy. Indeed, Africa responded with ambivalence to the end of the Cold War. Many of the outside factors aggravating Africa's problems disappeared when the super-powers stopped jostling for advantage on the continent. However, large amounts of aid have also been jeopardised as a result of Africa's loss of leverage over the opposing East-West blocs. Indeed, the amount of aid to Africa was reduced in 1992. Whereas US development assistance to Africa budgeted at \$800 million a year in 1992 dropped precipitously, the US

Congress had “no trouble approving a \$600 million aid package for the former Soviet republics.”⁴⁰⁴ This was partly based on racism on the part of the Bush administration.

Similarly, Washington’s major aim in regard to both trade negotiations and aid programmes is to serve US foreign economic policy, not African development. Through the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) they imposed on several African countries with US backing, the World Bank and the IMF emerged as a sort of “super state.” Any country that does not adhere to the rules of the game as laid down by the IMF, does not get any money. In the same vein, Washington is striving in the current global trade talks to open up African economies to greater foreign control. As a result, Africans may lose control of even the modest resources they now have. One of the best examples of such a scenario is Uganda under Museveni. Today, Uganda is the darling of IMF/World Bank policies in Africa. Retrenchment of civil servants, demobilization in the army, cost sharing in schools and hospitals, and privatization schemes, have all been recommended by the US and IMF/World Bank and only implemented by state managers.⁴⁰⁵ Because Uganda is now a model of the IMF/World Bank and US-related policies in Africa and Museveni is the articulate defender of these policies at Pan African fora, the US and its allies have found a good prefect for their post-Cold War policies in Africa.⁴⁰⁶

The second impact is that African dictators like the late Mobutu who served well Cold War purposes by posing as “friends” of Washington, are no longer important in regional politics from the looking glasses of the US. Their services are no longer required. Washington is now at great pains to demonstrate that it can no longer be seen to hobnob with African dictators.⁴⁰⁷ Similarly, the US no longer wishes to be a party to proxy wars. Thus, immense progress has been made in trying to reconcile warring factions in Angola and Mozambique. The late Jonas Savimbi was dumped by Washington after rejecting the results of the 1992 elections in Angola and returning to the bush. Instead, the Clinton administration proceeded to diplomatically recognize Angola.

The third impact is that the winding down of the Cold War facilitated not only the independence of Namibia, in March 1990, but also triggered a major political shift in South Africa, leading to the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1992 and to the holding of all race elections in April 1994, whereby Mandela was elected President of apartheid free South Africa.

US policy toward Africa began to change dramatically around 1990, towards greater concern for democracy, accountability and human rights. Giving aid to Africa is now premised on evidence of democracy, human rights, accountability and good governance.⁴⁰⁸

That notion of human rights following the end the Cold War was, according to President Bush, based on the premise that “a limited government that constitutionally protects political and civil rights creates the most nurturing environment for development.”⁴⁰⁹ But in situations where “the government is the principal guarantor of a wide range of economic rights”, the experience had been that the so-called rights are often used as excuses to ignore, or override, fundamental human rights and freedoms.”⁴¹⁰ Thus, the linkage of human rights foreign policy and development was the central theme of President Bush following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Some of the measures taken by President Bush in executing his human rights foreign policy was the withholding of bilateral aid to African countries considered to suppress human rights. In Kenya, for instance, relations with Washington and other Western donors in general started to deteriorate, in 1989. The American Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, stated publicly that Washington would direct assistance to countries that “nourished democratic institutions, defend human rights and practised multi-party politics.”⁴¹¹

The Bush administration, in conformity with the legislation on human rights, acquiesced to the Congressional freezing of \$25 million military aid to Kenya.⁴¹² The major contention was that President Moi had to allow multipartyism to operate in Kenya. Because of Moi’s stubbornness, the donor countries decided to withhold foreign aid in 1991. This ultimately forced Moi to allow mutipartyism.⁴¹³

Following his official visit to some African countries in August 1991, Senator Paul Simon, then Chairman of the US Africa Sub-committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated that US aid would be given to those countries that were moving toward democracy.⁴¹⁴ The foregoing reflected the general position of the US Congress and the Bush administration. The policy was associated with the changes that occurred in Benin, Cape Verde, Namibia, Congo and Zambia, leading to multi-party elections. More than \$30 million pledged by the Bush administration were meant for the promotion of “civic education, human rights monitoring, and the technical assistance to national conventions, electoral commissions, and in constitution-making.”⁴¹⁵ Other than suspending aid to Kenya, Togo and Cameroon, the Bush administration also imposed economic sanctions against Libya and Somalia as a result of the violations of human rights. Washington also successfully sponsored resolutions in the UN, against the Sudan due to violations of human rights.⁴¹⁶

During the 1980s, the US stepped up its military aid programme to Malawi on the grounds that it was encouraged by the country’s staunchly anti-communist foreign policy and also because Malawi, being the only post-colonial African country to have established diplomatic links with South Africa, shared its desire for peaceful change and non-violent resolution of conflicts within southern Africa. As such, Malawi was an ally worthy of support since it had the same philosophy of “constructive engagement” as propounded by the Reagan/ Bush administrations during the 1980s. However, with the end of the Cold War, Dr. Khamusi Banda ceased to be regarded as a staunch ally against communism. Instead, pressure mounted on him to stop violating human rights and move toward greater democratization; hence the withdrawal of part of the economic/humanitarian aid to Malawi by Washington.⁴¹⁷

The Bush administration’s efforts on the issue of human rights were continued by President Clinton, whose own human rights foreign policy was within the context of the “enlargement of the world’s roster of democratic countries.”⁴¹⁸ In Africa, the criterion was the linkage of American foreign aid with good governance, structural reform and respect for political and human rights. The administration attempted to pursue a consistent human rights foreign policy in Africa. In Malawi, for instance, the Clinton administration continued from where the Bush administration stopped. On April, 1993, the US Senate passed a resolution expressing the feelings of the Senate regarding the Government of

Malawi's arrest of its opponents and suppression of freedoms, and hence conditioning assistance to Malawi. After the Senate's resolutions, on April 14, 1993, US Vice President Al Gore, met with the Malawian Ambassador to the US, Robert Mbaya, to discuss the planned referendum on multi-party democracy. The Vice President was interested in the process of democratisation in Malawi. He was also critical of the serious human rights abuses perpetrated by the Government of Malawi. This continued Western ostracism of the Banda regime, had proven a very effective weapon towards the benefit of the multi-party movement. In 1994, general elections were held in Malawi and Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front became the new President of Malawi, having won the elections.⁴¹⁹ Apart from Malawi, there are a few cases such as Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Somalia, Angola and Sudan, where the implementation of the policy continued to have effects.⁴²⁰ Nevertheless, the Clinton administration had also been accused of its indifference on the issue of genocide in Rwanda, in 1994.

Generally, violations of human rights are still rampant in Africa. The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been particularly bad. In one of its February 1993 reports, Washington warned that the then Zaire could turn into "Somalia and Liberia", leading to "Regional destabilization and humanitarian disaster."⁴²¹ The Clinton administration tried to isolate President Mobutu internationally. In the then Zaire, "ethnic cleansing" instigated by the Mobutu regime, led to the 1993 killing of over six thousand people and two hundred and seventy thousand rendered homeless in Kivu bordering Rwanda. The 1993 UN Secretary General's report indicated that in the then Zaire, the "virtual impunity apparently enjoyed by the security forces would seem to indicate that they commit human rights violation with the consent of the highest authorities."⁴²² The human rights violations in the DRC continued even after the overthrow of the late Mobutu by Laurent Desire Kabila in 1996, and after the assassination of Kabila in early 2001 when he was replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila.

The political situation in Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation, was even more bleak. Following the annulment of the June 1993 elections, reportedly won by businessman Moshood Abiola, General Sani Abacha began a systematic violation of human rights. It was reported that over 1,000 Ogonis of Niger Delta region, in Nigeria, were shot dead by the military regime between July and October 1993 alone. As a result of the cancellation of the elections and the killings, the Clinton administration cut off \$450,000 aid for military training and \$11 million grant.⁴²³ As fate would have it, Abacha suddenly died and was replaced by General Abdusalam Abubakar who paved the way for Nigeria to return to civilian rule. In May 1999, presidential elections were held and won by former military ruler, Olusegun Obasanjo. And since 1999, Nigeria has been fairly stable despite intermittent ethnic clashes which result into violation of human rights.

In Kenya, the Clinton administration continued to emphasize conditioning aid to democracy and human rights. Since the administration's assumption of power, "preventive diplomacy" has been applied to Africa in general and Kenya in particular. The notion was to prevent the possibility of a country deteriorating into anarchy. Conversely, however, preventive diplomacy negated the enhancement of democracy because Washington ended up supporting less democratic regimes while criticising their human rights record. This was the case with Kenya. Although Smith Hempstone, the US Ambassador to Kenya during the Bush administration had gone, during his "tour of duty" in Kenya, he had led his

government in pressuring Moi to accept multi-party democracy. However, following the 1992 elections in Kenya – which were won by Moi’s party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) through rigging, Hempstone himself urged the opposition to accept the results. Thus, the arrival of Aurelia Brazeal as the new US Ambassador to Kenya attracted attention, especially as a contrast to Hempstone, with whom she would be compared. An examination of relations between Kenya and the US during the two years of the Clinton administration, that is, from 1993 to 1995, reveals a seesaw pattern.⁴²⁴

In Uganda, evidence of democracy, human rights and good governance was not applied to the Museveni regime. This has been so, despite violations of human rights as reported by Amnesty International and various Uganda newspapers ever since Museveni captured state power in 1986. This has been so because Museveni has cultivated close relations with the US and its allies.⁴²⁵

As Adar has convincingly argued, the direct involvement by the US on the issue of human rights arises as a consequence of four issues.⁴²⁶ First, the US is increasingly involving the issue of human rights because of its national interests in Africa. Second, the US global responsibilities have increased as a result of the end of the Cold War. Third, the US as well as most of the African countries, is a party to contracting a number of international human rights instruments. Fourth, the US views peace and stability within the context of the observance of human rights.

Although African states have accented to a number of human rights instruments, they continue to violate the provisions of the instruments. This, however, does not necessarily mean that they reject that human rights is not a universal concept.⁴²⁷

As we have discussed, during the Cold War period, containment of the Soviet Union, in particular and Communism in general, dominated US foreign policy behaviour in Africa. This led to support of dictatorial regimes, irrespective of their human rights records. However, the end of the Cold War ushered in a new era. We have demonstrated that the Bush and Clinton administrations set in motion political conditionalities in Africa. However, although withholding of funds to countries in Africa that violate human rights is now the central policy position, there has been inconsistency in this direction as demonstrated by Washington’s soft attitude toward Museveni’s Uganda as compared to most other African countries.

Globally, the end of the Cold War has rendered Africa rather irrelevant to international diplomacy and security.⁴²⁸ The US and its allies have shifted their attention to Eastern Europe, where there are better economic opportunities and a better chance of influencing the course of international diplomacy. The attitude of the US and its NATO allies toward Yugoslavia attracted the attention of the US and its allies virtually overnight. They, together with the UN, were ready to intervene so as to save the Muslims from annihilation.⁴²⁹ This was not the case for Somalia where there was a determined reluctance to be involved until the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali strongly protested and went to the extent of accusing the US and its NATO allies of racism. Reluctantly, the Bush administration launched Operation Restore Hope, initially as a largely US initiative. But even when the US and the UN finally intervened militarily in 1992, they focused on the humanitarian aspects of the emergency, thereby limiting their ability to act on the core political and security dimensions.⁴³⁰

In summary, it can be observed that the end of the Cold War is a benchmark in the history of Africa. Africa has ceased to be a theatre of the Cold War. This leaves room for tackling some of Africa's political problems. Indeed, it has facilitated the independence of Namibia, the end of apartheid in South Africa and the resolution of political bottle-necks in Angola and Mozambique. In the same vein, the post-Cold War era has seen the collapse of one-party political systems and the ushering in of pluralist democratic processes in most African countries. However, this is not to say that in itself, the adoption of multiparty democracy is without problems, as the Kenya situation after the 1992 election illustrates.

From the global point of view, we have demonstrated that Africa has been further marginalized. This is from the political economy point of view. As a result, African leaders have to take stock of the continent's predicament. This necessitates collective responsibility on their part in trying to solve the continent's political and economic problems.

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SHAPERS AND MOVERS

Selected personalities



Adlai Stevenson

United States
Ambassador to the
United Nations,
1961-1965.

Advised against UN Security Council's application of coercive measures against apartheid Pretoria despite opposition from Third world countries.



Apollo Milton Obote

President of Uganda
1962-1971 and 1980-
1985

A staunch anti-imperialist crusader who experimented with Marxism-Leninism ideology in Uganda in the late 1960s at the height of the Cold War. For this, the West is reported to have aided in his overthrow in 1971. He also challenged John F. Kennedy on the Civil Rights Movement in the US.



Ahmed Sékou Touré

President of
Guinea, 1958-
1984.

Rejected French paternalism.



Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Secretary-General of
the United Nations,
1992-1997.

Doubted whether the level of US development aid to Africa would grow substantially during the 1990s due to US attention to Eastern Europe.



Andrew Jackson Young, Jr.

United States
Ambassador to the
United Nations, 1977-
1979.

He pushed US to support liberation movement in Africa.



Dwight David Eisenhower

President of the
United States,
1953-1961.

His administration's African policy was to check Soviet expansion.



Fidel Castro

President of Cuba,
1959-2008

He helped MPLA in Angola against South Africa.

George C. Marshall

Allegiance to United
States of America,
1901-1945.



*His Marshall Plan is said to have kept
Western Europe from going communist.*




**Franklin
Delano
Roosevelt**

President of the
United State,
1933-1945.

Challenged European colonialism in Africa.

George H. W. Bush

President of United
States, 1989-1993.



*Sent US troops to Somalia in Operation
Restore Hope.*



**Gamal
Abdel
Nasser**

President of
Egypt, 1956-
1970.

*Reclaimed Suez Canal from Britain and
France in 1956.*

George W. Bush

President of United
States, 2001-2009



*Tried to force countries to enact terrorism
laws.*



Haile Selassie

Emperor of Ethiopia, 1930-1974.

Founder member of OAU in Addis Ababa.

Henry Kissinger

United States Secretary of State, 1973-1977.



He encouraged South African invasion of Angola.



Harold Macmillan

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 1953-1964.

His famous "wind of change" speech in South Africa only a few weeks before Sharpeville, convinced a number of Afrikaners that Britain would soon pressurize them to grant political rights to the African majority.

Hubert Humphrey

Vice-President, 1963-1969. 1949 to 1964; 1971 to 1978.



Was opposed to apartheid in South Africa.



Harry S. Truman

President of the United States, 1945-1953.

Responsible for Truman Doctrine and Point IV programme.

Indira Gandhi

Prime Minister of India, 1980-1984.



She followed the footsteps of her father, Nehru, as well as her predecessor, Shastri, in favouring adoption of non-alignment policy. She referred to the people of Indian origin settled in Africa as "Ambassadors of India."



**Jawaharlal
Nehru**

Prime Minister of
India, 1947-1964.

He stated that whether a country was imperialistic, socialist, or communist, its foreign minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country. To him, Indians, to a certain extent, participated in exploiting East Africa, South Africa and other parts of Africa. Although they also did a great deal of good work, the interests of the people of Africa had to come first.



**Jean
Kirkpatrick**

United States
Ambassador to
the United
Nations, 1981-
1985.

Gave the impression that she condoned apartheid.



**John F.
Kennedy**

President of the
United States, 1961-
1963.

He supported the East Africa student air lifts to US universities and colleges and started the Peace Corps.

**Jomo
Kenyatta**

President of
Kenya, 1964-1978.



Stressed African interests rather than those of Cold War protagonists.

**Julius
Kambarage
Nyerere**

President of Tanzania,
1964-1985.




He inaugurated the Ujamaa socialism.

Josip Broz Tito

President of the
Socialist Federal
Republic of
Yugoslavia, 1953-
1980.



He was a communist who promoted Non-Alignment and was a founder member.



Kofi Annan

Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1997-2007.

Blamed for failure to act in Rwandan genocide, in 1994.

Leonid Brezhnev

General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1964-1982.



He observed in 1978 that the imperialist forces and their accomplices in Africa were placing their main hopes on undermining the unity of African countries.



Kwame Nkrumah

President of Ghana, 1957-1960.

Symbolized African ideals of independence.

Leopold Sedar Senghor

President of Senegal, 1960-1980.



Best known for promoting Negritude.



Yoweri Kaguta Museveni

President of Uganda. 1986 to present.

Staunch defender of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in Africa.

Lyndon B. Johnson

President of the United States, 1963-1969.



He pledged to oppose all radical governments whether they came into being through foreign invasion, domestic revolution, or election. This applied to the Rhodesian crisis too.



Mahatma Gandhi

India's "Father of the Nation". Born 1869, died 1948.

He and the entire Indian Nation considered Indian independence struggle to be part of a campaign to dismantle colonial shackles in Africa and Asia. His teachings of passive resistance were adopted by some African nationalist leaders.



Mao Zedong

Chairman of the China Communist party, 1945-1976.

Supported Tan-Zam Railroad and UNITA in Angola.



Margaret Thatcher

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 1979-1990.

Arranged for Rhodesia to self-govern which changed name to Zimbabwe.

Mengistu Haile Mariam

Ethiopian Head of State, 1977-1987.



In the 1970s, he embraced the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, which was increasingly popular among many nationalists and revolutionaries throughout Africa and much of the Third World at the time. He led the revolution in 1974. The end of the Cold War contributed to the winding down of the major militarized conflicts in Africa. He lost Soviet and Cuban support in 1989.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev

President of the Soviet Union, 1985-1991.



The man credited with helping end the Cold War with his glasnost and perestroika reforms. In the West, he remains the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize winner who helped end the Cold War.

Mobutu Sese Seko

President of Zaire, 1965-1997.



He was reportedly used by the US and Belgium to oust and kill Lumumba.



**Moïse
Tshombe**

Congolese
politician, 1919-
1969.

*Wanted to separate Katanga from Congo
and was reportedly involved in Lumumba's
death.*

**Nikita
Khrushchev**

Secretary of the
Communist Party of
the Soviet Union,
1953-1964.



Supported Africans in Guinea and Congo.



**Nelson
Rolihlahla
Mandela**

President of South
Africa, 1994-1999.

*He inspired anti-apartheid movement world
wide.*

Osama Bin Laden

Believed to be the
Founder of Al-Qaeda,
1979 to Present.



*Reportedly, his organization bombed
Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, New York and
Washington.*




**Ngugi wa
Thiong'o**

Kenyan Author.
Born January 5,
1938.

*A critic of neo-colonialism in Africa,
particularly in Kenya.*

**Patrice
Lumumba**

Prime Minister of
Democratic Republic
of Congo, June 24-
September 14, 1960.



*The US perceived him to be a threat to its
interests in Africa.*



**Richard
Milhous
Nixon**

President of the
United States,
1969-1974.

The most prominent feature of US policy toward Africa during his administration was a desire to maintain close links between Africa and the West, with the notion of keeping Africa out of the orbit of the Soviet Union and its allies.

**Theodore
Roosevelt, Jr.**

President of the
United States, 1901-
1909.



Encouraged Britons to turn Kenya into a 'white man's' country.



**Ronald
Wilson
Reagan**

President of the
United States,
1981-1989.

Advanced policy of constructive engagement towards apartheid that seemed to support South Africa.

Tom Joseph Mboya

In active politics from
1957-1969.



Associated with 'Air Lift Africa'. Through his efforts and those of the African-American Students Foundation (AASF), President Kennedy arranged for the Joseph Kennedy Foundation to pay for the transportation of African students to the US in the 1950s and 1960s.



**Samora
Machel**

President of
Mozambique,
1975-1986.

Was attracted to Marxist ideals. Was a revolutionary and a scholar who, through gorilla warfare under the banner of FRELIMO, helped liberate Mozambique from the shackles of Portuguese colonialism.

**William
Jefferson
Clinton**

President of the
United States, 1993-
2001.



He pulled US out of Somalia, watched genocide in Rwanda, and bombed Sudan after terrorist attacks in East Africa.



Winston Churchill

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 1951-1955.

Was not interested in independence for Africans. He wanted British empire to remain intact.



The founding members of the Non-Aligned States. They met in New York in October 1960.

From left: Nehru of India, Nkrumah of Ghana, Nasser of Egypt, Sukarno of Indonesia and Tito of Yugoslavia.

Indo-African Relations

Relations between the Indian sub continent and the African continent imply South-to-South cooperation. In this chapter, we discuss the nature of the relationships. Two periods are emphasized. First, the de-colonialization period, when India played an important role in genuinely supporting independence for African colonies. Second, the postcolonial period when India became an important ally of the new states of Africa both politically and economically.

The Historical Legacy of Indo-African Relations

The people of India and Africa are known to have had close and friendly relations for the past many centuries. Ancient sea-fares regularly sailed between the West coast of India and the East African coast to conduct trade. Even before the Portuguese sailor, Vasco da Gama, “discovered” the sea route to India via the Cape of Good Hope, the people of East Africa and India interacted continuously. For many centuries, much before the Greek sailor’s guide, *The Periplus of the Erthrean Sea* was written, the Indian Ocean was a great highway of commercial relations. As George Delf has observed, “one of the earliest recorded navigational accounts, *Periplus of the Erythrean Sea*, Circa, A.D. 80, mentions India as well as Arab ships trading along the coast.”¹ Similarly, Marco Polo wrote of Indian ships “which visit the island of Madagascar and that of Zanzibar.”² Likewise, even if this observation may be disputed, at least in the Swahili world, R. Coupland acknowledged that “much of the ocean shipping was Indian owned and Indian manned, and since Arabs in general seem never to have shown much aptitude for the technique of business, it is probable that the Indians were from the earliest days the masters of finance, the bankers and money changers and money-lenders.”³

The earliest recorded proof of ancient Indo-African relations is found in the Puranas of the Hindus. Colonel John Speke, an officer in the Indian army, who was financed by the Royal Geographical Society to come to Africa to search for the source of the River Nile from 1859 to 1861, claims he secured help in his explorations from the ancient Hindu scriptures.⁴

The fact that the Puranas mentioned Misri, ancient Egypt, shows that this region was known to India’s fore-fathers. References to the Nile in the Puranas may be traced to the fact that the Hindus had been trading with Rome, Greece, Egypt, and Eastern Africa long before the birth of Christ.⁵ This is contrary to the mistaken view that India’s relations

with Africa were fragmentary and of recent rather than traditional importance because there was no land bridge between India and Africa; that Africa had its back turned on the Indian Ocean and that there was an absence of high contemporaneous civilization (other than in the Nile basin), which might have attracted the people of India.⁶

To the contrary, India had trade relations with Zanzibar and other parts of Africa. Gold and ivory remained the major commodities which the Arabs exchanged for manufactured goods, cloth, metal works and beads.⁷

Nearer to our times, more convincing evidence is contained through the works of archaeologists, especially those who have done extensive excavations of the great Zimbabwe ruins, which reveal that India's contacts in the past centuries were not merely confined to the eastern coastal kingdoms but had extended to the remote hinterlands. The Indian beads and coins discovered there show the extent of trade contacts between India and South Central Africa. Zimbabwe commodities such as gold and copper found a steady market in southern western India before the eighth and ninth centuries A.D. Iron spearheads, coiled wire, bronze objects and some imported glass beads found in the ruins were of Indian manufacture.⁸

An important account of another aspect of Indo-African relation is the presence of Africans in India. This account was made by Ibn Batuta who visited India around A.D. 1342. According to his observation, Africans in India were used primarily as mercenary soldiers, crewmen, and dock workers. Recounting his visit to Alapur, a small town south east of Gwalior, he revealed that the Governor was an Ethiopian.⁹

Additionally, Africans were taken to India by Arab traders as soldiers. For instance, the Muslim king of Gaur, in West Bengal, who ruled between 1474 and 1495, recruited about 8,000 African soldiers. These Africans were brave and excellent fighters. As such, some rose to glorious heights and became legendary figures. The story of Queen Razia illustrated this point. She was deeply influenced by an African by the name of Yakut who was a stable boy. She elevated him to the post of master of stables. But his rise to power triggered off a revolt by the nobility of her court, resulting into the murder of Yakut. Many other cases of African soldiers rising against their rulers and usurping power can be cited. For instance, in the kingdom of Bengal, a certain Shamsuddin Abu Nassar Muzzaffer Shah, an Ethiopian, seized power.¹⁰

Africans are reported to have played an important role in political affairs also during the Moghul rule. In the Deccan, when the Moghul emperor, Jahangir, conflicted with the Hindu ruler of Ahmenager, his success was thwarted principally due to the military leadership of the African Minister by the name of Malik Amber. Africans, especially Ethiopians, also excelled in the navy. During the time of Shivaji, they were an important factor in his resistance to his opponents on sea and land. In 1670, Emperor Aurangzeb appointed a certain Siddi as his Admiral. Africans were also recruited in the armies of the Nizam of Hyderabad up to 1947 when India attained independence and the state was merged with the Indian Union. These people of African descent, who generally call themselves ex-faujīs (ex-servicemen), have settled in Hyderabad, intermarried and merged with the mainstream of India. Similarly, on the west coast of India, in Junagarh, there is an entire village settled by people of Ethiopian descent who mainly work as labourers in the famous Gir forest, the home of Indian lions.¹¹

Much as there was early settlement of Africans in certain parts of India, there was also the return and resettlement of Africans in East Africa and in various parts of Asia, on the Arabian peninsula, and in Persia and India. These resettlements according to J. Harris, were the result mainly of European efforts to abolish the slave trade in India.¹²

Furthermore, Harris refers to the impressive role of especially “Bombay Africans”, named after one hundred and fifty who arrived from Bombay in 1875 at Freetown near Mombasa.¹³ Although western trained, “Bombay-Africans” were denied opportunities equal to Europeans in mission stations. As such, they became a source of protest against discrimination in churches and missions.

It was a two-way traffic. Africans went to India in those early days and a large number of Indians¹⁴ came to East Africa for purpose of trade and commerce and later to fill the vacuum created by the abolition of the slave trade. The date for the first Indian settlement in Africa is not quite known. However, some kind of Indian settlement came about around the same time as that of Arabs in the seventh century. Thereafter, the number of Indian settlements considerably increased. There was, however, a vast difference in the social and economic life of the Indian and Arab settlers. The Arabs gradually began to identify themselves with the ruling class but the Indian settlers confined their activities exclusively to trade and commerce. The Arabs acquired land and generally controlled the lucrative slave trade but the Indians were from the beginning, what they still are in East Africa, that is, the masters of finance, bankers, and shopkeepers. Much of the trade was either directly in their hands or managed by them for wealthy Arab land owners. The Indians thus rendered an essential service to the community as a whole, unlike the Arabs who had to pay in the long run for not doing it themselves. Although dependence of Indian industry and skills helped the Arabs to get rich for sometime, it gradually weakened their economic development and initiatives.¹⁵

Immigration to Africa considerably increased with the spread of news in India about the prosperity of Indians in East Africa. This prompted Colonel Rigby to write in 1860 that the Indians kept virtually all shops in Zanzibar. Said Seyyid of Zanzibar, took control of the island by usurping the sovereignty of Muscat in 1806 and granted the Indians in East Africa, complete religious, social and economic freedom. He also used them in administration and finance service largely because the Arabs lacked the required skills and expertise. When John Kirk arrived at Zanzibar as the Political Agent of India (1866-1877), there were between five and six thousand Indians settled in the coastal towns and at the trade posts in the interior. Of these, about 3,660 came from British India or from the Indian state of Gujarat and the rest from other parts of the country. Majority of the Indian immigrants were Muslims belonging to the Khoja and Bohra communities. Unlike the Hindus who came without wives and children to earn a living and return to their homeland someday, the Muslims were real colonists for they brought their families with them and made East Africa their home. Kirk estimated the amount of British Indian capital invested in Zanzibar at no less than £1.6 million. About one-eighth of this amount had been advanced to the Arabs residing in Zanzibar. Apart from the Indian monopoly of trade and finance, the Indian rupee was the East African currency until the end of World War One.

Whereas Indians have settled in the East African coast for centuries, majority of the present Indian population in Africa is of recent growth. The heavy influx of Indians started after the abolition of slavery in the British Empire in 1833, especially at Natal and Transvaal in South Africa, to save the country's vast sugar plantations from total collapse. In East Africa, the Indian population, until the end of the 19th Century, consisted mainly of traders.

At the beginning of the construction of the Kenya-Uganda railway in 1897, over 25,000 technicians and labourers were brought from India by the British. However, more than 90% returned to India after the expiry of their contracts. New batches of professionals namely, doctors, lawyers, engineers and teachers from Gujarat and Punjab entered East Africa from early twentieth century. This is contrary to the mistaken belief that the present Indian population are mainly the descendants of the "coolies" employed during the construction of the railway.¹⁸

Following the construction of the railway, Indian traders spread along the new railway line into the interior. But even before the advent of the Uganda Railway, a few Indian traders penetrated the mainland and entrenched themselves there.¹⁹

Visram was perhaps the greatest individual in the economic history of East Africa. According to an early advertisement, he was a dealer in provisions, beads, piece-goods, copper and iron wires equipment of caravans, enamel ware, etc.

By 1904, his chain of stores and activities had extended from Dar es Salaam at the Tanzanian coast, to Hoima in Western Uganda, and from Zanzibar to Gondokoro. His services were recognized by the Kabaka of Buganda as well as the British East Africa Protectorate. He also acted as a banker advancing cash against cheques and at times issuing his own cheques. Although the Indians who followed Visram were not pioneers on the grand scale like him, they nevertheless played an important role in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (renamed Tanzania in 1964) by carrying trade enterprises into the remotest corners of these countries.²¹

Due to this historical connection between India and the east coast of Africa, a large Indian community had established itself in East Africa by the beginning of the twentieth century. Indians also began venturing into Mozambique and neighbouring countries of Central Africa. Indian settlement in Ethiopia, although small, is quite old. However, Indian settlement in West Africa was non-existent then due to difficult terrain, distance and general unfamiliarity.²²

The history of Indo-African relations is still at its nascent stage. A great deal of research needs to be undertaken from the valuable materials that are still lying untapped in India, Africa, the Arab world, and Europe.²³

It is important to observe that following the abolition of the slave trade in the British colonies in the early nineteenth century, Indian immigration as contracted labourers began. Slavery had been an inexhaustible source of very cheap unskilled labour in plantations owned by Europeans in the different parts of Africa. However, when this source dried up, the European colonizers were forced to look elsewhere, and India provided a fertile source of cheap "indentured" labour with the connivance of the British Government of India, especially in South Africa and Mauritius.²⁴

Indian immigrants, especially in East Africa, who in later times also comprised skilled and semi-skilled persons, assisted the British in opening up the country side and in providing middle-grade administrators. They also established shops, schools and hospitals. This according to some Indian scholars, was commendable because Indian immigration contributed to the development of East Africa, despite some occasional friction between them and Africans.²⁵ Other Indian scholars argue that Indians in East Africa have been handled as an oppressed group.²⁶ However, we contend here that during the colonial period and thereafter, Asian merchants have been part and parcel of the exploiting class in East Africa. By exploitation, we mean utilizing the capacity of various strata to accumulate money in the form of capital and not in the direct relation of surplus labour appropriate to surplus labour source. The other exploiters were the colonial state, the post colonial state and African merchant capitalists-cum-compradors and the rising “national” bourgeoisie.²⁷

The argument by Asian authors, like Delf that “the railway was the foundation of East African development, and without Indian labour it could not have been built...,” is not valid in that the railway actually contributed to the underdevelopment of Kenya and Uganda. This is because these countries’ natural resources were siphoned through the railway to metropolitan centers overseas. By playing the role of agents in the building of the railway, Indians contributed to this predicament. The railway was not in the interest of the African peasantry and working class in Kenya or Uganda; it was meant to serve the interests of British imperialism.²⁸

When the railway was completed, there was an urgent need by the British to stimulate trade along its route. The railway, therefore, encountered further settlement of the Kenya highlands by both European and Indian communities. However, in 1906, the British settlers began to campaign against Indian settlement in the highland areas most conducive for agriculture.²⁹ Indians were now competing with the British in the settlements of the highlands – competition developed into tension between them. The white settlers feared the settlement of Indians and their actual merchant role.

Hence, Indians too had a dream of colonizing Kenya. According to B.A Ogot, “it should, however, be emphasized that the Indians in Kenya were not the helpless and innocent victims of British imperialism, as many writers would want us to believe.”³⁰ The views of Bernarsidas Chaturvedi, a leader of the Greater India Movement, are representative of this Indian dream. He agitated for more Indians to be sent to East Africa which he termed as “India’s America”.³¹ As Ogot pointed out, “This was not just the dream of a fanatic.”³² Indeed, in Kenya itself, A.M. Jeevanjee, one of the Indian leaders, said in 1910 that he would go so far as to advocate the annexation of Kenya to the Indian empire.³³ Ogot further indicates that in 1921, the *East African Chronicles*, the official organ of the Indian Congress in Kenya at the time, published an article visualizing the future when Kenya would be Indian administered; that the Aga Khan himself had suggested that East Africa be set aside for Indian Colonization.³⁴ This, however, does not mean that India was an imperial power. Certain individuals in India wanted to annex Kenya under the umbrella of British Imperialism. Therefore, “Indian Colonization” has been used here adversely. If the Indians had finance capital of their own, like the British, they (Indians) would have colonized Kenya.³⁵

A clash between Indian interests and British imperialism became inevitable as both the British and the Indians wanted to “colonize” Kenya and chart its destiny accordingly. Questions arose whether Kenya’s “development” was to be used on European or Indian foundations. Therefore, this struggle between British imperialism and Indian interests for the control of Kenya constituted the so-called “India Question.”³⁷ In this struggle, British imperialism triumphed, and Indians therefore tried to ally themselves with the different fractions of Africa nationalists albeit for their own (Indian) interests.

British, Indian and African Politico-Economic Relations

In commerce, Indians were the masters. The British preferred them to man commerce because they had no political base. Africans had a political base and, therefore, they could challenge British imperialism. In effect, what happened was the racial structuring of Kenya’s economy. And as the colonial Governor wrote to the Secretary of state for the colonies in 1907, the white settlers were in no position to compete with the Indian shopkeepers for supply of provisions and articles in daily use or as petty traders.³⁸

Political representation was another source of struggle between the British and the Indians. Composed of six nominated official members and two nominated unofficial- all of them white, Kenya’s first Legislative Council met in 1907. The first Indian, A.M. Jeevanjee, was nominated in 1909. And as Delf observes, “The consensus returns of 1911 further increased Indian dissatisfaction when it was found out that there were 11,886 Indians as compared to a European population of 3,167.”³⁹

Political antagonism between Indians and Europeans continued until World War I. However, during the war, the rivalry somehow subsided. This was because the Indian soldiers had effectively participated in the war in East Africa on the side of the British.⁴⁰ After the war, the tense relations between the two resurfaced. A number of demobilized British officers settled in the highlands, further aggravating the settlers’ pressure. Tension increased when an economic commission appointed by the colonial authorities disparagingly referred to the Indian community.⁴¹

The Indian Government became increasingly involved in this Indian/European rivalry. In an apparent move to out do the British settlers, Kenyan Indians agitated for the transfer of Kenya to the control of India, arguing “ours is an Indian colony.” This aroused great resentment by the white settlers who called Indians all sorts of names such as, “visionaries”, “lovers of the line of least resistance”, etc.⁴² Indians were defeated because they were disorganized. In the 1920s, the colonial regime regarded African interests as paramount. What had happened? Indian merchants were taking away many resources from African peasants. Thus, African peasants were discouraged from increasing production of cash crops, thereby undermining British interests. So the British had to sacrifice Indians by promoting African cooperatives to market peasants’ produce. In other words, Indian interests were counter to British interests and hence, the clash of interest.

By 1939, the Indian population had grown to nearly 50,000. Due to colonial land laws, the majority of them centred in towns, controlling most of the retail trade. Meanwhile, the British monopolized the major export crops (coffee and sisal). Generally, Indians

were prosperous businessmen. R.C. Thurnwald has attributed their economic skills to the simplicity of their life, among other factors.⁴³

Indian success in business, however, did not benefit the African peasantry and working class as they sent a considerable proportion of their earnings back to India. For instance, "A teacher.....who earns 200 shillings sends 100 shillings home....."⁴⁴ Indeed, Indians did not have Kenya's interest at heart. To them, Kenya was just a place for accumulation of wealth which was to be invested not in Kenya, but either in India or in Britain and elsewhere. Hence, they were exploiting Kenya the same way as the British.⁴⁵ This partly explains why Indians did not mix with Africans, and most Africans did not admire them either. Indeed, to the African, "the Indian comes, gets money, and disappears with it, taking with him all the little urchins begot in the meantime."⁴⁶ Their transfer of money to India was not just due to strong family loyalty; they perceived that their future was not certain in Kenya. This perception was, perhaps, a valid one. Like all colonists, they had a thin line to walk. In the Kenyan economy, Indians occupied a position that was commensurate with their political and social status – roughly halfway between the European and African communities.

Between 1939 and 1962, there was a shift of power in the Kenyan political scene. Many Indians felt bitter toward the white settlers whom they regarded as obstacles to their aspirations. S.G. Amin expressed his feelings for settlement of Indians in the white highlands.⁴⁷ However, Indian anger did not make much impact on the colonial regime. It was the increasing strength of African nationalism, which manifested itself in the Mau Mau liberation war that erupted in 1952. During the Mau Mau war, twenty-nine Asians and ninety-five Europeans died.⁴⁸ However, the number of casualties might have been much higher. In effect, the liberation war was directed against the injustices committed against Kenya Africans by forces of foreign domination including Asians.⁴⁹ For many Asians, it was a difficult and dangerous time. They found themselves caught up in a crossfire of suspicion between the Africans and Europeans. African leaders constantly warned Asians that they obstructed African political advance at their own peril. Thus, the Asians, especially of the younger generation, had few alternatives but to support African nationalist demands. In 1956 after some hesitation, Asian members of the legislative council supported African majority demands.⁵⁰ Even after the rude rebuffs of 1959, when African leaders made it plain that Asian participation in their parties was an electoral liability, Asians continued to support the transfer of power to the Africans but not without misgiving.

The Asians' support of the African cause was not genuine. It was circumstantially forced on them. They still regarded themselves as aliens. In their political agitation, therefore, they expected to be granted a *primus inter pares* status. When such schemes failed, the Kenya Indian Congress withdrew from exerting collective influence in Kenya's political arena in 1962. One member complained that Indians were not in Kenya to disown their heritage and were not about to see the extinction of the Indian race in Kenya.⁵¹

Another one echoed the fear for many that the time was not far off when Indians would face discrimination, despite the fact that they were Indians and they would remain Indians in Kenya.⁵² Another one who tried to identify with Africans urged others to have confidence in the African leaders.⁵³

However, this does not suggest that the Africans were being racist; they only wanted to be their own masters in a multi-racial society without discrimination based on colour.⁵⁴

Indeed, before independence in Africa, racism characterized relations between Africans and non-Africans, whether white or non-white. Equally true was the fact that relations were based on class, that is, exploitation of the oppressed by the oppressors, irrespective of colour.

The situation was not different in South Africa where the early planters in the sugar plantations of Natal experienced immense difficulty in obtaining labour. The European colonizers, therefore, found it advantageous to employ Indian labour. Thus, India, which had already supplied labour to Mauritius in 1834 and to British Guyana in 1837 under the indenture, was the obvious source of such labour. During the economic depression, i.e. from 1866 to 1874, immigration was suspended, as the result of the American Civil War, only to resume in 1874. Thus, between 1874 and 1886, some 30,000 Indian workers entered Natal. In 1904, the total number of Indians in Natal amounted to 100,918, compared with a European population of 97,109. Their growing number in Transvaal forced the Transvaal legislature to curtail immigration of Indians into the Transvaal. This was done in 1907 when the new Transvaal legislature passed the Asiatic Law Amendment Act of 1907. With passive resistance, Mr. Mahatma Gandhi brought about compromise. However, neither Natal alone nor Transvaal alone could deal with a problem which concerned both the Imperial and Indian Governments.⁵⁵

Between 1919 and 1925, further legislative restrictions were effected. 1925 saw the Union Government introduce the Areas Reservation and Immigration Restriction Bill which was specifically directed against Indians. According to the Interior Minister, "the bill frankly states that the Indian race in this country is an alien element in the population; and that no solution of this question will be accepted to the country unless it results in a very considerable reduction of the Indian population".⁵⁶

Thus, whether in East Africa or South Africa, Indian settlers were not seen in positive light, especially with the surge of African nationalism. This prompted Jawaharlal Nehru to signal a warning as early as 1938. To him, Indians, to a certain extent, participated in exploiting East Africa, South Africa and other parts of Africa, although they also did a great deal of good work. However, by remaining in Africa, he cautioned that the interests of the people of Africa had to come first.⁵⁷

Right from the historical legacy, it is clear that Indo-African relations depended, among other things, on the following: behaviour of Indian settlers in Africa; their relations with Africans on the one hand; on the other hand, their relations with the European colonizers; India's long struggle for freedom; and the worldwide movement against imperialism, especially after the end of World War II.

Indo-African Relations, 1945-1965

The years after world war II saw India's prestige rise high in colonial Africa. This was for a number of reasons. For instance, among the colonies of Asia and Africa, only India had an unusually long and unbroken record of resistance against colonial rule. This earned greater responsibility as India approached the threshold of political independence.

The Gandhian techniques of mass movement impressed colonial people all over the world. Indian National Congress became the model for waging successful mass struggle among the African nationalists. They, in many cases, even adopted the nomenclature "congress" to identify their respective parties.⁵⁸ Reference to Mahatma Gandhi and his teachings were adopted by African nationalist leaders. According to Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana: "After months of studying Gandhi's policy and watching the effect it had, I began to see that, when backed by a strong political organization it could be the solution to the colonial problem."⁵⁹ Other leaders elsewhere in the colonial territories expressed similar views. Indeed, for sometime, it seemed that the Gandhian model would become an integral part of the African nationalist heritage.

Two things in post-independence India were significant to the African nationalists. First, the way in which the new Indian Government strove to secure the merger of the princely states into the Indian Union. Although nationalist sentiment among the people of these states generally facilitated the process of merger, occasionally, the government used force as in Hyderabad or Kashmir to secure the merger. However, what really struck the African nationalists, according to A. Gupta, was that instead of accepting the territorial divisions the British had left behind, the Indian leaders worked for and succeeded in redrawing the political map of India on a major scale.⁶⁰

At that time, the goal remained unrealized, and it was not until 1963, that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed, having gained inspiration from the Indian experience. Second, the policy of non-alignment which India adopted in order to avoid any military alliance with either of the power blocs in the Cold War and to assert its independence as a sovereign nation in global affairs. These two goals of non-alignment doctrine greatly impressed the African nationalists since it enabled a weak and economically underdeveloped country to maintain its autonomy in global affairs amid pressure from the two power blocs. The doctrine also facilitated an ex-colony in maintaining good relations with the metropolitan power without subordinating itself to it. Maintenance of good relations with the metropolitan power was important for the newly independent state, as a sudden disruption of ties could damage its economy. The decision of republican and non-aligned India to continue its membership of the British Commonwealth, therefore, shaped the diplomatic behaviour of the various newly independent Africa states. It was only Tanganyika's Julius Nyerere who declared in 1961, that his country would not join the Commonwealth, until South Africa left the organization. Otherwise, for non-alignment, no post-colonial state in Africa opted out of it. During the Cold War era, African nationalist leaders made it clear that however dependent on outside powers, their non-alignment would make no compromise whether in matters affecting their sovereignty or in matters relating to the colonial and racial domination of Africa.⁶¹

India's long struggle for federation and the worldwide movement against imperialism have, in historical perspective, been so intertwined that it would be difficult to extricate one from the other. Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharl Nehru and the entire Indian Nation considered Indian independence struggle to be part and parcel of a campaign to dismantle colonial shackles in Africa and Asia.⁶²

Nehru's feelings for the African cause touched the core of many a heart. He sought every occasion and every forum to fight side by side with the African Nationalists. Way back in 1938, in the presidential address at the conference of peace and empire held in London, he said that probably no people in the world had suffered so much as the Africans.⁶³ Another occasion chosen by Nehru to give vent to his feeling for Africa was during the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947. He said that India particularly had a special responsibility to the people of Africa and urged help for the African so that he could attain the rightful place in the human family.⁶⁴

Cautioning Indian settlers in Africa not to undermine the interest of Africans, Nehru said in early 1950 that Indians wanted to be friends with Africans. He discouraged any form of discrimination racial or otherwise.⁶⁵ He repeated this theme many times.⁶⁶

In addition, in 1955, at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Nehru returned to his favourite theme of ending colonialism in Africa.⁶⁷

On his own initiative, the South African racist regime was excluded from the Afro-Asian Conference. Instead, a delegation of African National Congress (ANC), made up of Moses Kotane and Maulvi Ismael Cachalia, was received as observers. This afforded them the opportunity to acquaint themselves with many Afro-Asian leaders, including Nehru when they met again during a stopover in Delhi on their way back home.⁶⁸

From the day of its independence, India under Nehru began to play a role of a crusader for peace and freedom. Nehru cultivated contacts with numerous leading freedom fighters from Africa who were then either studying in London or were based there. They included Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah, Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere, Obafemi Awolowo, Namdi Azikiwe and others.⁶⁹

Political development in Africa became of interest to the people and leaders of India during the early years of its independence. It was satisfying for them to note that Africa was on the move, despite imperialist onslaught on the people of Africa. The imperialists were resisting the forces of change. Whereas the colonized people of Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda and most of French colonies were matching peacefully towards independence, some African countries witnessed violent uprisings.

The Mau Mau liberation war in Kenya during the early and mid 1950s let loose a reign of terror by the British colonial regime. Violation of human and property rights by the British against Kenyan Africans was the order of the day. Also detained was Jomo Kenyatta, the charismatic Kenyan nationalist. Upon learning of his arrest and detention, Nehru was immensely perturbed. He sent two Indian lawyers to Nairobi to defend Kenyatta for his alleged complicity in the Mau Mau struggle. This act was a symbolic gesture of Indian solidarity with the struggling Kenyans.⁷²

During the Algerian war of Independence, as France was meeting its Waterloo in North Africa, Nehru permitted the National Liberation Front (FLN) to open its office in New Delhi, in addition to providing financial and material assistance to the FLN. India's advocacy of Algeria's rights for freedom in the UN, helped in forging Afro-Asian unity on this issue.⁷³

On March 12, 1962 Nehru welcomed the settlement between the FLN and the French government and told the Indian parliament that the Algerian struggle was an intensive one “unparalleled in history”, adding that the settlement was long hoped for.⁷⁴

Gamal Abdel Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956 brought about the tripartite aggression by Britain, France and Israel over Egypt. This aggression greatly angered Nehru who vehemently castigated the attack and supported Nasser government’s right to take over the canal. At the UN, Indian delegates took a lead in condemning the attack and asking the three belligerent nations to withdraw their forces. It was not until a UN police force was sent to the Canal Zone to enforce a cease-fire and replace British and French forces that Nehru felt satisfied.⁷⁵

Following Ghana’s independence from Britain on March 6, 1957, African students in Delhi assembled to celebrate the occasion. Addressing the students, Nehru expressed his happiness and declared that the independence of Ghana signified so much for Africa.

For Nehru, the emergence of Africa from colonial bondage was part of the continuum of Asian-African resurgence. He observed at a banquet in New Delhi held in honour of Kwame Nkrumah in December 1958, that the common background of colonial rule and common problems would “inevitably” bring the nations of Asia and Africa closer.⁷⁶

This was despite the different levels of “development” of these nations, a clearly deterministic position. All the same, Nehru’s personal commitment to Asian-African resurgence helped India to pledge its support to the Africans on two fronts: their anti-colonial struggle to achieve political independence and the struggle in South Africa to end racial domination by a white minority.⁷⁷

Nehru believed that the policy of racial discrimination as institutionalized by the South African government to subjugate the African politically and economically for the benefits of the white minority was repugnant to the conscience of humanity, violated the provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and was contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the UN. India’s struggle against apartheid, therefore, was an integral component of the wider struggle of the people of the world against all forms of oppression, domination, exploitation and discrimination.⁷⁸

India’s abhorrence of apartheid had been given expression even before the struggle for national independence. Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the Indian nation, had numerous unpleasant encounters with racists during his sojourn in South Africa and this was later a factor in his resolve to uproot imperialism from India.⁷⁹

In early 1946, the Indian Government raised in the UN, the problem of racial discrimination under Articles 10 and 14 of the UN Charter. It accused South Africa of violating the Charter and international law due to its racist ordinances targeted at Indian settlers.⁸⁰ Having failed to persuade the South African government to terminate its racial policy, the government of India, in 1946, recalled its high commissioner and severed trade relations with South Africa. This was before India attained full independence in 1947 and before any other country had even considered racism as an issue deserving condemnation. The severing of trade relations was a considerable sacrifice for India, because South Africa at the time accounted for 5% of its total export. This was, therefore, a time when as an emergent independent nation, India needed all the resources at its

command, especially foreign exchange, to reactivate its economy, which had till then been dominated by the colonialists. The mistreatment of Indians received in foreign lands agitated the minds of the Indian nationalists. Gandhi himself was drawn into active politics because he could hardly remain indifferent to the fate of his country men in the racially structured South African society.⁸¹ Indian nationalists of all persuasions, including the liberals and the militants, pledged their support to improving the status and conditions of Indians settled abroad.⁸²

October of 1946, saw the UN general assembly convene for the first time. India then introduced the issue of unjust treatment of Indians in south Africa.⁸³ During the session, the General Assembly, on India's insistence, passed a resolution declaring, "it is in the higher interest of humanity to put an immediate end to racial persecution and discrimination."⁸⁴

The decision by India to raise in the UN the question of Indian settlers in South Africa was, therefore, an extension of its earlier nationalist commitments. But having raised the issue, India soon recognized that opposition to racial discrimination could not remain limited to the issue of Indian origin alone, because in the final analysis, the whole issue rested on the human rights provision of the UN Charter. India, therefore, found it necessary to extend support to all groups and communities subjected to racial discrimination in South Africa.⁸⁵ This clearly meant a change in policy which was underscored in President Rajendra Prasad's address to parliament in 1952. According to him, the question was no longer merely one of Indians of South Africa. Rather, it had already assumed a greater and wider significance. It was a question of racial domination and racial intolerance. It was a question of the future of Africans more than that of Indians in South Africa.⁸⁶

Two years later, in 1954, the general assembly adopted two resolutions. The general assembly resolution 816 (IX) was adopted on November 4, 1954.⁸⁷ On the occasion, the general assembly recalled that at several sessions, it had considered the question of the treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa and had adopted resolutions on that subject.⁸⁸ It also recalled the report of the United Nations good offices commission.⁸⁹ The general assembly then proceeded to adopt five resolutions.⁹⁰

The second resolution, Resolution 820 (IX), which suggested to the government of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa that they should seek a solution of the question by direct negotiations, was adopted by the General Assembly on December 14th 1954.⁹¹ The General Assembly considered the second part of the UN commission on the racial situation in South Africa,⁹² having recalled General Assembly Resolution 103(1), which stated that it was in the highest interest of humanity to terminate racial persecution and discrimination, and resolutions 395 (V) and 511 (VI). It also recalled that the commission, in its first report, had concluded that the racial policies of South Africa were contrary to the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁹³ The General Assembly also noted, with apprehension, the adoption of new laws and regulations by the South African Government which, in the Commission's view, were also incompatible with the obligations of the government under the UN Charter. It further noted the profound conviction of the commission that the policy of apartheid constituted a grave threat to the peaceful relations between ethnic groups in the world.⁹⁴ Between 1946 and

1962, the UN general assembly passed twenty resolutions against the racist policies of South Africa. One resolution was also passed by the Security Council in April 1960.

March 21, 1960, had witnessed the Sharpeville massacre, when the South African police opened fire on a crowd of African people at Sharpeville near Johannesburg. The demonstrators were protesting peacefully against the racist pass laws when the police fired upon them, killing sixty-nine and wounding one hundred and seventy eight. Indeed, by 1960, following the Sharpeville massacre, the changed stand of India had come to be endorsed by the UN security Council's resolution recognizing that South Africa's apartheid policies, no longer the complaint of discrimination against Indians alone, "might endanger international peace and security."⁹⁵

The Sharpeville massacre drew reaction of shock, horror, anger and grief in India. In New Delhi, a public meeting was convened to mourn the victims. Addressing the meeting, Nehru compared the outrage to the Juliana Bagh tragedy in pre-independence India, in which the British soldiers massacred a peaceful gathering of citizens. He declared that in the same way the Jalianwala tragedy shook the edifice of British imperialism in India, the Sharpeville massacre would be a starting point in the struggle against racism in South Africa. Moving a resolution by Nehru himself, the Indian Parliament adopted the resolution condemning the massacre and extended its sympathy to the victims and to those who were suffering because of racial discrimination in their own homeland.⁹⁶

Previously, the Commonwealth did not consider domestic or bilateral issues at its various conferences. South Africa was also a member of the multiracial organization. However, after Sharpeville, there was strong resentment in India and in African member-states of the Commonwealth against South Africa's apartheid policies.⁹⁷ Indeed, India was happy when racist South Africa was expelled from the Commonwealth.

Determined to continue with its set course of racism, Pretoria defied the numerous requests, recommendations, admonitions and condemnations. As such, in 1962, a resolution was moved by thirty-four member-states of the UN, including India, deploring Pretoria's failure to comply with the UN resolution. The general assembly passed a resolution requesting member-states to take certain diplomatic and economic steps against the South African Government, to urge it to abandon its racist policies.⁹⁸

It is important to remember that India had recalled its High Commissioner from Pretoria in 1946, and the Indian mission was withdrawn in 1954. Until the 1962 resolution, India maintained some contact with Pretoria through its mission in London mainly to implement the various UN resolutions urging negotiations between the two countries on the question of treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa. In compliance with the provisions of the 1962 resolution, India severed this diplomatic contact too.⁹⁹

Further steps were taken against South Africa by India. Nehru instructed the Indian authorities concerned not to permit vessels flying the South African flag to land in Indian sea ports and to prohibit Indian ships from visiting South African ports. The general ban on trade with South Africa, which was in existence since 1946 and had been extended to cover South-West Africa (Namibia) since 1953, had exempted some items of cultural and religious interest to be sent through postal and other channels. Restrictions were now

placed on sending such literature by limiting it to a small number of specified categories. Additionally, the Indian Government informed the International Civil Aviation Organization that it would not allow aircraft registered in South Africa to land at Indian airports or to overfly India.¹⁰⁰

Interestingly, it was not its original involvement in South African affairs that shaped India's policies in regard to the anti-colonial and anti-racist movements in other parts of Africa. India realized that any step to protect the interest of the Indian communities in East Africa in particular, would be exploited by the racist-colonial elements to drive a wedge between the African nationalists and India. The fear was far from being unfounded. Already, Pretoria had started a campaign against New Delhi's "imperialist ambitions" in Africa. In 1954, at a press conference held in London, South Africa's High Commissioner in London had stated that "...if Nehru could weaken European influence in Africa, then it will mean Africa for the Indians."¹⁰¹

The white settlers in Kenya, taking the cue from South Africa, had cited the presence of Indian settlers in East Africa, which was larger than the Europeans, as an instance of India's future design to colonize Africa. In 1948, the Governor of Kenya had described Nehru as a "Hindu Communist", who was plotting to grab Tanganyika under the cloak of UN Trusteeship.¹⁰²

It is true that the sustained anti-Indian campaign by the colonists gradually soured relations between Africans and Indian communities. This is so, because Africans themselves had also formed their own opinion about the Asians as exploiters. The 1948-1949 riots in South Africa, Kenya and Uganda involving the two communities were partly because of the attitude towards Indians formed by Africans, although it is true that some Africans genuinely shared the European view that Indians were a "dirty, unscrupulous, and generally harmful" race.

Whatever the interpretation, Nehru decided to send Apa Pant as High Commissioner to Kenya. Pant carried Nehru's directive to pledge India's solidarity with the African cause, even if it meant abandoning the interest of the Indian settlers in East Africa. The notion of concentrating India's diplomatic effort in Kenya was because in its racial pattern, Kenya approximated the South African scenario. The White settlers in Kenya wanted by all means, to preserve Kenya as a "White man's Country." After South Africa, it was in Kenya that the anti-Indian campaign by the whites was most intense. This is not surprising because the interests of white and Indian settlers clashed, and so each wanted to undo the other., therefore, appeared to recognize that if the European design succeeded, Kenya would inevitably become an extension of South Africa, containing and intimidating the forces of African nationalism. For Africa, this would be disastrous. For India, there would be no security to the zone of peace it wanted to establish over the Indian Ocean.¹⁰³ Thus, as soon as he arrived in Nairobi, Apa Pant clearly stated that the Indian Government would support the African nationalists, even if some Indian settlers, would not. This position of the Indian Government was irrespective of the feeling of white settlers or the colonial regime in Kenya. Nehru established contacts with many African nationalists including Kenyatta. On the eve of his election as president of the Kenya African Union (KAU), in June 1947, Kenyatta dispatched a letter to Nehru with one of the members of a Kenya-African delegation to India. Nehru replied by pledging

not only India's support for the Kenyan struggle but also reminded the Indians in Kenya of the need to identify themselves with the Africans.¹⁰⁴

Although the subject of India's subsequent dispute with the colonial regime in Kenya and the recall of Apa Pant is outside the scope of this chapter, it was evidently Nehru's approach to Kenya that, together with his personal dislike for South Africa's apartheid policies, set the tone of New Delhi's general African policy.

The major ingredients of Nehru's policy were three-fold. First, an emphasis on decolonization and achievement of African majority rule. Second, opposition to racial domination in East, Central, and Southern Africa. Third, advice to Indian settlers to integrate themselves with the indigenous population.¹⁰⁵ The third ingredient of India's African policy was not heeded to by Indian settlers in Africa. Nehru refused to accept the claim that they were entitled by virtue of their origin to Indian protection. He instead announced in the Lok Sabha on September 15, 1953, that "they, that is, the Indians, could expect no help from us, no protection from us, if they seek any special rights in Africa which were not in the interests of Africa."¹⁰⁶

Regarding decolonization, on the other hand, India's policies were based on two premises. First, in their struggle to achieve independence, the Africans should follow the peaceful constitutional means. Second, the international balance of forces would force the colonial powers to wind up their empires in Africa. Both these premises stemmed from India's nationalist experience. Indeed, the Indian approach to decolonization was in sharp contrast with the one of China. In its support for the forces of national liberation else where, China emphasized two points. First, that armed struggle was an integral component of any nationalist movement. Second, that no ruling class ever voluntarily abandoned political power. In the subsequent years, especially after 1960, the Africans clearly perceived the divergence between the Indian and Chinese approaches.¹⁰⁷

Thus, in supporting the Africans, India cautioned them against resorting to violence. For instance, when the Mau Mau war erupted in October 1952, India's ruling Congress Party issued a resolution stating that the use of violence in the adoption of the method of violence by some African groups had greatly injured their cause.¹⁰⁸

The emphasis on the need to adhere to the peaceful constitutional means to political advance also influenced India's stand on the question of recognition of the Provisional Government of Algeria (GPRA). On this question, India adopted a legalistic stance: that the recognition of a Government in exile was contrary to international law.¹⁰⁹ This stand, ironically, was in line with that of the countries of the western bloc in which "India had seldom agreed on colonial matters." The Algerian question also widened the distance between India and the militant group of African states which came to be known as the Casablanca group.

As far as its attitude toward the colonial powers was concerned, India took a softer line towards the British than towards the French, the Belgians and the Portuguese. It was due to its ties with the Commonwealth that India assumed that Britain was more sincere than any other colonial power in working for the advance of the African countries towards self-government and independence. Vice President Radhakrishnan of India, during a state visit to East Africa in 1956, said that the British "had been more humane and civilized in

their methods in Africa than other colonial power”.¹¹⁰ This Anglo-centric view persuaded India to take a stand on some issues which were widely divergent from the majority stand of the Africans. For instance, India did not favour the fixing of a time-limit for colonial withdrawal from Africa.

The divergence became more pronounced on the Algerian issue and during the protracted Congolese crisis (1960-1963). The crisis in the Congo arose from a combination of factors. Within a month of achieving independence, on June 30, 1960, there was a rebellion in the armed forces. Then followed the secession of the richest province of Katanga. This prompted the intervention of the Belgian troops and challenges to the authority of Premier Lumumba’s Government which threw the entire state into chaos. Before this, India had no contacts with “sub-Saharan” French and Belgian territories, and, therefore, enunciated no special policies.¹¹² Originally, India was not all that enthusiastic about UN intervention in the Congo. However, having sent combat troops for the peace-keeping operations of the UN, India’s sole concern became one of saving the Congo from the involvement in its affairs by the great Powers and thereby salvaging the reputation of the world body. Reflecting on these developments, Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha: “Normally, we would have withdrawn them, that is, combat troops, but we have hesitated and we hesitate to do so because it would really mean the collapse of the UN work”.¹¹³

Nehru spelled out three specific objectives that India sought to achieve in Congo. The first objective was to secure the withdrawal of the Belgians from the Congo. The second one was to control the armed forces led by Colonel Mobutu. The third objective was to restore the Congolese Parliament. This involvement in Congolese affairs made it appear as if Nehru’s sympathies were not deep enough to prompt India to pledge its total support for Lumumba as demanded by members of the radical Casablanca group. India’s refusal to recognize the regime in Stanleyville that Gizenga had set up following Lumumba’s assassination further annoyed the Casablanca group. On the other hand, India’s involvement in the Congo drew the suspicion of the conservative Brazzaville (later Monrovia) group. Anti-Indian propaganda in the Western press, especially reports of the supposed “misdeeds” of the Indian troops in the Congo, aggravated their mistrust of India.¹¹⁴ In brief, whereas India’s refusal to recognize the GPRA of Algeria made it seem as though it had gone “soft” on the colonial issue, its involvement in the Congo made its intentions suspect in the eyes of both the radical and conservative African states. However, in reality, India had no special interest in the Congo, “beyond a concern for its insulation from foreign interference and a desire to extend, if possible, the zone of non-alignment”.¹¹⁵

The foregoing notwithstanding, the cold-blooded murder of Lumumba in 1960 greatly disturbed Nehru. An anguished Nehru warned the imperialists: “A dead Lumumba is far more powerful than a living Lumumba”, meaning that martyrs never die. Lumumba had himself prophesized thus: “You will be heroes but not when you are alive”. Nehru asked the UN to be firm in defending the sovereignty and integrity of the Congo and in defeating the attempts of the imperialists who wanted Katanga to secede.¹¹⁶

Addressing the UN General Assembly in 1960, Nehru blamed the Belgians who left the Congo in such a sorry state. He cited the long years of colonial rule that resulted in the

plunder of vast wealth from the Congo for the enrichment of the colonial power, while the people of the country remained poor and backward.¹¹⁷

At the request of the UN Secretary General, Nehru agreed to send Indian troops to strengthen the hands of the UN because he was keen on seeing a united Congo. However, he put across three conditions for India's agreement to send its troops. First, Indian troops had to function as a unit by themselves and were not to be mixed with others. Second, they were not to conflict with the forces of any UN member state other than the Belgian mercenaries. Third, in no way were they to be used against popular movements in the Congo. Within this framework, India succeeded in helping the restoration of the independence and integrity of the Congo and the eventual creation of conditions to terminate the agony of that country.¹¹⁸

India was one of the countries that argued for a maximal role for the UN force, after the assassination of Lumumba had demonstrated the inefficacy of a strictly non-interfering position. Indian troops became the backbone of the operations undertaken to end Katanga's secession and avert civil war. Throughout the period of political crisis in the Congo, the Government of India urged adherence to the legalities of a parliamentary government and a unitary state rather than support for particular personalities vying for power.¹¹⁹ India fully supported the Aduola government, and despite its earlier stun criticisms of Moïse Tshombe and Mobutu, it maintained relations with each of them during their premierships. Although India opened an embassy in Leopoldville (Kinshasa), in 1960, it had no special interest in that country beyond a concern for its insulation from foreign interference and a desire to extend, if possible, the frontiers of non-alignment.¹²⁰

India always considered Portuguese colonialism as the most primitive and uncivilized. This was so, having witnessed the worst savagery on its own soil in Goa. Nehru was, therefore, keen at removing the Portuguese pocket in Goa which he described as "an ugly pimple on the fair face of India." He realized after independence, that peaceful methods of non-cooperation would have no effect on Lisbon soon after the Portuguese troops started firing on peaceful protesters in Goa. Nehru's patience dried up and ordered Indian troops into Goa in December 1961. The use of force to liberate Goa, though minimal, was not quite in line with the Gandhian philosophy. However, Nehru's government clarified that it handled every situation on its own merit. The anti-imperialist forces, the world-over, were happy with Nehru's decision. The freedom fighters in Africa, especially from the Portuguese colonies, hailed it as a shot in their arm. The image of India as a champion of freedom rose in Africa and India's foreign policy was regarded by the Africans as being at its brightest. Solidarity between India and liberation movements in Africa from then on became the order of the day. Through its action in Goa, India had showered its blessings on the armed struggle being waged in many parts of Africa.¹²¹

Nehru affirmed India's right to military intervention in Goa three months before the liberation of Goa when he inaugurated an International Seminar on Portuguese Colonies held in New Delhi. He stated that India could not tolerate a foreign bridgehead on its coast as a foreign base, because Goa was a threat to India's security. He also spoke at length of the larger complex of the Portuguese and other colonial structures in the African continent. He paid tribute to the freedom fighters in Angola and Mozambique

saying that theirs was a vital struggle against Portuguese colonialism. He blamed some big powers for helping the Portuguese for Cold War purposes. Assuring the African people of Indian support, Nehru said: "so far as India is concerned, our thinking and emotions are with you and in so far as we can help, we shall help you in the task of coming out of the morass of colonial domination."¹²² And at the first Non-aligned Summit in Belgrade in September 1961, Nehru took up cudgels against Portugal. He castigated the massacres, genocide, and other inhuman acts bestowed on the people of Angola by Portugal.¹²³

In Rhodesia, Nehru watched the political drama with anguish. He was vehemently opposed to the notion of the Central African Federation even before its formation in 1953 and thereafter. This is because it was felt that it was an attempt to perpetuate apartheid and white minority rule. On many occasions, Nehru condemned this new phenomenon which was rearing its ugly head in Rhodesia as "settler colonialism."¹²⁴

When the Central African Federation was dissolved in 1963, paving the way for the independence of Malawi and Zambia on the basis of majority rule, India was happy. However, Britain was unwilling to decolonize Southern Rhodesia until some kind of accommodation could be arranged between the privileged whites and the deprived Africans. Smith rapidly moved to curb the activities of African nationalists and on November 11, 1965 he illegally seized power by declaring UDI. Although Britain meekly protested, it kept its eyes and ears closed and let Smith have his way.¹²⁵ But Nehru was no longer on the scene by the time of UDI. Nevertheless, from the very beginning up to its end, India regarded the Smith regime as illegal. Premier Shastri described UDI as a "serious development" on the day it was declared. Contending that UDI would pose a problem on the African continent, he said while addressing the Congress Parliamentary Party: "so far as India is concerned, we have made it clear that we will not recognize the Smith regime."¹²⁶ Indeed, India kept on pressing Britain to use force to terminate UDI.

May 1963 saw the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Nehru welcomed it as an event of international significance. He felt that this would not only boost the emerging African personality but would hasten the process of decolonization in Africa. He hailed the identification of the entire African continent with the non-aligned movement. He felt that Africa gave a numerical strength to the movement. This helped make it a powerful force in the UN.¹²⁷

By the end of the 1950s, India's global concerns seemed to extend beyond the limited horizon of Asian-Africanism. New Delhi's dominant place in the Asian-African movement as inaugurated by the Bandung conference was taken over by Cairo, which hosted the first Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference in 1957. The All-African Conference held after 1958 by-passed India altogether. During the Belgrade Conference, personal differences between Nehru and Nkrumah of Ghana sharply surfaced.¹²⁸

Regarding African matters, India's earlier zeal to contest imperialist dominance seemed to be on the decline. The business of cultivating close relations with the Africans was entirely left to the technical and diplomatic staff. Nehru himself became somehow unconcerned about the principles he had invoked for cementing relations among the countries of the Third World. He emphasized that India would not create or lead any

third bloc. In 1960, when it was suggested that India should join the Africans to fight Portuguese colonialism, Nehru remarked that liberation of Mozambique or Angola was an African problem.¹²⁹

During the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962, India's isolation from the Asia-African group stood clearly revealed. According to Jansen, "India-Prototype of the non-aligned was let down by the non-aligned countries....."¹³⁰ Only four African states, namely, Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Libya and Nigeria, gave diplomatic support to India. Others expressed "sympathy and concern."¹³¹

The defeat of India at the hands of China immensely undermined its position in world affairs. Many in the Asian-African world believed that India had been cut to a size that reflected its position as a power. According to them, India's military and economic possessions were not sufficient to enable it to act as a global power the way it had sought to do under Nehru.¹³² Besides, Nehru's own view of non-alignment suffered a powerful set back in the sense that the Sino-Indian conflict had proved that whereas non-alignment ensured equidistance from the two military blocs, it held no guarantee against military aggression by a member of either of them. At this time, China was a partner in the Communist bloc, and the nature and extent of its differences with the Soviet Union had not come into the open yet.¹³³

Following the border conflict, India re-framed its Africa policy on a different set of premises. Instead of supporting the nations of Africa as a bloc, which neither satisfied the radicals nor the conservatives, India became more selective. It cultivated close diplomatic economic relations with those countries which had stood by it during the crises. It pledged increased technical assistance to Ethiopia and Nigeria. In Ethiopia, where it had already established a military mission, Indian capital was channelled to construct a large source of Ethiopian imports. In East Africa, India concentrated its efforts on winning Kenya's good will. The Indian Government encouraged Indian industrialists to invest in the building of an industrial estate of twenty-two units in Nairobi. The policy of the Indian Government was motivated by three factors. First, the free economy of Kenya encouraged foreign investment. Second, in contrast with Tanzania, where China's influence was on the rise, Kenya was overtly anti-Chinese. Third, the large Indian community in Kenya was willing to place at India's disposal, the necessary assistance.¹³⁴

Thus, India's diplomacy in Africa became one of winning support from those who overtly showed suspicion of China. Later, especially after the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, India attempted to mobilize support against Pakistan.¹³⁵

In view of the growing friendship between Peking and Rawalpindi, India used its diplomacy to isolate its neighbours in the Asian-African bloc. As such, at a conference of Indian diplomats in Africa held in New Delhi in 1963, it was decided that India was to launch a full scale propaganda offensive in Africa against both China and Pakistan. During the year, a high-powered delegation led by Indira Gandhi visited several African countries for four reasons. First, to assess China's influence in, Africa. Second, to explain the factors behind India's reverses in the border war. Third, to assess the future of 420,000 people of Indian origin settled in Africa, who Indira Gandhi referred to as "Ambassadors of India." Fourth, to effect technical and economic collaboration with

African countries.¹³⁶ The report submitted to the government spelt out two definite conclusions. First, that Africa's new leaders were not pro-Chinese. Second that there was abundant good will for India, which ought to be cultivated.

Despite, this India continued to be obsessed with China's apparent increasing influence in Asia and Africa. This surfaced during the non-alignment conference in Cairo in October 1964. Premier Shastri tried to send a mission of representatives of non-aligned nations to Peking, but this immensely annoyed the African members.¹³⁷ At the preparatory meeting held in Djakarta for a second Bandung-type conference, India moved that both Malaysia and the Soviet Union should be invited to attend the conference as participants. The intention was to isolate and embarrass China.

However, 1965-1966 saw India determined to revive its original image as an anti-racial power. This became necessary so as to counteract China's propaganda that India had joined the camp of the imperialists. India also kept an eye on developments in southern Africa and it assisted the liberation movements there. It vigorously took up the Rhodesian issue in the UN after a brief period of vacillation. As a protest against Smith's illegal regime, it withdrew its mission from Salisbury five months before Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence UDI. Simultaneously, it began assisting the liberation movements through the OAU liberation committee whose headquarters were in Dar es Salaam.¹³⁸

Along side the diplomatic offensive, India earnestly sought to promote economic co-operation with African countries. From the early days of independence, Nehru felt that India's relations with the countries of Africa should further be strengthened through economic and technical co-operation. He often argued that co-operation among developing countries was a must for the gigantic effort to overcome poverty, hunger and underdevelopment. He was of the view that the complementarities obtaining in Indian and African economies presented a tremendous scope for mutually beneficial co-operation.¹³⁹

Nehru emphasized the fact that freedom is not just political independence, but includes economic welfare and social justice. According to him, independence can only be safe guarded through a strong economic base. Economic independence, he often said, has to be regarded as an urgent precondition for the success of an independent foreign policy. He underlined collective self-reliance among the developing countries as a positive strategy to deal with the developed world.¹⁴⁰

Nehru was the architect of India's economic and technical co-operation programme. Soon after India's independence, Jomo Kenyatta, wrote a personal letter to Nehru requesting him to provide facilities for education and technical training to students from Kenya. Nehru immediately drew up a schedule in this direction.¹⁴¹

In concrete terms, Nehru conceived economic co-operation with the countries of Africa in a broad three-tier set up, namely, balanced trade, joint ventures and. technical assistance. Although the base for fruitful cooperation is set by exchange of commodities and products, Nehru felt that international trade also played an important role in getting together countries which were geographically apart and creating in them a sense of belonging.¹⁴²

Joint ventures were set up in cooperation with African governments because of the official encouragement India gave to export of private capital and managerial expertise to the African countries. The notion was that the joint ventures would provide a market for India's capital goods. They would also help in the export of raw materials, semi-processed manufactures, spare parts, components, and so on. Another consideration was that they would earn foreign exchange in the form of dividends and royalties. They would also encourage goodwill and mutual co-operation between India and the countries in which investments were being made.¹⁴³

The second important aspect of India's economic approach to Africa was a slight shift in official attitude in favour of the Indian settlers. Because the people of Indian origin who settled in Africa were "Ambassadors of India", by 1964, the Indian Government had started seriously considering the possibility of bringing the Indians settled in Africa within the frame work of its policy goals in Africa. It, therefore, initiated negotiations with the Kenyan Government with the idea of founding the Africa-India Development Corporation (Africendo) with Kenyan Asians and Indian Capital. The corporation's long term objective was "to seek the integration of the Indian community, numbering about 150,000, in the economic life of Kenya, thus fortifying the foundations of a multi-racial society."¹⁴⁴ "The initiative was premised on the false assumption that once the Africans realized the contributions which the Asians were making to the economic reconstruction of Kenya, relations between the two races would improve. The Kenyan Asians were not willing to part with capital in the absence of political security because of the exodus that began with the passing of the British Immigration Bill in 1968."¹⁴⁵

Special relationships were also cultivated with other countries outside East Africa. The case in point is the relationship between Cairo and New Delhi. A structure of tangible co-operation was built by India and Egypt during and after the Suez Crisis in a way that no conference proclamations could possibly have accomplished. India's skilful presentation of the Egyptian case at the London meetings, together with its energetic efforts to reach a negotiated settlement and its unstinting support during the three-power (Britain, France and Israel) attack, were recognized by Cairo. Nasser's government turned to India to handle its relations with Britain and France when diplomatic ties with those two countries were severed. They were restored in 1958 and 1961, respectively. Egypt was one of the first countries with which India established a practice of balancing trade payments in domestic currencies during the 1960s. Egypt became the largest purchaser of Indian tea. The first excavating team ever sent abroad by the Indian archaeological department was to a pre-historic Nubian site near Aswan.¹⁴⁶

India assisted in the training of Egyptian Air force personnel, and in 1964, the two countries agreed to collaborate on the production of supersonic combat aircraft.¹⁴⁷ New Delhi supported Cairo's position that the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran were territorial waters of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and, therefore, the consent of those states was necessary to all navigation in those waters.¹⁴⁸ Via a succession of state visits commencing in 1955 and at tripartite conferences with President Tito, Nehru and Nasser cultivated a personal understanding and regards that brought equal benefits to both sides. Lacking a Western support and cautious of a too deep involvement with the communist states, Egypt relied on India's prestige and support for its own independent foreign policy and its standing in world affairs. It courted India's pro-Arab stance on the issue of

Palestine. On the other hand, India gained the goodwill of the largest Arab state and thereby undermined any Pakistani plans to promote a pan-Islamic bloc hostile to India. At the time of the Chinese invasion of 1962, Egypt demonstrated a more active concern for the withdrawal of Chinese forces than any other state in Africa. It remained neutral in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 and on the Kashmir issue in general.¹⁴⁹

New Delhi also demonstrated sympathy for the Sudan. Controlled by an Anglo-Egyptian condominium from 1899, the Sudan was given the option of independence under an Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1953. The elections held that November were supervised by an international commission chaired by an Indian, Sukumar Sen. After its independence in 1955, in the face of deteriorating relations with its northern neighbour, the Sudan turned to India for technical and professional personnel to assist in its development. Relations developed along mutually beneficial lines with Nehru praising Sudan's efforts at bridging the Arab and African worlds together during his visit in 1957, and President Abraham Abboud supporting India's secular approach to the Kashmir problem when he toured India in 1964. Sudan was India's largest supplier of long staple cotton.¹⁵⁰

It was with Ethiopia that India enjoyed perhaps the most intimate relations in continental Africa. In Ethiopia, Indian troops had assisted in the defeat of the fascist Italian forces of occupation during World War II. Due to Ethiopia's long history of Independence and the high prestige of Emperor Haile Selassie, a relationship of psychological equality and mutual respect was facilitated. Following the adoption of the use of English in 1948, Ethiopia applied to India as an English-speaking but non-western, non-aligned country, for the much needed technicians and teachers. Indian officers were also asked to organize and staff the Ethiopian military academy at Harrar. However, the importance of India's military mission sharply diminished after Washington was invited to assist Ethiopia's defences in 1958. Unlike many African leaders, but in concert with Nehru, Haile Selassie followed a moderate line on anti-colonialism and an univitiolic non-alignment. During the 1960s, India became the third largest source of Ethiopian imports but purchased little in return. Haile Selassie firmly supported India's case against China in 1962 as well as the Indian stand on Kashmir. Through careful diplomacy, India's friendship with Ethiopia was not allowed to deteriorate by a developing relationship with Somalia, to which deputations of Indian medical and technical personnel were being sent by the mid 1960s.¹⁵¹

Because of its size and potential, Nigeria was singled out by a number of foreign offices, including that of India, as the country which could exercise the most profound and moderate influence on Africa. Although the position of Ghana was also appreciated in New Delhi, the mercurial temperament of Kwame Nkrumah prevented a fruition of relations between the two governments.¹⁵² Nigeria was the only "sub-Saharan" African country visited by Nehru in September 1962, although he failed to establish a rapport with Premier Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. In the absence of any traditional ties, other than the Commonwealth, and in the wake of serious internal problems faced by Nigeria, the two countries remained in an exploratory stage of their relationship throughout the mid 1960s, although they took similar positions in the UN on such matters as the Congo and disarmament. On request, Indian economic professional and military advisers were sent to Nigeria. The vast distance and heavy freight charges, coupled with the fact that India

needed a few Nigerian commodities such as palm oil, frustrated their mutual desire to extend trade relations. A heavy balance that favoured India's exports of cotton textiles and jute goods remained.¹⁵³

In as far as the great Islamic bloc from Afghanistan to Morocco was concerned, India sought to secure goodwill even where contacts were low keyed and maintained a studied department from the intra-regional rivalries of which Egypt was often a protagonist. In North Africa, as expected, India supported Tunisian complaints against France over the Bizerte incident of 1958. Indo-Tunisian trade increased after the conclusion of bilateral trade agreement of 1960. To Morocco's claim of neighbouring Mauritania, India extended tacit support by refraining from recognition of Mauritania independence until after that country was accepted as a member of the UN.¹⁵⁴ Such was the picture of Indian diplomacy during Nehru's premiership. It can be reiterated that Nehru had managed to cultivate warm political and economic relations with numerous African countries.

Thus the sudden death in New Delhi on May 2, 1964, of premier Nehru, was widely mourned in Africa and other parts of the world. African leaders paid glowing tribute to Nehru's support for the freedom struggle in Africa and his unceasing fight for the cause of world peace. Several African countries also sent special envoys to New Delhi to either participate in Nehru's funeral or offer condolences to the government of India and Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi.

The people of Egypt received the news with profound shock. President Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered one week of national mourning. He said that although Nehru's death was a "great loss to humanity, his flame lighting the way for humanity will continue to burn brilliantly".¹⁵⁵

The news of Nehru's sudden death came as a deep shock to the people of East Africa where he had been a household name for decades. It was regarded as the passing of an era in the annals of the freedom struggle in Asia and Africa. All flags in Kenya were flown at half mast. The Hindustani service of the voice of Kenya, which started playing mourning tunes, was inundated with condolences from all parts of Kenya and individuals and associations.¹⁵⁶

May 28, 1964, saw Kenyatta lead his entire team of ministers in procession to the Indian High Commission where they signed the book of condolence on Nehru's death. Prior to that, they observed a minute's silence in the Prime Minister's office. At a public meeting, Governor – General Malcolm Macdonald reflected the feeling of the assembly when he said: "The whole world sees the flame of Jawaharlal Nehru's life extinguished."¹⁵⁷

In his tribute to Nehru, Kenyatta described him as a great statesman and a very humane man; a friend of all who needed him, and a true follower in the footsteps of an immortal Gandhi.¹⁵⁸

In the Tanzanian capital, Dar es Salaam, flags flew at half-mast on all Government buildings. A stream of callers, including Premier Julius Nyerere, flocked at the Indian High Commission to offer their condolences. President Nkrumah of Ghana, in a broadcast, paid tribute to Nehru saying that rarely had the qualities of wisdom, courage, humanity and great learning found such perfect fusion and expression in one individual

as they did in Pandit Nehru. Nkrumah further observed that Nehru's voice was heard in the councils of the world in defence of freedom and the dignity of humans.¹⁵⁹

In Uganda, the Uganda National Assembly adjourned on May 27, 1964, as a mark of respect to Nehru after the members of Government and Opposition parties had paid glowing tributes to him. Premier A. Milton Obote asked the members to stand in silence for two minutes in memory of "a great statesman who had been a great believer in the parliamentary and constitutional system." Flags were flown at half mast. May 28 was declared a day of national mourning and all government offices were closed. The Prime Minister appealed to federal and district governments and private firms to follow the Central Government's lead. On behalf of the Opposition, Gaspar Oda said that Nehru's death was a loss not only to India but to the whole world. Oda stated that Nehru was a devoted nationalist who fought for the emancipation and freedom of all subject nations, adding "His name will shine with golden letters as a great statesman who was working not only for India but for the cause of the whole world."¹⁶⁰

Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, the then Nigerian Premier, in a telegram to President Radhakrishnan, recalled Nehru's visit to Nigeria in 1962. He said that Nigerians would always remember Nehru's "shining qualities of wisdom, simplicity and humility as well as his deep understanding of human problems. We shall miss his wise counsel in the comity of nations and especially in the Commonwealth."¹⁶¹ In Kaduna, northern Nigeria, the Regional Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello said that in the death of Nehru, "India has lost a father."¹⁶²

In 1965, the Indian Government instituted an award as a tribute to the memory of Nehru for his life-long dedication to the cause of peace and international understanding. The coveted Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding was bestowed on four illustrious sons of Africa as a sign of India's respect for the political leaders of Africa. The recipients were former Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, former Tanzanian President, the late Julius Nyerere, the late president Leopold Senghor of Senegal and former president Nelson Mandela of South Africa.¹⁶³ Let us now turn our attention to some aspects of politico-diplomatic relations between India and Africa.

Indo-African Politico-Diplomatic Relations Since 1965

By 1965, two developments can be identified for the understanding of politico-diplomatic relations between the Indian sub-continent and the African continent. First, India as a beacon of decolonization in Africa, as one of the founders of the NAM, and crusader for Afro-Asian resurgence, had been let down during the Indo-Chinese war by the very people whose cause it had always championed. The situation for India became more worrying when it observed that African countries that belonged to non-aligned and professed groups were ready to accept Chinese claims and versions regarding China's border disputes with India. India, therefore, found it necessary to review its relations with African countries vis-à-vis non-alignment.¹⁶⁴ Hence, India adopted a planned policy of long term objectives in Africa which was to be executed with sincerity and consistence. In the politico-diplomatic realm, there were several departures from Nehru's Africa policy. These included the prominence India gave to its differences with China and Pakistan in its interactions with Africa, a selective approach of friendship towards those

countries which were hostile to China, and the attempt to integrate the Indian Settlers in Africa into India's Policy Framework in Africa.

Second, by 1965, most of the African countries had attained independence and, therefore, politico-diplomatic relations between India and Africa from that time onward was one between two independent and sovereign peoples. This period witnessed a complete change in the state of subsequent Indo-African relations. From a position of utter diplomatic failures, chaos and isolation, India overcame its problems in diplomatic and political fields and established ever growing relations with African countries.¹⁶⁶ An analysis of this period helps us understand the relative role of diplomacy in global politics, the identification of causes and styles, and the convergence and accommodation of interests in befriending each other. Additionally, this provides a clue of the trend in which India is proceeding in its relations with Africa today.

Following the Chinese aggression of 1962, India and African countries met in the Third Plenary Assembly of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) at Moshi in Tanganyika between 4th and 10th, February, 1963. Although AAPSO was a non-governmental organization, all countries took it seriously and it witnessed the diplomatic acrobatics of different countries which was just an extension of their respective governments' policies. India was represented by two Congress MPs. They, without delay, presented their proposal calling the Conference to approve the "Colombo Proposal" for settling the conflict without reservation. They revealed that Indians would, if necessary, quit the AAPSO altogether if the resolution was not passed. However, the Chinese objected to it very strongly, wondering why 'family' quarrels were brought up when there was a much more important business of chasing imperialists out of Africa at hand.¹⁶⁷ Africans accepted the Chinese position, the Political Committee ruled against the Indian proposal, and Indians walked out in disgust. The Chinese carried the day and the final resolution did not contain the Indian proposal.¹⁶⁸

The Sino-Soviet dispute had already surfaced by this time. In any Afro-Asian meeting or in any other international meeting, the diplomacy of the Chinese and of the Soviets was always to gain diplomatic support of the other countries against each other. In Afro-Asian meetings, India was in the Soviet faction, trying to counter all Chinese moves as much as possible. Like the Moshi meeting of February 1963, the conference of AAPSO Executive Committee at Nicosia in Cyprus, held in September 1963, was dominated by Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian disputes. During this conference, African delegates, many of whom had supported the Chinese delegates at Moshi, now switched over to the Soviet camp. They could not understand the Chinese attacks on Test Ban Treaty, which they had enthusiastically approved. In the same vein, they were not willing to blindly accept the fury of Chinese onslaught on the Soviet Union, which they felt was endangering the solidarity of Afro-Asian Movement in which Africa had come to lead. According to Nkrumah, in his message to the conference: "it should be our concern that this conference appeals to China and Soviet Union most strongly to eliminate their differences and to come together without any delay. Afro-Asian solidarity should also not lose its anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist force".¹⁶⁹

Thus, at the Havana meeting of Solidarity Conference of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, on January 3, 1966, all delegates proclaimed solidarity. However, it was

the Indian resolution on 'peaceful co-existence', placed in the political committee, that brought all the inner diplomacy into play. The Indian proposal was vehemently opposed by the Chinese. This is because the wordings of the resolution were written as to put the Chinese at the receiving end.¹⁷⁰

The Chinese rejected any mention of the word 'co-existence'. They, therefore, absolutely refused to accept the final conference declaration if it included that term. What was still Basutoland and South West Africa (later renamed Malawi and Namibia respectively), were among the African countries that supported the Chinese throughout. India was backed by Chile, Mauritius, the United Arab Republic (UAR) and others. Although the impasse seemed to be complete, no more was India to be ignored or to lie low. Cuba, anxious for the success of the conference, sought a way by means of compromise. The Cubans proposed that the Indian resolution be amended, so that it become a separate resolution instead of becoming part of the General Declaration as the Indians had wanted. Although the Chinese opposed this proposal when it was put to vote, it was accepted by thirty one votes to nine. Indian diplomacy succeeded by obtaining the support of all Arab delegates (except Oman) and some Africans, by promising to support UAR claims for establishing a permanent secretariat in Cairo for this kind of meeting. China's diplomatic failure was apparent but worse for them was still to follow. In 1967, in an AAPSO Council meeting of Nicosia, the Chinese and their supporters walked out from it after the majority voted to rescind the previous decisions to hold the following AAPSO plenary in Peking. The ouster of China from such a militant body as AAPSO was a huge success for Indian diplomacy. Although the major contributory reason for it was the Sino-Soviet split, Indian diplomacy exploited this split to the best possible extent against its adversary. Equally vital was the aggressive posture of friendship which India adopted towards African countries and the association with which went a long way in giving India its legitimate position in global affairs.¹⁷¹

Although the priority of Indian diplomacy, until the late 1960s, was to counter Chinese influence in Africa and make reliable friends with African countries, India was determined to develop strong economic relations with African Countries. This helped India in meeting its political priorities in its Africa policy. However, the economic consideration was not minimal. The relatively higher level of India's development and umbrella of South cooperation under NAM gave India incentives in economic fields to fulfil its political end. The other area where Indian policy change was noticeable was Indian support to liberation struggle in Africa. From mid 1960s, India became more overt and militant in its support to African freedom struggle.¹⁷²

By the first half of the 1970s, India had made numerous outstanding achievements at the domestic front. These achievements injected self-confidence in it. 1971 saw India win the Bangladesh war despite the combined threat of Pakistan, China and the US. The liberation of Bangladesh by India and its subsequent war with Pakistan retrieved much of the ground that India had lost in 1962. Militarily, India demonstrated how effectively and efficiently it had reinforced, reorganized and strengthened its armed forces. Indian diplomacy scored victory at this stage when it obtained the support of one Super Power against the other by the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971, thereby keeping intact, India's status as a non-aligned country. Ironically, the threat posed by Washington helped India rehabilitate its image as an anti-imperialist power. Premier Indira Gandhi made it a

point from this time onward, to suggest that certain diabolical forces, aided and abetted by the imperialist powers, without mentioning them, has been threatening India's Security. This facilitated centralization of power in its hands. Both domestically and externally, India was able to project itself as a powerful leader, as one who was unafraid of any outside power.¹⁷³

India's prestige received a further boost with the detonation of its first atomic bomb in 1974. Although from a purely military point of view, the explosion of a single bomb carried little meaning, it nevertheless indicated the magnitude of India's progress in the scientific and technological areas. Overnight, the country became a member of the prestigious nuclear club. The launching of Aryabhata satellite also placed India among the few privileged countries.¹⁷⁴

This period saw a shift in the global balance of forces which also favoured India. The Vietnam war had virtually exhausted American capacity to intervene in other parts of the world. This explains why the US Seventh Fleet appeared in the Bay of Bengal but there was no follow-up action to check the entry of Indian troops into Dacca. China also seemed unwilling to get entangled in the affairs of South Asia. After initial support, China left Rawalpindi to its own devices. On the other hand, the Soviets seemed ready to help India under the provisions of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971.¹⁷⁵

These developments had a direct bearing on Indo-African politico-diplomatic relations. Henceforth, Indian policy and diplomacy towards Africa became more positive. For instance, India again became a power to turn to for help and assistance. During this period, Indian diplomacy changed its priority. In Africa, India's major concern was to foster economic cooperation under the umbrella of South-South cooperation. In order to develop and promote South-South Cooperation, India utilized all its diplomatic strengths under international fora like the UN, NAM, 'Group of 77', etc.¹⁷⁶

By mid 1970s, the China factor that had obsessed India, was no more. Indeed, there was a decline in the influence of China which had once loomed over Africa, a revolutionary spectre. In its incessant quarrels with the Soviet Union, China often struck postures that embarrassed even its friends in Africa. Eventually, on the Angolan issue, China sided with those very forces that were widely believed to have received help from racist South Africa or the CIA, making 1974 China's unlucky year in Africa.¹⁷⁷

Premier Gandhi, in contrast, took a personal interest in cultivating good relations with the African Liberation Movements on a new footing. During the Lusaka and Algiers conference, she spent considerable time getting in touch with African leaders from the Portuguese and settler-dominated territories. Addressing a meeting of Indian diplomats in 1973, Gandhi urged them to make the Africans aware of the negative forces of imperialism. Unlike her father, Gandhi was not willing to repeat the mistake of deferring decision on disputed matters. As such, when the nationalists of Guinea-Bissau established a Government in exile, she immediately granted it recognition, thereby disregarding the issue as to whether such a government was legally or illegally constituted. In the same vein, as the Angolan civil war proceeded, dividing the OAU into rival camps, her government announced in the Indian Parliament, its decision to recognize the MPLA Government in Luanda.¹⁷⁸

The most suitable field for the study of Indo-African diplomacy is the NAM, where both India and Africa have had a free play of diplomatic and policy projections directed towards each other, in contrast to organizations like the UN and the Commonwealth, where their maximum effort was to act in union vis-à-vis developed countries. The idea here is to examine the operational styles, response and effectiveness when Indian policy interacted with Africa.

After the policy modification of the mid 1960s, the first Summit of NAM was the Lusaka Summit of 1970. Between the Lusaka Summit of 1970 and the New Delhi summit of 1983, the major running issues in these summits were three. First, the changing concepts of NAM. Second, support to national liberation struggles. Third, the case of South-South cooperation. The question related to the definition and purpose of NAM had always surfaced in one way or another. During the Cairo summit, the difference between India and Africa was on NAM's priority, that is, peaceful co-existence or national liberation. As far as India was concerned, NAM as a movement, equidistant from super powers' rivalry, "was the main source of its power,"¹⁷⁹ However, "the power derived from non-alignment existed only in relation to those states whose peculiar interests were attacked when that posture was assumed by another state."¹⁸⁰ This is why India adhered to its earlier philosophy for NAM. In operation, it accepted and encouraged economic dimension, although it did not change from the position which was very close to provide the peculiar gain which India was having in that position.

In 1964 in Cairo, when the tone was of militancy, India did not change its stand. In 1970 at the Lusaka Summit, most of the militant leaders such as Nkrumah, Ben Bella and Nasser, etc, who had vigorously championed the case of military liberation struggles, were absent. The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa had already toned down the appeal for armed struggle. The manifesto emphasized peaceful and non-violent change as a method of liberating the oppressed African majority. But the issue was not left untouched. African concern for liberation struggle had its impact in the Final Declaration. Although it stated that there was no need to redefine NAM, there were nuances of these leaders' perceptions in the final charter. It no longer defined non-alignment as an "irreplaceable instrument for solution of contemporary world and establishment of international relations based upon principles of active and peaceful co-existence" but rather as "an integral part of the changes in the present structure of international community in its entirety, and production of anti-colonialist revolution."¹⁸¹ In 1973, at the Algiers Summit, Cuba again floated the opinion that as NAM was anti-colonial and anti-imperialist, the Soviet Union was its natural ally. This change in the definition of NAM was based on different elements. In spite of India's reservation, in Economic Declaration, it observed that détente was no longer sought by non-aligned nations, "as it did not have any beneficial effect on developing countries and international cooperation".

In 1976, at the Colombo Summit, the Cuban thesis of "natural ally" was rejected. It was at the Havana Summit of 1979, that controversy over the concept of natural ally became very sharp. M. Moustapha, the Foreign Minister of Senegal, accused Castro of exploiting his position as a host "to favour his interest and his political opinion."¹⁸² However, it was President Nyerere of Tanzania who restored the balance. He doubted whether the movement had permanent enemies and permanent friends, let alone natural ones and

warned that natural alliance between non-alignment and the Soviet bloc would make the movement “cease to be an influence on the world and fall apart.” India helped in preparing the final draft which was a compromise but it underlined the primacy of the unity of the movement. The major thrust and focus of non-alignment shifted to the cause of economic cooperation. In the changed circumstances of the 1980s, NAM’s earlier relevance for India had given way to a more tangible concept of South-South cooperation in economic matters. At the New Delhi Summit of 1983, this issue was the first item of the Agenda as well as in the Final Declaration. In the earlier successive summits, India had yielded here and there to make a dent on more relevant and useful concept of South-South economic cooperation.¹⁸³

Regarding the issue of India’s support to African liberation struggles during successive NAM summits, India had joined its African friends and others in protest against South Africa’s minority regime and colonial rule. At the Lusaka Summit of 1970, out of six major resolutions, three were on apartheid, arms supplies to Portugal and Zimbabwe, in addition to general resolution on decolonization. It proposed that economic and diplomatic relations with South Africa be terminated. India had broken its diplomatic relations and imposed economic sanctions against South Africa way back in 1946. As for Portugal, it had announced, after the Goa action, that it would not resume its diplomatic ties unless Portuguese colonies in Africa regained their freedom. At the 1976 Non-aligned Summit of Colombo, it pledged “increasing practical support to liberation movements, since any delay in effective action is bound to encourage the minority racist regime in South Africa to precipitate wider conflicts and resort to massive violence.”¹⁸⁴ The Delhi summit of NAM condemned US policy of “constructive engagement” aimed at countering the international campaign for the total isolation of South Africa. It noted that the persistent effort of the apartheid regime to acquire nuclear weapons was yet another indication of its determination to maintain its dominance of the majority Africans in South Africa and its neighbours. India accorded full diplomatic recognition to South West Africa People Organisation (SWAPO) representatives at New Delhi on April 19, 1985, while commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of SWAPO at an extraordinary meeting of NAM in New Delhi. This was done at a time when South Africa had announced the establishment of a puppet interim government in Namibia. The meeting also committed all possible diplomatic, military and material support, emphasizing the need for greater political as well as “more tangible material assistance” to SWAPO.¹⁸⁵

Thus, an uncompromising champion of freedom and an ardent opponent of colonialism and racialism, India felt that to resort to armed struggle for liberation was a genuine cause, which received the Indian Government’s moral and material support. Premier Rajiv Gandhi, speaking on the occasion of Africa Day, in 1986, said: “we are honoured to have with us on Africa Day one of Africa’s bravest freedom fighters: Sam Nujoma. He personifies the qualities for which the African struggle has earned renown throughout the world, unflinching courage and unwavering commitment, dedication, endurance, discipline and the will to victory.”¹⁸⁶

The economic front saw Africans start questioning the rationale of dependent development. This was so, by the early 1970s. The increasing realization for the need of South-South cooperation both in India and Africa, for their own separate reasons, got articulated in various conferences. It was at the 1970 Lusaka Summit of NAM that both

Africans and Indians underlined the need for its implementation. The resolutions on non-alignment and Economic Progress were separated from fourteen other resolutions of the conference, which for the first time, dealt with a working programme and preliminary negotiations among non-aligned nations. As host, president Kenneth Kaunda emphasized the need for economic unity. He said: "we must move non-alignment with what critics consider mere political and idle rhetoric. We must work out and agree on common action to give substance to the movement not only in political field but in the economic and technical fields which will add to our unity and strength."¹⁸⁷ Nyerere raised the hope of developing countries in developing through the ideas of developed countries. He emphasized that, "for in seeking to overcome our poverty, we each inevitably run the risks of being sucked into the orbit of one or other of the Great Powers." He added "it is through these questions of trade and aid that our actions in world affairs can be influenced, if not be controlled." He, therefore, urged the Lusaka Conference to consider "the question of how we can strengthen Non-alignment by economic cooperation."¹⁸⁸ At the same conference, Premier Indira Gandhi elaborated in details, the potential areas and logic behind South-South cooperation. Assuring the conference, she said, "if we decide, and I hope we shall, India will be glad to play her modest part."¹⁸⁹

The economic diplomacy, which supported the political imperatives of the 1960s, became primary by the early 1970s and political diplomacy started encouraging and supporting it under the umbrella of NAM and South-South cooperation. The then Minister of External Affairs, explained India's new policy shift during the early 1970s, said in the Lok Sabha on April 25, 1972: "...our Heads of Mission have also been told that they have to keep watch over the economic needs of the countries of their accreditation... they should act like commercial salesmen on behalf of a private firm and they should not consider this work as inferior or below their dignity."¹⁹⁰

The ever growing industries and the need to balance trade kept Indian economic diplomacy on the forefront of its foreign policy. Nevertheless, in Africa even during the early 1970s, the response for cooperation under the umbrella of South-South Cooperation was not encouraging. This was for three reasons. First, it happened because the African hope of capitalist aided development was not entirely discarded. Second, India's offer of technological cooperation based on intermediate range technology and unlike western aid, without significant financial support, did not appeal to the new leaders of Africa who were impatient to achieve rapid economic and industrial development. Third, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Asian question in East Africa adversely affected economic relations between India and Africa. The expulsion of Asians from Uganda in late 1972 convincingly brought to the fore the complimentary aspects of Asia's economic role in African countries.¹⁹¹ Despite this, some of the African leaders had started appreciating the cause of South-South cooperation within their countries as against providing rhetorical complements to this concept in international fora.

The 1973 NAM Summit of Algiers had reaffirmed the resolve for South-South Cooperation. The 1973 oil crisis and the realization of the failure of the first development decade, that is, 1960-1970, prompted the summit to adopt the economic issue with vigour and detail. In 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution on the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The major milestone in the policy of Africa regarding South-South cooperation was the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action by the

OAU in its extraordinary session at Lagos on April 28-29, 1980. It was a collective African expression of Africa's inclination and resolve for collective self-regional economic cooperation among African countries and greater economic linkages with other developing countries, including India, which were "more developed among the developing nations."

The UN was another place in which India and Africa worked closely on matters of interest to the international community, during this period, especially on subjects which related to freedom and peace. The similarity of views was astonishing, much to the discomfort of some western countries. During the three years of India's chairmanship of NAM, that is, from 1983 to 1986, Indian representatives at the UN saw to it that NAM and the Africa group kept up the regular process of consultations at all levels. This became an important factor in the functioning of the UN system so much to the advantage of the developing countries. India clearly saw that the numerical strength of the OAU, which was almost one-third the strength of the UN, gave so much prestige and importance to Africa.¹⁹²

The Africa group at the UN showed remarkable unity on matters relating to southern Africa. The issue of racism united all the countries in Africa as no other single issue did. It was to India's liking when it saw the Africa group at the UN presenting texts of possible positions, which served as the basis of the non-aligned declarations and resolutions.¹⁹³

The mood in Africa around the time of the New Delhi NAM summit was one of anger against Washington. President Reagan had, just prior to the summit, described South Africa as a "friend and ally". An aroused Africa group insisted on a stronger language in the resolution on southern Africa submitted to the summit. This suited the Indian and non-aligned strategy.¹⁹⁴

In its politico-diplomatic relations with Africa, India's respect for African leaders is evident from the fact that four African leaders have been honoured with the coveted Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding as was mentioned earlier in this chapter.

President Kaunda, while receiving the award on January 25, 1975, called upon Third World countries to work more closely to meet the international economic crisis and to further the aims and objectives of sovereignty and freedom of nations in a genuinely interdependent and peaceful world. He said, "The grave crisis of our times requires the vision, wisdom, courage and determination of a Jawaharlal Nehru."¹⁹⁵ In turn, Premier Indira Gandhi hailed Kaunda as a freedom fighter and a compassionate human being who became a tireless champion of African unity and freedom and lent moral and material support to the liberation movements of Africa.¹⁹⁶ In other words, Kaunda was praised for having suffered at the hands of the colonial rulers; for his relentless fight for the freedom of his people; and for his adherence to non-violence and universal freedom.¹⁹⁷

The 1973 Nehru Award was presented to President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania at a glittering ceremony in New Delhi, on January 17, 1976. The three-years' delay of the presentation was because it was not possible for the Tanzanian president to visit New Delhi earlier.¹⁹⁸ In a brief address before delivering the citation, premier Indira Gandhi

acknowledged that Nyerere had played a role in the formation of her own personality as she had known him as a friend, a friend of her father and as one whose understanding of world problems was a lesson to all.¹⁹⁹ In the citation itself, she described President Nyerere as a man of vision, a man of action and a man of compassion who would like to light a candle on top of Mount Kilimanjaro to bring hope and faith to those in despair.²⁰⁰

While presenting the award, president Zail Singh said that Nyerere was one of the outstanding leaders of resurgent Africa and one of the foremost champions of human rights. He described Nyerere as an eminent fighter against colonialism and as a staunch champion of Afro-Asian unity and cooperation who deserved to be honoured with an award instituted in the name of a great emancipator of mankind.²⁰¹

After receiving the award and while addressing the gathering, Nyerere called for the establishment of a new world order based on international justice, which he said was the only way towards greater equality of humankind. Emphasizing the basic unity of humankind, he said that the working of the economic system created by humans has caused exploitation of some by others. This had led to gross inequalities in the world, economic, political and social, which had to be rectified. The first step in this direction, he observed, was a deliberate transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor nations and a series of changes in the world finance and exchange system. This had to be coupled with the development of respect for the humanity of the individual, both nationally and internationally. He said that the first responsibility of the poor nations was to arouse and channel the power of their people to further their own development and not the profit of the few.²⁰²

Nyerere condemned racialism in all its forms, and suggested that the only way to eliminate it from the mind of humans was to challenge its organized state expression. He urged the nations of the world to unite and take positive action to defeat the tyranny base on race as it was a challenge to all humankind. He recommended the total rejection of colonialism as a system of political organization. President Nyerere received a standing ovation from the audience as he concluded his hour long speech with the words: "our path lies... through the development of all human beings regardless of race, colour, culture or creed."²⁰³

Nelson Mandela was honoured with the Nehru award for the year 1979. This was in recognition of his fight against oppression and racial prejudice. The year 1979 had been designated by the UN as "Anti-apartheid Year" and thus Mandela was the right choice for the Nehru Award. India hoped that Mandela would be released so that he could go to New Delhi to receive the award, or else New Delhi was keen to welcome his wife, Winnie. However, due to the non-cooperation of the racists in Pretoria, ANC President, Oliver Tambo, travelled to India to participate in the award-giving ceremony on November 14, 1980. President Sanjeeva Reddy, while presenting the award said: "The conferment of the award is a reiteration of India's unflinching support to the African people in their fight against apartheid, racialism and colonialism". Opening his speech at the ceremony, Tambo observed that "the vast majority of the people of South Africa regard this day in New Delhi as a national occasion for them." Premier Indira Gandhi on her part said: "Mandela is with us in spirit as is my father."²⁰⁴

The 1982 Jawaharlal Nehru Award was conferred on Leopold Sedar Senghor, former Senegalese president, on December 12, 1984, in New Delhi. Conferring the award, president Zail Singh recalled the rich contribution made by Senghor: "A great supporter of national independence and international cooperation based on mutual respect and tolerance, he has spoken consistently and in an unwavering voice, for freedom, racial equality, African unity, world peace and international cooperation."²⁰⁵

Honouring Senghor at the award ceremony, the citation stated that the world community owed a special debt of gratitude to Senghor. He had enriched human life with the magic of his words, the enchantment of his insights and the magnitude of his visions. Receiving the Award, the late Senghor said: "The jury of the Jawaharlal Nehru Award has honoured me by bestowing on me this coveted award. I have appreciated this all the more because my teachers at Sorbonne had taught me to admire Indian civilization when I was a student."²⁰⁷

Since 1965, at the official diplomatic level, India has rapidly established and expanded diplomatic, commercial and consular relations with post-colonial African states. Twenty-four resident Indian missions were, over the years, established in the following countries in their alphabetical order: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libya, Madagasca, Somalia, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Non-resident Indian missions covered twenty-two countries in their alphabetical order: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Swaziland, Togo and Upper Volta.²⁰⁸ In the same vein, seventeen countries, namely: Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.²⁰⁹

The number of visits of Indian leaders to Africa and of African leaders to India, have been impressive. More importantly, these visits not only enabled the leaders to discuss matters of mutual interest, but also demonstrated India's unwavering interest in peace and progress of African countries. Throughout these visits, India also underlined its traditional interest in Africa's major political cause, namely, the eradication of the remaining vestiges of colonialism and racialism. Thus, as with Nehru, the sudden and most unexpected death of Premier Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984, was received with profound shock in Africa and the entire international community. There were several reactions from African leaders.

President Q.K.J. Masire of Botswana said: "the death of Her Excellency Indira Gandhi had deprived the world of a great stateswoman and a champion of peace. Indira Gandhi will be particularly remembered for her work and close cooperation with the Commonwealth and the non-aligned movement. It is unfortunate that great leaders lose their lives prematurely."²¹⁰

President Albert Rene said that the death of Mrs Gandhi constituted a heavy loss of not only to the people of India but to all peace-loving peoples of the world and progressive humankind. He added that Mrs Gandhi would be remembered for her relentless endeavours in achieving a new international economic order, détente, disarmament and world-wide peace.²¹¹

President Nyerere of Tanzania said that Tanzania recognized her as a friend of Africa as well as a devoted supporter of the liberation of Africa from colonialism and racism. Nyerere also acknowledged her contribution to the struggle of the Third World for justice and peace, among many other significant contributions world-wide.²¹²

President A. Milton Obote of Uganda said that Mrs Gandhi was not only the leader of the largest democracy in the world, but was also the elected leader of the struggling people in the non-aligned movement. He further observed that Mrs. Gandhi was an outstanding lady who was one of the greatest leaders in modern time.²¹³ These reactions from African leaders reaffirm the cordial politico-diplomatic relations that have existed between the Indian sub-continent and the African continent. They demonstrate an appreciation of the role of Indian leaders in the prosperity and progress of Africa.

Indo-African Economic-Diplomatic Relations Since 1965

In the later 1960s, Indian diplomacy in Africa emphasized the cultivation of economic relationships. Although Africa is a natural trading area for India, both Africa and India were long divided into separate regions of European market control. The continuing imperialist monopoly over the infrastructure of trade, namely, shipping lines, banking and insurance, trade routes and patterns of trade-hampered the emergence of new economic relationships once European political rule had been eliminated. However, the intention to expand trade and enter into economic cooperation was expressed in every joint communiqué issued by the Indian leaders and the leaders of African countries. Although tangible steps lagged behind intentions, Indian trade agreements charted a course of future expansion of the commerce, and Indian business delegations explored possibilities for industrial collaboration such as in the sugar industry of Uganda.²¹⁴ In Africa, New Delhi realized that any growth of trade would have to transcend the mere commercial exchange of goods and involve participation in economic development. However, India's low level of economic performance rendered its aid programmes a disappointment compared to Western assistance or even to the Chinese modest effort.²¹⁵ Despite strong competition from the more developed countries of western Europe and North America, India's trade with Africa showed an upward trend in the 1960s.²¹⁶

Thus, India's approach of economic assistance to Africa has been guided by a desire to appear as a friend and ally and not as an exploiter; determinedly shunning the temptation to participate in what Nyerere has called the "second scramble for Africa."²¹⁷

A new economic dimension in Indo-African relations was acquired from the mid 1960s onwards. Although India had trade and commercial ties with Africa, during Nehru's time, economic relations continued but without special attention. Nevertheless, by the mid 1960s, a new economic element was not only added, but cultivated by India in its African policy with deliberate attempts for gains, in the context of South-South Cooperation.

During the mid 1960s, with the attainment of political independence by many African states, the crystallization of NAM and India's own desire and compulsion to cooperate were put on a new plane. India began following a policy of long-term objectives in Africa. The policy aimed at the creation and consolidation of stronger economic bonds

among the countries of the South with the help of India's relative economic strength for the development of these countries on a mutually beneficial basis.

The 1964 summit of NAM had, in line with the OAU's determination to "provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation among all states", started injecting self-confidence among the newly independent states. Thus, the Cairo Declaration decided to coordinate and concert its effort with the OAU "with a view to safeguarding their joint interest in economic, social and cultural development and in international cooperation."²¹⁸ In this way, Indo-African relations acquired a conceptual umbrella of NAM for economic cooperation. The "Group of 77" forum for developing countries, was formed in 1964. India actively participated in its formation. This forum was to examine major international economic issues being discussed under the framework of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The group also had the mandate of speaking with one voice vis-à-vis the entire developed countries.²¹⁹ Unfortunately, the 1962 Chinese invasion of India had humbled the Indian position in the Third World, NAM more generally, and particularly in Africa in the wake of the Indo-Chinese war. Due to its large economic support to Third World countries, China gained enormous influence there.²²⁰ This was in contrast to India's largely rhetorical and moral support to these countries.

India was, therefore, forced to reorient and step up its economic diplomacy. Thus, following the November 1963 New Delhi gathering of Heads of Indian Missions in Africa and West Asia, the Indian Government decided "to provide technical and economic assistance to other developing countries to the maximum extent possible within the limits of financial and manpower resources."²²¹ As had already been mentioned in this chapter, in 1963, a high power delegation led by Indira Gandhi visited several African countries to assess Chinese influence in Africa. The other reason for the visit was to explore the possibility of effecting technical and social cooperation with those countries. The delegation recommended that there was abundant goodwill for India which could be utilized. A follow-up action was taken by the Indian Government. Major plans were drawn and approved by the Cabinet on September 15, 1964.²²³ The need for forging economic linkages and economic cooperation among developing countries, was for the first time, systematically realized. The need for "a cooperation effort by developing countries themselves on the other,"²²⁴ was also emphasized.

These considerations and imperatives were the bedrock upon which New Delhi launched its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC programme). With this, India joined the group of aid-donors in the Third World. The ITEC programme enabled India to counter the Chinese aid diplomacy in the socialist countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America.²²⁵

This broader regional and international perspective put Africa under the policy goals of Indian economic diplomacy. Indian economic initiative in Africa was multi-pronged. The selective approach of friendship was adopted. Countries like Ethiopia which had supported India during the Indo-Chinese War, received Indian capital to construct large scale textile mills, even at the expense of affecting Indian textile export. Indeed, the 1960s saw India become the third largest source of Ethiopia's imports.²²⁶ Countries like Kenya, which were anti-Chinese but did not openly support India in the 1962 War,

received Indian industrialists who invested in the building of an industrial estate of twenty-two units in Nairobi to win the good will of the Government of Kenya.²²⁷

Most of the technical and economic assistance went to Kenya and Ethiopia. To counter Indian influence in eastern Africa, China extended assistance to Somalia in the 1963-64 period, when Somalia had border disputes with Ethiopia and Kenya. In 1964-65, India allotted Rs. 2,600,000/- for instance to Somalia. This amount was more than doubled in 1965-66.²²⁸

The allotment of loans was another factor in India's economic diplomacy. After 1962, Africa had a large share in the granting of loans. By 1966-67, five African countries, namely Ghana, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda and two Asian countries, namely Nepal and Sri Lanka, received loan offers amounting to 285,000,000/- in form of Indian goods.²²⁹

Joint venture was another component of Indian economic diplomacy. Indian share comprised capital investment in the form of Indian personnel and machinery. The first joint venture ever established by India was in 1958, in Ethiopia. The 1958-63 period saw only six joint ventures established by India in the entire Third World countries. However, under the new economic diplomacy, in 1964, twelve new proposals were approved. In 1965, fifteen were approved and in 1966, additional twelve were approved. Besides the economic gains, the policy aim was to establish strong links with Third World Countries. This was meant to demonstrate Indian participation in their endeavours for development.²³⁰

In 1969, New Delhi announced guidelines for Indian collaborators. The notion was to distinguish India from developed countries' multinationals and not to create any impression of domination over the host country's industry. Similarly, the idea was to avoid creating domestic problems for local government or industry.²³¹

Although the driving force for Indian economic initiatives in Africa during the mid 1960s was political, it was in itself a beneficial drive that was used for political urgency. This element of economic gain, based on India's relative economic strength, enabled India to keep on pursuing its economic diplomatic goal along with its ideological commitment to NAM and Afro-Asian resurgence in Africa. By the late 1960s, African response was not very strong for the call of South-South cooperation. This was because of the then prevalent belief that massive injection of capital from developed countries to Africa would lead to success like the Marshall Plan.²³²

As has already been observed, by early 1970s, Africans started questioning the wisdom of dependent development. The increasing realization for the need of South-South cooperation both in India and Africa, for their own separate reasons, got articulated in various conferences. It was at the Lusaka NAM summit of 1970 that both Africa and India underlined the need for its implementation. The resolutions "On Non-Alignment and Economic Progress" were separated from the other fourteen resolutions, which for the first time, dealt with a working programme and a preliminary negotiation among non-aligned nations. Nyerere, speaking at the conference, pointed to the unfounded hope of developing countries in developing through the ideas of developed countries. He emphasized that; "in seeking to overcome our poverty, we each inevitably run the risk of

being sucked into the orbit of one or other of the Great Powers, adding, "it is through these questions of trade and aid that our action in world affairs can be influenced, if not be controlled." Nyerere, therefore, asked the Lusaka conference to consider "the question of how we can strengthen non-alignment by economic cooperation".²³³ Premier Indira Gandhi, on the other hand, assured the conference that "if we decide and, I hope we shall, India will be glad to play her modest part."²³⁴ She emphasized in her address, the spirit of mutual cooperation. Thus, India considered South-South Cooperation and collective self reliance among the developing countries as a positive strategy to deal with the developed countries from a position of strength and confidence in its pursuit of North-South dialogue.²³⁵

In the aftermath of the Bangladesh War of 1971, the detonation of the atomic bomb in 1974 and the ouster of the Chinese from the African scene, political imperatives of economic diplomacy began in the wake of the Indo-Chinese War of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, subsided. Nevertheless, the economic gains from the past economic offensive were increasing and it always had a brighter prospect in the Third World. It suffices to observe that the economic diplomacy that supported the political imperative in the 1960s, became primary by the early 1970s. Political diplomacy began to encourage and support it under the umbrella of NAM and South-South cooperation.²³⁶

Assessing the result of economic diplomacy, the Minister for External Affairs told Parliament on April 23, 1973, that "there is a growing awareness among people of Asia and Africa about the competence and stability of this country to be provider of technical know-how and expertise."²³⁷

In Africa, even during the early 1970s, the response for cooperation under the umbrella of South-South cooperation was not encouraging although the ever-growing industries and the need to balance trade kept Indian economic diplomacy on the forefront of its foreign policy. This was for three reason. First, the African hope of West aided development was not completely abandoned. Second, India's offer of technological cooperation based on intermediate range technology and unlike western aid, without significant financial support, did not appeal to the new African leaders, who wanted to achieve rapid economic and industrial development without further delay. Third, throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, the Asian question in East Africa adversely influenced Indo-African economic relations. The expulsion of Asians from Uganda by President Idi Amin in 1972, convincingly brought to the surface the complimentary aspects of the economic role of Asians in Africa.²³⁸ Despite this, some African leaders had started appreciating the cause of South-South cooperation within their countries as against providing rhetorical complements to this concept in international fora. For instance, while speaking at the Kenya Institute of Management in 1972, Mwai Kibaki, the then Minister of Finance in the Kenyatta Government, said "it was time that poorer nations realized that unless they took measures in the right direction to improve things for themselves, they would for a long time remain the victims of big power decisions."²³⁹

In the western market, the demand for the products of African Countries continued to fall. This was as a result of a combination of factors like invention of substitutes, more efficient use of resources and lower growth in population. Western countries, suffering under the recessionary pressure, which began during the 1970s, increased their

protectionist measures. This action in turn resulted in growing market rigidity, declining soft aid prospect and mounting debt burdens for most African Countries. The realization by Africa then was that under such situations, concerted action through technical and economic cooperation among the countries of the south was imperative. It was in this regard that the Non-aligned summit of Algiers in 1973, reaffirmed the resolve for South-South Cooperation.

Thus, at the inauguration of the non-aligned inter-regional programme of cooperation in Georgetown, Guyana, on September 13, 1974, President Nyerere called upon Third World countries to seek India's economic cooperation and technical assistance for meeting their needs. He also urged poor countries to help each other, observing that "the real economic partners of the poor are the other poor", adding in a question form, however that: "despite the fact that India had made great strides in the manufacture of simpler type of capital equipment, do any of us investigate whether our wants can be met from that country before we place an order in Europe or America?"²⁴⁰ Nyerere, a well known advocate of economic cooperation between India and Africa, made the call for African Countries to look to India for economic cooperation because he realized that there were similarities of socio-economic conditions and cooperation which were mutually beneficial.

Three years later, in July 1977, during his visit to India, the Tanzanian Finance Minister argued that the solution of the problem lay in cooperation among developing countries.²⁴¹ The principal milestone in African policy regarding South-South cooperation was the adoption of the Lagos plan of action by the OAU in its extraordinary session at Lagos on April 28 1980.²⁴² It was, therefore, the collective African expression of their inclination and resolve for collective self-reliance. The plan emphasized the need to find ways of restricting or neutralizing the dominating influence in Africa of the developed countries. It sought intra-regional economic cooperation among themselves and greater economic linkages with other developing countries. The determination by African countries to pull out of the economic chaos encouraged and propelled India to promote cooperation with African countries at bilateral and multilateral levels. India's desire to cooperate with Africa took a positive dimension because its experience in planned development was relevant to Africa.²⁴³

Thus, there existed a strong desire both on the part of India and Africa for adopting South-South cooperation. Indeed, India took the initiative in sponsoring economic cooperation as an integral programme among the non-aligned countries and in helping to build the Group of 77 within UNCTAD. Essentially, India conceived economic cooperation with African countries in a broad four-tie set up, namely, balanced trade, joint ventures, technical assistance and consultancy.

Exchange of commodities and products form the basis of meaningful cooperation. However, international trade also plays an important role in assembling countries geographically apart and creating in them a sense of belonging.²⁴⁴ India's trade relations with Africa varies in terms of region and intensity. This is because Africa is a vast continent comprising over fifty countries. No doubt, Africa is endowed with enormous riches in mineral resources and agricultural products.

Until the early 1970s, Indo-Africa trade was mainly in traditional items. India's export, non-traditional items, that is, manufactured or semi-processed, value added items, were below fifty percent but imports from Africa during the same period were mainly of primary goods. The structure of India's export to Africa nevertheless changed from the mid 1970s onwards. In other words, the non-traditional items, namely, engineering goods, iron and steel and chemical and allied products (including pharmaceuticals and cosmetics) have occupied the place of traditional items like, jute manufacture, textiles and clothing from the beginning of the 1970s. Engineering goods have been the leading items in India's exports to Africa. Exports of engineering goods increased from Rs. 34 crores in the 1970/71 fiscal year to Rs.172 crores in the 1982/83 fiscal year. India's export of chemical and other related products including pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, showed continuous increase from the 1970/71 fiscal year to the 1980/81 fiscal year. Most African countries do not have established industry for pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. Indeed, eighty to ninety percent of requirements are imported from western countries. Indian products match the quality and packaging of those from the West. This, therefore, means that there is enough potential for developing and diversifying Indian pharmaceuticals and cosmetics to countries like Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.²⁴⁵

The traditional export items include tea, spices, cotton manufactures, cotton yarn, thread, and clothing. These are leading items in Indian export. The share of cotton yarn, thread and related materials that had shown declining trend after the 1977/78 period, picked up well and transactions worth Rs. 67 crores were carried out by India during the 1980/81 fiscal year as against Rs. 14 crores during the 1978/79 period. This occurred because India was successful in finding new African market for this category of goods in countries like Benin (Dahomey), Liberia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles and Swaziland.

Indian export neither reflects Indian progress and its capacity, nor the demand pattern of Africa. Only four groups of commodities constitute about four/fifths of Indian exports. These are engineering goods, tea, cotton manufacturers and chemicals. India is a major supplier of engineering goods to Africa, right from nut bolts to electrical and electronic goods. But even in this sector where India can easily compete with other countries, Indian share in African market is between two and three percent.²⁴⁶

From African countries, India imports the following: raw cashewnuts, non-ferrous metal (such as copper, zinc and lead), pearls, semi-precious stones; rock phosphate, dyeing, tanning and colouring materials. However, raw cotton and cashew nuts started disappearing from Indian imports list from 1978 onwards. This is because these items have been increasingly processed in the producing countries like Egypt, Kenya and Tanzania. On the other hand, New Delhi's imports of non-ferrous metals increased throughout the 1970s. That notwithstanding, there has been a shift in composition of imports from Africa. Raw materials and primary goods apart, many other items are featuring in New Delhi's import list. These include Aluminium, non-metallic mineral manufactures, electric and non-electric machinery and certain types of food stuff and vegetables from Kenya; oil seeds, nut kernels and cocoa from Nigeria and Kenya; phosphoric acid and fertilizers from Morocco, alcohol and phenone from Libya and some

petroleum products from Algeria. Although in terms of value and volume they are very small, an inroad has been made in importing value added products.²⁴⁷

The foregoing analysis demonstrates that commodity pattern of Indo-African trade has changed since the early 1970s. Between 1970/71 and 1980/81, the export of non-traditional items (in value term), made an increase of 423 percent. In contrast, traditional items rose by 86 percent. Percentage-wise, where as non-traditional items were 48 percent in the 1970/71 fiscal year of the total of Indian export to Africa, during the 1980/81 fiscal year, they constituted 72 percent.²⁴⁸ The implication of this is that Africa still remains a supplier of raw materials for the Indian market.

This apart, although Indo-African commercial ties are age-old and significant, endeavours have been made towards increasing mutually beneficial trade links, much more needs to be done. Trade figures hardly approximate any relationship with either the needs or requirements of Africa or the capacity and capability of India. Thus, India's share of exports to Africa is only about four percent of its total exports and of imports from Africa are less than two percent.²⁴⁹

Thus, Indo-African trade has been at a low level. Apparently, India has not fully tapped the African markets. This is because import items can easily be supplied by India. On the other hand, many African countries have yet to fully study India's potential hence the need to fill the communication gap.²⁵⁰

Another reason is that many African countries are severely short of foreign exchange, and India is offering commercial credits although on a modest scale due to its paucity of resources. The credit terms are soft, bearing an interest of five percent in most cases. They are designed to enable African countries buy goods and services from India. However, many African countries have not utilized the credits offered by New Delhi. Ironically, the major short falls have been in countries like Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, the countries that most need the credits.²⁵¹

The low level of Indo-African trade also has to do with infrastructural problems. The irregular and delayed shipping services have been affecting Indian delivery schedules. These, too, have been tarnishing India's image as a prompt supplier. Heavy freight and high insurance rate also hamper India's export competitiveness.²⁵² Intermediaries are also responsible. Indian importers prefer to buy African diamonds from Belgium, Zambian and Zairian Copper from London Metal Exchange, to getting them directly from producer countries. This dominance of marketing agency is due to their erstwhile colonial linkages that have been cultivated among the elite of African society.

Another factor in the low level of Indo-African trade has to do with the disorganization and weakness of Indian missions, particularly the commercial wing.²⁵³ The visits of Indian trade delegations to these countries have been very infrequent and poorly planned. The products selected for display are not always chosen in accordance with the requirement of the countries concerned. In the same vein, India has not taken enough trouble to acquire proper knowledge of non-English speaking countries or to present its image in a proper way. The cumulative effects of all these have been to widen the information gap.

Whereas trade is recognized as an important link in the economic cooperation programme, India also recognized the need for cooperation with the friendly countries in the realm of establishing joint ventures and sponsoring programmes of joint collaboration. Joint ventures help to secure developing countries much needed capital resources and technical know-how for their industrialization. This kind of arrangement among developing countries makes them partners in progress. Indian participation in the joint ventures covers a wide and exciting spectrum, including paper and pulp, machine tools, tractor assembly, electric fans, steel furniture, razor blades, chemicals, textiles, glass products, cement, soft drinks, auto parts, diesel sets, jute goods, garments, etc.²⁵⁵

The first joint venture India established was in 1958 in Ethiopia. After the initiation of the ITEC programme in 1964 with a view to sharing India's technical expertise with other developing countries, New Delhi adopted a more positive policy. 1964 saw an Indian good will mission visit Africa. It reported that, "we must actively participate in setting up joint industrial ventures in as large measures as possible."²⁵⁶ By 1985, there were a total of 44 Indian joint ventures in Africa. Out of this, twenty-five were in operation and nineteen under implementation. However, in Africa, Indian joint ventures are confined to only ten countries. Moreover, this number is much less than Indian joint ventures in Asia.²⁵⁷ Although Botswana, Egypt, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Uganda and Zambia are the beneficiaries, Kenya and Nigeria alone have 80 percent of the total operational Indian joint ventures in Africa.

The dominant motive in these collaborative arrangements is to share the knowledge which India possesses in the realm of industrial technology, with the idea of helping other developing countries. However, Indian partners in these collaboration projects do not normally have majority participation: they are minority partners. Their contribution to equity capital is in terms of supply of capital equipment and know-how. The basic idea of the terms of the agreements is that the collaboration arrangement should not smack of anything even remotely suggestive of any kind of exploitation. The management of these projects is supposed to fall in the hands of local partners. As such, training of local labour is an essential part of the agreement.²⁵⁸

We can observe that Indian technology which is of the intermediate type, involving more labour and less capital, is relatively well suited to Africa, where capital is scarce and labour, both unskilled and skilled, is abundant. The labour-intensive technology, which New Delhi offers through joint ventures, is not necessarily the slowest cost of technology; it only enjoys comparative cost advantage at a low volume of production needed by most, if not, all developing countries.²⁵⁹

No doubt, joint ventures have played a major role in stepping up the theme of two-way cooperation, thereby paving the way for the much-desired self-reliant industrial development. India is mainly motivated by the desire to share its experience of development. The offer of collaboration from a developing country like India, which has a relatively strong industrial and infrastructure base, and which has the largest reservoir of technical and scientific talent, meets the varied needs of the developing countries and acts as an alternative source of transfer of technology.²⁶⁰

Technical co-operation also characterises Indo-African economic relations. Indeed, as early as 1949, when India was still struggling with the birth pangs of freedom, it

instituted a modest scholarship scheme for African youth to study in India. The first lot of students numbered fifty-three. Since then, thousands went to India to pursue their studies in the various fields and in the various institutions of higher learning. Some of Africa's best officers in the armed forces have also been trained in Indian defence establishments and academies.²⁶¹

The major forms of technical assistance are providing training in India, deploying experts abroad for short or long terms, underwriting feasibility and techno-economic studies, financing the visits of economic delegates both ways; organizing technical workshops and supply of equipment. The field of co-operation is very extensive. Training facilities have been provided in such diverse fields as development of water resources, foreign trade promotion, rural development, small-scale industries, standardisation, journalism, veterinary science, railways, constitutional and parliamentary studies, etc. The Indian experts deployed have been for such fields as transportation, geology, animal husbandry, telecommunications, etc. Equipment supplied has been mainly in the areas of scientific laboratories, agriculture, engineering and law books, etc. Assistance in establishing industrial estates and technical training institutes has been warmly welcome by many African countries, especially in Kenya, Mauritius and Tanzania.²⁶²

Following grave food and economic situations faced by "sub-Saharan" and "Sahelian" Africa, Premier Rajiv Gandhi, in November 1984, expressed sympathy and support for the struggle against the crisis. New Delhi announced a gift of 100,000 tonnes of wheat in keeping with the principles of international cooperation and mutual assistance. The major recipients of the grain were Ethiopia (41,374 tonnes), Sudan (22,560 tonnes), Somalia (10,000 tonnes), Kenya (5,000 tonnes) and Tanzania (5,000 tonnes). The total cost of assistance was Rs 230 million.²⁶³

When the crisis of food shortage in Africa showed no signs of improvement in 1985, New Delhi announced another contribution of Rs 120 million worth of wheat, amounting to 57,000 tonnes to the OAU Unity Special Emergency Fund. The recipients were:- Tanzania (15,000 tonnes), Mozambique (15,000 tonnes) Sudan (12,000 tonnes) Somalia (4,000 tonnes) Ethiopia (4,000 tonnes) Madagascar (3,000 tonnes) and Seychelles, Djibouti, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic and the African National Congress of South Africa (1,000 tonnes) each.²⁶⁴

The daunting economic problems of Africa elicit considerable sympathy in India, and admiration for the way the various countries here, are handling their problems. Premier Rajiv Gandhi appealed for greater international aid to Africa. This appeal was contained in a message to the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on the Critical economic situation in Africa which took place in May 1986.²⁶⁵

In the same vain, under the ITEC programme, in the sphere of industry, especially small-scale and medium-scale, India has initiated programmes where its experience and technology in this section can be utilized by African countries. An exploitation of Indian machinery for small-scale industries was held in Nairobi in 1985 and later in Addis Ababa. At the Biennial Pledging Conference held during the 10th Session of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, New Delhi pledged a sum of \$ 400,000 for an ECA project for the promotion of small scale industries in Africa. With funds from ITEC and assistance from the National Small Industries Corporation, New Delhi has assisted in

establishing 48 small scale industrial units in Tanzania. Tanzania's Agriculture University in Morogoro was earmarked to receive academic as well as practical assistance. Five Indian experts were seconded to the Zambia Small Industries Development Organization to prepare a report for developing the small-scale sector in Zambia.²⁶⁶ The list of such programmes in Africa is too long. It also suffices to observe that bilateralism is the keynote of New Delhi's economic cooperation, although multilateralism is increasing.

Technological surveys and consultancy services also form the basis of economic cooperation between India and Africa. This is a result-oriented programme which has had some far-reaching success on the part of India. Surveys are offered and conducted for ore extraction, hydroelectric power, railway modernization and expansion, petrochemical and steel, sugar and cement industries and water resources.²⁶⁷

In Nigeria, two steel mills have benefited from consultancy services of the Metallurgical and Engineering Consultants (India) Limited (MECON). The Steel Authority of India Limited has been associated with the reopening of Bomi Hill Mines in Liberia for iron ore and for setting up a steel plant. The water and power consultancy have secured contracts for water supply projects in Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria and Tanzania. Among the other projects that have been undertaken and executed in Africa are: power generating and distribution plant in Kenya, cement unit in Nigeria, Steel Structural and fabrication in Malawi and water storage tanks in Ethiopia. Tanzania has had, with Indian Consultancy, a string of integrated units, sugar plants, textile mill, paper and pulp plant and bicycle plants with a capacity of producing 100,000 bicycles annually. It was inaugurated by President Kaunda in 1982. Indian consultancy firms have also secured jobs concerning tyre retreading, corrugated board cartons, wire drawing, PVC cables, aluminium utensils and builders' material. For instance, Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited has executed a power plant unit in Libya and Hindustan Machine Tools contract in Algeria, Kenya and Nigeria. Technical assistance in hotels operation has been extended to Egypt and Tanzania. Airports and feeder roads have been built in many African countries.²⁶⁸

The work of Indian Railway men in Africa deserves a special mention. Rail India Technical and Economic Services Limited (RITES), a state-owned enterprise, specialized in innovating railroad network. It undertakes feasibility studies, staff training, manpower planning, systems design and management consultancy. It has executed railway projects in Algeria, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.²⁶⁹

Telecommunication Consultants India Limited (TCIL), provides consultancy services and executes projects in the field of telecommunications in a number of African countries, notably Mozambique, Nigeria and Somalia. In the field of electronics know-how, there is the Electronics Trade and Technology Development Corporation Limited (ET&T). It has provided consultancy to Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria and Sudan. ET&T offers consultancy as well as material for transistor radios, telephone sets, quartz clocks and watches, telephone instruments, etc, in knocked down condition. Apart from this, it specializes in defence and aerospace equipment.²⁷⁰

Mention can also be made of the work of the National Small Industries Corporation Limited (NSIC), well known in almost every country in Africa. It is devoted to the

promotion of small industries in India. India's experience of one million industrial units in the small-sector, which turn out 50 percent of the country's production, could greatly benefit African countries. NSIC offers turnkey projects in all kinds of industries, engineering, chemicals, electricals, food, textiles and leather.²⁷¹

Although India offers sophisticated technology as well as assistance in small scale industries, it is Indian consultancy in the field of food and agriculture which is gaining popularity. Being a priority sector in virtually every African country, India's scope to assist these countries is vast and varied. West African countries, in particular, are looking to India in the important field of food self-sufficiency.²⁷²

Although India's programme of economic and technical cooperation with Africa is a modest one, there is vast scope for expansion. There is ample evidence of political goodwill and understanding between the people of Africa and India. This is important for South-South cooperation and collective self-reliance as prescribed by the NAM. Despite the demise of the Cold War, the NAM remains relevant for this purpose. Denied the economic and financial backing by the developed countries, especially in the post-Cold War era, India and Africa, like other developing countries, are left with no alternative but to foster the spirit of partnership among themselves. They have to share their experience, something which should be a two-way traffic. The act of sharing of experience should mean pooling together resources, know-how, production methods, and markets; hence the notion of interdependence-an economic necessity based on equality and free will.

Conclusion

Indian settlers in Africa constitute one of the most important variables in Indo-African relations, especially in the sense that their discrimination helped to strengthen India's anti-racial and anti-imperialist policy during the colonial and post colonial periods in Africa. But by mid 1960s, Indo-African diplomatic relations had greatly declined. This was so because Nehru, who had played a leading role in Afro-Asian resurgence, had become somehow diffident to African affairs. New Delhi did not realize that such vital issues as peaceful coexistence which it cherished, had to be integrated with African drive for decolonization. It was not until the priority of both India and Africa was integrated in a way that made Africa feel that despite New Delhi's own preference and policy, New Delhi could not win many friends in Africa. However, once it was achieved, New Delhi was able to befriend African countries.

It can be demonstrated that India, which had ideological and historical identification with African Liberation movements, both for decolonization and abolition of racial discrimination, provided increasing support to them. The early period saw India's material support as minimal: neither was its diplomacy pursued with tact and care. This made New Delhi to be labelled as harbouring "soft" feelings on issues like colonialism. Although the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the addition of material assistance to Indian diplomatic efforts, they remained meagre. Why? Because of New Delhi's own limitation to give more in those terms. Despite this, the diplomatic alertness and initiatives were vigorously pursued and they bridged the gaps of less material assistance, in presenting India as an uncompromising champion against colonialism and racialism. This earned India the honour and prestige unequalled by none in the Third World.

In the mid 1960s, New Delhi added an economic dimension to its diplomacy and policy towards Africa and the entire Third World for meeting its political imperatives. It started the ITEC and other programmes to counter the growing Chinese economic diplomacy in Africa and other Third World areas. These greatly helped New Delhi in terms of friendship with Africa. Although the political urgency faded over the years, under the NAM umbrella, it became the major political goal. In Africa, other diplomatic endeavours became supportive and adjunct to it. However, the economic relations which emerged following New Delhi's initiative and the response of Africans and priority in the umbrella of South-South, has not been that encouraging. Thus, indo-African growing trends in the economic realm requires that it has to be cultivated with care and tact if it has to operate in the context of South-South cooperation. The south-south concept has to be emphasized and the growing trend into indo-African economic relations has to qualitatively differentiate itself from North-South relations. We should not lump all relations as healthy signs of South-South cooperation whether this South-South cooperation demonstrates the positive perception of Africa to its minimum acceptable level or not. Although the current economic relations with Africa is beneficial to New Delhi, as far as Africa is concerned, there is no qualitative difference from North-South relations. It is, therefore, in this realm that NAM remains relevant in that it's diplomacy faces the great task of reconciling the clash of perceptions and interests in Indo-African relations.

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Africa and The Post-Cold War World Order

The history of the Cold War into which Africa was drawn, has been adequately covered elsewhere.¹ But it is imperative to state right from the outset that since the end of World War II, the world became bipolar in terms of power politics. However, the late 1980s witnessed profound changes in international relations. The intense rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted in the collapse of the latter in 1992. The Soviet Empire crumbled, thereby terminating the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War gave way to the New World Order proclaimed by both President George Bush and his new Russian counterpart, Boris Yeltsin. Two leading scholars have coined the term “global apartheid” to the more sophisticated form the world system has moved to.² Since the 1960s, African states have tried to weave through the Cold War rules that dominated international politics. After the end of the Cold War, they found themselves in a new system where the old rules began to be discarded.

Global Apartheid

The end of the Cold War has generated global apartheid. Global apartheid offers two basic options for African States: despair or new nationalism. New nationalism can take three forms: diversification of external links, African isolationism, and African internationalism. In between, they can turn to African isolationism. In the long run, internationalism can dominate African politics.

The basic concepts developed here are the Cold War, global apartheid, despair and new nationalism. The Cold War can be conceived as the relations of competition and conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union since 1947 resulting from two tenets of US foreign policy. First, the assumption that communism represented a “dangerous” ideological force in the world and so, the US had to combat its spread. Second, because the Soviet Union was the vanguard of the communist challenge, American foreign policy had to contain Soviet expansion and influence.³

Global apartheid is described as “A system in which a minority of whites occupy the pole of affluence, while a majority composed of other races occupy the pole of poverty; a system of extreme inequality in cultural, social, political, economic, and military terms.”⁴ Politically, global apartheid is characterized by the dominance of one ideology: liberal democracy, and the control of the United Nations Security Council by states from the Northeast and Northwest. Economically, global apartheid is characterized by the

accumulation of riches by a minority of whites, the control of financial international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT by states from the Northeast and, by an exclusive network of economic relations between the states of the Northwest and Northeast. Militarily, global apartheid can be described as the dominance of one military power, the United States. Global apartheid has three basic political, economic and military implications for Africa. These implications are respectively: democratization, marginalization and demilitarization. Despair is the pessimistic attitude on the part of African leaders concerning the prosperity of the continent. They would like to continue to rule their countries the way they did in the past without any conviction that any meaningful change can occur, the ultimate result being the spread of despair among the masses of Africans. On the contrary, new nationalism is the realistic and intelligent determination to conquer the African environment and spur development. It is different from the old type of Nationalism which was naïve and unrealistic. In practice, it can take three different forms as already mentioned.

The major political feature of global apartheid is the undisputed victory of the ideology of political liberalism in the world. The contention between liberal democracy and Marxism, which could have led to a third world war, ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. All the communist dreams of global conquest have faded away. Zbigniew Brzezinski was right when he stated in 1986-88 that “communism (was) in a grave – indeed, terminal-crises. It (was) still powerful as a system of political power, but the idea of communism (was) essentially dead.”⁵ The disappearance of communism left the world with only one dominant ideology. Since the beginning of the 1990s, liberal democracy has been sweeping across Eastern Europe. It has also been proclaimed in the former Soviet Union and has spread to Africa too. Francis Fukuyama notes that what has been occurring in the world can be called the end of history.

That is, “the end of point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”⁶ Although we do not agree with Fukuyama that we are at the end of history, we nevertheless accept that with the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy has become the dominant ideology. The dominance of Western liberal democracy can be seen as the predominance of Western civilization in the world since then. In as much as liberal democracy is made of Western values, one can assert that the world has been dominated by Western culture. Other cultures and ideologies have been demoted.

The adoption of Western liberal democracy by the North has led to the convergence of interests between the Northeast and Northwest. This convergence of interests can be seen in international institutions. The 1991 and 2003 gulf wars are clear indicators of the end of the rivalry between East and West and the beginning of a new era where they united at the expense of the South. Iraq was therefore a victim of the end of the Cold War⁷. During the cold war, the Soviet Union could have opposed the United States intervention in the Gulf. The South as such has been left without any “protector.” Mazrui notes an African proverb which affirms that “when two elephants fight, it is the grass which suffers, and when two elephants make love, it is also the grass which suffers.”⁸ The political convergence of interests between the Northwest and the Northeast has increased the gap of power between the North and the South. The UN Security Council has since then been used to serve the interests of the North. The international community has witnessed how

the United States succeeded in using the UN to convince the entire world to unite against Iraq. While the UN was almost ignored during the Reagan administration, it suddenly became an efficient tool for American foreign policy during the Bush administration. It is again through the UN that the United States, during the Bill Clinton administration, intervened in Somalia. The intervention in Somalia was supposedly a humanitarian action which the US wanted appreciated by the international community. The reality of the matter, however, is that the US unequivocally established its role as the sole enforcer of the international order after the Cold War. The convergence of interests does not only lead to political inequalities, but also to economic inequalities.

During the Cold War, the world was economically divided not only between the North and South, but also between East and West. Although the West was economically more powerful than the East, one could talk of a kind of competition between the two sides and the interests of the South were often defended by the East. The gap between the North and the South was clearly evident.⁹

In the last decade or more, North America, Western Europe, the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Japan controlled two-third of the world's products while the majority, composed of Latin America, Asia, Africa and Oceania, shared only one-third.¹⁰

Another aspect of global apartheid is that international financial institutions are controlled by the white minority who occupy the pole of affluence. During the 1960s and the 1970s, international financial institutions became a significant source of aid providing capital on concessional terms to developing countries. However, during the Cold War, the East used to sympathise with the South in its struggle over the basic policies of the regimes. The end of the Cold War has caused the East to shift to the side of the minority West and it no longer has any interest in defending the South. More unfortunately, instead of being judges, the former Soviet Union and Eastern European Countries have themselves been involved in the game because, like their former "protectorate", they needed financial support after the collapse of their economies. This leads us to the last economic aspect of global apartheid, which is the priority given to financial problems faced by Russian and Eastern European countries *visa-a-vis* the Third World.

Although Herma Cohen, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, assured Africans that the United States could help Eastern Europe with money from the defence budget cutbacks without affecting resources available for Africa, and that, the United States could even increase its aid, the situation seems rather bleak for Africa. An important element that should be taken into account when analyzing this issue is that after the Cold War, the United States has itself been facing many domestic problems that need to be solved. As a result, Africa could suffer from this internal necessity. For example, Randal Robinson noted in 1992 that the aid level to Africa was \$ 800 million and although the house had suggested an increase to \$ 1 billion, there was no agreement with the senate.¹² He added that although Transafrica has asked for increased aid to Africa, the United States allocated much of the funds to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union instead of Africa.¹³ The tendency has been to decrease rather than increase funds allocated to Africa. Thus, the demise of the Cold War has not only increased political and economic inequalities, but has also changed the military distribution of power to which we turn our attention.

Since World War II, the US and the Soviet Union were the two military superpowers which dominated the world. One of the implications of the end of the Cold War is that militarily, the world has moved from bipolarity to unipolarity. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the world with only one superpower. As put by one source, “the distribution of power in world politics has become like a layer cake. The top military layer is largely unipolar, for there is no other military power comparable to the United States.”¹⁴ The first Gulf War marked the beginning of the new era of US military dominance of the world. The United States remains the only superpower which could efficiently intervene in regional military conflicts. Geoffrey Kemp even warns that given the recent developments among Third world countries, “it is unlikely that the United States will be able to distance itself from the traumas of this new world and retreat to a neo-isolationist posture with international involvement primarily focused on economic matters.”¹⁵ The American interventions in Kuwait, Somalia and other areas are illustrations of the new involvement of the United States in regional conflicts. The US involvement in Rwanda was crucial for any resolution of the refugee problems. Although the US resisted intervention in Yugoslavia, Europe needed US help to solve this post-Cold War conflict which was the beginning of a new trend in international politics. After the Cold War, the world has witnessed a new resurgence of nationalism, ethnic conflicts and Islamic fundamentalism. Ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union are to be understood within this new trend. The Neo-Nazi movement in Germany is another example of nationalist extremism, although it has not yet reached the state level. The bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York, the attack of a Jewish Centre in Buenos Aires and the bombing of the Israeli embassy in London are signs of Islamic fundamentalism.

In Africa, Islamic fundamentalism has taken a new stance in the Sudan which is forming a kind of coalition with Iran to promote this ideology in Africa. Egypt is fighting to contain Islamic fundamentalism in its territory. The world is also witnessing how Algeria is desperately fighting against the Islamic party. Twenty three African states are members of the Islamic Conference Organization, which shows to what extent Islam has penetrated Africa.¹⁶ Although we do not see too much appeal to Islam in predominantly Christian African countries, Islamic resurgence could well turn out to be one of the challenges of Western liberal democracy. It is today the dominant ideology of the world. If Africa were to face Islamic expansionism, the United States would be once again the “police force of last resort” that the continent would turn to. But how does global apartheid directly affect Africa? It is to this question that we turn.

Africa and Global Apartheid

One of the political implications of the end of the Cold War in Africa is the new wave of democratization sweeping the continent. There are certainly other causes behind this movement, but it has been triggered by the events of Eastern Europe. Many Africans had expressed their dissatisfaction with the status quo for years, long before they heard of Ceausescu’s death. But the events of Eastern Europe, particularly the overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu, had a great impact on the latent convictions of Africans to change their systems. Africans understood that they could also succeed in changing the status quo like in Eastern Europe. Many African leaders were aware of the possibility of

contagion and tried to keep their people as much as they could, out of the daily developments in Eastern Europe.

Fortunately, that revolution was so important in the history of the world that any attempt to ignore it was doomed to failure. Not only were the people of Africa influenced by the Eastern Europe events, but also some African leaders learnt from them. President Mobutu's decision of enterprising a popular consultation about the future of the institutions of his country, for example, was taken right after the death of President Nicolae Ceausescu. And out of that popular consultation, he decided to introduce a multiparty system in Zaire.

Africa today is a veritable workshop of democracy. Putting aside some democratic regimes, directed democracies, and some authoritarian systems like that in Sudan, the continent is under political mutation. But that mutation has taken different forms depending on the will of the regimes in power to hold free and fair elections. A close examination of the situation in Africa allows us to classify African states in transition roughly into three categories in terms of their commitment and success to organize free and fair elections. Countries which by the year 2000, had succeeded in organizing acceptable elections; those where the results of the elections have been controversial; those where elections have not yet been held. Although our classification is based on a general opinion, therefore, not excluding possible vulnerability to an empirical research, it contains some useful elements. The first category comprises Benin, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The second category includes Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Uganda, Kenya and Senegal. The last category comprises Angola, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, etc.

Democracy in Africa should be understood as a process. Its political and economic outcomes are yet to be seen. At the 26th OAU summit held in Addis Ababa, a declaration entitled *"The Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World"* was adopted by African States.¹⁷ This declaration recognized that a political environment guaranteeing human rights and rule of law would be more conducive to government accountability and probity and that popular political processes would ensure the involvement of all in development efforts.¹⁸ The accountability secured in a democratic system would contribute to the improvement of African economy. Nevertheless, one should draw a distinction between democracy and economic growth. An authoritarian regime can sometimes be more efficient for economic development. A statistical analysis done by Barro on the relationship between democracy and economic performance reveals that: "on average, political freedom neither helped nor hindered growth. Given values of the other variables, the average effect of more democracy on economic growth is roughly zero."¹⁹ What should be said is that democracy can bring an important humanitarian change in Africa, and Africans need it. From "poor and enslaved", Africans can at least become "poor and freer." But to become "rich and free", Africa needs more than democracy. And since democracy cannot survive without economic growth, Africa could as well be in the midst of a quandary. The West is satisfied to see the process of democratization taking place in Africa. But does the West support Africa in this period of transition? This leads us to examine the trend taken

by economic relations between the North and Africa. The prospects seem not to be encouraging for Africa.

According to Callaghy, “the increase marginalization of Africa is twofold- economic and politico-strategic and both aspects are tightly linked in their consequences.”²⁰ The marginalization of Africa started before the end of the Cold War. The events at the end of the 1980s triggered a process which was already under way. While the conflict between East and West was ending, the West made it clear that it would give priority in allotting aid money to Governments which respected human rights and were free from corruption. At the Franco-Africa Summit of June 1990 at LaBaule in France, François Mitterand made a plea for political openness, multipartyism, individual freedoms, and state of rights. In brief, he asked for a fundamental change in African governments to adopt democratic values. And he added that, democratic regimes would attract French attention more in allocating financial aid.²¹ The American official position was spelled out by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, who stated that: as a people and a government, the US firmly believed in representative government and pluralistic democracy with an independent judiciary, protection for the rights of minorities and limited executive power.²²

This new attitude, triggered by the diminishing of the Cold War, was then emphasized by the World Bank in its 1989 report: *From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*. Essentially, the World Bank argument was a technical one. In the early 1980s, when African governments ran out of foreign exchange, they turned to the World Bank and its sister, the I.M.F. to solve their balance of payment problems. These international financial institutions, as any bank, had to make sure that their loans would be repaid. As a result, harsh domestic policies were recommended by the World Bank to create appropriate conditions for the repayment of the money. The logic behind the World Bank policy was that responsible governments would have avoided such disaster in the first place. This logic explains the Bank’s demand for better governance.²³ Once the international institutions had adopted that alibi of good governance, the West felt freer in the issues of aid to Africa that it no longer wanted to deal with. Callaghy refers to this phenomenon as post neo-colonialism and contends that no one cares about Africa; it is no longer important. The West wanted to leave it to the IMF and the World Bank because it is becoming more embarrassing after the Cold War.²⁴

Despite the plea for democratization in Africa, the West does not actually concretely help the continent achieve that change. One way of measuring the West’s commitment to democracy in Africa is to compare the foreign aid received by democratic and non-democratic regimes. In 1991, the Bush administration requested for over \$130 million for what some scholars termed as undemocratic government of Kenya, Zaire and Malawi. On the contrary, only \$30 million were requested for democratic governments of Benin, Botswana and Namibia.²⁵ The role of France in the democratization of Africa has been even more ambiguous. The new conditionality of governance is not the real issue. The problem is that Africa has lost its economic and politico-strategic position in the world. As put by General Obasanjo: “Africa is in decay and dereliction. Africa is on the periphery of the world, whichever way you look at it. We are not in the mainstream of the world.”²⁶ In discussing the marginalization of Africa, concerns have been expressed by African leaders that aid would be diverted from Africa to Eastern Europe. The West

offered assurances that such fears are unfounded because Africa receives concessional aid and Eastern Europe gets market-rate loans.

What should be noted here is that the real problem for Africa is not only a fall in aid, but also a failure of aid to grow fast enough to keep up with Africa's rapidly growing needs. From this viewpoint, stagnation in aid is also a problem for the continent. A close examination of the trade relations between the West and Africa and aid assistance shows evidence of decreasing interests. According to Schraeder, "From 1985 to 1990, US military assistance (minus the roughly \$2,000 million given annually to Egypt) fell from \$280 million to \$39 million, with development aid dropping approximately 50 per cent during this period."²⁷ The same trend is shown by Clough concerning US aid to Africa and US military aid to the continent. An examination of US aid to Africa from 1958 to 1988 and US military aid to the continent between 1974 and 1988 shows that starting around 1985, US development aid, as well as military assistance, were on the decline.²⁸ "Since 1985, total US aid to Africa has stagnated at just below a billion dollars a year. The high in 1985 was \$25 billion, while the administration requested \$905 million for 1990."²⁹

The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the end of its aid to Africa. This change in policy was noticed in the early 1980s, when Mozambique was informed that it would not join the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and that it should turn to the West for economic assistance.³⁰

According to the UN first report on the New Agenda for Africa:

while still higher than in the mid 1980s, the overall aid flows to Africa fell sharply in 1992 Measured in current dollars, official development assistance (ODA) to the continent declined from a peak of \$19.7 bn in 1990 to \$18.3 bn in 1991 and \$12.1 bn in the latter year. For sub-Saharan Africa specifically, ODA in 1992 fell by 22 per cent from 1991.³¹

From the foregoing, one can assert that the West has lost its interest in Africa or that interest has drastically declined. The end of the Cold War, the bad economic and political records of African states, the oligopolistic competition between industrialized countries and economic problems in the West, do not attract economic assistance to Africa. The best Africa can get, in particular from those countries which still have a modicum of interest in the continent like France, is the stagnation of their assistance. Africa has, therefore, reasons to be concerned because the problem is not only a fall or stagnation of aid, but also a failure of aid to grow fast enough to keep up with the continent's rapidly growing needs. One thing is clear: the chances for aid to grow are very slim. This viewpoint was confirmed by the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali: "It is unlikely that the level of official development assistance to Africa will grow substantially during the 1990s."³² Africa, therefore, remains marginalized. What then are the military implications of that situation?

The internal character of the origins of the major armed conflicts in Africa, was aggravated by the military support from the East and West during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has contributed to the winding down of the major militarized conflicts in the continent. Mengistu Haile Mariam lost Soviet and Cuban support in 1989 as we have

already seen. Ethiopia felt obliged to offer Eritrea autonomy and Mengistu left the country for exile life in Zimbabwe. His departure created new conditions for peace settlement in Ethiopia. The end of the Cold War and Gorbachev's New Thinking created a climate encouraging peace negotiations between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO rebels in Mozambique. It also facilitated the UN involvement in peace keeping. Russia lost interest in supporting the ruling Popular Movement for Liberalization of Angola (MPLA).

As a result of the superpowers' willingness to reduce tensions in the Third World, negotiations were made possible in Angola. Although the results of the elections did not put an end to the war, if Washington and Moscow as well as their allies ceased their military support to both sides, a peaceful settlement of the conflicts would be possible. Although the MPLA lost Soviet military support, the US material and strategic support to UNITA did not dry up.³³ Herman Cohen states that "the Cold War in Africa ended essentially in the mid-1970s with one exception: The Angola issue."³⁴

Moreover, these long-standing African civil wars have taken other paths that offer more chances to peace than the Cold War did. An encouraging indicator of relative decline in general hostilities is a fall in the arms imports. Africa's arms imports dropped drastically in 1989 to \$370 million, the lowest level since 1972.³⁵ The tendency to democracy and negotiations for peace settlement in the continent would probably keep the arms flow low. Can democratization, marginalization, and demilitarization lead African leaders to authentic solutions to the problems facing the continent? Is it possible to witness the blossoming of a *Pax Africana*? These are important questions Thomas and Mazrui pose. The questions can be tackled by the various options available.

Options for Africa

In the 1960s, Africans believed that political independence would bring economic prosperity. This belief is best represented by Kwame Nkrumah's often-quoted admonishment to Africans: "Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else will be added unto you"³⁶ Four decades after the political independence of the continent, events have proved otherwise. In the efforts to develop their economies, African countries have adopted different strategies. Some of them like Tanzania, adopted a partial withdrawal from global capitalism. Others decided a complete integration into the world market like Nigeria, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Zaire. 'Group strategies' have also been tried, like economic regionalism, and commodity cartel. Despite all these strategies, Africa is still enduring poverty. Worse, the end of the Cold War has accelerated the marginalization of the continent. In light of all the implications of global apartheid discussed above, Africa has two basic options.

The first option offered to Africa is despair. If hope is a key to success, despair is a key to failure. After more than three decades of poor performance, there are many reasons for African leaders to lose faith in the prospects of their countries. This feeling is aggravated by the literature on Africa, which often shows, with justification, bleak prospects for the prosperity of the continent. Callaghy notes that "Many African officials fail to realize that changes must be made. If not, important changes in the world political economy will by-pass Africa. Even successful reform will not eliminate Africa's marginality to the

world economy in the short run.”³⁷ Brent adds that the development challenge facing Africa is tremendous.³⁸

If twenty-seven years of hard work constitute only the end of the beginning, the acceleration of the marginalization of Africa can lead some Africans to despair. There are Africans who no longer believe in the prosperity of the continent. Leaders who fall into despair would not probably relinquish power. They would continue to do much of what they were doing before without any personal conviction that these actions would change the situation of their countries. It is difficult to identify African leaders falling into this category because they would not show overtly their despair for political reasons. But some facts can help in identifying the group of leaders who could fall into this category.

Dictators who have been in power for a long time without achieving progress in their countries would fight more for power than for the development of their countries in which they no longer believe. The demise of the Cold War would accelerate their despair because the East-West conflict was the only bargaining asset they could count on. What is more dramatic is that they lead into despair the people they are ruling because of their continuing poor performance. As already mentioned, the events in Eastern Europe awakened the latent feeling among Africans who do not want to fall into despair. The real cause behind the wave of democracy in Africa is the failure of authoritarian governance, which has raised the need to transform inefficient and unaccountable regimes. A certain number of leaders have already gone like Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, Kaunda of Zambia, Denis Sassou Ngwessou of Congo and Didier Ratsiraka of Madagascar. Others like the late Mobutu of Zaire, tried to resist in vain. He was swept away from power by the late Laurent Kabila, backed by Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe and others. Kabila himself was assassinated in January 2001 and his son, Joseph Kabila became president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as Zaire was renamed by Laurent Kabila. What needs to be said is that Africans have refused to fall into despair, doing the same thing every day, or enduring hard sacrifices without any positive change.

Despair is not, fortunately, the feeling of the majority of Africans. Thus, General Obasanjo urged Africans to marginalize the rest of the world: “Africa cannot be marginal for Africans. For Africans, Africa is everything. And that is the way it ought to be. It cannot be otherwise. We should in fact be working for the marginalization of the rest of the world in the affairs of Africa.”³⁹ The E.C.A. encourages Africans and mentions in its creative *African Charter for Popular Participation* that, given the current world policy and economic situation, Africa is becoming further marginalized in world affairs, both geo-politically and economically.⁴⁰ D. Thomas and A. Mazrui do not exclude the possibility of a *Pax Africana*: yet such neglect may in the end prove to be a blessing.⁴¹

The chances for despair are very slim in Africa. Thus, Africans can find solutions to their problems. The prospects for developing African new nationalism are not as bleak as some believe. It is to this new nationalism that we turn.

The second option offered to Africans is what can be termed: *African New Nationalism*. There is a growing feeling among African intellectuals that Africa should not become the “social case” of the world, a land dependent on international welfare.⁴² American intervention in Somalia to “help feed” starving people has been seen as another

humiliation of the continent. This feeling has been expressed by the opposition of many African scholars arguing for the OAU or the Arab League intervention in Somalia instead of the United States. The case of Rwanda's refugees in the DRC has once again deepened the wound of this emerging class of African New Nationalists. From humiliation to humiliation, starting with slavery to post neo-colonialism going through colonialism and neo-colonialism, Africans feel the need to change what went wrong. According to Winrich Kuhne, Africa's diminishing status in global politics can give the continent a chance to determine its own fate.⁴³

New Nationalism is to be understood as the product of a painful process undertaken by Africans to control their environment since the 1960s. African fathers of independence propelled a naïve and unrealistic type of nationalism. The collision with the world system could not result in anything else but defeat. As a result, a generation of dictators took over, but the end of the Cold War has accelerated their disappearance because the rules have changed. Another generation has emerged more eager "to push those changes that are immediately beneficial and coordinate with others elsewhere the long-run strategies that will permit more fundamental transformation" in the continent but it is struggling in Africa.⁴⁴ New Nationalism is a realistic and intelligent determination on the part of Africans to control their environment and to succeed. It can take three forms.

One aspect of the colonial economic legacy is the specialization in the production or extraction of a limited number of commodities. Thus, Ghana specialized in cocoa; Tanzania in sisal; Zambia in copper; The Sudan in cotton; Malawi in tea. These materials are produced for the former colonial powers, hence the neo-colonial links. Many African countries did not change this dependency in the post-colonial period; they preferred to protect the "special" bonds linking them to their former masters. The tendency was more pronounced in "Francophone Africa" than in "Anglophone Africa." France continues to maintain strong economic, political and military ties with its former colonies. This is one of the consequences of the colonial policy of 'assimilation' practised by France. Economically, French neo-colonialism is expressed in the powerful financial bonds that link most of "Francophone Africa" in membership of the franc zone. These countries form the *Communate Financiare Africaine* (C.F.A.) while many other African countries have created their own currencies. Politically, French neo-colonial links are displayed in the annual Franco-African summit, which gathers francophone countries with France. Membership has been extended to some non-francophone countries. Militarily, France has been involved so many times in African trouble spots that it is called the *gend'armes d'Afrique*. Revenhill notes that nearly eight thousand troops are maintained on a permanent basis in the Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon and Senegal.⁴⁵

In "non-francophone Africa" and the former Belgian colonies, the tendency to diversify external links started before the demise of the Cold War. Britain lost its interest in Africa a long time ago. As a result, "Anglophone Africa" tried to diversify its external links. Nigeria, for example, has developed strong links with the United States. In terms of US imports from Africa, three countries are the main United States trading partners: Nigeria 38%, South Africa 17% and Angola 15%.⁴⁶ Recently, Nigeria has been trying to open its doors to French cooperation. This openness has been welcomed by France, which seeks to extend its influence outside its former colonies. Zaire has had unpredictable relations

with Belgium after its “independence”. Instead, strong links have been developed with the United States and France. The American and French intervention in 1977-1978 to help Mobutu crush invasion in Shaba region is just one example of the relations developed between Zaire and these countries. The United States’ imports of the raw materials it needed from Zaire is not negligible: copper 33%, cobalt 32%, natural gas 63%, aluminium 42%, gold 26%, zinc 26%.⁴⁷

Angola developed strong links with the former Soviet Union and even some trade relations with the United States in oil production. Many countries outside French colonies have developed relations with France. Beside Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire, the former Portuguese colony, Cape Verde, the former Spanish colony Equatorial Guinea, and the former British colony Gambia, are full members of the Franco African Conference. Moreover, Angola, Botswana, Egypt, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sao Tome, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe are observers.⁴⁸ Despite strong French neo-colonial bonds, some Francophone countries have tried to diversify their external links too. DeLancey notes that Cameroon’s foreign policy can be described as a struggle to expand its relations beyond France to other developed capitalist powers, while at the same time exploring and developing relations with the countries of the Third World, especially African neighbours.⁴⁹

Despite the difficulties it entails, Africa has also tried to develop external relations with the Middle East. Accordingly, “Between 1973 and 1983, total bilateral and multilateral Arab aid to non-Arab African countries amounted to \$8.3 billion, of which \$5.3 billion was disbursed to assist projects and \$2.9 billion constituted non-project allocations.”⁵⁰ Although it still has to be developed, African countries have also started co-operation with Japan. Asia is the most important recipient of Japan’s aid (60 per cent). Nevertheless, Africa’s share has been increasing. “From some \$268 million in 1982, Japan’s support to Africa rose to over \$1 billion in 1989. After falling back in 1990, Japan’s aid to Africa again rose in 1991 to over \$900 million.”⁵¹ Japan occupied the fourth position after the United States, France, and Germany as the largest donors of bilateral aid to Africa in 1990-1991.⁵²

The diversification of external links was complicated by the fact that Africa had to take a stance vis-à-vis the rivalry between the Eastern and Western blocs. The adoption of the Non-Alignment Movement was a solution to this dilemma. Today, many African countries are losing their interest in the Non-Alignment Movement. This is a sign that the Movement was more conceived by African countries as a response to bipolarity than a framework to advance the development of their peoples. The end of the Cold War bodes well for African countries as they try to diversify their links with the North and the other parts of the world without too many constraints. In the short run, therefore, African countries can continue their relations with the IMF and to open their doors to any other external aid, which can help solve their economic problems. The prospects for success are, however, bleak. But this is the more reason that apart from diversifying links, African countries should join hands with other third world countries to repackage NAM for it to remain relevant.

One of the features of the strategy of complete integration into the world market is the need for large-scale external aid. Brazil, for example, has accumulated capital from

outside in order to expand the stock of machinery and other production equipment. In light of the increased marginalization, Africa cannot obtain large-scale external aid. Moreover, Africa can no longer expect large-scale external aid because of the precipitation of the international debt crisis since the 1980s. By the mid-1980s, world economic crisis turned private bank flows to the South into the debt crisis and total financial flows to the South fell considerably. And for many investors, the climate for investment in Africa continues to appear inhospitable. In addition, the strategy of complete integration into the world market proposed by the IMF itself remains controversial. It did not succeed in Africa despite the World Bank's publicity for Ghana. Zaire also used to be the best pupil of the World Bank and the IMF, but today it is bankrupt.

In other words, African countries have to diversify their external links with the hope that such a move would solve their financial problems. They would, however, be faced with disillusion. This disillusion would open the way to African isolationism to which we turn.

The formation of the OAU in May 1963 was African's response to the search for continental unity. Despite its failure in the task of the development of the continent and other aspects, the OAU achieved much in the liberation of the continent from colonization as we have already acknowledged. Compared to Asia and Latin America, Africa has to some extent, made more progress in terms of pan-continental aspirations. Internal factors and the external intervention in African politics have contributed to Africa's inability to pursue common policies. The external intervention occurs because of the superpowers' interests in the continent and also because African regimes or their rivals request for external support. The effectiveness of the OAU was also limited by the split loyalty of African states. Many African states practise dual attachment to continental norms and to the Western powers.

The end of the Cold War offers new hopes for African unity because these barriers are supposed to play a less important role. The external intervention is losing its intensity. The demilitarization of the continent can wind down long-standing African militarized conflicts and create a better atmosphere for co-operation. The split loyalty of African states to African Unity is due to the fact that they are dependent on the western democracies for economic, financial and military assistance. With reference to marginalization, and the eventual failure of the first option, that is the diversification of external links, African leaders do not have another option left but African isolationism. African isolationism is to be defined as Africa's consciousness of constituting a marginalized community of the world whose interests are in serious conflict with the capitalist world and, therefore, need to take care of themselves for their survival. This consciousness operates at two levels: within the different countries and within the continent. Isolationism is different from marginalization in the sense that while the latter is static and initiated from outside, the former is essentially dynamic and initiated from inside. It is Africa's desire not to continue depending on external cooperation but on African capabilities.

The closing down of external barriers has some impact on internal barriers. Political and ideological differences can be lessened by the convergence of interests between East and

West. Idiosyncratic factors may become less antagonistic because of the new democratic wave sweeping the continent. Although economic differences can still remain, the new atmosphere can be more conducive to regional co-operation.⁵³

Regional groupings are the concrete framework within which African isolationism should occur. Although regional co-operation in Africa is still facing many problems, some positive achievements can be noted. The major regional groupings have survived despite the difficulties they cope with. The East African Community (E.A.C.) has been revived. The "Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest" (E.C.A.O.) has been to some extent successful in regional integration. According to one source, "Intra-community trade has increased in value from US\$73 million in 1970 to US\$369 million in 1981, US\$406 million in 1983 and US\$300 million in 1986."⁵⁴

An encouraging picture is provided by intra regional trade in SADCC between 1976 and 1979. A significant increase in relative terms can be seen in Mozambique's trade with both Tanzania and Swaziland. On the contrary, trade relations between Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi decreased in relative terms. But Botswana-Angola trade went up; bilateral trade between Botswana and Zimbabwe got ahead of the trade relations in the region; and Zambia-Zimbabwe trade relations grew sensibly in relative terms.⁵⁵ Between 1981 and 1986, the economic situation of SADCC member-states deteriorated for many reasons, namely, severe drought, armed conflicts, increased external financial dependence and economic recession.⁵⁶ But by 1988, the situation improved. As one can see, these ups and downs are influenced by external factors.⁵⁷

An examination of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank's indicators of the direction of trade exports between African countries shows a progress to internal cooperation. A comparison of the percentage of exchange between African countries in 1981 and in 1990 reveals there is a tendency to increase the exchange. Out of 47 countries examined, 25 increased their exchange, 6 remained stagnant, and 16 decreased their exports to other African countries.⁵⁸ The marginalization, demilitarization and democratization of the continent should have positive impact on regional cooperation.

A recent example of the making of African isolationism is the overall negative reactions of "Francophone Africa" to Paris' decision to devalue the C.F.A. franc. Although the meeting of the heads of state of the franc zone has been dominated by those who still believe in the continuity of the traditional links between France and Africa, the devaluation has triggered a strong feeling, especially among a younger generation, of creating independent currency for the zone. The bitterness of the relations between France and the franc zone has led Prime Minister Edouard Balladur to initiate a trip to Africa in order to declare the success of the reform. But ultimately, Africans are the last judges of the measures. One thing is clear: Africans in the franc zone have learned how their economic relations with France were precarious in the necessity of self-reliance.

Amidst difficulties, the assertion of African capabilities is a process under way not only in Africa, but also outside the continent. Patrice Lumumba said at an international seminar held in Ibadan that on the cultural level, the new African states had to commit themselves in developing African culture.⁵⁹

No process of the integration of African and European civilizations is taking place. The problem is to borrow only what is necessary for the development of the continent. Unfortunately, as put by Ali Mazrui: "Africa as a whole borrowed the wrong things from the West – even the wrong components of capitalism. We borrowed the acquisitive appetites of capitalism but not the creative risk-taking."⁶⁰

The "fathers" of African independence like Patrice Lumumba, emphasized the particularities of African culture. African isolationism wants to go beyond the simple assertion of African values: the assertion of African capabilities too. The work achieved by Zairian researchers under the label of "appropriate technology" constitutes an illustration of the realities of African capabilities. Hard work in a hostile environment has nevertheless allowed a number of Zairians to produce simple tools to solve daily problems in "housework, cookery, farming, fuel and energy use." In 1982, more than 28 patents for inventions were attributed to Zairian researchers.⁶¹ This type of enterprise exists in other African countries, it is just a matter of being informed.

While Africans are working on the amalgamation of their culture with Western Civilization in the continent, African-Americans are doing the same thing outside Africa. An African descent isolationism is, therefore, also under process. The development of Black Studies in the US is to be classified into this process. African-American capabilities is a reality as can be testified by their different scientific inventions.

To Senghor "Negritude is the awareness, defence and the development of African cultural values."⁶² Culture is then the root of Pan-Africanism. A supposedly innate inferiority of Africans was seen by whites as the cause of the misfortune of African people. Pan-Africanism was an assertion of African values against their prejudice. It was also an assertion of solidarity of the weak against the strong.⁶³ Although African internationalism includes cultural values, it is more developmental in the sense that it promotes African capabilities at the international level. It is defined as Africans' consciousness of other marginalized communities out of the continent with whom they need to associate in order to assert their common capabilities and succeed in development. It is difficult to achieve African internationalism without a strong African isolationism first in the continent. That is why African internationalism is the long-term option available to African leaders.

African internationalism as an assertion of African capabilities is also making its way. In 1962, civil rights leaders formed the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA) to organize a black lobby on Africa. In 1976, Charles Diggs and Andrew Young launched the idea of the creation of Transafrica. And under the leadership of Randall Robinson, Transafrica played an important role in African politics in the United States.⁶⁴ An initiative of Leon Sullivan has focused on economic relations between Africans and African-Americans. Michael Clough notes that in April 1991, a delegation of prominent African-American leaders headed by Sullivan attended the first American Summit in Abuja. Its goal was to propose a plan to assist in the development of Africa.⁶⁵

The summit was followed by the second one held in Libreville, the Gabonese capital, from May 25 to May 28, 1993. The summit of Libreville was interpreted in different ways. Some analysts put it in the context of the competition for influence in Africa between the United States and France. They argued that because Gabon was one of "the

strategic points of France's African backyard", the United States moved in there to enhance its interests in France's orbit.⁶⁶ No matter how useful this analysis can be, it would not detract us from the deep significance of the summit: the assertion of African capabilities at the international level. Development was the focus of different speeches presented at the summit.⁶⁷ When Rev. Jesse Jackson and Andrew Young referred to democracy, they stressed its impact on development: "military regimes are inherently unstable" – Jackson; "democracy is essential for development" – Young.⁶⁸

The assertion of African capabilities and solidarity between Africans and the people of African descent is the process toward black intellectual independence, which could lead to what Ali Mazrui calls "black Talmudic tradition."⁶⁹ Black Talmudic tradition can trigger the internationalization of Black capabilities. The world would perhaps at last witness the blossoming of a *Pax Africana*.

Conclusion

We have demonstrated that the end of the Cold War has generated a more sophisticated world system that is better described by the term "*global apartheid*." The new system is characterized politically by unabashed victory of political liberalism in the world and the subsequent convergence of interests between the Northwest and Northeast. Economically, from East-West and North-South dichotomies, we are witnessing a North-South dichotomy where international financial institutions are controlled by the white minority who occupy the pole of affluence. The East, being shifted to the side of the white minority, no longer has any interest in defending the South as in the past. Militarily, the world has moved from bipolarity to unipolarity.

African states are already coping with the realities of global apartheid: some of them are positive, others negative. Politically, the new wave of democratization is sweeping the continent. Some dictators could not resist the "Hurricane Demos"; some have succeeded in diverting it; some others are still desperately hanging on, waiting for its eye. Economically, the event at the end of the 1980s have triggered the process of the marginalization of Africa, which was already under way. Today, no one cares about Africa; it is no longer strategically important. Everybody wants to leave it to the IMF and the World Bank. And Africa is powerlessly looking at desperately needed financial aid flying to Russia and Eastern Europe. Fortunately, the end of the Cold War has contributed to the winding down of the major military conflicts in the continent. Africans can now at least negotiate for peace settlement without a strong interference of the superpowers. In light of these changes, African leaders have two main options for the prosperity of the continent: despair or new nationalism.

Leaders who despair would continue to do much of what they were doing before without any personal conviction that these actions would develop their countries. Fortunately, the chances for despair are very slim in Africa. The decades of painful exercises have generated an embryo of competent elites willing to control their environment. They are characterized by new nationalism which is different from the old model of nationalism which was naïve and unrealistic. New nationalism can take three forms, namely, diversification of their external links, African isolationism and African internationalism – which would be developmental rather than cultural.

Notes

1. As in footnote 32 in Chapter 1 of this book.
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7. J. Nye, "What New World Order?" *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 71, No. 2, spring 1992, p.84.
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11. H. Conen, *West Africa*, 12-18 February, 1990, p.208.
12. R. Robinson, "Challenging US Policy Toward Africa." *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 46, Number 1, Summer, 1992, p.147.
13. *Ibid.*, p.155.
14. Nye, "What New World Order?" p.88.
15. G. Kemp, "Regional Security, Arms Control, and the End of the Cold War." E. Kegley and E. Wittkopf, eds., *The Future of American Foreign Policy*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, p.141.
16. J. Harbeson and D. Rothchild, *Africa in World Politics*. Boulder; San Francisco; Oxford: Westview Press, 1991, p.208.
17. *West Africa*, 23-29, July, 1990.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *The Wall Street Journal*, December, 14, 1993, p.A16.
20. Callaghy, "Africa and the world Economy: Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place." J. Harbeson and D. Rothchild, eds., *Africa in World Politics*. Boulder; San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1991, p.39.
21. *Jeane Afrique*, 23-29, July, 1990.
22. Cohen, Southeastern University Commencement Address, June 24, 1990.
23. *Africa Confidential*. Vol. 31, No. 15, 27, 1990, p.3.
24. Callaghy, "Africa and the World Economy", p.41.
25. Robinson, "Challenging US Policy", p.145.

26. General Oleségún Obasanjo, "Demarginalizing Africa", *West Africa*, 15-21 April, 1991, p.550.
27. P. Schraeder, "Speaking with Many voices: Continuity and Change in US Africa Policies." *The Journal of Modern Africa Studies*, 29, 3, 1991, p.409.
28. M. Clough, *Free at Last? US Policy Toward Africa and the End of the Cold War*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992, pp.8, 13.
29. J. Herbst, "The United States and Africa: Issues for the Future." J. Harbeson and D. Rothchild, eds., *Africa in World Politics*. Boulder; San Francisco and Oxford: West View Press, 1991, p.164.
30. Clough, "Free at Last?" p.12.
31. *Africa Recovery*, December, 1993, p.6.
32. Ibid., p.4.
33. Thomas and Mazrui, "Africa's Post-Cold War Demilitarization", p.167.
34. *West Africa*. 12-18 February, 1990, p.208.
35. Thomas and Mazrui, "Africa's Post-Cold War Demilitarization", p.165.
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42. W. Kuhne, "Africa and Gorbachev's New Realism." F. Deng and W. Zartman, eds., *Conflict Resolution in Africa*. Washington, D.C.: The Bookings Institution, 1991, p.67.
43. Ibid.
44. "Careful Intelligence" is a strategy of development suggested by Ad Abdel-Malek. It is also adopted by I. Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy*. Cambridge; New York; Port Chester; Melbourne; Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.92.
45. J. Ravenhill, "Africa and Europe: The Dilution of a 'special Relationship'." Harbeson and Rothchild, eds., *Africa in World Politics*, p.193.
46. Clough, "Free at Last?" p.17.
47. These percentages were reported by the institute de Massachusetts at the meeting of the Club of Rome in 1972 according to the Zairian Newspaper *La Semaine: Hebdomad ire d'Information Generales*, No.84, 15 Aout, 1991, p.3.
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50. N. Chazan and V. Le Vine, "Africa and the Middle East: Patterns of Convergence and Divergence." Haberson and Rothchild, eds., *Africa in World Politics*, p.217.
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53. Harbeson and Rothchild, eds. *Africa in World Politics*, p.14.
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56. Seidman and Anang, eds., *Twenty-First Century Africa*, p.78.
57. For details, see *United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank: Africa Development Indicators*. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1992, pp.114-122.
58. Amin, Chitala and Mandaza, *SADCC*, p.153.
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62. Mazrui, *Cultural Forces in World Politics*, p.135.
63. P. Calvocoressi, *Independent Africa and the World*. London and New York: Longman, 1985, p.9.
64. Clough, "Free at Last?", pp.32-33.
65. Ibid., p.34.
66. *West Africa*. 21-27 June, 1993, p.1044.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., p.1045.
69. Mazrui, *Cultural Forces in World Politics*, p.143.

India and The Post-Cold War World Order

Ideology, Policy and Politics of the Post-Cold War World Order

The ideological, political and policy questions in the post-Cold War period must be answered. Where is the post-Cold War world going? Is there any line of confrontation replacing the old one between communism and capitalism? Can globalization of market economy remain a long-term new phenomenon? Can the Western political and economic vision dominate the world? Will trouble overtake the US drive to apply its values to global problems? If so, what new ideology will emerge out of it?¹

These are some of the questions being debated among the Western think tanks. For the first time, some of the discerning thinkers have realized that secular liberal democracy, free markets, human rights and the nation-state framework of international relations may crash despite all the attempts of the Western political and financial institutions to protect them. According to G. Fuller, the “next ideology” to emerge will be the opposition to imperialist challenges by Third World regimes that cannot cope with the effects of Western values and goals.² Fuller’s ideas thus sound different from those of another American thinker, S. Huntington. Huntington argued in 1993 that the future global conflict will be dictated by “cultural clashes” rather than by economic or state interests.³ In a sense, Fuller’s forecast of a new conflict between North and South seems to be provoked by the debate over Huntington’s theory. Although he makes no reference to Huntington’s ideas, what he says is in fact a further development of and a sharp turn to the thinking on the same subject.

According to Fuller, the Third World has challenged the “modernization” concept of the West for over a century. He argued that the magnitude of Third World problems and demands and the volatility of the situation and world anarchic trends are far greater today than ever before. His ideas are thus similar to P. Kennedy’s. According to Kennedy, there is today a vast demographic – technological fault line appearing across the planet. On one side of this line are the fast growing adolescent, under-resourced, under-capitalized, under-educated societies. On the other side are rich, technologically inventive, yet demographically moribund, aging populations. The challenge, Kennedy observes, is preventing this faulty line from erupting into a world - shaking crisis.⁴

It is imperative to note that these words, coming from a Western thinker, tend to be taken as a great solace to the democratic and revolutionary movements of oppressed people

around the world. It is natural that the very triumph of Western political values at the end of the Cold War should spawn its own opposition in the pendulum swings of history.

On the spectrum of world politics today, we perceive a powerful vacuum, a gaping hole where Soviet- style Marxism- Leninism fell off the ideological map. The question then is this: do all the Third World countries have to undergo the same painful process of modernization? If yes, then it is a slightly more reassuring scenario for the West.

However, if there are serious doubts and conflicts among Third World leaders over the needs for passing through the same exercise by every small and big developing nation, then the character of the scenario changes. The debate, therefore, is whether the Western model is obligatory and inevitable.

Our response is that they are not because Western values are on trial everywhere in the absence of any global alternative. Moreover, Western Leftists and Liberals alike have adopted the same values as human rights and social-environmental causes, which are not palatable to the globalization agenda of the Western ideologies. Additionally, these values clash with the concepts of Third World people.⁵

The question of the next ideology should, therefore, not arise because we strongly believe that socialism can be revived. This is despite the fact that the last half of 1989 saw the dramatic collapse of most of the Communist Party governments of Eastern Europe. Their downfall was brought about through massive upsurges which had the support not only of the majority of the working class but also a large slice of the members of the ruling parties themselves. These were popular revolts against unpopular regimes. Engaged in a financially exhausting arms race with the US and concentrating all its energies on such areas as space research, missile technology, etc; the socialist camp lagged behind in industries and manufacture.⁶

The mounting chronicle of crimes and distortions in the history of existing socialism, its economic failures and the divide that developed between socialism and democracy, have raised doubts among the proponents of the socialist cause as to whether socialism can work at all. Indeed, already, many in the affected countries are easy targets for those aiming to achieve a reversion to capitalism.⁷ Shock - waves of very necessary self-examination have also been triggered off among communists both inside and outside the socialist world. But there should be no cause for alarm.

Socialism certainly produced a Stalin and Ceausescu. However, it also produced a Lenin and Gorbachev. Despite the distortions at the top, the nobility of socialism's basic objectives inspired millions upon millions to devote themselves selflessly to building it on the ground.⁸

But it is more vital than ever to subject the past of socialism to unsparing critique so as to draw the necessary lessons. This is because of our confidence in the future of socialism and its inherent moral superiority. We should, therefore, not allow ourselves to be inhibited merely because an exposure of failures can inevitably provide ammunition to the traditional enemies of socialism: our silence can, in any case, present them with even more powerful ammunition.

The term “Stalinism” is used to denote the bureaucratic - authoritarian style of leadership (of parties both in and out of power), which denuded the party, and the practice of socialism of most of its democratic content and concentrated power in the hands of tiny, self-perpetuating elite. Whereas the mould for Stalinism was cast under Stalin’s leadership, it is not suggested that he bears sole responsibility for its negative practices. The essential content of Stalinism, in socialism without democracy, was retained even after Stalin in the Soviet Union (until Gorbachev’s intervention), albeit without some of the terror, brutality and judicial distortions associated with Stalin himself.⁹

There is still reluctance, among a diminishing, minority, to look squarely in the mirror of history and to concede that the socialism it reflects has, on balance, been so distorted that an appeal to its positive achievements, sounds hollow and very much like a special pleading. It is obvious that if the socialist world stands in tatters at this historic conjuncture, it is due to the Stalinist distortions.¹⁰

We should have little patience with the plea in mitigation that, in the circumstances, the Stalinist excesses (such as forced collectivization), brought about some positive economic achievements. Statistics showing high growth rates during Stalin’s time prove only that those methods of primitive accumulation¹¹ can stimulate purely quantitative growth with early stages of capitalism or socialism – but at what human cost? After all, more and more evidence is emerging daily that, in the long run, the excesses inhibited the economic potential of socialism.

Another familiar plea in mitigation is that the mobilizing effect of the Stalin cult helped save socialism from military defeat. It is, however, now becoming clear that the virtual destruction of the command personnel of the Red Army, the lack of effective preparation against Hitler’s onslaught and Stalin’s dictatorial damaging intervention in the conduct of the war would have cost the Soviet Union its victory.

We need vigilance against the *perestroika* styles of work and thinking which infected virtually every communist party and moulded its members for so many decades. It is not enough to merely engage in the self-pitying cry: ‘We were misled’. We should rather ask why so many communists allowed themselves to become blinded for so long. And, more importantly, why they behaved like Stalinists towards their comrades who raised even the slightest doubt about the “purity” of Stalin’s brand of socialism.¹²

There are still outposts in the socialist world, which mourn the retreat from Stalinism and use its dogmas to “justify” undemocratic and tyrannical practices. But it is a matter of time before popular revulsion leads to a transformation. In general, those who still defend the Stalinist model – even in a qualified way – are a dying breed because at the ideological level, they are bound to be left behind.

Socialism, therefore, faces an onerous task. First, the task of the development of the Third World countries with social justice, and then of ushering in a New International Economic Order.

To perform this task, however, socialism must profit by the experiences of the last seventy-five or so years. It must revert and adhere to the basic values of socialist humanism, and never lose sight of its mission to make democracy real. The main lessons of the collapse of the socialist regimes are that there is no short cut to socialism.

Authoritarianism may yield quicker results than democracy; but to be enduring, socialism, which caters for the masses and is opposed to the benefits of development being monopolized by a few who are advantageously placed, must enlist the active support of the former. This is important because perfect equality being unattainable in society, there are bound to be groups in positions of advantage - who would engineer a counter-revolution to promote their personal or group interests. Authoritarianism gives them the required opportunity to do so.¹³

The concepts of dictatorship of the proletariat and the vanguard role of the party, even though conceptually intended for the period of transition, must be abandoned. So must be the concept of democratic centralism, which lends itself to abuse. Democracy must be adopted not merely as the ultimate end, but also as a means to an end. Violence must be eschewed, except the minimum necessary to maintain the authority of the state, and the state itself must be based on a broad democratic consensus.¹⁴

Even the domestic economic policies need to be reconsidered. In the euphoria of the Soviet Revolution, textbook dogmas were applied without due consideration of ground realities. In agriculture, collectivization was a gross instance of such a dogmatic approach. In industry and trade, nationalization to the complete exclusion of the private sector in production and exchange was another. Mixed economy is not inconsistent with socialism, provided the private sector functions within the parameters prescribed by the state. Even direct foreign investment is permissible in areas and for purposes, which benefit the masses of the host country. China and Vietnam are reported to have liberalized their economies. They are quoted as cases of disillusionment with socialism and a gradual drift to capitalism. But it need not necessarily be so. The broad policies they have adopted are consistent with socialism. It depends on how they are implemented.¹⁵

After the dissolution of the Soviet system, in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Eastern Europe, there was a veritable propaganda war against socialism and in praise of capitalism. However, continuous recession in the US and Europe and millions becoming unemployed, the havoc that restoration of capitalism brought in the former USSR and East Germany and the threat of virtual trade wars between the USA and Japan (and that too after the new General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)) have generated new thinking all over the world. How India was affected by and responded to these developments, is discussed herein.

The new phenomenon is that on the prescriptions coming from thousands of miles away, again by force of ballot, not bullets, Communists are coming up again. Indian communists of all varieties rejoiced over the Communist victories in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Russia, Italy, etc. What, however, is not clear to many Indian Communists is that they are New Communists who do not profess "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "democratic centralism" as many Indian Communists do.

It is evident that Indian Communists need to borrow a leaf from other Communists in order to march the new realities of socialism in the post-Cold War era. Even the French Communist Party abandoned the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" in 1994.¹⁶ Italians and other Communists of Europe did it much earlier. In India, it is only the CPI, which

abandoned the slogan of dictatorship of the proletariat as way back as at the Amritsar Congress in 1958, and this stand continues up to date.

Unfortunately, in India, much of the backings and squabbles between the various Communist Parties are because each of them claims to be the vanguard and wants to have its hegemony. The French Communists who cannot be accused of leaving the revolutionary path as some people do against the CPI have decided to abandon that course. Through a massive demonstration in Paris in defence of public education on January 16, 1994, they demonstrated how it can be done. Except for fascists, they rallied all but did not claim, like the India Communists in competitive claims, that the Communist Party was the main force behind that programme.¹⁷

Realizing that no merger of the CPIs can occur without proper spadework in order to minimize the programmatic differences, “revolutionaries” among the Indian Communist often claim that without one hundred per cent unity on ideological and programmatic questions, there cannot be unification of the Communist Parties. However, it can also be observed that the undivided CPI’s split and formation of CPI -M was a revolutionary step though the revolution never materialized. In Nepal, the overwhelming number of Communists did not listen to this puritanical Marxism and united themselves in one United Communist Party of Nepal, (UCPN). Ceylonese Communists have also done the same. The majority of Italian Communists, Polish and others even changed the names of their parties. Although Indians need not go to that extent, they should begin to merge their mass organizations into one body, name notwithstanding. Calling one’s pocket organizations a mass organization is the contribution of the Indian Communists to world thinking, and this has paralysed the working class in India.¹⁸

Indian Communists can borrow a leaf from the Vietnamese Communists whom no body can charge of reformism. Vietnam’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at a rate of 7.5 percent over 1992. Thus, a new Asian (Communist) Tiger is coming up from the ashes of the Cold War.¹⁹ 150 foreign companies, of which over 100 are international contractors, have registered to bid for in Vietnam. We do not imply here that American companies should build roads in India for Indians are themselves capable of doing so. However, to claim that the moment one talks of inviting foreign capital India is sold out, is ridiculous because no Indian Communist can claim to be more revolutionary than the Vietnamese.²⁰

Turning to China, we can claim that Indian Communists have the credit of facing the hostility both of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and of the Communist Party of China (CPC). But world revolution or success of world socialism cannot come out of it. It is, therefore, ridiculous to think that the Indian Communists have now become the centre of International Communism or even for the fight against imperialism or US imperialism for that matter.²¹

It is important to recognize that the Chinese like the Vietnamese, are not opposed to large-scale import of foreign capital and the Dunkel proposals now incorporated in the GATT. We do not doubt the remarkable or unprecedented development of China that has been achieved along with the rise in the standard of living. The consumption level of farmers has risen to 6.7 per cent per annum, national consumption to 6.8 per cent, and the per capita income of the rural people at the annual rate of 8.9 percent following fifteen years of reform in the Peoples Republic of China. It is, therefore, Communist China that

has the potential to challenge the hegemony of the US in the twenty first century and not any hot phrases and jargons.²²

The Communist Party of China says that there is no fundamental contradiction between a socialist economy and a market economy. To the party, the issue is which is more suitable for developing social productivity. Solely adopting a planned economy fetters production, according to the party ideologues.²³ The Cubans are moving toward a similar direction. In recent years, the Cuban Government has paid particular attention to the formation of joint ventures with foreign capital, a process that is advancing successfully with the tourism area and is beginning to extend to other economic activities.²⁴

This is quite different from the thinking of the Indian Communists. Although there is no question of copying any country, nevertheless it is no use shutting our eyes from it.

Similarly, on the question of unity of Communists and all progressive forces, we witness a new development in Italy. Italy's Communist Refoundation Party cannot be accused of liquidating the Communist Party as one can say of the new Communist formation of Democratic Party of the Left (PS), which is the majority. Despite the split being new and not more than thirty years old as in the case of India, the second congress of the Communist Refoundation Party of Italy by 70 percent of votes, adopted a resolution for a political, programmatic and electoral alliance of the left and progressive forces and rejected the resolution either of separate, independent line or alliance only for electoral purpose.²⁵

We recognize that the threat of Hindutva in India is no less than that of fascism in Italy. Although leftist groups realize this, they do not come forward to unite all the secular forces in a concrete manner. However, when the threat became more than imminent, the call for voting for the congress was made at Shimla at the eleventh hour.²⁶ This, notwithstanding, the CPI attempted a new approach to some extent in its programmatic statement. The abolition of the licence permit raj, was welcomed. Even import of foreign capital was not ruled out as we shortly discuss in some detail. What suffices to observe here is that in action. The overwhelming majority of the Indian people demanded the rolling back of the new Economic Policy in Toto. They know that Dunkel is now incorporated in the GATT. But even then, the Dunkel agitation is going on when actually the need is to concretise the possible adverse provisions and practices of the new GATT and prepare mass actions against them. When threatened by the US trade law 310 even a strong economy like Japan has to retaliate by stating that it would go in appeal to the World Trade Organization established under the new GATT.²⁷ The CPI also supported the Mandal Commission recognizing the element of the caste factor in India. This it did by noting a combination of new social forces fighting for social justice and political power.²⁸

On the ideological question proper, the CPI in the preamble of the Party Constitution, had said that the "noble traditions, historical experience, rich cultural heritage and valuable teachings of great social reformers and thinkers of our country will hold the party to cultivate scientific temper and social ideals". On organizational principles, it has added a new element by stating in the same preamble "... minority opinions on substantial political issues shall be made known to all party units and party members."²⁹

These are some of the new features indicative of the rethinking sweeping the CPI. This is certainly a positive development. Instead of resorting to mutual recriminations, indeed, Indian Communists of all varieties should sit down to chart the actual viable and convincing alternative path to meet the post-Cold War challenges in India. Communists all over the world are doing it. In face of the US offensive, the need of the hour is to unite, not only the Communists, but also all the patriotic and secular forces to defend India, the Indian economy, as well as security.

The most appropriate ideology to fulfil these multi-dimensional goals is socialism in its revamped form. Socialism has a greater role to play in the twenty first century to bring justice to millions of world populations who are crying out for such justice than it played in the twentieth century.³⁰ This is provided the following factors are taken care of: First, the right conclusions should be drawn from the collapse of the socialist regimes. Second, the human values of socialism should not be abandoned, not even in the period of transition. Third, the dogmas which have developed in the name of Marxism are suitably modified to suit the ground realities.

This also means that we cannot dismiss the past of socialism as an unmitigated failure. After all, statistics show that before the demise of the Soviet Union, that is, after only seventy years of social endeavour in what was one of the most backward countries in the capitalist world, there were more graduate engineers than in the US, more graduate research scientists than in Japan and more medical doctors per head than in western Europe. It also produced more steel, fuel and energy than any other country.³¹ How many capitalist countries can match the achievements of most of the socialist world in the provision of social security, child care, the ending of cultural backwardness, and so on? There is certainly no country in the world, which can beat Cuba's record in the sphere of health care.

Another area within the ideological spectrum in which India should readjust is non-alignment. Non-alignment as an ideology and a policy of Third World countries during the post-Cold War period has been a centre of debate among scholars of international relations the world over. The most persistent question often asked is whether or not non-alignment remains relevant to Third World countries in the post-Cold War era. For instance, according to Huntington's book, non-alignment is not only old fashioned, but largely irrelevant in the post-Cold War era.³² But according to Rajan's book, non-alignment remains relevant to India's foreign policy and to NAM in global politics, despite the end of the Cold War, and in spite of the pressures of the process of globalization of India's political economy. It is to Rajan's argument that we subscribe.

According to him, non-alignment and the NAM were only "born in the Cold War but did not originate in the Cold War itself, nor was it integral to it." Politically, to him, "the alleged revolutionary changes" in the post-Cold War are illusory because hegemonization of the great powers over the international system remains today as valid as ever for the last 350 years of the sovereign - state system. The US pressure on Russia to subvert the two year Indo-Russian agreement of the sale of cryogenic engines (along with transfer of related technology), is to Rajan a blatant act of US apprehensions of India as a potential competitor in the field of commercial launching of satellites." Hence, he pleads for non-alignment as the foreign policy umbrella for India to pursue the policy

of “self reliance” in technology, and opposition to the discriminatory character of the NPT and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as part of NAM’s basic crusade for the democratization of international relations.³³ That Russia had to succumb to US pressure in this respect for understandable Russian economic reasons, is one aspect of the prevailing state of international relations. It was a blatant act of superpowerism.

The related, but more important, point of this development is its political as well as economic significance to non-aligned India. In effect, the US forced modification of a valid agreement between two independent, sovereign nations. Politically, it needs to be underlined that the allegedly revolutionary changes in the post-Cold War period is nothing of the kind - hegemonism of the imperialist powers over the international system remains today as during and even before the Cold War. This needs to be re-emphasized, contrary to much conventional thinking, especially in the news media. For this reason, non-alignment continues to be relevant and valid, despite post- Cold War (and superficial) changes in the framework of international relations.³⁴

Second, in terms of economic significances, it is clear that there is little prospect of the developed states helping in the economic or technological development of the developing states. The so-called North-South dialogue has been practically frozen, and the developed states have shown mere lip-sympathy for the poor, developing states, by intermittently - and in dribblets - offering economic and technical assistance (perhaps outmoded too). The US opposition to the Indo - Russian economic and technical deal we have already referred to, was more to do with this old stand than the present US smokescreen to prevent transfer of the technology of the manufacture of missiles of non-members of the notorious international cartel of the developed states (and their friends, the MTCR).³⁵

Another economic aspect of the US pressure on Russia is that the Russian cryogenic engines are believed to be much cheaper than those of the US, and that is precisely the reason for India going in for the Russia engines. This was done after exploring the costs of supply of the engines by some other nations, particularly, the US and France. In the circumstances, non-aligned India has no option but to return to its time-tested policy of self - reliance in the development of technology for these engines, as in other respects. Indian scientists are capable of manufacturing these engines. Obviously, this would mean greater cost, and delay too, in the manufacture of these engines. But then, that is how other nations, China in particular, have developed their own technology. There is no alternative if India is determined to retain its non-aligned stance. This, therefore, is in India’s vital national interest. As such, it is a major political decision for the Government of India.³⁶

There is no ground to fear that if India went ahead with the indigenous development of this technology, India would have to confront the US, the sole superpower. This is unnecessary as the case of India’s decision to go nuclear confirms. This is simply a matter of skilful diplomacy. India, therefore, has to reiterate its traditional stand that, as a non-aligned state, it plans to move ahead in its economic, technological, development for peaceful purposes.³⁷

It is also in this regard that New Delhi should not resent Russia’s reneging of its agreement with India. Moscow has its problems and reasons for yielding to US pressure. Nevertheless, New Delhi can continue to maintain with Moscow, economic,

technological and diplomatic relations in other fields. In this way, New Delhi can, as it has done before, avoid a confrontation with Moscow, which continues to be a reliable old friend.³⁸

In the large sense, the 113 countries that make up the NAM account for over 75 per cent of the world's population and the largest single supra-national organization outside the UN. The Movement brings together people of the developing countries who have a similar colonial experience of foreign power domination and suffer from the skewed world economic and political order heavily loaded against them. We cannot, therefore, say that such an important body ceases to be relevant simply because the Cold War has ended. The global power dispensation as it is constituted in the post-Cold War period is hostile and disadvantages NAM members, India inclusive.

The issues now are more inclined to economic development, liberalization and the globalization of trade and financial services to the advantage of the developed countries. This is the new challenge facing the NAM. But there are even larger challenges such as the democratization of the internal power structures of the NAM member states, accountability and transparency in governance and the liberalization of the political space. Others include the nurturing of a consensual mode of governance that is inclusive and protects minority rights, encourages conflict resolution within and outside the member-states, and protects human rights and human dignity. All these issues were, at the height of the Cold War, placed on the back burner and were in virtually all member – states, grossly violated and abused with impunity.

It is, therefore, imperative that the NAM in the early twenty first century, takes cognizance of the fact that most of the current conflicts in the world are largely confined to its members. These conflicts, both internal and external, are threatening the very survival of the NAM. The democratic world, therefore, expects that NAM can address these wars and conflicts forcefully and dispassionately as they are crucial to the survival of the movement as a visible supra-national organization, rather than becoming another talking shop in which leaders seek glory and grand - standing.

Like other international groupings, the NAM has to re-invent itself in order to sustain geopolitical relevance and to be of benefit to member-states. It needs a new common denominator, a thread that binds its diverse membership and gives it a renewed sense of purpose. The NAM has to promote peace and development. It is only by acting together that the poor of the world can be heard. And it is by unity that common enemies such as war and poverty can be conquered. It is actually by hanging on, and revising the mission statement that the NAM can hope to succeed further.

This should not be something difficult to achieve. The NAM can borrow a leaf from history. It is now established that such bodies can always organize themselves to get their own back in whatever small way they can. For instance, the oil - producing countries were once in a position in which they thought they could do nothing to win the perennial war between oil and gold in dollar terms. But by organizing themselves into the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), they have been able to win many battles against the predatory international order, including through the 1974 embargo. Since then, the oil consuming countries have never again dismissed the oil

exporting countries contemptuously. The Group of Seventy Seven have similarly used their forum to take home important gleanings from the geopolitical North.³⁹

By continuing with dialogue, the NAM can reach a common stand through which to confront the geopolitical North in the struggle for a fairer world system. Failure to unite on fundamental issues is one of the factors that makes it easy for the North to maintain its privileged, profligate and arrogant over-lordship over the South. It is for this reason that the NAM should rethink its strategies in a world in which it can no longer play one superpower off against another. Only a rejuvenated NAM can force the gnomes of Zurich to make up to their ethical duty to fellow humans.⁴⁰

The importance of NAM is further confirmed by what amounts to “Sowing the seeds of a New Cold War”⁴¹ This disturbing picture was painted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit of 1993 which approved a US proposal, “Partnership for Peace”. The proposal involves the extension of NATO’s scope to provide for immediate military cooperation and political consultations between the NATO and the East European nations - Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Poland -all former members of the erstwhile Warsaw Pact. This act was a prelude for full membership of NATO. But Russia protested against the extension of NATO’s territorial jurisdiction to its borders. However, it is possible that this cautious, preliminary step is meant to entice Russia too into the NATO’s partnership - an unlikely possibility.

This development was the first serious step in reversing the progress to a new post-Cold War world order - the sowing of the seeds of an incipient Cold War, and devaluing of the detente among the great powers. For obvious reasons, both sides of the old Cold War were very cautious and discreet, either in respect of the US proposal and NATO approval or in Russia’s negative criticism. What is clear is that the East European nations desired full membership of the NATO, and have accepted the NATO proposal. Much as Russia would want to criticize this extension of NATO, it was restrained by its post-Cold War domestic political problems and by its dependence for economic assistance from the old Western bloc, namely, the developed states.⁴²

It is clear that a new detente has emerged despite the crumbling of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of a bipolar world. It is, therefore, premature to celebrate the end of the Cold War and a bipolar world. The lessons of diplomatic history provide the simple reason. Among the many lessons of this diplomatic history, one that has prevailed intermittently, is that, the Cold War although not so characterized until the end of World War II, detente has alternated for all the 350 or so years of the sovereign nation-state system. This is so because the play of power politics has been persistent since the birth of the system in the mid seventeenth century. This play comprises the desire of states to retain their power and to increase it constantly vis-à-vis other states - at least for most of the times.⁴³

Thus, initially, the new development of the extension of the NATO into Central European states posed a danger, sowing the seeds of a new Cold War between the NATO and the new Russia. It would eventually and naturally, break down the prevailing detente. But this would only be a repetition of the fate of the detente of the 1970s, which broke down in the 1980s, until the new detente in the late 1980s.⁴⁴

We do not dismiss either the anxiety of the East European states about the re-emergence of Russian chauvinism and the threat to their security from it, or Russian suspicion about the motives behind the extension of the NATO's geographical/political jurisdiction. Indeed, both are legitimate. But this does not lend credence to the co-called better post-Cold War world order.⁴⁵

In other words, the end of the Cold War has not paved the way for a more peaceful world as was originally expected. At the beginning of the twenty first century, peace continues to elude humankind. A more turbulent world is in place as non-Western cultures reassert themselves on global politics as the West fades. We are witnessing a Hobbesian state of war born of the feverish struggle to dislodge the West, led by the US, from its present status as a superpower. What we are witnessing is the beginning of the disintegration of the world followed by integration, consolidation and expansion of new power centres. The doomsday hypothesis is that the west is declining in both real and relative terms, while the East is concomitantly ascending, where the top contenders for world domination are China and the Muslim world.⁴⁶

The building blocks in Huntington's model are that the ideological wars we have already discussed - capitalism versus socialism - have given way to the wars between cultures. *He views language and religion as the core of any culture and that cultures emerge when a people are faced with a crisis, when they perceive that their survival as a distinct group is threatened.*

A culture gives rise to states and power for confronting the enemy. The questions peoples are now asking everywhere in this era of cultural resurgence are, "who are we?" "who are they?" and "who are our enemies?" Wars are then fought along the lines dictated by answers to these questions. Consequently, one method of determining the strength of a culture is whether or not its language and religion are dominant.

Territorially, matters are even more frightening for the West. Using statistics and maps, Huntington shows that the dominance of the West was in the 1920's when the Western powers controlled 49 percent of the world's land area. This has dwindled over the years to the extent that now the Western powers seem to have retreated or forced back to North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand, an area amounting to only 24 percent of the world. Other civilizations have resurged and taken up the rest. These other cultures and civilizations listed include China, Japan, Islam, Hindu, Orthodox Russia, Latin America, and Buddhism.

Economic growth is discussed as another key variable in the resurgence of the East. Japan took the lead starting in the 1950's; then rapid economic growth began to be registered in the so-called Four Tigers (Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore). They were followed by China, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, India and Vietnam. These countries are said to have registered steady average annual growth rates of between 8 and 10 percent or more, which contrasts, drastically with most growth of the European and American economies and the stagnation that has pervaded much of the rest of the world. Huntington observes that this transformation has been overwhelming to the extent that the second and third largest economies in the world in the 1990s were in Asia with likely increase to four of the five and seven of the ten largest economies by the year 2020 thereby making Asia control over 40 percent of the world's

economic production. Yet, economic power means political power and this is where the fear lies. Asian countries are, therefore, set to rival the West for domination. The medical metaphors in the East in the 1990s were and still are: "The days when US sneezed and Asia caught cold are over; and even a high fever in America will not make Asia cough."⁴⁷

Then enters the arms race with the East acquiring immense military power and weapons of mass destruction. The leader in this is China. Apart from arming itself to the teeth, China has also helped its Asian friendly countries to follow suit. More frighteningly is China's nuclear power, which has spread to North Korea, Pakistan and the Muslim world. China possesses nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles capable of striking New York from China's mainland. This arms proliferation now puts the balance of power at stake as the percentage figures of World Military power since 1900 show. In 1900, the West controlled 43.7 percent; China, 10 percent; Islam, 16.7 percent; Russia, 16.6 percent of the world's military power. In the 1920s, the corresponding figures were 48.5 percent; 17.4 percent; 3.6 percent; and 12.8 percent. This was the zenith of Western military power. Then the law of diminishing returns took over; things began to shift away such that by 1970, the West controlled a declined military power while the other civilizations had expanded theirs; Western, 26.8 percent; China 24.7 percent; Islam, 10.4 percent; and Russia, 25.1 percent. By 1991, Western military power declined further to 21.1 percent while China moved up to 25.7 percent; Islam, 20 percent and Russia dropped to 14.3 percent. It is projected that by the year 2020, the West will command a mere 10 percent or less of world military power, down from 45 percent in the 1920s. The scenario is alarming to the West.

Thus, in all spheres of development, the West is on the decline and the East on rapid rise. This is why a new world power is likely to emerge in the twenty first century. But it will not be easy. There will be wars as the struggle for supremacy gets under way. It has already happened, it is on, and it is unstoppable. It is in this regard that the first gulf war took place (US - led coalition versus Iraq in 1991).⁴⁸ It is also in this regard that we can understand why under Bill Clinton, the US tried to re-establish itself as the global policeman, thereby upholding the position of his predecessor, George Bush, adopted against Iraq after the end of the Gulf War, by continuously bombing Iraq and imposing, via the UN, embargoes and military surveillance against Baghdad.⁴⁹

It is the same behaviour that explains the US missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan on August 20, 1998. The attacks targeted installations which, according to Washington, were linked to Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi businessman whom the US accused of funding a network of terrorist groups and of being responsible for the August 2, 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi city, Kenya and Dar-es Salaam city, Tanzania. Washington alleged that the target bombarded in Khartoum, Sudan, was a chemical plant that manufactured a substance used in chemical warfare.⁵⁰ Much as international terrorism cannot be tolerated in international relations, it is argued in many diplomatic and academic circles that the US missile attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan were carried out to try to divert the attention of Americans from President Clinton's sex scandal involving him and a former White House intern, Monica Lewinsky.⁵¹ Osama Bin Laden was to later claim responsibility for the attack on New York's World Centre and the Pentagon on September 11th, 2001.

Of course, Huntington was right in a number of ways. But by over playing the “clash of civilizations” dimensions, he ignored the creative, constructive interaction and engagement between or among the civilizations. For instance, Islam, through centuries of exchange with the West, laid the foundations for the growth of mathematics, sciences, medicines, agriculture, industry and architecture in medieval Europe. Today, some of the leading ideas and institutions that have gained currency within the Muslim world, whether in politics or in economics, are imports from the West. Huntington also missed the point that Hindu and Muslim cultures, as they stand today, have imbibed each other’s numerous qualities and aspects in the course of history.⁵²

Another weakness in Huntington’s analysis is his failure to highlight the second cardinal feature at the philosophical level. Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Sikhism and Taoism, share certain common perspectives on the relationship between humans and their environment, the integrity of community, importance of family, significance of moral leadership, and the meaning and purpose of life. Civilizations are, therefore, capable of forging common aspirations and bonds. A typical example is the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN) which encompasses at least four “civilization identities”, to use Huntington’s term - Buddhism (Thailand), Confucian (Singapore), Christian (Philippines) and Muslim (Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia). Yet it has evolved an identity through trials of thirty years.

It is, therefore, clear that Western thinkers hardly accept that the root causes of global conflicts lie in the US and Western dominance, not the clash of civilizations. By magnifying the so-called clash of civilizations and underplaying all other major factors behind such clashes, Huntington tries to preserve, protect and perpetuate western dominance, which he claims is under threat from a “Confucian - Islamic connection” that is emerging as a challenge to the Western interests. This is the most mischievous and most dangerous implication of his theory of the “clash of civilizations”.

It is true that the Western public is under pressure of recession and unemployment. But his thesis could mislead them by diverting their ire against wrong “enemies” other than their own civilizations. Thus, if indeed, the West is declining according to Huntington’s statistics, never mind their accuracy and genuineness, the reasons for this possible decline are to be found in the West itself. Similarly, China and some Islamic nations have indeed acquired weapons of mass destruction. But it is not entirely true that the Islamic states are buying weapons from China, although it is true that China is rapidly increasing its weapons capability. Of course, the military power of the West must be countered. But if the military power of the West is declining, it is not necessarily, because that of China and the East is increasing but probably because Western weapons technology is either stagnating or deteriorating.

But how does one reconcile Huntington’s plea that the West and the US in particular, “should not reduce its military capabilities”? The facts tell a different story. First, the US has not reduced its military power.

It is the largest global weapons merchant. It sold weapons worth \$ 25 billion in 1993 alone. US is also the most well equipped power with a wide range of sophisticated weaponry. Second, although China is an important producer of weapons, it is the only major power, which reduced its military budget throughout the 1980s. Third, most

Muslim countries buy their weapons not from China but from the US. The US was, for instance, instrumental in arming Iraq against Iran during the two countries' eight-year war in the 1980s, only for Washington to realize Iraq's military power before it turned around to destroy what it had helped Iraq to build. The US has also been instrumental in arming Pakistan against India, thereby fuelling the arms race between the two neighbours. The US military support for Israel and reactionary Arab regimes like those in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and others, is well documented. Fourth, China has failed to endorse the Muslim position on many global issues. The Confucian - Islamic Connection is, therefore a myth propagated to justify the US military spending.⁵³

Huntington's thesis matches with some of those American scholars like Jeanne Kirkpatrick, former US Ambassador to the UN and now professor of Government at Georgetown University, who believe that the next big confrontation is bound to occur between the West and Islam. As far as "Islamic threat" perception is concerned, Huntington and the like, have no difficulty in selling their ideas to the West. Antagonism toward Islam and Muslims is deeply embedded into the psyche of the Western society. Hindus are recognized just only as some spiritualists and nothing beyond that. "Islam has bloody borders", writes Huntington, meaning Muslims spill the blood. Yet more often than not, it is the Muslims who are being bullied, bloodied, budgeoned and butchered. A small faction of Islamic fundamentalists does not constitute the entire Islam. An ordinary Muslim in any country does not support fundamentalists or terrorists.⁵⁴

Huntington lists half a dozen civilizations. At first sight, one would feel he was right. Were not the Catholic Croats fighting Orthodox Serbs? Both of them opposing Muslim Bosnians? Azeris fighting Armenians? Ruthless conflict between extremist Hindus and Muslims in India is also an example.

This view is totally deceptive. A second look at the world would make it clear: it is neither simple nor new. Conflicts between civilizations are as old as history of humankind. Consider the struggle of Jews against Rome in the first century, or revolt of Greeks against Turks in the nineteenth century. Occidents and Orientals have been in conflict often in the last 1300 years. Disputes with China, North Korea, or Japan are not nourished by conflicts between their civilizations. They are the result of their palpable national interests at work. Moreover, within each camp of civilization, conflicts within themselves and divisions are far more significant. Such a scenario does not exclude the West, which some observers equate with violence and barbarity.

Thus, "New World Superpower" or not, the post-Cold War world order is more disorganized and more unstable than the Cold War world order. This does not make the NAM and the UN "old - fashioned and largely irrelevant" in the so-called new world order as Huntington and his likes⁵⁵ would like us to believe. To the contrary, this disturbing development re-emphasizes once more, the need for continuing vigilance of the non-aligned nations to protect their non-alignment from the potential renewed Cold War struggle between the sole remaining superpower, the US, which is continuing its hegemonic policies over the world community and new centres of power which, although resisting such American imperialistic design, would themselves become imperialist; hence the need for NAM to search for a new *raison d'être* after the end of the East -

West polarization. Moreover, one unchecked superpower is as dangerous as two mutually antagonistic super powers.

The UN needs to do the same. Looking back at the operations of the UN for the last fifty-three years, an obvious fact emerges that the world organization is an absolutely indispensable factor in the conduct of international relations. This despite the limitations of the UN in a Cold War framework.

It was thought that once the Cold War ended, the UN would operate normally, in terms of the provisions of the Charter and the foundational, extra - Charter, assumption about the revival of great power understanding.⁵⁶

However, we know that the Cold War was not entirely responsible for the distortions in the working of the UN, although it became customary to blame the failures of the UN on it. The reasons for the failures or limitations of the UN were due to other factors, which few were willing to admit openly. Among them, the major one is the old adage about the League of Nations; that the failure was not of the organization, but of member-nations. It is unfortunate that the Cold Warriors misused the forum and instrumentality of the UN to serve their respective bloc interests. Whereas the Cold War distorted the functioning of the UN - contrary to the provisions of the charter and the extra- charter assumption - the fact that the organization has survived the Cold War provides some lessons for the twenty first century. The most obvious but very important one is that it survived despite the pessimistic view of many nations, intellectuals and the media. Second, it has been responsible for achieving specific, though limited, successes in all aspects of its five purposes: maintenance of peace and peaceful settlement of disputes; promotion of self determination of colonial peoples; promotion of economic, social and cultural cooperation; of fundamental human rights and freedoms; and above all; as a forum for the harmonization of conflicting interests of nations.⁵⁷

Besides these limited successes, the more demonstrative success is in the tremendous, nearly four-fold, expansion of membership, despite the Cold War distortions, from the original 51 Nation - states to 185. This expansion was inconceivable in the late 1940s, because of the plain limitations of Article 4 of the charter. This has occurred despite these limitations. Today, contrary to these limitations, the principle of universality of membership has been unquestioningly accepted. The best example was the admission to membership of four old, minuscule states of Europe, namely, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco and Andorra. The smallness of their area and population as sovereign states, is even laughable. In effect, membership of the world body has become the most important badge of sovereignty of states and peoples. Equally, it is the basis of greater and more comprehensive effectiveness of the Organization.⁵⁸

Equally important to observe is the fact that despite the Cold War constraints, the UN has intermittently expanded the scope of its jurisdiction and activities; again, inconceivable by the framers of the charter or member-nations. Perhaps the best illustration is the underplaying of the domestic jurisdiction provision (Article 2(7) of the charter vis-à-vis the continually expanding scope of UN jurisdiction. It seems today there is nothing to limit this scope, except the consensus of member-states. This is an amazing development, which even the traditional skeptics ought to acknowledge. Indeed, this is an aspect of the functioning of the UN, which is a good illustration of the great potentialities of the world

body - beyond the term of the Charter or the intentions of the founders of the organization.⁵⁹

What is further amazing is that none of these positive beneficial developments during the Cold War necessitated amendments to the charter. It is worth noting that there were many other positive developments during the Cold War era that were greatly conducive to the strengthening, and even survival of the organization.

Another major positive development of the Cold War era, which, however, was not directly due to the UN itself, is the emergence of the NAM, which we have already discussed. The NAM greatly moderated the Cold War distortions of the UN and consequently helped to stabilize it, and even to survive the Cold War. Until the early 1960s, the UN was dominated by the US - led camp. However, the emergence of the NAM altered this situation and helped the world body in many positive ways. Whereas it is in order to deplore the Cold War distortions in the functioning of the UN, in retrospect, it is fair to argue that the firm foundations of the world body were laid during these very Cold War years. Perhaps, the survival of the UN is a sort of dividend for the twenty-first century.⁶⁰

The end of the Cold War era revived the hopes of many nations about the UN working thereafter according to the terms of the charter as well as the foundational assumption of the Organization - that indeed, a new and beneficial era had dawned on the world order not only in the immediate post-Cold War era, but even in the twenty first century, of which the UN would be the centre - piece. Despite some notable, positive developments in the immediate years of the end of the Cold War, the overall developments have not been entirely conducive to the hopes of revival of the world body, either according to the terms of the charter or the expectations and hopes of member-nations. For instance, whereas the harmful bipolar division of the world has come to an end, it has been replaced by something much worse, namely, a unipolar world with the US as the sole hegemon. This deplorable development has had numerous negative impacts on international politics, including the functioning of the UN. As a result, this grave development has revived, in a more acute form, the domination of the world body in the 1950s, by the US and its Western allies. The US pays 25 percent of the UN budget plus another 30 percent for other UN activities. More seriously, the US held the UN at ransom by not paying its dues both for budgetary and other expenses of the world body to the extent of \$ 1.179 billion in 1995. Granted, some other member - nations were also heavily indebted to the UN. But this was no excuse for the US, the richest contributor, not to pay its legitimate dues.⁶¹

Worse still, US domination, both within and outside the UN, resulted in the manipulation of the two other, traditionally adversarial permanent members of the Security Council — Russia, the erstwhile Soviet Union until its demise — China in order to serve the interests of the US and its Western Allies. The notorious instance was the way the Council was made to give a blank cheque to the USA and with the connivance of these two great powers, to punish Iraq for its “aggression occupation” of Kuwait in 1990 and onwards, and this outside the authority, control of the Security Council, and without any accountability to the UN.

This American act was a violation, in some respects, of the terms of Chapter VII of the charter. The US action had less to do with the UN vacating the aggression of Iraq on, and occupation of, a tiny nation. It had more to do with the achievement of a variety of US foreign policy objectives and interests in the Gulf area. That the US and Russia connived at the misuse of the Security Council authority to serve essentially the wide interests of the US and its Western allies, does not redound to the credit of these permanent members of the UN. It, *inter alia*, marginalized the General Assembly.⁶²

In the case of Haiti too, in 1994, Washington was able to get the Security Council authorization with the connivance of Russia and China for threatening to use force to replace a military regime with its elected President. This US action had more to do with the US Monroe Doctrine than with the purposes or principles of the UN charter. The UN should not impose democracy on member-states with threats or use of force. After all, the UN, and the US are not concerned with promoting democracy in many other cases of member-states. Action in the case of Haiti also underlines the dangers of the UN intervening in the internal politics of small or weak nations and that too selectively and arbitrarily on some excuse or another, such as alleged violation of human rights.

In fact, the Western news media and intellectuals have even questioned the sovereignty of some Third World countries despite their UN membership because of the sad tragic cases of Somalia and Rwanda. Some of them have even revived the old abandoned idea of some being placed under UN trusteeship. It is, therefore, all the more appropriate that the state remains the foundation stone of the present world order. It is, essentially because of the success of the US manipulation of the Security Council in the Iraq - Kuwait case that the then US President Bush and the Western news media triumphantly announced that at the end of the Cold War, the world body had been revived and a new world order had emerged. But nothing of the kind happened. The reality of the matter is that at the beginning of the 21st Century, there is only a US world order, not a new UN world order - which is terrible for the UN and its members.⁶³

One harmful consequence of US domination of the UN and, the international financial institutions, is that since the end of the Cold War, the UN has come to have a far lesser role than during the Cold War years in the promotion of international economic cooperation, particularly in the economic development of many poor countries. However, despite this pessimistic observation, there are positive developments, which induce an optimistic view of the Organization at the threshold of the reorganization of the UN and of restructuring the Security Council, especially in its composition. There was also wide participation in the debate on the Secretary -General's proposals in his Agenda for peace seeking to reform and strengthen the UN. Whereas some of his proposals were impracticable, the debate on them encouraged thinking and approach on positive and optimistic terms.⁶⁴

In the debate, there was less idealism and more realism of what is possible and desirable in the transformation of the world body and its place in the post-Cold War world order. There was also a realization that the UN's powers and financial resources are too limited to carry out its continually expanding activities. The Organization's powers, barring enforcement powers under chapter VII of the charter, are limited to recommendations, requests, appeals, advice and general norm setting for all countries.

In brief, if the UN has to genuinely contribute to world peace, security and development, it should effect a restructuring of its principal organ. Closely associated with the task of reforming the UN is the vexed issue of restructuring the Security Council (SC). In this regard, much debate has occurred. One view is that Germany, Japan, India, Nigeria and Tanzania should be accommodated as permanent members of the UN security Council.

Whereas the US and its allies are not averse to granting permanent membership to Germany and Japan, they are opposed to India being seated in the UNSC. The other view is that Germany and Japan should be made permanent members with veto powers, but India, Brazil or Nigeria could be admitted on a separate category as additional permanent members but without veto powers.

The US has come up with the idea of creating a new Economic Security Council in the event of worldwide pressure on the major powers to involve India, Brazil and or Nigeria as permanent members with veto powers. In other words, the US would like to have a separate forum of five or seven nations which would wield more and crucial powers in the UNSC, should it be expanded. This would be another way of maintaining its hegemony in the UN system.⁶⁵

The advocacy of India for a permanent seat in the UNSC, needs to be examined objectively. It is the argument of Indian leaders and diplomats at the UN and elsewhere that considerations of the country's size and geo-strategic location, its population, its role in world affairs, especially its commitment to the objectives enshrined in the UN charter, its contributions to the UN fund and more so its participations in the UN peace-keeping and peace settlement activities from Korea to Somalia, entitle it to a seat in the UNSC. India also has the support of many a powerful nation in this regard, including Russia. Margaret Thatcher also supported India's case for the UNSC in her lecture at the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation in New Delhi sometime in 1995. The US too tried to extract concessions from India on the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the US would support India's candidature of the UNSC if India agreed to sign the NPT. But Indian leaders are fully aware of such American designs and were not about to oblige to them in this regard.⁶⁶ This was confirmed when India exploded nuclear devices in May 1998, and thus declared itself a nuclear state.

Washington came up with yet another argument to exclude India from the UNSC. Its argument was that representation of countries other than Germany and Japan should be on the basis of regional representation. This pitied Argentina against Brazil in Latin America, Egypt against Nigeria in Africa and Indonesia against India in Asia, with a further complication in the case of India that Pakistan would strenuously try to block a regional consensus for India. But developing countries should not allow their efforts to be side tracked by their inter and intra- regional rivalries over the membership of the restructured security Council.⁶⁷

An independent group of experts established at the suggestion of the UN Secretary-General, also examined the question of the expansion of the UNSC. The group comprised Muchkund Dubey, former Indian foreign Secretary, Richard Von Weizsacker, former president of Germany, Moeen Qureeshi, former Vice-president of the World Bank, and Brain Urghart, former Under Secretary - General at the UN and a resident scholar at the Ford Foundation. The group, which worked under the aegis of the Ford

Foundation, proposed the enlargement of the UNSC from present 15 to 23 states. It also suggested that there should be five new permanent members in the council, raising the strength of permanent members to ten.⁶⁸

The group set only one criterion for Council membership couched in vague language, recommending that all the new members should be selected with due attention paid to the principle of “participation” and “equity” in a universal organization. The new permanent members would also be chosen, said the group, for their ability and will to contribute according to their capabilities to peacekeeping and peace enforcement.⁶⁹

Regarding the position of the veto, the group said that the veto rights of the permanent members should be restricted to issues concerning peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The group also suggested that to enable a better handling of new challenges to international peace and security, a team be established to keep the pulse on developments to be able to give early warnings to the UN about new exploding situations around the world. It also proposed a rapid deployment force under the control of the UN to meet sudden unexpected situations. On the question of the creation of the new Economic Council, the report of the Independent Working Group make detailed proposals, the most important being that it should formulate guidelines to coordinate the work of the UN agencies and international institutions engaged in such issues as fiscal, and trade policies.⁷⁰

In relation to the expansion of the UNSC, the non-aligned countries were guided by the positions enunciated in the final documents adopted at the Jakarta Summit and subsequent Ministerial meetings in Cairo and New York. The two guiding principles established by the NAM were equitable geographical distributions and sovereign equality of states. Accordingly, the non-aligned countries suggested an expansion of the UNSC to 26 with four members for the Western European and other Group, three for the East European Group, Seven for the Asian Group, seven for the African Group and five for the Latin American -Caribbean Group. But how such expansion could be undertaken was the big question.⁷¹

Some UN observes like Olara Otunnu, President of the International Peace Academy, a former Ambassador of Uganda to the UN and also a former Foreign Minister of Uganda, have suggested a four-tier membership structure. The first tier would comprise the present permanent members, namely, the US, Britain, France, Russia and China. They would retain their veto power with the understanding that it would be used with restriction. The second tier of membership would comprise new permanent members without the right of veto. The third tier would comprise a new category of “tenured seats” which would be for a period longer than two years but less than permanent. This new category, also called “semi-permanent”, “quasi-permanent”, or “composite” would acquire its membership on the basis of a three plus one formula granting three tenured seats to members selected from each of the three regions, Africa, Asia and Latin America and one to a member elected directly by the General Assembly. The fourth category could be expanded from 10 to 14 or 15. A variation of this multi-layer proposal would eliminate the second either by not having any new permanent members or by giving veto power also to the new permanent members.⁷² The veto question is discussed under

Cluster Composition because it directly relates to the nature of the composition of the Security Council impinging on the decision-making process.⁷³

The “non paper” of the working Group of July 12, 1995, refers to proposals made to limit the scope and use of veto. For instance, it was suggested that the veto should not apply to the admission of new member-states, procedural matters in accordance with article 27(2) of the UN charter, disputes to which a permanent member was a party, the security Council decisions to send investigative missions in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN charter, issues relating to provisional measures under article 40 of the charter, measures under article 50 relating to economic problems of third world countries arising from UN-imposed sanctions, recommendation for the appointment of the UN Secretary - General and issues relating to international human rights law.⁷⁴

Some of the measures to limit the scope and use of the veto could be implemented through revision of the Provisional Rules of procedures of the Security Council, current practices within the Council and General Assembly Resolutions, without making amendments to the UN Charter. But as the Independent Working Group pointed out, if there was an increase in the number of members accorded veto rights necessitated by Charter revision as a complimentary measure, an amendment restricting the scope of the veto for all permanent members would be desirable.⁷⁵

Apart from the question of the veto, other rights and privileges of permanent members are being discussed. In addition to the permanent status on the Security Council and their veto power, permanent members enjoyed other *defecto* privileges — the so-called ‘cascade effect’ which include permanent representation in UN bodies such as the International Court of Justice, Economic and Social Council and other general committees of the General Assembly. Additionally, nationals of the permanent members of the Council also hold key senior positions on the UN secretariat.⁷⁶ But would new permanent members, if any, also enjoy the benefits of this cascade effect? Although the report of the Independent Working Group contains some valuable observations on the role of the Security Council, there are also some implicit criticisms of the Council’s functioning in the Post-Cold War period in it.⁷⁷

What then is the scope of the Security Council’s jurisdiction? The mandate given by the Charter is to assume primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. In the past, the notion of “threat to international peace and security” was generally understood to encompass an act of aggression or a breach of the peace, involving some actual or potential military manifestation usually in the context of an inter-state or regional conflict.

The Post-Cold War period is witnessing a new trend in the Security Council towards a broader and expansive interpretation of “threat to international peace and security”. Many situations, which would have been in the past considered under the domestic jurisdiction of the state, have been in the recent period, determined “threat to international peace and security”.

In March 1991, after the US - led alliance expelled Iraq from Kuwait, the Security Council Resolution 687 placed Iraq under the most comprehensive set of restrictions ever imposed on a country, by the UN. Among others, it contained the stipulation that the

lifting of the sanctions would depend on the policies and practices of the Iraqi Government.⁷⁸

In Resolution 748 of March 1992, the Security Council made a determination that the failure of the Libyan Government to extradite the suspects in the bombing of the Pan American Jet liner that exploded over Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988 constituted a threat to international peace and security. In the case of Somalia, the Security Council in Resolution 794 of December 1992, determined that the magnitude of human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia constituted a threat to international peace and security.⁷⁹

It is important to observe that questions have been raised whether all these determinations truly fall within the scope of “a threat to international peace and security”, as originally envisaged in the charter. The formulators of the UN Charter, like the authors of the Covenant of the League of Nations, were principally concerned with the problem of international war rather than with inter-state violence.

The charter concentrates on the problem of inter-state wars. However, the realities of the world at the beginning of the twenty first century, do not correspond to that of 1945 when these concepts were incorporated into the charter. Whereas the concern of the international community in the aftermath of World War II was about inter-state wars with the alarming proliferation of internal conflicts, the preoccupation today is with them. This demands an adaptation of the institution, which is mandated to keep the peace. This involves developing a more progressive interpretation of a threat to international peace and security as well as norms and criteria based on international consensus. The charge of double standards against the UN made with justification, points out the absence of such norms and criteria, which alone could give legitimacy to UN actions.⁸⁰

Intervention in Somalia gained legitimacy because it was able to command broad international support. However, Libya’s refusal to handover suspects in the bombing of an aircraft constituted “a threat to international peace and security” and raised many eyebrows, especially in view of the fact that many actions by Israel in the region were brought to the attention of the Security Council around that time and the Council refused to take action.

The resolution on “repression of the civilian population in Iraq” was criticized by many, including some members of the Security Council as not falling within the mandate of the Security Council.⁸¹ The resolution on Iraq was adopted at a time when the “international community” was in a mood to punish Iraq, so its basic flaw was not duly recognized.⁸²

Another issue of major discussion relates to procedures and processes of decision-making of the Security Council. There have been serious criticisms about the lack of transparency of the proceedings and secretive nature of decision-making. Instances can be cited when one or more Western members of the council have announced actions in the name of the Security Council without prior decision following discussions in the council and the UN had legitimised and taken responsibility for them. Secretary-General, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, voiced criticisms against this in public. Many actions on former Yugoslavia were taken by Western Foreign or Defence Ministries and

then approved by the UN. Mid-February, 1995 saw the non-aligned countries present to the working group a position paper on the composition and the procedures of the Security Council.⁸³ Washington was already on the defensive. On March 8, 1995, Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, among other things, responded to the non-aligned countries by stating that the changes the Council made were greater in scope and consequences than all those of the prior forty eight years.⁸⁴

It is true that the UN Security Council has taken many steps to enhance the relationship between the Council and the general membership. However, most of the new measures have been introduced on ad-hoc basis and the question which steps could be further streamlined, expanded or possibly institutionalized, is not easily answered.

The issue is exceedingly relevant because the charter does not envisage the Security Council to function in isolation. Its legitimacy derives from the special responsibility conferred on it by the membership of the UN as a whole. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the UN, its members confer on the Security Council, under Article 24(1) of the charter, primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council acts on their behalf. It is *primary* responsibility and not *exclusive* responsibility that is given to the Security Council the discharge of which should be seen to be on behalf of the general membership.

The case for greater transparency and participation is, therefore, strong. During the Gulf crisis in 1990 when the Security Council met with great frequency and took a series of unprecedented actions, the General Assembly's proceedings went on and the US ensured that the Gulf crisis was not on the agenda of the Assembly.⁸⁵

Thus, as Henry Kissinger rightly observes, diplomacy is immensely relevant in any discussion on the Security Council.⁸⁶ Thus, while there was a near unanimity regarding the need to restructure the UN Security Council, the process that was set in motion is intrinsically weak and deliberately slow. If the powers that be could not get away with their narrow objective, they wanted to ensure that the process was delayed. This, despite the rhetoric of globalization as championed by the US.

Globalization, Liberalization and Structural/Mutual Adjustment

There is no doubt that globalization ceaselessly confronts us today. Like the world (or worlds) that it seeks to understand, the notion itself is riddled with contradictions and ambiguities. These contradictions include those inherent in social reality as they are variedly perceived and others in the endeavours of social science theorizing.⁸⁷

It is important to observe that what is referred to as globalization is complex, unwieldy and currently considered all - pervasive. It depicts, *inter alia*: the transformation of the relations between states, institutions, groups and individuals; the universalization of certain practices, identities, and structures; and perhaps more significantly, the expression of the global restructuring that has occurred in recent decades in the structure of modern capitalist relations. This very character creates tremendous problems while specifying and defining the notion. It leads, in certain cases, to its trivialization and devaluation, leading to its usage in an often celebratory and triumphalist manner that

proclaims the victory of particular economic systems and ideologies and the arrival of the “end of history” *ala* Fukuyama.⁸⁸ Before proceeding any further, a word of caution suffices: While there is a rapidly growing interest in the issue of globalization, much of it is expressed very diffusely.⁸⁹

According to the available literature, the notion of *globalization* is used mainly in the following sense: as a presence, of making global; being present world-wide and; at the world stage, or global arena.

In this sense, there is the question of visibility, immediacy, and availability. An issue, object, or approach is globalized if either through commerce, production, consumption, politics and the media or mass communications or information technology, etc; it is present or visible world-wide or in what can be considered important global centres. It is in this sense that one can talk of the spread in some cases of the universalization of artefacts, issues, ideas, life styles and movements.⁹⁰

One can also talk, in this sense, of the *globalization* of certain issues such as sustainable development, human rights, abolition of capital punishment, e.t.c. This usage does not normally presuppose power relations. Within this usage, it is possible to describe flows, exchange relations and the much-vaunted interdependence and counter penetrations, and to emphasize the spread of consciousness, life styles and cultures.⁹¹

A second form of power usage has within it, clearly, the element of power relations either at the economic, political or cultural levels. It is an ‘order’ and a constructionist notion. It presupposes the making or remaking of the world as a process and the existence of a system or structure, whether it is that of an integrated capitalist market, a world information or communication order, or a world political order.⁹² Within this perspective, one deals with the elements of ‘domination of the creation and dissolution of an ‘order’ and by extension. such issues as inequality, polarization and asymmetry.⁹³

To S. Amin, globalization is an imagery of global chaos and disorder. It is within the ‘order’ usage that several analyses and definitions have emerged. Authors tend to move between different meanings incorporating diffusion and flows, domination and exchange, and the creation and dissolution of various ‘orders’. The fluidity and mobility in usage tend to further complicate the precise specification of the notion.⁹⁴

It is also possible to offer a classification based on the primary thrusts and concern of the specific globalization discourse. In the literature, there are three such large clusters. First, that of globalization implying global culture and civilization along the Huntington thesis as already discussed. Second, globalization referring to the global economy, the international division of labour, the new information technological revolution and global capitalism. Third, globalization as the expression of the global political and military order. However, the boundaries between these clusters are not rigid and fixed. As we have already demonstrated, analysis within one cluster tends to assume inter relationships with the other and a related set of determinants.

Therefore, within the globalization discourses, there is some hesitation by scholars to specify the notion in a clear and precise way. In carrying out concrete analyses, the notion is often used more descriptively or integrated within a broader analytical framework emphasizing the construction of a world order or the action and

consciousness of agents initiating and responding to the making of these “orders”. These, therefore, tend to be broad or general definitions.⁹⁵ For instance, globalization is “... a concept which refers to both the compression of the world and intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole.”⁹⁶ This “compression” which occurs in spatial and temporal terms, contains different elements operating at the level of culture, consciousness, civilization, knowledge production and economic relations with a wide range of impacts generating multiple and diverse expressions and reactions. There are also other similar broad attempts at definition.⁹⁷

For most of these, the emphasis is on an emerging system characterized by interdependence, flows and exchanges, the role of new technologies, the integration of markets, the shrinking of time and space, especially the “... intensification of world-wide social relations which link distinct localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice-versa”.⁹⁸

A review of several of these definitions shows the remarkable extent to which there is a resounding silence with regard to the importance of notions such as coercion, conflict, polarization, domination, inequality, exploitation and injustice. Many of the definitions in common usage do not incorporate these and only a few of the contributions tackle these headlong.⁹⁹ Instead, what we have are sugar notions of interdependence, global flows, exchanges, etc. Even where capitalism and capitalist restructuring are mentioned, one reads only of a benign, creative process producing new technologies and expanding opportunities. But there is little or nothing about monopolies, disruptions and dislocations of the labour and other markets, the emergence of a global regulatory chaos and possible anomaly and how these are being exploited for gains.¹⁰⁰ Neither do we read of the pains of adjustment in the less industrialized nations, the spreading misery, social exclusion and the alienation of an increasing number of people.¹⁰¹

In concluding this part of the discussion, it is important to point out that there are other scholars who, despite their concern with the systematic investigation of what obviously is the same problem as the concern of the globalization discourse, have rejected the notion or kept their distance from it. For instance, E. Said treated similar problems of cultural analysis, world domination and world order. Yet, self-consciously and explicitly, he did not operate within the framework of globalization.¹⁰² The same applies to D. Harvey who analyzed “The condition of post modernity”, in which the implications of post-Fordism and flexible accumulation for culture, politics, urbanism and social consciousness are treated.¹⁰³ Other scholars prefer to emphasize the factors of inequality, disorder and polarization embodied in it, pointing out the contradictions and disorder.¹⁰⁴ Other more skeptical scholars “question the validity of the currently fashionable concept of economic globalization”.¹⁰⁵

The notion of economic globalisation is used in this section of the chapter, despite its shortcomings, not only to attempt to capture the unfolding of the social phenomenon, the reflections, and debate that surround it, but also to enable us critically engage the issues that arise from it, and in that way, seek own understanding and interpretation of it.

Globalization is, therefore, a real challenge for the South especially in economic terms regarding the amalgamation of the South with the world economy. Today in international economics, globalization is the keyword. In simple economic terms, it refers to the

process of gradual elimination of economic borders and a concomitant increase in international exchange and transnational interaction.¹⁰⁶

The idea of globalization of economies is rooted in the economic recession of the industrialized countries, especially of the US since the early 1980s. The US, which is now a declining economic power, finds Japan and the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) as its main economic rivals. It has a continuous trade deficit not only with Japan, but also a number of developing countries including South Korea, Brazil, China and India.¹⁰⁷

The US politics of economic survival has impelled it to follow a policy of aggressive economic diplomacy in international trade and commerce. In mid 1989, the US started a direct dispute with eight developing countries, namely, India, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, China, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia and Thailand by clubbing them together in its "Priority watch list". On May 26, 1989, it equated India with Japan and Brazil, quite deliberately and irrationally and included these "unfair practitioners" in its "black" list. Washington's aggressive attitude surfaced after India had initially refused to privatise and open its insurance market to the foreign investors. In the indo-US commercial Sub-Committee meeting of April 2 and 3, 1990 which almost coincided – with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union – held in Washington, the Bush Administration's Trade Representative, Carla Hills, accused India of having a "restrictive" investment policy and "regulatory" trade regime. Washington's grievance on the investment issue was ventilated in the accusations that India refused to open its "\$ 3 billion plus insurance market" to the foreign insurance companies; put restrictions on foreign equity participation in Indian companies; required all companies to buy local components before importing them from abroad; and imposed export requirements on the foreign investors. Washington threatened to put India under its unilateral punitive action in the event of India's failure to withdraw from "restrictive" investment policy by June 16, 1990, by the use of super 301, meaning 100 percent import duty on Indian products. Only two days before the deadline of June 16, 1990, India escaped the use of super 301 by announcing that a set of new economic policies would be implemented soon. One year later on April 16, 1991, India was again grouped together with China and Thailand for trade discrimination against Washington on intellectual property rights, and was threatened to be put under Special 301 of US Trade Act. However, this was also kept in abeyance in view of India's declared policy of economic reforms.¹⁰⁸

It is true that India had to act under its domestic economic constraints and inadequate bilateral Official Development Assistance to finance India's development requirement with a population growth rate of 2.1 percent. 1991 census impelled India to depend on hard commercial lending of the IMF. In November 1981, India had to borrow SDR 5 billion (RS 8000 crores) under the IMF's Extended Fund Facility for a period of three years with an interest of nine to ten percent. Repayment began in 1985. Yet in 1989, India had to repay Rs 3600 crores to the IMF with the consequence of resorting to fresh loans from the same source. According to the World Bank estimate, in 1991 India ranked third, next to Mexico and Brazil, among the world debtors, with a current account debt of roughly \$ 70 billion and a debt service ratio of 27 percent to export earning.¹⁰⁹

Under the IMF loan conditionalities (opening up of Indian market to foreign goods and capital), the Indian Government amended the FERA Act of 1973, under its new set of economic reforms, to raise the foreign equity participation from 40 to 51 percent. In the case of export-oriented products, foreign equity participation could be as high as 100 percent. Such measures were meant to satisfy the advocates of globalization of the Indian economy. As an essential part of the structural reform, India's new trade policy aims at reducing import duties to a flat rate of 20 percent on all imports. The number of items under the Open General License (OGL) has also been increased. India's new request for the IMF's Standby Facility of \$ 2.26 billion in July 1991 was accompanied by devaluation of the Indian rupee by 20 percent under the IMF's directive, with a view to export promotion. Thus, by December 15, 1993, when the Uruguay Round of GATT reached its final stage, subject to its ratification within four months, the Government of India had already implemented a substantial part of it under the IMF conditionality and, therefore, the acceptance of the GATT proposals had become a *fait accompli*. The Indian Government tried to justify this action by claiming such advantages as technology transfer, marketing expertise, and introduction of modern managerial techniques. It ostensibly aspired to achieve an export-led economic growth depending on the high rate of foreign equity capital, as prescribed by the IMF under its loan conditions.¹¹⁰ But as far as we are concerned, such economic policy can lead to mal-development in India. It can also aggravate India's economic problems.

Thus, under the camouflage of liberalization of the world economies, the US, the sole superpower in the world, tries to utilize world trade to its maximum advantage. Similarly, the emerging trade blocs in the international economy which almost coincide with the conclusion of the GATT accord, indicates that the industrial powers of the world now vie with one another in capturing large markets of the developing countries, as far as possible, with their free out flow of goods, services and capital. India with its large market, is naturally one of their main targets.

Indeed, in the wake of liberalization, many industries are booming in India. There are plenty of talks on Joint Ventures, Acquisitions, Mergers, Euro-issues "JAMES" and new Shares. Trade visits from Washington, sponsored by the IMF/World Bank are now fashionable. Junk food advertisements, Pepsi and Coke and corn flakes popularization are now the 'in thing' in all discussions. The mass media like TV, FM radio and press are all busy praising the virtues of liberalization.¹¹¹ The poor do not comprehend *JAMES*. What they understand is whether the prices of onions, tomatoes, chillies, condiments are coming down or not as a result of liberalization and fiscal adjustment in the country. They do not understand how many projects are signed by states. The poor farmer understands whether his pump set gets *bijli* or not and whether in the height of summer, his crops get water through his electric pump or not.¹¹²

In India, one still hears about plague, measles, epidemic, polio eradication initiatives, energy for the poor, fuel wood crisis and increasing infant mortality in some states, literacy and primary education concerns, water crisis and unsanitary surroundings in slums and shantytowns. A large number of the poor and the marginalized people in thousands of villages/slums are not affected by the economic reforms. They are passive onlookers to the reforms.

It is true that reforms bring growth and growth brings employment and employment brings income. But is this automatic? Is the same old trickle down theory being heard? How can the process of getting growth to reach the poor be hastened? Can markets be pro-poor? Can the essential human services and the price of getting them be made poor-friendly? Will labour be displaced as the result of mechanization and modernization of industries? What will happen to the large mass of illiterates who cannot get into the job market? What will happen to the social services provided by the state if the state stops providing them? Is the private sector interested in running schools and health centres, water supply and sanitation services?

We do not get the right answers to many of these questions. The Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation in its three - year assessment of the reforms in India said:

The bulk of the increase in employment that took place between March 1990 and 1992 had occurred in contract and other forms of non-regular employment, the share of which in total employment had gradually risen to one-third by March 1993 and regular employment fell by 3 percent in 1992 - 93 even as the value of fixed assets of the sample companies rose by some 27 percent.¹¹³

Reforms per se are not bad. To the contrary, the virtues of the market as an institution should percolate down the public administration and help the public. The virtues of the market such as cost consciousness, efficiency and effectiveness, paying for the services or products, etc. have to be encouraged by those who run the vast Indian public bureaucracy. In fact, the urgent need is for revamping and improving the Indian public bureaucracy, which comes in contact with the poor and the marginalized people. In India, public-oriented bureaucratic systems are basically: public health; public health engineering and sanitation; public primary education; railways, public distribution and public banks which deal with the poor; public road transport and public highways; public utilities such as electricity and public distribution and supplies.¹¹⁴

Thus, whatever reforms that keep going at the macro - level should percolate down the layers of the public administration and should reach the poor, which unfortunately, is not happening. All the good elements of the reforms are siphoned off by the top creamy layers of society and the bad fall out is reaching the poor.¹¹⁵

Indian public health system requires improvement and it has to get into the habit of doing business with the poor people more efficiently. Health sub centres are devoid of manpower as well as drugs. Poor people who need small treatment facilities like treatment of diarrhoea, do not get them and are forced to go to private medical practitioners. Hand pumps in the rural areas are rendered non-operational for want of minor repairs. Public roads are in shambles despite the toll tax that is collected round the year. Schools have leaking roofs and children do not get attracted to them. The list of failure of the Indian public administrative systems is endless.¹¹⁶

The fruits of reforms are what ordinary people of India need. They are not convinced, and rightly so, that these IMF/World Bank - sponsored reforms and liberalization are for them. The state has to undertake the task of educating and informing the public about liberalization if it is to succeed. Presently, this is not happening. There is a sense of fear among the poor. They even feel that they may not get drinking water but would only get

Coke or Pepsi to drink. Satellite Television has done more damage to the liberalization process than helping it.¹¹⁷

Who then, should take the lead and bring the fruits of reforms to the poor? The corporate sector is very suitable for this exercise. But it should not do it in a cosmetic style like digging a well in some village and building a school in another village. Corporate management values must help and benefit the poor up to tiny sectors and informal sectors. In this regard, the state and district administration must learn to be efficient. Similarly, state governments must believe in enabling, facilitating and not controlling, restricting and directly doing. They must also improve delivery of existing services and must encourage the reporting of the truth and not just palatable white washing.¹¹⁸

In a nutshell, liberalization must help in sustainable human development which not only helps economic growth but also distributes its benefits equitably. As such, genuine liberalization is one that is pro-poor, pro-nature, pro-jobs, pro-women and pro-children.

It is, therefore, necessary to have mutual adjustment in the post-Cold War world instead of unilateral adjustment as is being imposed by the sole surviving superpower. Let us elaborate this together with the structural adjustment programme which has been imposed not only on India but on the entire developing countries in a uniform way. First of all, structural adjustment is not really something new. It has been constant in the process of global capitalist expansion. Global capitalist expansion is a process of the centre dominating the entire system and forcing the periphery to adjust to fulfil numerous conditions which favour the reproduction of the whole system as an unequal system. Polarization is inbuilt in the global expansion of capitalism and is not a by product of some specificities, here and there of differences.¹¹⁹

The peripheries cannot catch up by reproducing what has been done in the centre. Capital accumulation is a process which operates on a world scale by submitting the peripheries to the centre and is, therefore, a process of constant structural adjustment of the peripheries to the centre.

Second, the problem does not appear constantly. There are in history, periods of high growth, relatively easy growth and, therefore, the illusion for the peripheries that they can catch up is developed.

During those periods, there is usually high growth everywhere in the centre and in the peripheries but the high growth in the peripheries leads to growing contradictions. These include increasing disparities and at a certain point, the whole system enters into a crisis. At that point, there appears the necessity of the so-called structural adjustment which again, is unilateral structural adjustment of the peripheries to the new stage of global growth.¹²⁰

Assuming this thesis is correct, then we should develop a counterstrategy, counter-politics, and mobilize forces with a view to modifying the rules of the game, modifying the logic of the system. This involves examining the tools of polarization in the Post-Cold War world order. Of course, polarization has been enforced in different forms historically from the mercantile capitalist period to the multinational corporations' pattern which emerged after world War Two and was dominating the Cold War period. The post-Cold War world seems to be moving into a new stage in which polarization is

proceeding from what Samir Amin has described as the five monopolies of the centre,¹²¹ namely, the monopoly of which technology (if only due to the enormous financial capacity which is needed to be competitive during the development of modern technologies).

Second, the monopoly of control over financial flows (that is, through the integration of the financial system at the global level recaptures the savings from any part of the world and channels them according to the logic of global capitalism). A few decades ago in a country like India, 90 percent of the national savings were channelled through the national institutions, whether public or private. This may not quite be the case today, although statistics were hard to come by. But in a country like Mexico where studies have been conducted, 80 percent of the national savings goes into the American or North American global financial system through the multinational corporations (MNCs). It is probably increasing in India.

Third, the monopoly on the decision for the access and use of natural resources. This is a growing important monopoly of the centre. For instance, the oil in Arab countries is accessed and used as a result of the decision of the major forces dominating the world.

Fourth, the monopoly on mass media and through mass media culture and sub-cultures and political manipulation of public opinion and so on. Not only due to the development of technologies which has turned the world into “a single village” but also due to the centralization of capitalist domination over the gigantic means of communication and media. This is really an enormous monopoly.

Fifth, the monopoly over weapons of mass destruction. These include nuclear, biological, chemical and other weapons.

Through the working of these five monopolies, the post-Cold War world is moving into a new phase of further and deeper polarization. The claim, especially in the West, is that the Third World does not exist any more and that the differentiation within the Third World had been so large that one cannot put a country like South Korea and Burundi in the same boat.

But according to Amin, a view we subscribe to, the Third World has always been differentiated. As such, the peripheries should always be entrusted with a variety of different functions in the systems at every point of time. Polarization has historically been quasi synonymous of the industrialized centres versus the non-industrialized, and lastly rural peripheries. That was true for Asia, Africa and Latin America until half a century ago. But gradually, the peripheries have industrialized and urbanized. These processes have been associated with the achievement of political independence. The industrialization, however, has been unequal among the so-called developing countries. But the industrialization of the peripheries continues to be controlled by the centre via those five monopolies which include, not only economic in the normal sense, but also political and military tools. In this regard, mass communication and armaments are political in a direct way.¹²²

This trend was already operating during the Cold War. The only difference was that the Cold War overshadowed it to a certain extent and, therefore, it was not seen clearly. In the post-Cold War period, this tendency has become more pronounced. In that sense and

through those monopolies, therefore, industrialization is no more synonymous with catching up; rather, it is a new form of polarization, a kind of putting out a system. Increasingly, the post-Cold War period is witnessing the control of industries and the labour in those industries in the peripheries by the five monopolies. Labour and capital are being more and more de-valorised while labour and capital associated with the operation of the five monopolies are over-valorized. And, therefore, the surpluses sucked out of the industries in the peripheries are benefiting the centre. This new pattern of putting out system is a new form of neo-colonialism at the political level.¹²³

How, then, do the peripheries fight those five monopolies? There has to be a counter-strategy of mutual adjustment. However, a part from China and India and perhaps Brazil, there are no countries in the periphery that are capable of fighting these monopolies. However, there is need to fight these monopolies through regionalization. There should be large, regional or even confederation of states based on a serious political understanding of a common future. In Asia, there are two giants, namely, China and India in addition to the other countries of South East Asia.¹²⁴

These regions have a number of common features. There are also inequalities not only between countries but also within larger countries as well. There are also a number of common features both at the level of development, cultural patterns and geo-strategic positions. Therefore, the capacity to negotiate collectively not with the North as one entity but taking it as three or perhaps four units- that is, North America (US and Canada), Japan and European Union. And to have those collective negotiations, a system of mutual inter negotiation, interdependence between vast regions of the world, we should allow for mutual adjustments.¹²⁵

The process that we know is the most unequal process. It is one by – one, that is one country negotiating with the global system as represented by the World Bank and IMF. This does not favour the individual country, not even India, because India is also not very strong. Instead, we can have regional negotiations which would provide real capacity of enforcing mutual adjustment with a view to reducing the negative impact of those five monopolies. Hence, instead of global negotiations, there be intra-regional or inter regional negotiations on trade; instead of one GATT, a series of different arrangements; instead of one IMF, a series of financial and monetary arrangements and communications among them; instead of one capital market, a series of capital markets; instead of one World Bank, ten regional banks and communications among them; etc.

At that regional level, we could also have a serious capacity to move into science and technology and reduce the monopoly on science and technology. We could also have even – within the perspective of global disarmament and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and their targets – development of collective defence capacities keeping out of the agenda the military intervention which has been going on from the Gulf war to Somalia and the wars here and there.¹²⁶

Mutual adjustment must be of countries of a region among themselves and with the view to strengthening their bargaining power with the North. This, notwithstanding, would need visual adjustment within the regions but the idea of being in a more powerful position in negotiations with other regions.¹²⁷ Although this remains utopian due to a variety of factors - the new US hegemony and the enormous internal problems of any

region and even of any big country or small country (political, cultural, ethnic, regional), among other problems, should not prevent us from having the vision of an efficient strategic line to develop gradually knowing that there is nothing which succeeds one hundred per cent immediately in human action.

In the Indian context, there is a very strong lobby, especially in the Finance Ministry, plugging the World Bank Line. This is the only option. There is no other alternative to this whole theory of liberalization, globalization and marketization. But this, in our opinion, is leading to some kind of dependency and erosion of the strategy of self-reliant progress India had been making in the past. Thus, *the no alternative syndrome* should not be intertwined. History is the choice between a variety of alternatives. We can relate the variety of alternatives, to a certain extent, to objective interests, short run or long run, to the perception of those interests, economic, class or national, etc. It is a complex scene. But there are always alternatives - not only two ways, capitalist path or the socialist - but a variety of choices.¹²⁸

In India, China and other countries of the world, there are people supporting enthusiastically the idea of globalization as it is offered to them. And it is those people who claim that there is no alternative available to this type of globalization. But what is the core of that globalization? What is its pattern?

The contention is that what is offered to the periphery is a truncated integrated market, an integrated market at global level, quasi-perfect for trade, gradual of course. But the idea of globalization which is offered to the periphery is free trade; total free trade. Second, a global integration of the capital market, including its financial dimension or perhaps even stock dimension. However, it is not a global labour market which would mean totally free migration. This truncated globalization of the markets is bound to lead to polarization; this is what is offered to the periphery.¹²⁹

This globalization pattern, however, is not necessarily imposed on the periphery - in some cases, it is done through counter-revolution or military intervention - but in most cases, it is promoted via an alliance with the ruling classes. Due to the historic weakness, the relative weakness of the bourgeoisie of the centre, there has always been a big tendency in the ruling classes of the bourgeoisie to accept to inscribe their development perspective in a compradorized system from a compradorized position.

We should view “compradorize” not as a form once and forever. At each stage of capitalist expansion, there is a comprador role. Industrialists can be comprador today, that is, those industrialists who are involved in this system of putting out. They are the comprador industrialists; the state itself can be a comprador state.¹³⁰

The result of this globalization would, therefore, be catastrophic for India and other peripheries. Thus, India faces enormous danger from globalization. Globalization process completely annihilates the national capacity and state efficiency. It is, therefore, a system of a kind of blind market, truncated, operating with no counter- force crystallized as a political national state. And, therefore, it is bound to promote resistance. Since it is producing polarization, it is bound to create resistance among the victims. Because this resistance cannot find, in the national state, an efficient tool, it promotes all sorts of societal splits and explosions in society. This phenomenon is at the root of the revival of

ethnicity, provincialisms, religious fundamentalisms, and so forth. For India, which is a large country, multi-national and multi-religious, such a policy which is developed under the slogan that “there is no alternative” (TINA) that may lead to dismemberment of India in the political sense.¹³¹

Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Diplomacy

Before we proceed to examine the role of nuclear weapons in the foreign policy of a nuclear state, it is imperative to point out that the first atomic weapons, including the two dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, derived their energy from fission, the splitting of atomic nuclei. Modern nuclear weapons, however, are based on fusion i.e. the joining together of atomic nuclei at extremely high temperatures the heat for which is created by an initial fission reaction.¹³² The subsequent chain reaction creates an enormous release of energy causing massive destruction through the combined effects of heat, fire, shock, and wind. High levels of radiation are the by-product of the uranium and plutonium used in the fusing reaction.

It suffices to observe that the actual nuclear device which can be the size of a small piece of luggage, is contained within a casing called a warhead. Strategic nuclear weapons are divided into four categories, according to the way in which the warhead is delivered to its target: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which carry the warhead into space and release it on a trajectory toward its target; sub marine - launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which work in the same way, but are launched from submarines instead of land, bombers, which carry the warhead to its target; the cruise missiles, which reach their targets by air; flying a pre-programmed route close to the ground. In principle, however, a nuclear device can reach its target by virtually any means, including automobiles and even parcel post. Nuclear weapons have also been adapted to many other weapons systems, including artillery shells, landmines, short-range missiles, surface to air missiles, and depth charges.¹³³

Distribution- wise, the vast majority of nuclear weapons are in the hands of the five nations known to possess them: the United States, Russia, China, France, and Britain. They are also the five permanent members of the UNSC. A portion of the formerly Soviet nuclear arsenal remained on Ukraine soil in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In addition, several other nations are now assumed to possess nuclear weapons. India, which exploded a “peaceful nuclear device” in 1974 already has a small arsenal of nuclear weapons; so does Pakistan, following their nuclear tests in May 1998. In 1989, an Israeli technician confirmed that Israel has built as many as several hundred nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort in the persistent Middle East conflict. With the possible exception of Israel’s, these arsenals are much outweighed by those of China, France, and Britain, each of which has many hundreds of nuclear weapons. Their arsenals, in turn, were dwarfed by those of the superpowers, who maintained many thousands of weapons in their so-called “tactical” arsenals, while reserving many thousands more for their “strategic” arsenals.¹³⁴

In understanding the dynamics governing relations between the superpowers and other nuclear states, the term deterrence becomes significant. For that matter, the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons has fundamentally transformed military strategy

and the nature of war in general. For the first time in the history of warfare, the destructiveness of the means of war far outweighs most ends for which a global nuclear war could be undertaken. While the United States possessed an overwhelming nuclear superiority throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, by 1960, the Soviet Union had built a nuclear stockpile enough to guarantee that any nuclear attack upon it could be met with a significant nuclear retaliation. In the subsequent years, the Soviets added to their arsenal, reaching rough parity with the US by the late 1960s. This novel balance gave rise to the theory of “mutual assured destructions” (MAD). The MAD theory holds that, if both nations have the ability to destroy each other’s society, neither can use nuclear weapons for fear of bringing devastation upon itself. Under the conditions of MAD, the purpose of continuing to maintain nuclear weapons is to deter an attack by the other.¹³⁵

Defence officials, policymakers and experts have long disagreed over what constitutes a credible threat in order to retaliate, and what level of destruction against the attacker must be “assured” in order for deterrence to be stable. At one extreme, some have argued that the guaranteed destruction of not more than a few major urban centres is a sufficient deterrence against attack. According to this view, a small number of nuclear weapons with a very high certainty of reaching their targets is all that is needed for security. At the other extreme, some have asserted that a nation must be able to respond at a higher level of violence than its opponent, whatever its opponent’s level is, for deterrence to be guaranteed.¹³⁶

Deterrence, by its nature, is a highly symbolic process because it requires both parties to convince each other that they have the strength and the will to respond to threats against their vital interests. Deterrence has placed a high premium on demonstrations of resolve. For instance, during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union felt that a symbolic defeat would undermine the credibility of their nuclear deterrence, to the detriment of their overall security and influence. During this crisis and others of the Cold War, there were moments at which the commitment of national resolve was at least as important as the *prima-facie* issues themselves.¹³⁷

One critique of MAD is its failure to provide a motive for retaliation, which asks these questions: if a nation’s society has been obliterated, what national motive - other than sheer revenge - would prompt decision makers to launch the massive retaliation guaranteed by MAD? If a nation has ceased to exist, what national interest can it pursue by launching a retaliatory strike? Many have responded that even the slightest probability of retaliation is sufficient to deter attack given the colossal stakes, any potential aggressor must fear that the victim can act out of revenge. But others have felt that decision makers need options other than massive retaliation after a nuclear attack. For deterrence to be convincing, they contend, a country which has been attacked must still be able to respond with selective, punitive retaliations. If the attacked country retains the ability to engage in cycles of increasing violence, an aggressor cannot feel the potential to gain a decisive advantage with a massive, sudden first strike. This argument became especially prominent in the US in the late 1970s, and led to an emphasis on weapons and strategies for protracted nuclear warfare often called “war fighting”.¹³⁸

We recognize that MAD had the effect of “wiring together” the security of the two superpowers because they both relied on the stability of deterrence to ensure their

security. Thus, paradoxically, any attempt by one country to gain an absolute advantage could have diminished its own overall security by undermining deterrence. The less stable the nuclear balance, the more precarious the situation was for both sides, even for the country favoured by the imbalance.¹³⁹

This interdependence led the United States and the Soviet Union to seek ways in which to ensure stability. Through arms control, the superpowers sought to maintain an essential parity of nuclear forces and to limit the deployment of some especially destabilising weapons systems. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, for instance, limited national defences against nuclear missiles. The two superpowers also negotiated an extensive array of “confidence and security - building measures” designed to facilitate communications in a crisis, prevent misunderstandings, and safeguard against accidental launches.

The enormous destructiveness of nuclear weapons, plus the absence of any kind of effective defence against them, gives them unique qualities. Three situations are worth distinguishing: wars between nations possessing nuclear weapons in quantity, wars between nations having only a few, and wars between a nation that has nuclear weapons and one that does not.

Let us first consider the dramatic third possibility. A nation possessing nuclear weapons in quantity that fights a war against one that does not possess them could, in principle, win that war absolutely and virtually instantly, by using a portion of its nuclear arsenal.

However, such a war has not been witnessed. This is because there is a strong, worldwide “taboo” against any nuclear use. The Soviet Union did not use nuclear weapons in Afghanistan and the United States did not use them in Vietnam or Iraq. It is true that in the first two cases, an additional reason the nuclear power eschewed their use was some fear of a reaction by the other superpower. But at least equally important was a fear of incurring universal ignominy by using weapons that are generally feared as hideous and hyper violent. Hence, the United States could not even consider the global consequences of using nuclear weapons against Iraq in the Gulf War, even though the Soviets would have taken no immediate military action in response.¹⁴⁰

Any war between two nations that both possess nuclear weapons in quantity would carry consequences so colossal that anything like full-scale use would mean the annihilation of both, and enormous damage to others as well. Between the United States and the Soviet Union, such a war would have produced global environmental damage so profound that there is doubt whether humanity would have survived. Between heavily armed superpowers, however, the enormous inhibition of MAD, came into play and, paradoxically, nuclear weapons had relatively little value. Thus, although MAD is uncomfortable, it is one of the less dangerous nuclear configurations possible.

The last case is war between nations that have only a few nuclear weapons. Although this is the least unlikely case, a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is seen by some as perhaps the most worrisome possibility.

India’s relations with the United States deteriorated in the post-Cold War period following the assumption of power in Washington by the democrats. The Clinton Administration became obsessively preoccupied with a single issue, namely, non -

proliferation in South Asia, on which the perceptions and approaches of Washington and New Delhi were clearly divergent.¹⁴¹

US policy became one of persuading India, along with Pakistan, to cap, roll back and eventually liquidate its nuclear weapon capability to stop the deployment of Prithvi and Agni missiles and to join a nine-power conference on South Asian Security.¹⁴²

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction became a critical element of Washington's vision of a world order in which possession of such weapons is the sole prerogative of the existing nuclear weapons powers so that they could have unchallenged hegemony over the world power structure. The United States and its allies convinced themselves that the hegemony of this new alliance is the only means of ensuring international peace and stability. Washington also perceived a potential threat to its own security stemming from India's emergence as a full-fledged nuclear weapons and missiles power.¹⁴³

This new US policy was, however, not consistent with India's security interests. For any self-respecting country, national security must remain the supreme and ultimate criterion for taking a view on any proposal on arms control and disarmament. The US has no credibility or moral authority to preach non-proliferation to the rest of the world. Washington acquiesced in Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons. In the same vein, even after the end of the Cold War, Washington is sitting on the most awesome arsenal of nuclear weapons and refuses even to countenance the suggestion of eliminating them. It also refuses to recede its position against giving a non-use or no-first-use commitment. It is only now, after accumulating massive stocks of nuclear weapons and acquiring unmanageably large quantities of weapon-grade fissile materials has it come to accept more than the decade old Indian suggestion of a freeze on the production of such fissile materials. These conditions, among others, have negated the improvement of Indo-US relations in the post-Cold War period.¹⁴⁴

Summary of Washington's non-proliferation pressures on India during the 1992-1993 period. India was to formally cap its nuclear research and technology development; this capping process had to be "transparent" and subject to monitoring by Washington. India and Pakistan had to commit themselves to a time-bound programme to reduce weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

This had to be done under "international" monitoring and "formal transparency", India had to commit itself to elimination of its nuclear weapons and missiles development capacities in a definite time – frame. This had to be done under "international" inspection or verification and these arrangements had to be implemented before June 1995, when the international conference for the indefinite extension of the NPT) was to take place.¹⁴⁵

The quid pro quo could be: some sort of a nuclear security guarantee to India by the nuclear weapons powers; supply of certain categories of arms and technology under controlled conditions and not placing hurdles against India's nuclear power, food irradiation, health projects, and space research programmes provided they were subjected to "international disciplinary regimes".¹⁴⁶

Since then, lateral and tangential pressure on India has been increasing on these matters. This pressure is building up in the context of general and increasing acquiescence of the

“international community”, in the various nuclear and space-related disciplinary regimes being put in place by US -led imperialism.¹⁴⁷

This notwithstanding, Washington's perceptions of the means and ends of its non-proliferation efforts in South Asia have brought it into conflict with allies like Pakistan and important powers like China and India. In this context, neither a unilateral approach nor a confrontational approach would be helpful.¹⁴⁸ Rather, as the events of 1998 demonstrated, it only damaged US interests and also the larger goals of the non-proliferation regime. The tactfulness with which Washington dealt with the countries of South Asia to tackle the problem of nuclear proliferation would be a true test of its post-Cold War nuclear diplomacy on the other hand, and its commitment to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation on the other. Washington failed this test when both India and Pakistan exploded nuclear devices in May 1998.

Indeed, India's resolve to have nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War period was strengthened by Washington's policy of supporting a comprehensive Test Ban (CTBT) and arm - twisting India into accepting NPT. Washington's position on CTBT has been deceptive. It does not mean that Washington was keen on not conducting any nuclear test explosion; neither did it ensure that Washington would either reduce its nuclear stockpile or stop improving its nuclear capabilities. This is because since CTBT was conceived, Washington has been carrying on extensive research in evolving alternative methods of nuclear weapons without explosion.¹⁴⁹ Indeed, a group of American physicists suggested way back in 1995 that the US could maintain reliable nuclear weapons without physical nuclear tests.¹⁵⁰

The US has been successfully evolving the capability of testing complex computer nuclear device using laser simulation and a complex computer system. It is, therefore, consistently advocating for banning all kinds of nuclear testing. The other four nuclear powers are also said to be processing alternative methods of testing nuclear weapons without explosion. The nuclear race cannot, therefore, be said to have stopped.

Thus, despite the efforts by Washington and its Western allies to curb what has been termed as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the impulse in the Third World for advanced weaponry has been expanding since the end of the Cold War because of the feeling of insecurity following the collapse of the countervailing superpower, the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War has, therefore, spurred Third World countries, India and Pakistan inclusive, to jealously guard what they feel is their own indigenously acquired nuclear capability. Increasingly, the threshold countries were, by 1994, no longer shy of “coming out of the closet” as far as demonstration of their scientific and technological prowess in the nuclear field is concerned. The case of India and Pakistan is illustrative in this regard.¹⁵¹

It was, therefore, not surprising that on May 11, 1998, India conducted three separate underground nuclear blasts. Since 1983, India has built an array of guided missiles. Its surface-to-surface prithvi (Earth), first tested in 1988, has a range of 250 Kilometres. Agni (Fire) a ballistic missile first launched successfully in 1993, has a range of between 1,800 kilometres and 2,480 kilometres, enough to reach Beijing. Both can carry nuclear warheads. Indeed, according to Murli Manohar Joshi, Minister for Science and Technology and himself a nuclear physicist, Indian Scientists would cap the country's

missiles with nuclear warheads “as soon as the situation requires”. Despite this, he added; “But India will not attack any state.... The new capability will only deter an arms race.”¹⁵² He added that the nuclear tests that also included a thermo nuclear explosion, were not directed against any particular country. In his own words: “This detonation is a message to the entire world and not to any particular country.”¹⁵³

Pakistan’s reaction to India’s detonation of the three nuclear devices was swift. Pakistani Foreign Minister, Gohar Ayub commented that the Asian sub continent had been thrust into a nuclear arms race and indicated that Pakistan was ready to conduct a nuclear test of its own. In his own words: “We are prepared to match India, we have the capability We in Pakistan will maintain a balance with India in all fields.”¹⁵⁴

But defiant India conducted two more underground nuclear tests two days later, that is, May 13, 1998. They invited further criticism of New Delhi by several governments. For instance, in Tokyo, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto had just told reporters that Japan was suspending \$ 30 million in grants to penalize India for India’s first round of tests and would closely watch its nuclear programme when an aide told him that India had just set off two more test blasts. He called the new tests “grave” and said he had instructed his government “to urgently consider” other penalties.¹⁵⁵

US president Bill Clinton, who was visiting Germany to meet with Chancellor Helmut Kohl ordered tough sanctions against India in retaliation for its underground nuclear tests. The sanctions included an end to American assistance to India, a prohibition on the export of certain and credit guarantees to India, US opposition to lending by international financial institutions to India.¹⁵⁶

In London, Britain’s Foreign Office summoned P.K Singh, India’s High Commissioner to complain about India’s second round of nuclear tests and to tell him they could jeopardize peace and stability in South Asia.¹⁵⁷

As for the Chinese, following their saying that “one mountain cannot accommodate two tigers”, the last thing they wanted to see is a nuclear India. “Sino-Indian relations are obviously in for a bumpy ride for the next little while now.” Echoing an official foreign ministry statement that accused New Delhi of seeking regional hegemony, a leading Chinese expert on India, Sun Shihai, Deputy Director of the Institute of Asia - Pacific studies of the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said: “India wants to achieve a dominant position in South Asia.”¹⁵⁸

China’s reaction to the first round of tests was calculated to avoid antagonising India while mollifying Pakistan. But China took its gloves off following the second round of India’s nuclear blasts. In its strongest reaction yet, China said it was “deeply shocked” by the tests and summoned the Indian Ambassador to hear a protest. Although China stopped short of backing US sanction against India, it called on the international community to close ranks to stop Delhi from developing nuclear weapons.¹⁵⁹

Decades of deep-seated suspicion between the two Asian giants were in part to blame for the largely cosmetic ties. China suspected that some Indian leaders were too sympathetic toward Tibet’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, who fled into exile in India in 1959 after an abortive uprising against communist rule. *The Press Trust of India News Agency* said Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, had cited “an atmosphere of distrust”

relations with China in a letter to US President Bill Clinton explaining the decision to conduct nuclear tests.¹⁶⁰

On Pakistan's part, it rejected global appeals for restraint in the face of India's nuclear tests, telling the 61 - nation conference on Disarmament in Geneva on May 15, 1998, that it would protect its own people. Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan told the world's disarmament forum that Pakistan would accept obligations in restricting self-defence capabilities only if these were equitable. Akram, Pakistan's ambassador to the UN mission in Geneva said: "Indian action, which poses an immediate and grave threat to Pakistan's security, will not go unanswered.... In the new strategic environment, it is extremely disingenuous for anyone to call on Pakistan for restraint."¹⁶¹

President Clinton had called Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, after the Indian tests, to urge restraint. But in clearly pointed words, and without naming President Clinton, Ambassador Akram said: "it is strange that senior officials of a major nuclear power continue to argue, unconvincingly, that India has not weaponized yet."¹⁶²

India had confirmed to the world that it is a nuclear power. And it did so in style, evading American spy satellites overhead. It managed to test its nuclear weapons without Washington knowing about it and it, therefore, caused a great deal of discomfort at the CIA headquarters in Virginia. This is the more reason why Washington tried hard to persuade Islamabad not to follow suit.

Not to appear to be caught off guard as was the case with the Indian nuclear tests, the *New York Times* of May 15, 1998 quoted US diplomatic, military and intelligence officials as saying that Pakistan was preparing to explode a nuclear warhead "very soon" meaning about two days from the day the *New York Times* story was published.¹⁶³

But this appears to have been guesswork on the part of Washington because Islamabad did not conduct its own nuclear tests until May 28, 1998. As Washington continued to guess when Islamabad would respond to the Indian challenge, US Senate Intelligence Committee leaders and other key senators said on May 18, 1998, that they would let Pakistan have US- built F-16 fighter aircraft if it did not match India's nuclear test blasts. The delivery of F-16 s would, therefore, be a reward for restraint.¹⁶⁴

But Pakistani Information Minister, Mushadhid Hussein, speaking from Karachi on the CBS programme "Face the Nation ", discounted the possible unlocking of the F-16 delivery as merely a step toward righting an historical wrong. Pakistan paid more than \$600 million in 1990 for 28 F- 16s multi -role fighter aircraft built by Lockheed Martin's General Dynamics Unit. But delivery of the air craft had been blocked since then, by a congressional ban aimed at preventing Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons.¹⁶⁵ However, according to Hussein, delivery of F-16s was not the solution.¹⁶⁶

In Islamabad, former Pakistani Premier Nawaz Shariff, said that his country would not be rushed into any decision on a possible nuclear test blast of its own. He added that his government was studying whether the world community would punish India to Islamabad's satisfaction.¹⁶⁷

Pakistan finally matched the Indian nuclear blasts by conducting five nuclear tests on May 28, 1998. Premier Shariff announced the blasts in a nation-wide broadcast. He

declared: “We have evened the account with India”, adding that it was an “auspicious day of historic importance” for Pakistan, which became the first Muslim country to conduct nuclear tests.¹⁶⁸ According to Sharif, Pakistan’s response was “unavoidable.” He stated that India had ignored Pakistan’s numerous non-proliferation proposals by exploding five devices close to the Pakistan border.¹⁶⁹

After the tests, Pakistan said it was ready to adapt a nuclear warhead to its newly tested long-range Ghauri missile, which was capable of travelling 1,500 kilometres and hitting most targets in India. Pakistan detonated the devices in the Chagai region of Pakistan’s desolate south-western Baluchistan province, barely 50 kilometres from its border with Iran. Sharif’s government had been under pressure from across the political spectrum to explode a nuclear device of its own since India carried out its first three on May 11, 1998.¹⁷⁰

It is noteworthy reiterating that Pakistan and India have fought three wars since 1947. They came dangerously close to a fourth, possibly nuclear confrontation in 1990 over the disputed state of Kashmir.

India, which controls two thirds of Kashmir, accuses Pakistan of stocking the eight-year old insurgency there. But Pakistan contends that it only offers moral and diplomatic support to the rebels. Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani, said in parliament that while New Delhi did not want a war with Islamabad, it would step up efforts to counter rebellion in Kashmir. In his own words: “A proxy war is on in Kashmir and our government is totally determined to defeat this without waging a war with Pakistan.”¹⁷¹

Like in the case of India’s nuclear blasts, reactions to the Pakistani blasts were swift internationally. Japan halted aid to Pakistan and the US promised similar action as world condemnation of the tests rained down and fears of a South Asian nuclear arms race were highlighted. Britain called an emergency meeting of the Group of Eight industrial Powers and China to discuss Pakistan’s and India’s tests.¹⁷²

President Clinton said that by failing to exercise restraint in response to the Indian tests, Pakistan lost an opportunity to strengthen its own security. He, however, urged Pakistan and India to take steps to reduce tensions in South Asia and reverse the dangerous arms race.¹⁷³

Despite this presidential call for reduction of tensions in South Asia, intelligence reports in Washington indicated that Islamabad was preparing further nuclear blasts, according to information provided by US spy satellites.¹⁷⁴

Indeed, on May 31, 1998, Pakistan staged another nuclear test, thereby intensifying fears that an arms race with India could spiral out of control. Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmad, Pakistan’s top diplomat, said a single device had been tested-not two, as officials had said earlier. Nevertheless, the news shattered hopes that “Pakistan would call a halt after marching India’s five underground tests with five of its own on May 28, 1998.”¹⁷⁵

Although reaction was swift, it was confined to harsh words. Underlying the powerlessness of the world community is that no country imposed new measures beyond sanctions previously announced against Islamabad and New Delhi, notably by the US and Japan. A spokesperson for the US State Department said: “We are very disappointed

that Pakistan continues to ignore the calls to exercise restraint that was made by the international community after its first test.”¹⁷⁶

India said it had expected Pakistan’s second round of nuclear tests and repeated its call for a pact not to use nuclear weapons. In a statement, the ministry of External Affairs spokesperson said: “The developments are on expected lines.”¹⁷⁷

Pakistan, on the other hand, expressed willingness to open immediate security talks with its archrival. In this regard, Shamshad said: “As a responsible nation whose record of restraint and responsibility is impeccable, Pakistan today assures the international community, and in particular India, of our willingness to enter into immediate discussions to address all matters of peace and security including urgent measures to prevent the danger of nuclear conflagration.”¹⁷⁸

Britain said that foreign ministers of the Group of Eight, namely Britain, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Russia and the US, would meet in London on June 12th, 1998 to coordinate a response to India and Pakistan. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook announced that they would consider “How we can most effectively bring both of them within the global non-proliferation regime and encourage them to address the roots of the tension between them.”¹⁷⁹ He, however, accused Pakistan of acting in “flagrant disregard of international opinion.”¹⁸⁰

The Japanese government strongly denounced the testing, calling Pakistan’s move “an act that challenges and runs against the nuclear non-proliferation movement, ignoring the international public movement”.¹⁸¹ The Japanese also recalled their Ambassador to Pakistan.¹⁸²

China, which had for sometime been accused by India of aiding Pakistan with nuclear and missile technology, responded rather mildly. China’s Foreign Ministry said, “We express deep regret that Pakistan has conducted nuclear tests once again and are deeply disturbed by the current nuclear arms race in South Asia”¹⁸³

Germany’s Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel said that Pakistani’s move was irresponsible; that Pakistan wasted a great chance with its series of nuclear tests.¹⁸⁴ He added that it was absurd that nations such as India and Pakistan “which can hardly feed their own people”¹⁸⁵ were taking on the will of the world community by testing nuclear weapons.

Russia, which Pakistan had accused of aiding India develop nuclear weapons was certainly concerned. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said his country took a “very negative”¹⁸⁶ view of Pakistan’s nuclear tests.

But some of the very countries that condemned India and Pakistan were either covertly or overtly responsible for aiding both countries develop nuclear weapons. Indeed, India and Pakistan took very different routes in their quests to build the bomb, competing in a covert nuclear arms race that moved along at a crawl for decades. India, whose nuclear programme relied on plutonium from reactors, got a jump-start from US president Eisenhower’s 1953 “Atoms for Peace” plan, which spread nuclear technology to nations that agreed not to use it for military purposes.¹⁸⁷

Pakistan secretly decided to develop a nuclear weapons programme in the early 1970s following its defeat in the 1971 Bangladesh war by India, which was widely held to be

far ahead in an atomic bomb programme. With China's assistance and smuggled technology, Pakistan built a uranium – enrichment programme under the guidance of a German trained Pakistani scientist.¹⁸⁸

India established an Atomic Energy Commission in 1948. Eight years later, the US and Canada agreed to help India build a nuclear research reactor for power generation, although India rejected an oversight by the new International Atomic Energy Agency. The US also supplied heavy water used to control nuclear fission.¹⁸⁹ Just two years later, in 1958, India began designing and buying equipment for a plutonium reprocessing plant at Trombay providing a capability that could lead to atomic weapons.¹⁹⁰

Pakistan, meanwhile had been under tough US sanctions since 1990, when president Bush was unable to certify to Congress that Islamabad did not have a nuclear weapons programme. Otherwise, Pakistan's atomic development took off in 1975 with the return of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a German - trained metallurgist who has headed the country's nuclear programme ever since. China was reported to have supplied Pakistan with highly enriched uranium and a nuclear bomb design. Slowing the arms race took a back seat to Cold War politics.¹⁹¹ Thus, responsibility for enabling India and Pakistan become nuclear states must be shared between forces within and outside both countries.

The barrage of criticisms fired from moral high ground in the West at India's and Pakistan's nuclear testing, read thinly disguised echoes of colonialism and racism in the chorus of disapproval. Numerous references to India's and Pakistan's widespread poverty with outrage at the vast cost of nuclear weapons were made mainly by countries with well-stocked nuclear arsenals. Charges from these countries were that both India and Pakistan behaved "irresponsibly."

Clearly, there was hypocrisy of Western powers which condemned India and Pakistan but tolerated a declared nuclear power in "communist" China. The West argued that while they could have nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan could not.

The feeling in the West was like "how dare little India and Pakistan blast nuclear weapons? How dare they presume they can join our club?" In the case of India, newspapers pointed to patronising imperialist press coverage, such as cartoons showing a nuclear mushroom cloud dropped against a clinched image of an Indian snake charmer or rope trickster. The implication was that if India could do it, anybody could do it.¹⁹²

In the West, India and Pakistan were treated as "rogue" states. But world non-proliferation policy hands created an exclusive club of nuclear powers – Britain, China, France, Russia and the US – intent on keeping down Third World "pretenders".¹⁹³ But if Ronald Reagan, the virtually senile President of the US, did not act irresponsibly by using nuclear weapons against his adversaries, then how can India, the largest democracy in the world, possessing one-sixth of human kind, act irresponsibly by acquiring nuclear weapons? Moreover, while India had carried out six nuclear tests in its history and Pakistan the same number, the US had notched up 1,032 nuclear tests.¹⁹⁴

Global nuclear policy is built on hypocrisy. While the US helped Britain and France, the declared nuclear powers, and Israel, the undeclared nuclear power, to develop nuclear weapons, it is up in arms to ensure that Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea, countries it terms as rogue states, do not develop nuclear weapons. In the same hypocritical manner,

it led the global outcry by imposing punitive sanctions against India and Pakistan for going nuclear.¹⁹⁵ Thus, the American reaction to both India and Pakistan was sweeping and sanctimonious.

Washington's condemnation of India and Pakistani's nuclear tests is thus questionable. The story the world received was only partial. The plot narrated by the White House and echoed by the American media presenting the US government as a principled foe of nuclear escalation – is akin to a fairy tale. For a start

American journalists did not have to visit India or Pakistan in order to find alarming evidence of a nuclear arms race. They could venture much closer to home. Forty miles from San Francisco, scientists at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory by July 1998, were still designing thermo nuclear bombs. Under a benign-sounding stock pile stewardship and management programme, the Department of Energy had been carrying on with the business of devising new and "improved" nuclear warheads.¹⁹⁶ The US government was spending \$ 4 billion a year to develop nuclear weapons.¹⁹⁷ The effort included sophisticated computer simulation that enabled upgrading of the deadly capacities of its nuclear arsenal without resorting to test detonations.¹⁹⁸

More than ever, the Clinton administration was a fount of piety as the president and his top aides continued to scold India and Pakistan. While lecturing India and Pakistan to show restraint, the US officials continued to lead the world in building a nuclear bridge to the twenty first century. The news media hardly seemed to notice as the United States completed the testing and deployment of B61-11 earth penetrating nuclear warheads in 1997. And when conflicts with Baghdad intensified over the winter of 1998, little was heard about Washington's not-so-veiled threat to use such weaponry against Iraq.¹⁹⁹

A few months before the May 1998 nuclear tests by New Delhi and Islamabad, President Clinton oversaw a major overhaul of nuclear weapons policies and issued a presidential directive allowing the Pentagon (US Ministry of Defence) to plan for the use of US atomic weapons against non-nuclear states.²⁰⁰ His order violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - the same pact, ironically, that the president cited in reverential tones on May 13, 1998, when he announced sanctions against India.

In February 1998, with a US - Iraq confrontation heating up, the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, warned that "Clinton's actions could lead to a world war." American news media attributed Yeltsin's comment to irrational inebriation. *The Los Angeles Times*, for instance, called the remark "somewhat daffy."²⁰¹ But Yeltsin was apparently referring to the fact that Clinton had authorized the US military to target Iraq with nuclear weapons.

Thus, non-proliferation to the non-nuclear world means keeping nuclear bombs in the hands of the West. But the world was far more complex than a decade before, and the US had hidden from that reality for too long. The monopoly of the five nuclear powers was broken by both India and Pakistan.

Rather than viewing the nuclear capability of both India and Pakistan in negative terms as Washington did, nuclear capacity of the two countries could speed up Kashmir peace. This conforms to our earlier thesis of deterrence. The nuclear capacity provides an alternative in resolving the Kashmir issue, the festering wound in Indo-Pakistan interstate relations. The Cold War too was a conflict over territorial control between nuclear

powers, and it was defused. One method was a multilateral, long lasting Helsinki Conference. So why not a conference on security and cooperation in South Asia for South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries and important neighbours, and not only focused on Kashmir? A central factor in ending the Cold War was the presence of a strong society across conflict borders. Why not step up the action of Indian and Pakistani organizations towards that end? As in the case of Northern Ireland, they were to be an image of an outcome more acceptable to most than deadly violence.

Kashmir is divided into four parts: Buddhist Ladakh, Hindu Jammu, the valley of Kashmir (mixed but majority Muslim), and Azad Kashmir (occupied by Pakistan). This creates three national agenda options as recipes for violence or full-war: integration with Pakistan, full integration with India, and an independent state of Kashmir.

However, differential status for the parts makes sense. Jammu - Ladakh could integrate with India. Azad Kashmir could integrate with Pakistan, and autonomy and devolution within India along the lines of the 1952 or 1974 constitutional framework for the valley of Kashmir, or have Indo-Pak cooperation like the Anglo-Irish one in Northern Ireland. But if having open borders for a Greater Kashmir Community, with observer status in SAARC and representatives in New Delhi and Islamabad can provide solutions, so be it.

Despite these possibilities, the following scenarios might be useful: Indo-Pak cooperation in softening the Azad-Kashmir border; civil society cooperation across that border: meetings of families, cultural cooperation, local economic cooperation needed everywhere to overcome the effects of globalization.

Conclusions

Let us summarize the main characteristics of the World order of the 1990s, which assumes that liberalism takes hold in Russia and that the Cold War is not renewed.

Values: Liberalism or democratic capitalism has triumphed over socialist dictatorship but not over socialism as a world ideology and is being incorporated into Eastern Europe, the former USSR, and a growing number of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), including former Marxist states like China, Vietnam, Mozambique and others.

The Western, particularly American values and attitudes of materialism, consumption, and self - gratification in an urban, industrial, high technological context are being rapidly spread across the world by American media and Trans National Corporations (TNCs). Socialism has temporarily retreated (not dead). Although religious fundamentalisms (Islamic, Hindu) are commanding a centre- stage as the dominant counter ideology so far, such orthodoxy has been a minor global competitor to liberalism.

Goals: The dominant goals are those of the G-8 powers and their financial institutions and emphasize the status quo, namely, global capitalism, liberal democracy, rule of Euro-North American international law, growing global trade, peaceful conflict resolution, and inequality in wealth, power and status between the G-8 and other states.

We contend that there is nothing new about these objectives. What is new is that the number of states advocating revisionist or revolutionary goals has drastically shrunk,

given the demise of the USSR and Eastern bloc and the moderation of former revisionist states like Cuba, Libya, Syria and Vietnam.

Power distribution: The bipolar system has been replaced by a unipolar oligarchy of the G-8, led on most dimensions, by the US, along with some increase in power of non-state actors (UNSC, IMF, World Bank) and declining power, generally, of the Third World. Power is somewhat omniscient of the nineteenth century concert system (expanded to include North America and Japan and still excluding the Third World).

Four variables can be outlined to elaborate the power distribution. First, security-wise, the US has become the single military superpower by capability and leadership, as seen in the Persian Gulf and Somalia although leadership in Bosnia has been exerted by the EU, especially Britain and France. There is no longer a military balancer against the US and its alliances, which could allow the G-8 to do whatever it wants militarily. However, the UNSC has increased its authority with regard to limiting the right of states to unilaterally use force and in terms of peacekeeping in inter-state conflicts.

Second, in terms of culture, American culture, more than European culture, is dominant and rapidly spreading throughout the globe. For example, English language over French, American films, television programmes, and journals.

Third, economically, there exists an oligarchy of shared power among the US, Germany and Japan, along with increasing power of such non-state actors as TNCS, the Betton Woods institutions and the EU. With only a few exceptions, most LDCs are losing wealth and power relative to G-8 states and financial organizations, and are becoming increasingly marginalized and dependent.

Fourth, politically and or diplomatically, disproportionate influence is exercised by the G-8, and their dominated UNSC, unencumbered anymore by rivals like the Soviet bloc. The global influence of major LDCs has decreased, although there is increased latitude for regional influence of some Third World powers like India and Pakistan, following their joining the nuclear club in May 1998.

Regarding rules and or norms as codified in international law, and the growing number of international regimes, these remain largely Euro/North American – centric, favouring the interests of the G-8 states. The elimination of the Soviet bloc, which sought to revise these rules of bipolarity has made it easier for the G-8 to impose its rules across the globe.

Global effects of the “new” world order: there are new global effects – some positive and others negative. We highlight these effects in the realms of war, economy and environment.

First, the dangers of world war and world nuclear war have receded and inter-state warfare has declined: what warfare remains is largely in the former USSR and the Third World.

Intra-state conflict, civil and revolutionary is rising in Eurasia and the Third World. What warfare exists is increasingly bloody due to continued advanced weapons proliferation.

Second, in the realm of economy, as security issues diminish, the economic dimension of international relations is rising in importance. Economic interdependence and integration is growing among the northern states with rising trade and investment, managed by regular G-8 conferences. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) states are experiencing economic growth and increased prosperity.

Conversely, the majority of Third World states are having difficulties developing and are becoming even further marginalized, dependent and disadvantaged by an international economy structured to benefit the North. Virtually every international economic trend is unfavourable for most LDCs, and the G-8 states, preoccupied with domestic concerns, are not in a position to improve international economic reforms or to sufficiently boost funding for foreign aid to ameliorate the plight of most LDCs. The most severely affected LDCs are in Africa and Latin America. The most favourable prospects are in some East Asian and South - East Asia LDCs.

Third, environmentally, when scientific consensus is reached about global environmental crises, the G-8 powers initiate new environmental regimes, as they did for ozone layer. Otherwise, these states are reluctant to make the difficult financial and political decisions to arrest environmental decay. With exceptions, therefore, the global environment is continuing to deteriorate.

The Middle Developed Countries (MDCs) have the financial resources and technology to reduce some of the domestic effects of environmental decay. However, most LDCs have more pressing problems to attend to resulting in pronounced environmental decline which harms long-term economic development.

In sum, at the beginning of the twenty first century, the world consists of a small number of privileged, powerful states (those of the OECD) favoured by peace, prosperity, and some ecological quality and a much larger number of marginalized states in the Third World plagued by warfare, civil unrest, unstable governments, economic stagnation and environmental decay. Some states, of course, are in between.

Advantages of a "New" World Order for the US

We have so far suggested that the US is more advantaged than India in the "new world order". Generally, that is true, as it has been for centuries. However, more specifically, there are some new advantages and disadvantages for both states in the Post-Cold War World order that need to be examined. The question also arises whether either or both are better off in the "new" world order than in the old one. The following points demonstrate how the US stands to benefit substantially from the "new" world order.

First, the US is more secure now than in the past half a century without the threat of the USSR, the Soviet bloc, and nuclear warfare. As a result, Washington has the opportunity to reduce its Military Industrial Complex (MIC) and military budget and its foreign military commitment and interventions.

Second, without a global balance, the US can use force whenever it wants without fear of any devastating retaliation and can usually count on the UNSC legitimisation of its military action as in the Persian Gulf; and with greater cost sharing from allies in the UN forces, US can do the fighting, as in Somalia.

Third, if the US chooses to reduce its military expenditures and foreign deployment, it can concentrate on retooling its domestic economy, shrinking its budget deficit, mitigating its domestic ills, and improving its global economic competitive position.

Fourth, the US can remake Russia and former Soviet bloc countries in its own image, as it did with post-World War II Germany and Japan, turning them into long-term allies, short run dependents, and favourable market and investment outlets.

Fifth, Washington wields heightened influence over Third World states which no longer have the USSR as a balance, no longer can practice non-alignment in the Cold War context, and have little choice but to placate Washington. Former LDC revisionists, like Cuba, Libya, Syria, and Vietnam, must be more circumspect and moderate in their policies in order to please the US.

Sixth, without the bipolar system and anti-communist phobia, the US can adopt a more flexible, complete foreign policy to take better advantage of new opportunities. Its foreign policy process could also become more open and democratic which could restrain officials from some of the excesses of the past.

Disadvantages of a "New" World Order for the US

But the other side of the coin constitutes disadvantages for the US. There are also new costs and dangers for the US as are expounded in the following points:

First, US Security could be short-lived should the liberal experiment in Russia fail and the communist system or Cold War are renewed. There is high potential for civil conflict throughout Eurasia, as has occurred in Yugoslavia, and for inter-state warfare among the former Soviet republics with frequent calls for US, NATO or UN intervention.

Second, as the sole military superpower, there are heavy demands by governments and the UN on the US for military aid and armed force. Whether the US acts unilaterally, through NATO, or through the UN, Washington has to make difficult choices about when to render such aid. If Washington plays an extensive role as a global police official, it could become enmeshed in interminable, costly conflicts and would not be able to substantially curb its military expenditures, which in turn would harm its economy and exacerbate domestic ailments.

On the other hand, if Washington too often declines to exert military leadership and to use force, it could be seen as a paper tiger, be blamed for lack of leadership and political will, and lose its superpower status. The positions of a military superpower, then is not without its travail.

Beset by internal problems, the US could lack the will and resources to meet the expectations for military leadership. What could be the rule? US action in the Persian Gulf and Somalia or inaction in Bosnia?

Third, the US may have set a precedent in the Persian Gulf that requires governments to gain UNSC approval to use force other than for strict defensive purposes. This precedent may constrain the US from using force in the future, even in its own hemisphere.

Fourth, US force may also be largely irrelevant in the post-Cold War era where the main conflicts are economic, social, ethnic and environmental. All nuclear weapons in the world cannot solve the problems of global debt, refugees, the greenhouse effect, or, for that matter, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

Fifth, if G-8 competitors like Japan and Germany should feel less need for the US security umbrella, the US would lose a major source of influence over them. In the past, the US has been able to trade the continuation of its security umbrella for concessions on other issues from its allied competitors.

Sixth, indeed, as economic, social and environmental issues become more pronounced, US power could significantly recede. In these areas, the US must share power with other G-8 states, especially Germany, Japan, France and Britain as well as with financial non-state actors and petty NGOs. The more these issues are important, the less the US can lay claim to preponderant power. The US has increasingly discovered that power is not fungible; its military power cannot easily be transferred into corresponding influence on these other dimensions of international relations.

Seventh, the far more complex international context could be fuddle US diplomatic officials used to simplistic, stereotypic thinking in a dichotomous bipolar world. On balance, the US is in a position to accrue greater benefits than costs from the post-Cold War world order.

This is particularly the case if the US limits its military activities and expenditures and uses the savings to rebuild its economy, and Washington creatively and skilfully takes advantage of the new opportunities for influence.

Advantages of a "New" World Order for India

The "new" world order offers a mixture of advantages and disadvantages to a middle developed country and a major Third World power like India. With the end of bipolarity, of Cold War conflict in Afghanistan, and of India's close ties to the former USSR, India stands to reap several benefits.

First, Pakistan has become less important geo-strategically to the US and its allies, despite Pakistani's joining the nuclear club. On the other hand, India is becoming more important to the US and its allies. Apart from becoming a nuclear state, India's assets, such as its large land mass, population, market potential, dynamic economy and democracy, reinforce its value over Pakistan to the G-8 countries. As such, India can gain more favoured treatment from these governments than it has in the past.

Second, Pakistan's smaller geo-strategic importance, coupled with its human rights violations and nuclear programme, have resulted in a decline in US military aid to Islamabad which is improving the regional balance of power for India.

Third, the irritations in US- India relations caused by bipolarity and India's close ties to the former USSR have been removed which should enable more amicable relations between these two governments. Although India's becoming a nuclear state irritated the US, this was a temporary affair as India stands to be even more respected by the US following its new status as a nuclear power in South Asia.

Fourth, without close ties to the Soviet Union, and with its new status as a nuclear power, India's relations with China could improve as both countries now have deterrence capability in terms of possible aggression from either side.

Fifth, following its joining the nuclear club, there is now greater acceptance of India's role as a regional power. Indeed, should the system move toward multipolarity, South Asia may not fall into any clear sphere of influence, which could make India, as the regional power, one of the main poles of the world system.

Sixth, India can upgrade the technological quality of its weapons by inexpensively purchasing advanced weapons from Russia and the former Soviet republics. This is already happening.

Seventh, if India desires, it can attract more foreign investment and imports of high technological products from OECD countries with their diminished fear that the technology can leak to the former Soviet bloc.

Eighth, India is well positioned to capture a chunk of a growing consumer market in the former Soviet Union. Further, if talks to increase free trade succeed, India could be able to carve out more areas of comparative advantage and to boost its export performance in the world economy.

Ninth, the North-South relationship has replaced the East-West conflict as a major dimension of international relations. As a leading Third World power, India has greater opportunity for increased leadership, status and influence in the Third World, and to serve as a key negotiator for the South with the North.

Tenth, the growing importance of the environment on the global agenda provides India and other high population, large land mass, Industrial LDCs with a new course of power against the G-8. They can employ environmental coercion, as India and Brazil successfully did, to create an environmental aid fund as part of the new ozone regime.

Disadvantages of a "New" World Order for India

Despite these benefits, there are important costs of the post-Cold War world order for India.

First, the policy of non-alignment shaped by India to improve its foreign latitude and influence vis-à-vis the major powers has become less useful in the post-bipolar world. As a result, India's global foreign policy options, allows no room to manoeuvre, and power resources have become more limited. India, therefore, needs to rethink its policy of non-alignment and shift it to the realm of international economics with the idea of using it to foster North-South dialogue.

Second, India no longer has the Soviet Union available as a balance against Pakistan, China or the G-8. For reasons stated earlier, New Delhi may have less need for a balance against Pakistan or China, but now India is more at the mercy of the G-8. It has, therefore, to placate the G-8 states.

Third, the strengthening of UNSC over the General Assembly has diminished Indian power in the UN since it is not a permanent member of the Security Council and has less

influence there than in the other UN bodies. Should India continue its economic liberalization and export-oriented development strategy, then it must operate in an international capitalist economy that is stronger than ever and discriminates against most Third World countries.

As already noted, there are opportunities for India to find profitable riches in the World economy, especially if free trade grows. The danger, however, is that it could be difficult for India to avoid increased dependence and the foreign exploitation of its resources and labour. As free trade grows, greater pressure on India to open its economy further to foreign investment awaits it. Some of India's most promising economic sectors could be bought by foreign TNCs with adverse effects. Foreign goods could flood India and destroy domestic business, increasing unemployment and poverty. It is not certain that the liberal, export-oriented developmental model demanded by the G-8 and the Bretton Woods Institutions can enhance Indian development. Although India's middle and upper classes may benefit, the masses of India could be harmed.

Fourth, as India becomes more enmeshed in the world economy, its upper classes could form closer links with counterparts in the North, thereby reinforcing the elite/mass gap and dual economy in India.

In conclusion, therefore, it is important to observe that the majority of Third World countries are already losing more than they gain from the "new" world order. In contrast, India is positioned to benefit quite a bit, especially on the regional and Third World coalition levels. These advantages, however, could be offset by new costs at the global level with regard to more limited foreign policy options and room to manoeuvre and by the danger that India would be unable to resist the exploitative features of the world economy.

India stands better chances in a multipolar than in a unipolar system because its foreign policy latitude and global influence would grow, and in a system with stronger non-state actors and enhanced UN authority because India can exert more power over the North in transnational institutions than in state relations.

However, the G-8 powers, led by the US are preventing changes in the international system that can diminish their power relative to that of the Third World states. Thus, while Indian benefits exceed its losses from the Post-Cold War world order, the US stands to gain proportionately much more than India from a world order that is shaped to serve the interests of the G-8 governments which have more power today than in the past half a century to impose their will across the globe.

Notes

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6. P. Godfrey Okoth, "The Collapse of Socialist Regimes in Eastern Europe". Paper presented at the 9th Mawazo Workshop, Makerere University, May 9, 1992, p.10.
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8. Ibid.
9. M. Gorbachev, *Perestroika - New Thinking for Our Country and the World*. New York: Harper and Row, 1987. R. Sakwa, *Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1985-1990*. New York: London Philip Allan, 1990.
10. Slovo, "Has Socialism Failed?" p.33.
11. K. Marx, *Capital*, (Vol., 1 Part VII). New York, 1967. Marx used the term primitive accumulation to describe the original process of capitalist accumulation which he maintained, was not the result of abstinence but rather of acts (including brigandage) such as the expropriation of the peasantry as happened during the British Enclosures. Thus, the term is here used to describe the arbitrary measures taken against the Soviet Peasantry to forcibly enclose them into collectiveness, rather than Preobrazhensky's "primitive socialist accumulation" involving the expropriation of resources from the better-off classes to generate capital for socialist industrial development.
12. Slovo, "Has Socialism Failed", p.33.
13. P. Godfrey Okoth, "Socialism in the Twenty First Century". Seminar paper KUSP/8/1997/89 presented in the department of History, Kenyatta University, May 28, 1998, p.7.
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The Cold War period witnessed competition from political, economic, ideological, diplomatic, military and social dimensions between the United States of America (USA), and the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In the superpower rivalries, India and Africa were adversely affected in many ways. The situation did not change for the better in the post-Cold War period, which has witnessed the domination of the world by the US and its allies, the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized countries. This domination has been characterized by the process of Americanization of the world, otherwise termed globalization, in virtually all spheres of life.

USA, India, Africa During and After the Cold War demonstrates that both the United States and the Soviet Union used African States, India and other Third World countries for their own geopolitical considerations; that the foreign policy and foreign relations of the US were meant to subject Africa and India to the dictates of US imperialism. The book assesses the impact of the Cold War and the post-Cold War order on Africa, India and the entire world and argues that the Non Aligned Movement is still relevant to the Third World countries despite the demise of the Cold War. The book analyses issues from the African point of view as opposed to hitherto Western view points but provides a balanced appreciation of the complex forces that shape foreign policies and foreign relations globally. It is a valuable contribution to modern diplomatic history and targets university students, researchers, foreign affairs ministries, and practising diplomats.

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